Episodes

1d ago

After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim . The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim " is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol , again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items ( kodashim ). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut ; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.

2d ago

If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the resulting food assumes the status of the more stringent offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. Although this law is presented in the context of the sin offering, a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 7:37 which juxtaposes various types of offerings, teaches that this principle applies to all sacrifices. Each offering mentioned in that verse serves to transmit a particular law to the others. A braita quoted in the name of Rabbi Akiva derives the law of foods cooked together from the word ' mincha ' in that verse, since the same rule appears in the context of the meal offerings in Vayikra 6:11. The sin offering in the verse, however, is used to teach other laws. While the braita derives three laws from the sin offering - that it cannot be purchased with second tithe money, must be offered during the day, and that all actions must be performed with the right hand - the Gemara limits this to two, and possibly even to one, since the other laws are taught explicitly regarding different offerings. Rava raises two questions concerning blood on a garment: one about the Temple laws of laundering blood from a sin offering, and the other about chatzitza (interposition) in the mikveh. He resolves the first question, but the second remains unanswered. The Mishna lists cases where kohanim do not receive a portion of the meat. If they are unable to perform the sacrifice due to impurity or similar disqualifications, they cannot receive a share. However, blemished kohanim, though not permitted to sacrifice the sacrifices, but are nevertheless entitled to receive a portion of the meat.

3d ago

Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis disagree about whether merika and shetifa of metal utensils that were used for cooking sacrificial meat are necessary daily during the holidays, or whether on the holidays one also needs to perform it only after the holiday ends. What is the basis of Rabbi Tarfon's position to be lenient on the holiday? The time for performing merika and shetifa is after the time for eating the sacrifice has passed. From where is this derived? Rebbi and the Rabbis disagree about whether merika and shetifa are both done with cold water, or whether merika is with hot water and shetifa with cold. Even according to Rebbi, who holds that both are with cold water, one would still be required beforehand to boil the pot with hot water to remove the taste of the meat that has now become notar, left beyond the time the sacrifice can be eaten. If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the food takes on the status of the more severe offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. This law is only applicable if flavor is imparted. The details of this law are analyzed. A question is asked: why does the positive commandment to eat sacrificial meat not override the negative commandment not to eat disqualified meat? Rava answers that this principle does not apply in the Temple. Rav Ashi answers that there is both a negative and a positive commandment not to eat the meat, which is why the positive commandment to eat it does not override. The verse relating to this law is mentioned in the context of the sin offering. From the verse in Vayikra 7:37, which mentions various different offerings, the sages learned that the laws of each type apply to all the other types as well. From the sin offering in that verse, they derive that this law applies to all sacrifices. What is derived from the other words in that verse?

4d ago

The Gemara raises two difficulties with the conclusion that earthenware vessels can be koshered by placing fire inside them. First, why does the Torah command that earthenware vessels in which sanctified meat was cooked must be broken, if they could simply be put into a kiln? The answer given is that kilns could not be used in Jerusalem, as they would blacken the walls and mar the beauty of the city. Second, why were the Temple ovens made of metal if earthenware ovens could have been used and koshered? The assumption behind this question is flawed, since the ovens needed to serve as a sanctified vessel in certain cases (such as the two loaves on Shavuot and the showbread), and sanctified vessels cannot be made of earthenware. Rav Yitzchak bar Yehuda left the study hall of Rami bar Hama and joined that of Rav Sheshet. Rami bar Hama was offended, assuming Rav Yitzchak sought greater honor. Rav Yitzchak explained that he had not received satisfactory answers from Rami bar Hama, who relied on logical reasoning rather than tannaitic sources. Rami bar Hama challenged Rav Yitzchak to send him a question, promising to answer with a tannaitic source. Rav Yitzchak asked about merika and shtifa (scouring and rinsing) of a vessel in which only part was used for cooking sacrificial items: does the entire vessel require cleansing, or only the part that was used? Rami bar Hama answered logically that only the part used requires cleansing, as in the case of blood on clothing. Rav Yitzchak rejected this reasoning and cited a braita proving the opposite, thereby refuting Rami bar Hama completely. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the requirement of merika and shtifa applies to both kodshei kodashim and kodashim kalim , or only to kodshei kodashim . From where do they derive this distinction? They both agree that merika and shtifa do not apply to truma . The Gemara raises a challenge to this from a braita, and three answers are offered.

5d ago

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita , urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva ( rok tafel ). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa , whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim . Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip ( kutach ). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

6d ago

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term " beged ." Rabbi Yehuda understands " beged " to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara . The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.

Dec 16

Study Guide Rami bar Hama asks Rav Chisda whether blood that splashes onto a garment already impure requires laundering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua explains that the question hinges on whether laundering is unnecessary only when impurity and disqualification occur sequentially, or even when they occur simultaneously. Rav Chisda connects the issue to a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis regarding the status of mei chatat that became impure, as interpreted by Abaye. To clarify Abaye's understanding, the Gemara presents a broader disagreement among Raba, Abaye, and Rava about the nature of the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis. A braita teaches that only blood fit for sprinkling requires laundering, excluding blood already disqualified. Rabbi Akiva rules that blood which had a moment of fitness and was later disqualified does require laundering, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that disqualified blood never requires it. The Mishna rules that blood splashed from the neck of the animal, or from the altar's corner or base, does not require laundering, nor does blood spilled on the floor and later gathered, since only blood received in a vessel and fit for sprinkling requires laundering. Two braitot are cited to demonstrate how these laws are derived from verses in the Torah. The Gemara further clarifies that the requirement of being "capable of sprinkling" excludes cases where less than the requisite measure was received in each vessel. Rava explains that this principle is rooted in a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 4:6. After presenting several drashot on the different words of that verse, the Gemara analyzes them both in relation to one another - explaining why each was necessary - and in relation to other statements. The Mishna continues with blood splashed on the hide: before flaying it does not require laundering, but after flaying it does. Rabbi Elazar limits laundering to the place of the blood and only where the material is susceptible to impurity. A braita extends laundering obligations to garments, sackcloth, and hides, and specifies that laundering, breaking of earthenware vessels, and rinsing of copper vessels must all be performed in a sacred place. Laundering is a stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other kodshei kodashim .

Dec 15

Shmuel holds that, according to Rabbi Akiva, wine may be brought as a voluntary offering, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, a braita records that Rabbi Akiva maintained the wine was poured into cups at the top of the altar, which raises a difficulty for Shmuel's position. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon, while the braita reflects Rabbi Yehuda's view regarding whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome ( davar sh'aino mitkaven ). In this case, pouring wine on the altar partially extinguishes the fire, which is forbidden by Torah law, though the intention is not to extinguish it. A further difficulty is raised: Shmuel himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda in prohibiting extinguishing a wood coal found in the public domain. This is resolved by distinguishing between the two cases. Shmuel aligns with Rabbi Shimon regarding davar she'eino mitkaven (an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibited action), but with Rabbi Yehuda regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa (performing a forbidden action not for its typical purpose). If the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on a garment before the blood is presented on the altar, that garment requires laundering in the Azara . This applies both to sin offerings brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner altar, but not to bird sin offerings. This distinction is derived from a drasha on Vayikra 6:18, which both expands and limits the law. Why are bird offerings excluded while inner sin offerings are included? Three answers are given. Two questions were asked about bird sin offerings. The answer to the second was supplied from a braita related to this topic, but ultimately both questions remain unresolved. Levi asked whether blood that transferred from one garment to another also requires laundering. Rebbi answers that it does and explains the reasoning.

Dec 14

If one sacrifice is more frequent ( tadir ), but another is more sanctified, which takes precedence? Three cases are brought from the first Mishna of the chapter (Zevachim 89) to prove that frequency takes precedence, but each is rejected in the same manner. A Mishna relating to the order of blessings in kiddush and a statement of Rabbi Yochanan are also cited to support the principle of frequency, but these too are rejected. Finally, an inference is drawn from the Mishna in Zevachim 90, which implies that if a peace offering and a guilt or sin offering were before the kohen, and both were from that day, the guilt or sin offering would take precedence - even though peace offerings are more common. To reject this proof, Rava distinguishes between "frequent" and "common." Rav Huna challenges Rava's distinction from a source about brit mila and Pesach , where brit mila is considered tadir . His difficulty, however, is resolved in two possible ways. Another question arises: if a less frequent sacrifice is slaughtered first and then they realize their error, should someone mix the blood (to prevent coagulation) while the more frequent sacrifice is offered first, or should they complete the one already begun? Four sources are brought to address this issue (three of which were also cited earlier), but all attempts are rejected. In the Mishna, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Tarfon disagree about whether oil can be offered in the Temple as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, who permits it, only a kmitza (handful) is burned on the altar, while the remainder is given to the kohanim to eat. Rabbi Zeira supports Shmuel's view from the Mishna, while Abaye presents an alternative opinion: that a voluntary oil offering is burned in its entirety, also citing proof from the Mishna. A Tosefta raises a difficulty for Shmuel, but it is resolved. The Gemara then suggests that this is a tannaitic debate; after an attempt to refute the suggestion, it is upheld. Regarding wine, there is likewise a debate about whether it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Akiva, it may be offered, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, this raises the issue of partially extinguishing the altar's fire, which is forbidden by Torah law. Others maintain that the wine is poured into the cups at the top of the altar. The Gemara concludes that this debate parallels the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda (usually in the context of melacha on Shabbat) about whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome.

Dec 12

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim , parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir , differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma , which would then require burning.

Dec 12

Study Guide There are two general principles employed by the Mishna to determine the order of precedence among sacrifices: A sacrifice offered more frequently takes priority. A sacrifice of greater sanctity takes priority. The Mishna elaborates on which sacrifices are considered more frequent and which are deemed more sanctified. In its discussion of sanctity, it emphasizes the unique attributes of each type of sacrifice and provides examples illustrating the precedence of one sacrifice over another. However, certain situations are not explicitly addressed, and the Gemara raises questions about the law in those cases, attempting to infer the answers from the Mishna's examples. The Gemara further examines each ruling of precedence in the Mishna, suggesting that the order could, in fact, be reversed. In every instance, the Gemara explains why the Mishna chose its particular order and not the alternative.

Dec 11

The Gemara makes one final attempt to answer the question of whether the airspace of the altar can sanctify disqualified items just as the altar does. The attempt is rejected. The Mishna teaches that liquid sacred vessels sanctify liquids, and vessels used for dry ingredients sanctify dry items. Liquid vessels cannot sanctify dry items, nor vice versa. If sacred vessels are punctured, they only sanctify if they can still perform their original function and remain whole. All sanctification occurs only within the Azara . Shmuel limits the first ruling of the Mishna to measuring utensils, but bowls and similar items can sanctify even dry ingredients. His proof is a verse regarding flour mixed with oil that was placed into a bowl generally used for liquids (Bamidbar 7:13). Rav Acha questions this proof since flour mixed with oil is not exactly a solid, and Shmuel provides two possible answers. Shmuel further rules that sacred vessels sanctify only when they are whole, filled with the entire amount needed for the offering, and can only sanctify items from within. Variants of this teaching differ slightly, as one version reads "from inside the Azara " instead of "from within the vessel" and another includes both. The difference between two of these versions is whether overflow is sanctified. Rabbi Yohanan qualifies the ruling that if there is not a complete amount, the item inside will not be sanctified. He explains that this applies only when there was no intent to reach the full amount, but if one intends to add enough to reach the requisite measure, each portion becomes sanctified as it is placed inside. A braita is brought to support this. Rav or Rav Asi qualifies the Mishna's ruling that dry vessels do not sanctify liquids and vice versa. This applies to sanctification for offering on the altar, but they are sanctified to the extent that the contents can become disqualified. Some say his statement was made regarding a different braita about meal offerings brought from orla and diverse kinds. A braita teaches that damaged sacred vessels cannot be repaired by melting or patching. Similarly, knives with defects cannot be sharpened to remove the blemish, and if a blade slips out, it cannot be reattached. This ruling reflects the principle that there is "no poverty in a place of affluence," referring to the Temple as a place of affluence. Abba Shaul recalls a defective knife in the Temple that was buried so that is would not be used. Another braita, based on the same principle, explains that the clothes of the kohanim must be woven, not stitched, and if they become soiled, they cannot be washed with cleaning agents such as natron or soap. Abaye clarifies that they can be laundered if only mildly dirty, but if cleaning them would require agents, they cannot be cleaned even with water alone. Some say they may never be washed at all. A braita describes the kohen gadol's robe as entirely blue, with hem decorations resembling unopened pomegranates and children's buttons. Bells were attached, either seventy‑two in total or thirty‑six according to differing opinions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson notes that this dispute parallels disagreements about the number of shades in leprous afflictions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson explains that the Torah juxtaposes sacrifices with priestly garments to teach that just as sacrifices atone, so too do the garments. Each garment corresponds to atonement for a specific sin: the tunic for murder, the pants for sexual immorality, the turban for arrogance, the belt for improper thoughts, the breastplate for judicial errors, the ephod for idolatry, the robe for lashon hara , and the tzitz for brazenness. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who taught that murder and lashon hara have no atonement through sacrifices, only through other means - egla arufa for murder and ketore t , incense, for slander. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between situations: when the murderer is known, the tunic atones; when unknown, the egla arufa atones. Regarding lashon hara , they distinguish between public lashon hara , which is atoned by the robe with its bells, and private lashon hara , atoned by the ketoret , which is offered in the sanctuary, a private space.

Dec 10

Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul . Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

Dec 9

According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

Dec 8

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara . Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim , which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim . This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Dec 7

Study Guide In the dispute among the five Tannaim regarding which items remain on the altar even if they have become invalid, Reish Lakish points out cases where there is a practical halakhic difference between the various opinions. According to the Gemara, his novelty lies in one specific case, where he wanted to emphasize that Rabbi Shimon still maintains his position in a case of libations that accompany the sacrifice but were not brought on the same day the sacrifice was offered. There is also a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding which types of disqualifications fall under the rule of "if they have ascended [the altar], they do not descend." The Gemara cites a braita that explains the textual basis for their respective opinions.

Dec 5

Study Guide Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim - is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in? Or taken out and brought to the altar and then back to the parochet ? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree regarding sacrifices whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary. Is the offering disqualified merely by the act of bringing the blood inside, or only if the blood is actually presented on the altar? The Gemara cites sources for each opinion and explains the underlying basis of their debate. Rabbi Yehuda rules that blood brought into the Sanctuary accidentally is exempt from disqualification. But what would he say if the blood was brought in intentionally, would it be disqualified only if it was presented? Rabbi Yirmia introduces a braita to address this question. Items that are disqualified are not meant to be placed on the altar. Yet if they are placed there, the altar sanctifies them and they must remain. However, there is a tannaitic dispute regarding which types of items are not removed once placed on the altar. Five different opinions are presented, and the Gemara explores the reasoning behind each of these views and why they disagree.

Dec 5

Study Guide There are varying opinions on several issues relating to blood that is meant to be brought on the outer altar but becomes disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. From what verse is this derived? Does it apply to all sacrifices, or only to sin offerings? And does it apply only if one actually sprinkled the blood there, and not merely by walking inside with the blood? If the blood of one sin offering is placed in two cups, and one is brought outside or one is brought into the Sanctuary, is the other cup (that remains in the Azara) disqualified? Rabbi Yosi HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree. Rabbi Yosi presents logical arguments to counter the Rabbis' position, while the Rabbis respond with verses from the Torah. It is also forbidden to bring the blood of sin offerings into the Kodesh HaKodashim , as this too is derived from a verse in the Torah. Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin-offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim , is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in?

Dec 4

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila ) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

Dec 3

Study Guide When different bloods are mixed together, how are they brought on the altar? If both sacrifices require the same number of placements, that number is performed, with the assumption that the blood placed on the altar represents a combination of both offerings. However, if the mixture includes blood from a sacrifice requiring one placement and another requiring four, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree on the proper procedure. Why does the Mishna introduce the case of blood from blemished animals mixed with valid blood, when it has already discussed a similar case regarding limbs of blemished animals mixed with valid limbs? The Gemara then cites a Mishna in Parah 9:1, which deals with waters of the red heifer that became mixed with ordinary water. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis dispute whether such water can be used, and if so, in what manner. Three possible explanations are offered to clarify Rabbi Eliezer's position. The Gemara proceeds to challenge these explanations: first, a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's interpretation, which remains unresolved. Then, five difficulties are posed against Rav Ashi's explanation, drawn from various braitot and our Mishna. Each of these is resolved through the method of ukimta , limiting the ruling to specific circumstances. Finally, one additional difficulty is raised later in the sugya, which remains unresolved.

Dec 2

A contradiction between the Mishna in Mikvaot 10:6, which seems to be Rabbi Yehuda's position anrules according to majority, and Rabbi Yehuda in the braita, who follows appearance, is resolved in two ways. Abaye suggests that in the braita, where the position is stricter, Rabbi Yehuda is quoting Rabban Gamliel, who was known for his stringency in cases of nullification, as he did not allow nullification at all in mixtures of the same type ( min b'mino ). Rava, however, explains that the more lenient opinion in Mikvaot refers to a case where only the outside of the cup was impure. By Torah law, the mikveh waters need only pass over the rim, not fill the cup. Since the requirement to fill the cup is rabbinic, there is room for leniency. Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Reish Lakish regarding pigul and notar that became mixed together. He holds that just as mitzvot do not nullify one another, prohibitions likewise do not nullify each other. This principle is based on Hillel, who would eat matza and maror together on Pesach to fulfill the commandment that they be eaten simultaneously. If mitzvot could nullify one another, the strong taste of the maror would cancel the taste of the matza , preventing fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza in that manner. Regarding min b'mino , a mixture of the same type, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis as to whether it can be nullified. A similar debate appears in the Tosefta Taharot 5:3 between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis in a case of a shard that absorbed urine: can it be purified by soaking or rinsing in urine? In the Mishna, there is also a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blood mixed with problematic blood. The question arises: does Rabbi Eliezer disagree in both cases - disqualified blood and dam hatamtzit (the blood that flows from inside the animal) - or only in the latter case? The Mishna explores various scenarios of blood mixtures and clarifies where Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis differ.

Dec 1

The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of sacrificial blood is present in a mixture with other bloods, it may still be sprinkled on the altar. By contrast, if the blood is mixed with disqualified blood, such as the blood that flows after the initial spurt of slaughter, the mixture must be spilled and cannot be used. Rabbi Eliezer permits it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, limits the Mishna's ruling to a case where another substance spilled into the blood. But if blood dripped into water, each drop would be nullified upon contact, immediately rejected from altar service. Once rejected, it cannot later be accepted, even if the majority of the final mixture is blood. This principle of "rejection" applies only to kodashim, not to mitzvot such as the commandment to cover the blood after slaughter. Reish Lakish rules regarding a mixture of pigul and notar : if one eats them together, there is no punishment of lashes. From this, the Gemara derives three principles about mixtures: (1) even forbidden items can nullify one another; (2) the rule that an item imparting taste is considered significant and not nullified is not a Torah law; (3) a warning given in a case of doubt ( hatra'at safek ) is not considered a valid warning. A difficulty is raised against the second principle. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve it, the derivation is rejected. Reish Lakish was speaking of pigul and notar involving two similar items, i.e. meat and meat, which are nullified by majority since their taste is indistinguishable. Taste is only a factor when dissimilar items are mixed, where the flavor is perceptible. The Gemara then questions: if similar items are nullified by majority, why does the Mishna, in the case of wine and blood, assess whether the wine would be noticeable if it were water? Since both taste and visibility rely on the same concept, it seems the Mishna treats two similar items as if they were different. If so, why not apply the same reasoning to Reish Lakish's case of pigul and notar , viewing them as distinct, and if they impart taste, liability should follow? After one failed attempt to reinterpret the Mishna, the Gemara resolves the difficulty differently: there is a tannaitic dispute. The Mishna reflects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, while Reish Lakish follows the rabbis. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from a Mishna Mikvaot 10:6. To explain it, one must assume the Mishna is authored by Rabbi Yehuda, since it employs the principle of "we view the item as if…". Yet at the end of the Mishna, purification waters are nullified in a mikveh if the mikveh waters are the majority. This stands in opposition to Rabbi Yehuda's stance that similar items are treated as different and are not nullified based on appearance.

Nov 30

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim . Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

Nov 28

Four difficulties are raised against Rava's explanation of Rabbi Shimon—that he permits sanctified items to be potentially disqualified only after the fact, but not ab initio. Most of these challenges are resolved, though not all. In the fourth difficulty, the case of the leper's guilt offering is discussed. The Gemara then seeks to clarify how the log of oil is brought in the case of a leper when sacrifices have become intermingled.

Nov 28

If sacrifices of the same type become intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are offered for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in cases where smicha is required, how can the sacrifice be brought, since one cannot perform smicha on another's offering? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha . Men's sacrifices, by contrast, would not be offered; instead, they would be left to graze until they developed a blemish and then sold, with new animals purchased for the altar. Abaye raises a difficulty from a braita that discusses public and individual sacrifices that became mixed both before and after slaughter and were nevertheless offered. Since public sacrifices are brought by men, the braita must also be referring to individual sacrifices brought by men. Rava resolves this by reinterpreting the braita, noting a difficulty in its plain reading. He explains that it refers only to a case where the blood of the animals was mixed after slaughter, and not to intermingling of live animals. In the braita cited by Abaye, Rebbi rules that if the blood of two animals was mixed in one cup, the kohen may combine the sprinkling for both sacrifices, but only if there is enough blood for each. A difficulty is raised against Rebbi from another braita in which he quotes Rabbi Eliezer regarding the red heifer purification waters, where no minimum amount is required for sprinkling. The same should apply to blood. Two answers are offered: either the purification waters differ from blood, or Rebbi was not stating his own view but merely quoting Rabbi Eliezer. Rami bar Hama poses two questions concerning a firstborn animal that became blemished. Rabbi Yosi bar Zevida attempts to answer from the Mishna about firstborns intermingled with other sacrifices, but his answer is rejected. The Mishna states that only sin and guilt offerings cannot be intermingled, since their differences are identifiable. The Gemara considers whether other offerings might also fall into this category, but all such suggestions are rejected. If a guilt offering becomes mixed with a peace offering, they are offered according to the stricter requirements of the two. This could potentially cause sanctified items to be disqualified. Rabbi Shimon does not have an issue with this, but the rabbis disagree and do not allow it. Rava limits Rabbi Shimon's ruling to a post facto situation and does not permit it ab initio.

Nov 27

In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item. Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika —two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty. Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate. Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma . The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies. Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma , but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue. The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given. If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha .

Nov 26

Two additional answers are offered to explain why, in the Mishna, the animal is not nullified among the others if one follows Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that only items sold exclusively by unit are not nullified in a mixture. The first answer is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a litra of dried figs, teaching that items sometimes sold individually are not nullified. The second answer is that live animals are considered significant and therefore cannot be nullified. The Gemara continues to ask why animals designated for sacrifices, when intermingled with an animal forbidden for benefit, are all left to die. It suggests resolving the issue through the laws of probability: one could remove an animal at a time and assume each emerged from the majority of permitted animals. The difficulty is that, according to halakhic rules of probability, this only applies once an animal has already been separated, allowing us to presume it came from the majority. But if the animals remain fixed and one is taken directly from the group, the law treats it as either permitted or forbidden (50/50), with no majority to rely upon. The Gemara further proposes creating a situation where the animals scatter from their fixed location, so they are no longer considered fixed, and each could then be assumed to come from the majority. Rava offers three explanations why this solution fails, the first two of which are rejected. The final answer is that, although theoretically possible, it was prohibited by decree, lest people apply the same reasoning in cases where the animals remain fixed. Rava concludes that since the animal is not nullified by rabbinic decree, if any of the animals in the mixture are sacrificed on the altar, they do not achieve atonement, and a new sacrifice must be brought. Rav Huna raises a difficulty with this explanation based on two Mishnayot in Kinnim 1:2 and 3:1. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rava holds live animals and birds can be rejected from the altar, whereas the Mishna rules that they cannot.

Nov 25

Study Guide After comparing the Mishna in Zevachim with a parallel Mishna in Temurah, the Gemara explains that the Mishna in Zevachim was included to emphasize that even an item prohibited outside the Temple — since it is forbidden for benefit altogether — will not be nullified and must be left to die. This, however, raises a difficulty, as such a principle could seemingly be derived from a Mishna in Avodah Zarah. The resolution is that the Mishna in Avodah Zarah does not deal with items designated for the altar. Therefore, if only that Mishna existed, one might assume that for sacrificial purposes, the laws of nullification would apply, so as not to destroy offerings. Conversely, if only the Mishna in Zevachim were taught, one might think the stringency applies specifically because these items are inherently despicable and unfit for the altar, whereas in non-Temple contexts, nullification might still be valid. According to Torah law, when permitted and forbidden items are intermingled, the forbidden items are nullified if the permitted ones form the majority. Yet there are exceptions to this rule. Why, then, is an animal not nullified in the majority here? The Gemara first suggests that animals fall into the category of items sold individually, which are not nullified according to Rabbi Meir. This explanation aligns with Reish Lakish's reading of Rabbi Meir's position in Mishna Orlah 3:6–7, which includes items usually sold individually but occasionally sold otherwise. However, it does not fit Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation of Rabbi Meir, which applies only to items sold exclusively as individuals — a category that does not include animals, since they are sometimes sold in flocks.

Nov 24

This chapter addresses cases where different items become mixed together - sacrificial animals with other sacrificial animals, sacrificial animals with non-sacrificial ones, or valid offerings with disqualified ones. Each type of mixture is governed by distinct rules. If sacrificial animals are mixed with animals that are forbidden for benefit, such as an ox sentenced to death for goring, or a sin offering left to die because its owner passed away, for example, then all the animals in the mixture must be left to die. In these cases, the usual laws of nullification do not apply. If a sacrifice becomes mixed with animals that are prohibited for the altar but permitted for benefit, the animals are left to graze, then sold. The proceeds from the most valuable animal are used to purchase a replacement sacrifice. If a sacrifice is mixed with animals that were never designated as offerings, all the animals are sold for sacrifices of that type and offered on the altar with the intent of "whoever their owner is." If sacrifices of the same type are mixed, they are all offered on the altar with the same designation. However, if different types of sacrifices are mixed, for example, burnt offerings with peace offerings, the animals are left to graze until they develop blemishes. At that point, new animals of each type are purchased, equal in value to the most expensive animal in the group, at the expense of the owners. In cases where an animal is mixed with others designated for sacrifice that cannot be sold, such as firstborns or animal tithes, they are left to graze until blemished. The owner then redeems the sanctity of one animal (for the sacrifice) in the amount of the most expensive animal and uses that money to buy a new sacrifice. Once blemished, the original animals may be slaughtered and eaten like ordinary firstborns or tithes. The Mishna also notes a case where the laws of mixtures do not apply: sin offerings and guilt offerings cannot be brought from the same animals. Thus, if animals designated for sin offerings are mixed with those for guilt offerings, this is not considered a mixture, as it is clear which animal goes with which offering. The Gemara questions the Mishna's phrasing of "even one in ten thousand," clarifying that the case refers to a single ox that gored, becoming mixed with many sacrificial animals. The Gemara compares this Mishna with a parallel Mishna in Temurah and then another in Avodah Zarah, questioning why each is needed. It concludes that every text contributes a distinct detail that cannot be fully derived from the others.

Nov 23

Study Guide How does Rabbi Yehuda counter the difficulties raised by Rav Shizbi? First, the Gemara shows that he derives the rulings of Rav Shizbi (that both the verses on a dead bird and the cheilev of an animal only apply to kosher birds/animals differently. Then, they bring three suggestions on how to explain the meaning of the word treifa in the verse regarding the cheilev . The first two suggestions are rejected. How does Rabbi Meir explain the three different verses - two for the impurity of a dead bird and the one for cheilev ? A braita is brought that derives some of the halakhot previously mentioned from the verses, that the cheilev ruling only applies to kosher animals and not to undomesticated animals. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether Rabbi Meir would hold that melika removes a bird from having impurity of a carcass in birds with blemishes or even birds not generally offered on the altar. This leads to Rabbi Yirmia asking if the same would be true if, instead of breaking the neck of a calf in the egla arufa ceremony, they broke the back of a goat?

Nov 21

The Gemara continues its discussion on whether melika performed by a non-kohen renders the bird a neveila , thereby imparting ritual impurity. Chizkiyah presents a ruling: if a non-kohen performs melika and the bird is subsequently placed on the altar, it is not removed. However, in a parallel case involving kmitza performed by a non-kohen, the offering would be removed. This raises the question - why is there a distinction between the two cases? A braita is cited to provide the Torah source for the Mishna's rulings regarding melika performed with the left hand, at night, and in other disqualifying circumstances. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether melika performed on a treifa bird (one with a fatal defect) prevents it from being considered a neveila . The Gemara examines the sources for their respective opinions. A verse concerning the prohibition of consuming the forbidden fats ( cheilev ) of a neveila or treifa is analyzed, challenging Rabbi Yehuda's proof text.

Nov 21

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Nov 18

Study Guide The Mishna, as in Chapter 2 (Zevachim 29b), outlines various scenarios in which a thought can, or cannot, render a sacrifice pigul , thereby making consumption of the meat punishable/not punishable by karet . Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with one of the rulings and maintains that if melika (the ritual slaughter of a bird) was performed with the intent to offer the blood beyond its designated time, and the blood was then squeezed with the intent to burn the flesh outside the Azara (Temple courtyard), the offering would be considered pigul . This is because, although the sacrifice was already disqualified for other reasons, the disqualification due to improper intent regarding time occurred first. A braita examines the verses concerning the bird burnt offering and derives several halakhot specific to this sacrifice: One who volunteers to bring this type of offering may bring only one bird. Melika must be performed by a kohen. Melika is not performed with a knife. Melika is performed at the top of the altar. Melika is done on the back of the bird's neck. The bird's head must be severed. All the blood must be squeezed out - none may remain. The blood is squeezed onto the upper part of the altar wall. There is a debate whether melika and the squeezing of the blood are performed on the sovev (the ledge surrounding the altar) or at its top. Another braita presents differing opinions regarding which parts of the bird are cast onto the beit hadeshen (the ash heap) and how those parts are removed. The bird is split in half - this is done by hand, as derived from a verse in Judges concerning Shimshon. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the tanna of our Mishna regarding a bird sin offering in which the kohen severs the head: is the offering thereby disqualified or not? Three interpretations are offered to explain the basis of their disagreement.

Nov 17

Three actions were performed at the bottom of the altar on the southwest side, as derived from verses in the Torah. The bird burnt offering was usually brought on the southeast side so that the kohen could be close to the beit hadeshen , where parts of the bird were discarded. Three actions were performed at the top of the altar on the southwest side, and the kohen performing the action would go directly there instead of walking around the altar entirely. The reason was to avoid damaging the items from the smoke rising at the top of the altar. The Mishna describes in detail how the bird sin offering was performed. A braita provides a source explaining why the blood of this offering was placed on the lower part of the altar and not the upper part, as is done with the animal sin offering and the bird burnt offering. Two different versions of how to perform melika are presented—one in the name of Rav and one from a braita. It was known to be one of the more difficult actions the kohen had to perform. Performing the kmitza on the meal offering and the chafina with the incense on Yom Kippur were also known to be challenging. The Mishna describes in detail how the bird burnt offering was performed. Some elements were similar to the sin offering, yet many differed. For example, the head was not severed in the sin offering, but was in the burnt offering. The entire bird was eaten by the kohanim in the sin offering, whereas the burnt offering was completely burned, aside from the parts tossed into the beit hadeshen (crop, feathers, and innards). Other differences include the laws regarding sacrificing with intent for the wrong type of offering. The sin offering is disqualified, as with animal offerings, while the burnt offering is not. Regular laws of pigul apply to both.

Nov 16

All ramps in the Temple had a slope of three cubits in length for every one cubit of height, except for the ramp of the altar, which had a gentler incline of three and five-ninths cubits. This was to accommodate the kohanim, who had to carry the animal body parts up to the top of the altar. The kmitza —a handful taken from the meal offering—could be performed anywhere within the Azara (Temple courtyard). The remainder of the offering was eaten by male kohanim, could be prepared in any manner, and was permitted to be eaten only on that day and the following night until midnight. Rabbi Elazar taught that if the kmitza was taken in the Heichal (Sanctuary), it was still valid. He compared it to the bowls of frankincense, since both are referred to with the term azkarata , and the frankincense is brought from inside the Sanctuary and burned outside. Rabbi Yirmia raised a challenge from a braita that seemed to imply the kmitza must be performed where the owner presents the offering—i.e., not in the Sanctuary, which is restricted to kohanim. However, two interpretations of that braita are offered, the first of which is rejected. Both explanations ultimately show that the braita was not intended to restrict the location of the kmitza , but rather to broaden it. Rabbi Yochanan ruled that peace offerings may be slaughtered in the Sanctuary. His reasoning was that since slaughtering may be done outside the Ohel Moed , it stands to reason that it may also be done inside. If the secondary location is valid, then certainly the primary one should be. A difficulty is raised from a braita concerning eating in the Sanctuary, which is prohibited, if not for a verse permitting it in unique circumstances. To resolve this, a distinction is made: slaughtering is a sacrificial rite, whereas eating is not. The bird sin offering is ideally performed on the lower half of the altar at the southwest corner, though it may be offered anywhere on the altar. Six actions were performed at the southwest corner—three on the lower half and three on the upper half of the altar. On the lower half: the bird sin offering, bringing the meal offering to the altar for kmitza , and pouring the remainder of the blood into the yesod (base). On the upper half: pouring the wine and water libations, and offering the bird burnt offering. When ascending the altar, people would typically go up the ramp on the right side, turn right at the top, begin at the southeast corner, and circle counter-clockwise around the altar before descending via the left side of the ramp. However, for the three actions performed on the upper southwest corner, they would ascend via the left side of the ramp to reach that spot directly, then turn around and descend from there after completing the task. The bird sin offering is brought at the southwest corner, a location derived from the placement of the meal offering. The meal offering's placement is itself derived from the verse in Vayikra 6:7.

Nov 14

Rav Yosef offers two additional explanations for why the altar in the Second Temple was constructed larger than the altar in the First Temple. When the Second Temple was built, how did they determine the correct location for the altar? Three explanations are brought. Which components of the altar are essential for carrying out sacrificial rites? The ramp of the altar was positioned on its southern side, measuring sixteen cubits in width and thirty-two cubits in length. Rav Huna cites a source to confirm that the ramp was indeed located in the south. A braita presents an alternative source from a statement by Rabbi Yehuda. There was a space between the altar and the ramp - the origin and function of this gap are clarified. If the ramp was thirty-two cubits long and the altar itself also measured thirty-two cubits in length, how does this align with the Mishna in Midot 5:2, which states that the total length was sixty-two cubits?

Nov 14

Sources Can kodshim kalim be eaten when there is no altar? Abaye proved from a braita of Rabbi Yishmael that they cannot be eaten. Rabbi Yirmia raised a difficulty against Abaye from a contradiction between braitot, resolving it in a way that one would conclude that kodshim kalim could be eaten even without an altar. However, Ravina provides an alternative resolution to the contradiction, and the Gemara brings another. Rav Huna says in the name of Rav that the altar in the Tabernacle of Shilo was made of stone. However, a difficulty is raised against this from a braita that explains that the fire of Moshe's copper altar continued until the time of Shlomo. They resolve it by saying that Rav Huna held by a different tannaitic opinion. Alternatively, one can explain that the fire could have still been on Moshe's altar, even though they were using the stone altar. If so, what was the fire used for? The Gemara suggests two possible answers. A Mishna is brought which says that the altar in the time of the Second Temple was expanded to be larger than the one in the First Temple, from 28x28 cubits to 32x32. Why? Rav Yosef suggests it was expanded as they needed more space. Ravin explained it based on a Mishna in Middot that described the addition of the shitin , two holes that were added for the libations.

Nov 13

In Zevachim 59, a difficulty was raised against Rav's position that a sacrifice slaughtered while the altar was damaged is disqualified. The contradiction came from a statement of Rav that incense could be burned even when the altar was removed. It was resolved by suggesting that just as Rava explained, Rabbi Yehuda distinguished between blood and burning (and required the altar for blood), so too Rav distinguished between blood and burning the incense (and required the altar to be complete for slaughtering and sprinkling the blood). Where did Rava make that statement? A lengthy argument between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is brought to provide background. Then a proof is offered for Rava's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda, based on Rabbi Yehuda's suggestion regarding the blood from the Paschal sacrifices that spilled on the floor, but the proof is rejected. Rabbi Elazar brings a source to derive the requirement for the altar to be complete to permit eating the remains of the meal offerings and other food of kodashim kodashim . Is a complete altar required for eating kodashim kalim ? Abaye brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael proving that the second tithe cannot be eaten in Jerusalem when there is no Temple. He first attempts to derive it from the firstborn by logical inference, but then derives it from a juxtaposition ( heikesh ). Abaye's explanation of Rabbi Yishmael leads to the understanding that kodashim kalim cannot be eaten when there is no altar. Rabbi Yirmia vehemently disagrees with Abaye, calling him a 'stupid Babylonian,' due to a contradiction between two braitot , which he resolves by differentiating between kodshai kodashim and kodashim kalim regarding this law.

Nov 12

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin ( kiyur ) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Nov 11

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya , the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Nov 10

Study Guide The bloods of the firstborn, maaser , and Pesach are only sprinkled once on the altar. This is derived from the fact that the word "saviv" - "around" the altar - appears in the context of the burnt, sin, and guilt offerings. One cannot learn from those cases to others, as details that appear two or three times cannot be used to establish a paradigm for a different case. Rabbi Tarfon taught that the firstborn can be eaten for two days and one night, as it is similar to the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagelili, on his first day in the Beit Midrash in Yavne, raised several difficulties with this comparison and likened it to a guilt and sin offering, which are eaten only for a day and night. When Rabbi Tarfon could no longer respond to the questioning, he left, and Rabbi Akiva took his place and said that in Vayikra 18:18, where the firstborn is compared to the thigh and breast given to the kohen, this is a juxtaposition between the firstborn and the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagellil responded that also the thigh and breast are given to the kohen in a thanksgiving offering which is eaten only for a day and night. Therefore, perhaps the comparison should be made to the thanksgiving offering instead. Rabbi Akiva was convinced by Rabbi Yosi that the comparison should be to the thanksgiving offering, but he found other words in the verse from which to derive an additional day. When Rabbi Yishmael heard about this, he engaged in a lengthy debate with Rabbi Akiva regarding his change of position—that the comparison is to the thanksgiving offering. Rabbi Yishmael argued that the law of the thigh and breast in the thanksgiving offering is derived by juxtaposition ( heikesh ), and the law about the firstborn is derived from the thigh and breast by juxtaposition, and one cannot derive a law from a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition. However, the Gemara explains that this juxtaposition is not typical: while the law of the thigh and breast is derived by juxtaposition, the time limitation is stated directly. The debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael centers on whether a law derived partially by juxtaposition and partially stated explicitly can serve as the basis for a juxtaposition to another law. The Gemara raises two difficulties with Rabbi Yishmael's position—one regarding the number of times the kohen gadol must sprinkle the blood of the bull and goat in the Sanctuary ( Heichal ) on Yom Kippur, and one regarding the amount of flour required for the loaves of matza that accompany the thanksgiving offering. Each of these laws is derived by means of a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition, along with something explicitly stated or derived by a gezeira shava . Each difficulty is resolved. The Mishna stated that the Pesach may be eaten only until midnight. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria, but Rabbi Akiva permits it until dawn. Each derives their opinion from a different verse.

Nov 9

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Judy and Jerel Shapiro for the marriage today of their son Oren Shapiro to Fay Gamliel of Toronto. "Mazal tov and may they build a Bayit Ne'eman b'Yisrael , and a bayit filled with love and peace!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff in loving memory of the 11 precious souls killed on the 18 of Cheshvan at Dor Hadash, New Light and Tree of Life in Pittsburgh. Joyce Fienberg, Dr Richard Gottfried, Rose Mallinger, Dr. Jerry Rabinowitz, Cecil Rosenthal, David Rosenthal, Bernice Simon, Sylvan Simon, Daniel Stein, Melvin Wax, and Irving Younger. And in honor of the Daf Yomi Pittsburgh group under the leadership of Rabbi Amy Bardack and Eric Lidji. What is the size of the Temple courtyard, the Azara ? These boundaries are important for three laws that are specifically done in the azara only - kohanim eat kodshai kodashim, slaughtering kodshim kalim takes place there, and one is punished by karet for entering while impure. Rav Nachman's father specified the boundaries. There was an assumption that he was trying to exclude a particular space by demarcating the exact size. They explain that he must have been excluding the chambers that open into the Azara but are partially outside the Azara boundaries. A difficulty is raised from a Mishna that designates them as sanctified. But it is resolved by explaining that the Mishna was referring to a rabbinic definition, but by Torah law, they are not considered the Azara. Two other sources seem to contradict this explanation, but are resolved. Rav Avudimi explained the source that the blood is disqualified if not brought on the altar before sunset of the day of the slaughtering. Rabbi Yochanan and Chizkiya disagree about the status of the meat of a peace offering on the night after the second day, both for laws of pigul and notar . Comparisons are made between the meat of the sacrifices that can be eaten for one day and those that can be eaten for two days – explaining the source of the differences between the two regarding the night of the second day. A firstborn, maaser and Pesach are kodshai kalim and have similar laws. However, certain issues surrounding eating them are different – who can eat them, how the meat is prepared, and for how long they can be eaten.

Nov 7

Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her Zayde, Ignacio (Israel) Marmurek, on his 42nd yahrzeit. "A pillar of the Jewish community of Buenos Aires, an ardent Zionist, a loving family man, I am proud to be his granddaughter, and he is missed." Communal peace offerings and guilt offerings have the same requirements. The derivation that communal peace offerings are slaughtered in the North is initially brought from a verse in Vayikra 23:19–20, but this is rejected because it relies on a juxtaposition built upon another juxtaposition - deriving communal peace offerings from sin offerings, which themselves are derived from burnt offerings. Instead, Bamidbar 10:10 presents a direct juxtaposition between communal peace offerings and burnt offerings, making it a stronger source. This raises two questions: why are communal peace offerings juxtaposed to sin offerings in the first verse, and why, in the verse regarding the ram offering of the nazir , is the peace offering juxtaposed with both the sin and burnt offering? One answer is given for the first question, and two possible answers are offered for the second. The Mishna introduces kodshim kalim , sacrifices with a lower level of sanctity. These may be slaughtered anywhere within the Azara and eaten by the owner anywhere in Jerusalem. The first examples cited are the thanksgiving offering (toda) and the peace offering (ram) of the nazir , as they share the same requirements and must be consumed within one day and one night. What is the source that kodshim kalim must be eaten in Jerusalem? Abaye and Rava each derive it differently from Vayikra 10:14. However, Abaye's interpretation is preferred due to a difficulty found in Rava's approach. Regular peace offerings may be eaten over two days and the intervening night. The Gemara cites three verses concerning peace offerings where slaughtering is mentioned, and derives a distinct law from each one—including the rule that they may be slaughtered anywhere in the Azara . Rabbi Eliezer and the first tanna disagree on how these verses should be interpreted and what hala khot can be extracted from them. One of the laws derived from these verses is that the door to the Sanctuary ( Heichal ) must be open when peace offerings are slaughtered. The Gemara proceeds to analyze the scope and implications of this requirement.

Nov 7

Rav and Levi disagree about whether there was truly no base on the south and east sides of the altar, or whether a base existed but the blood could not be poured there. Various sources are cited to challenge both opinions, and each difficulty is addressed and resolved. One of the sources provides a detailed description of how the altar was constructed. Rava, based on a drasha from a verse in Shmuel I 19:19, explains how David and Shmuel determined that the Temple would be built specifically in the territory of Binyamin and precisely at that location—not elsewhere. Although Ein Eitam was actually higher in elevation, two reasons are given for why that site was ultimately rejected.

Nov 6

Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim . Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev , a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar ( chut hasikra ). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot , horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod , base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.

Nov 5

The braita in Zevachim 51 extrapolates from the third mention (by the nasi ) of the base of the altar that for all sacrifices on the outer altar the remainder of the blood is poured on the base, the yesod . The braita then raises a question: perhaps the extrapolation should be different — that the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on the outer altar must be performed only on the sides where there is a base, i.e., not on the southeast corner, since the base did not extend there. A difficulty on that suggestion is drawn from the verse's wording. The verse states "to the base of the altar of the olah ," which suggests relevance to all sacrifices on the outer altar rather than only to the olah . But the sin offering, which is placed on the outer altar, is positioned on all four corners and not limited to the three corners where there is a base. If the verse had intended the latter ruling, it should have been phrased "to the base of the olah ," referring specifically to the burnt offering where that limitation would apply. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the unique inclusion of the word "altar" in the verse: it teaches that when blood is spilled on the base, it must be spilled on the roof of the base (top flat surface) and not on the wall of the base. With this reading, the subsequent lines of the braita, where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each say the law could have been derived by a kal va'chomer are reread including mention of the roof of the base. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva appear to assert the same logical argument using slightly different wording. Rav Ada bar Ahava and Rav Papa propose possible distinctions between their positions. Rav Ada argues that because Rabbi Akiva used more extended language about the remainder of the blood, that it "does not atone" and "does not come for atonement purposes," Rabbi Akiva must regard pouring the remainder as nonessential. Rabbi Yishmael, having said only "it doesn't atone," must hold that pouring the remainder is essential. Rav Papa rejects this reading, maintaining that no one posits an obligation to pour the remainder of the blood. He narrows the difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva to the specific case of the bird sin offering: whether mitzui , squeezing out the remainder of the blood and placing it directly on the wall of the altar while squeezing, is essential. Rav Papa understands Rabbi Yishmael to require mitzui , while Rabbi Akiva does not. A braita is then cited to support Rav Papa, showing that Rabbi Yishmael holds pouring the remainder is not essential. A difficulty is raised against Rav Papa's position, but the Gemara resolves it. Rami bar Hama introduces a tana who maintains that for sin offerings whose blood is placed on the inner altar, pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is essential; Rava, however, rejects this understanding of the braita and its conclusion. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dispute whether Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Akiva actually differ on the question of whether the remainder of the blood for inner sin offerings is essential.

Nov 4

Study Guide After suggesting that one can learn from Rabbi Meir's opinion about melika of a bird that is a treifa , that one can learn a binyan av from a kal va'chomer in kodashim , sacrificial items, the Gemara rejects this explanation because it is derived from chulin , not kodashim . Can one derive a law through a binyan av and then use another method of hermeneutics to derive something else? The Gemara only suggests an answer for a binyan av on a binyan av , but that answer is rejected since the method of derivation in the braita does not make sense. It must be derived from a verse in the Torah, Vayikra 2:6, and the braita is just being used as an asmachta . The remainder of the blood of the inner offerings is poured on the base of the altar on the western side. This is derived from Vayikra 4:7 where it states, "opposite the entrance to Ohel Moed ," which refers to the exit of the sanctuary, which is by the western side of the altar. In Vayikra chapter 4, the phrase "pour on the base of the altar" is mentioned for three different sacrifices. Each one teaches a different law relating either to the base of the altar or to the pouring of the remainder. The Gemara explains why these verses were available to be extrapolated and were not necessary for their straightforward meaning.

Nov 3

Study Guide The Gemara explores various hermeneutical methods used to derive halakhic laws - juxtaposition ( hekesh ), gezeira shava (verbal analogy), kal va'chomer (a fortiori reasoning), and binyan av (paradigm from precedent). It raises the question: can a law derived through one method serve as the basis for further derivation, either by the same method or a different one? They systematically examine each possible permutation, presenting logical arguments and textual proofs to evaluate the validity and limitations of such compound derivations. Importantly, this entire discussion is confined to laws pertaining to sacrificial items ( kodashim ) alone.

Nov 2

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha . However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol , Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava ? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava . Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.

Oct 31

Why does the Mishna begin with the bull offering of Yom Kippur as its first example? Given that the primary halakha regarding slaughtering in the northern part of the Azara (Temple courtyard) is derived from the burnt offering, one might expect that to be the opening case. Why would the inner sin offerings appear before regular sin offerings? The verse that establishes the requirement of slaughtering in the North appears in the context of the sheep burnt offering. From this, the rabbis extrapolate the same requirement for burnt offerings brought from cattle. This derivation hinges on the presence of a connecting vav ("and") in the verse about sheep, which links it to the preceding section discussing cattle. The vav serves as a bridge, allowing the laws of the later section to inform those of the earlier one. However, the Gemara challenges this method of derivation, questioning how it can be valid for those who reject such connections and brings a braita to prove that there is a debate regarding this issue. The debate is about whether one brings a hanging guilt offering if one is in doubt that one committed mei'la , misuse of consecrated property. After initially suggesting that the disagreement was about whether one can derive laws of one section from another if they are connected by a vav , this explanation is rejected, and three alternative interpretations are proposed. Of these, only the final one is accepted. The sin offering, like the burnt offering, must be slaughtered in the North of the Azara . This is derived from Vayikra 4:29, which states that the sin offering is slaughtered "in the place of the burnt offering." Additional verses establish that not only must the blood be received in the North, but the priest receiving it must also be standing in the North. These requirements are shown to be essential and not merely ideal. In Vayikra 4:24, the verse says, "And he shall slaughter it in the North." The Gemara analyzes the word "it" to determine what it might exclude. Four possibilities are considered, and after rejecting three, the Gemara concludes that the correct interpretation is that the animal itself must be in the North, but the person performing the slaughter need not be. Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North—and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering—a logical argument is made that the same strict requirement applies to the burnt offering itself.

Oct 31

A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek , one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim , a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara . Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.

Oct 30

What is the source in the Mishna for the halakha that one is not liable for the laws of notar and impurity when eating blood? Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether one is liable for eating items that are not fit for consumption while in a state of impurity. Is their dispute limited to items that themselves became impure, or does it also apply to a person who is impure and eats sacrificial items that are pure? Sacrificial offerings are slaughtered with six intentions: for a specific sacrifice, for a specific person, for God, for consumption by fire, to produce a pleasing aroma, and to be accepted by God. In addition, sin and guilt offerings must be slaughtered with intent for the specific sin they atone for. Rabbi Yosi stated that even if the slaughterer did not explicitly have all these intentions in mind, the offering remains valid. This is due to a stipulation enacted by the court that the slaughterer should not articulate all these intentions, in order to prevent errors that could invalidate the sacrifice, as the intention is performed by the one slaughtering/offering the sacrifice, not the owner of the sacrifice.

Oct 29

The halakha was decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Shimon regarding pigul in the inner sin offerings. Rava (and some say Rav Yosef) wondered: Why is halacha being decided on a matter that is no longer relevant in our times? To this, Abaye responded: "Expound and receive reward." Is there a difference between offerings brought by non-Jews and those brought by Jews? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi disagree on this matter. From which verses does Rabbi Shimon derive that certain laws do not apply to offerings brought by non-Jews? A baraita is brought which states that the tzitz (forehead plate of the High Priest) does not atone for offerings brought by non-Jews. Does this baraita align with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi as well? The prohibition against eating notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and tamei (impure items) applies even to offerings that do not have elements permitting consumption. What is the source for these halakhot?

Oct 28

Study Guide Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul . The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul , but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected. From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat? Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara .

Oct 27

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet . This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul , just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul . Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul , as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim . Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul . The Gemara explores Ulla's intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet , but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz , where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul , notar , and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan's statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.

Oct 26

Study Guide This week's learning is sponsored by Aunt Elayne, Fredjs, Hageges, Somers, Greenstones, and Pilichowskis in honor of Lana Kerzner's birthday. "We admire so much how you continue the Greenstone family legacy of intellectual curiosity coupled with daily dedication to learning and Judaism." Reish Lakish interprets Rabbi Meir's position in a Mishna in Menachot as holding that an offering becomes pigul not due to improper intent during part of the matir (the enabling act), but rather when improper intent occurs during the first stage, and the second stage is performed without any intent, the second stage is still governed by the initial improper thought. Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak disagrees, asserting that Rabbi Meir maintains one can render an offering pigul even through improper intent during part of an action. Two difficulties are raised against Reish Lakish's explanation based on two halakhot in the Tosefta. Regarding the first, three attempts are made to resolve the contradiction, but each faces its own challenge. One difficulty is also raised against Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak's position, but it is successfully resolved.

Oct 24

Study Guide Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbi) interprets the first mention of "bull" in Vayikra 4:20 as referring to the bull offering of Yom Kippur, even though the verse's context concerns the communal sin offering. According to Rebbi, this verse teaches that the Yom Kippur bull is comparable to the bull brought by the kohen gadol who sins, referenced by the second mention of "bull" in the same verse. Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rebbi, arguing that the laws of the Yom Kippur bull can be derived through kal v a'chomer (a fortiori) reasoning. However, the kal va'chomer argument he proposes is not fully spelled out in the text, and the Gemara clarifies which cases are being referenced and what laws are derived. Since Rabbi Yishmael does not interpret the word "bull" as referring to the Yom Kippur offering, but rather to the communal sin offering, the question arises: why use the term "bull" instead of simply saying "it"? Rav Pappa explains that the unnecessary word comes to teach a law not explicitly stated in the verses about the communal offering, but found in the kohen gadol 's sin offering - that the lobe of the liver and the kidneys are burned on the altar. Although this law could have been derived by juxtaposition, the inclusion of the word "bull" makes it as though it were written explicitly, which then allows it to be used to derive the same law by juxtaposition to the communal sin offering for idol worship. A braita is brought to support Rav Pappa's explanation and shows how the juxtaposition between the communal sin offering and the communal offering for idol worship (from Bamidbar 15:25) is established. However, another braita derives the juxtaposition from the verse in Vayikra 4:20. Both derivations are considered necessary, as each teaches a different law. Rebbi's position is cited earlier to support Rav Pappa's explanation that the word "bull" serves to compare the Yom Kippur bull to the kohen gadol 's sin offering for specific laws derived from the words " et ," " b'dam ," and " taval ." However, Rebbi himself states that the comparison teaches that all the laws are the same, not just those three. This discrepancy is explained as stemming from two different tannaitic positions. Two braitot from the school of Rabbi Yishmael are brought, each explaining why certain words or laws appear only in the kohen gadol 's sin offering and not in the communal one. Both are interpreted through parables that reflect God's relationship with His people. Finally, a Mishna in Menachot presents a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding whether a pigul (disqualifying intent) during the taking of the handful of the meal offering, but not during the taking of the frankincense (or vice versa), renders the offering pigul . Reish Lakish explains Rabbi Meir's position: the offering becomes pigul not because intent during part of the matir (the enabling act) can render an offering pigul , but because later actions follow the original intent. That is, if improper intent occurred during the first stage, and the second stage was performed without intent, the second stage is still governed by the initial thought. Reish Lakish supports this interpretation by asserting that our Mishna must align with Rabbi Meir's view. However, Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak disagrees and interprets the Mishna according to the rabbis' position.

Oct 24

Study Guide The Gemara cites a braita to locate the source for the halakha that all placements of the sin-offering blood performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. The braita's author treats the seven sprinklings as essential because they are treated as essential elsewhere - this statement is explained as referring to seven sprinklings in the rituals of the red heifer and the purification of a leper. The ruling that the four placements are essential is derived from the phrase "and as such he should do." Why not derive them from the phrase "and he should do like he did," which is used to teach the seven sprinklings - why can't both be derived from the same verse? Rabbi Yirmiya and Abaye offer different answers. The braita explains that the word "bull" mentioned first in Vayikra 4:20 refers to the bull of Yom Kippur. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak teaches from this that the blood placements are essential. Rav Papa, however, maintains that the essential nature can be derived from the verses of Yom Kippur and therefore understands the verse as teaching three specific laws about dipping the finger in the blood, laws drawn from the sin offering of the kohen gadol . A braita is brought in support of Rav Papa's position. Rabbi Yishmael held that the laws for the bull of Yom Kippur could be derived by kal va'chomer reasoning and therefore understood the "bull" in the verse to be referring to the communal sin offering.

Oct 23

Rav Papa cites a proof based on an inference from a Mishna in Zevachim 93a: if blood splashes onto one's clothing from the blood designated for placement on the altar, specifically from the three sprinklings following the initial one, then the garments must be laundered in the Azara (Temple courtyard), a process known as kibus . This inference is challenged, as the Gemara suggests that the Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, who is more stringent in his treatment of the remainder of the blood ( shirayim ) that is to be poured into the base of the altar, and the Mishna does not adhere to the mainstream view. Ultimately, this suggestion is dismissed, since there is no definitive evidence that Rabbi Nechemia requires kibus for the remainder of the blood before it is poured on the base of the altar. Nonetheless, the inference remains problematic for Rav Papa, as it implies that blood requires laundering even before it is sprinkled on the altar, an implication that aligns with no known position. Ravina offers a resolution: while the term "from the keren " (corner of the altar) excludes the law of kibus before placement on the keren , the Mishna's use of "from the base" includes blood that is awaiting placement on the base. A braita is introduced to explain the source of the halakha in the Mishna, that all placements of blood of sin offerings performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. This ruling is derived from a verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 4:20, in the context of the communal sin offering. The verse is fully expounded to draw parallels between the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol , the bull offering of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, and the communal sin offering for idol worship. The exposition also distinguishes between essential and non-essential components of the offerings whose blood is applied to the inner altar.

Oct 22

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel's reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

Oct 21

Study Guide A braita is presented that derives from the verse "And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured" the principle that if one performs just a single application of blood for each offering brought on the outer altar, they have fulfilled their obligation—supporting the halakha stated in the Mishnah. However, this verse is also used for various other interpretations and halakhot. This raises a question: how does the author of the braita derive this law from the verse if it is already employed for other teachings? Those who interpret the verse differently derive this law by another method: they learn the rule from the sin offering (in accordance with Beit Hillel) and extend it from there to other offerings. How do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel each derive their respective views regarding the sin offering from the biblical verses?

Oct 20

This month's learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z"l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah. As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch. The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to "consumption," and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice. The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving "outside of time," "outside of location," or "not for the sake of the correct sacrifice" and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda's position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states " lo yaniach " - "do not leave it" - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of "outside of location." Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda's reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it. Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering. Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba's statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba's position, which remains unresolved. Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet , even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet . Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices. In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet , since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten. In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet , because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

Oct 19

During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service. Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit , the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh , the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza , an interposition between the kohanim's feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved. The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul. Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar's position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor. A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva's leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.

Oct 17

How can the verse "do not touch kodesh " be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse. There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim . If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim )? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Oct 17

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara . Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla's statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara . The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara . Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla's statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet . Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla's citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items ( kodashim ), not one who enters the Azara . This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse "do not touch kodesh ." Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to t eruma . A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.

Oct 16

Who is permitted to slaughter an animal for a sacrifice? The Mishna presents the matter in a way that suggests slaughter by a non-priest is only valid post facto. However, this seems to contradict another source that explicitly permits such slaughter ab initio. Upon further analysis, this apparent contradiction is resolved: non-priests are indeed permitted to slaughter sacrificial animals from the outset. If an impure person performs the slaughter, the sacrifice remains valid. Yet another source seems to prohibit this. The resolution lies in distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law: while biblically valid, rabbinic authorities forbade impure individuals from slaughtering as a precaution, lest they come into contact with the sacrificial animal and thereby render it impure. There are two different versions of a braita relating to the prohibition for an impure person to slaughter or do smicha on the animal. Each version has a different understanding of the prohibition to enter the A zara (Temple courtyard). Is it prohibited even for a small part of one's body to enter or only for the majority? Ulla, in the name of Reish Lakish, holds that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara , it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover, who is allowed to go ahead with the purification process, which requires a small part of his body to enter the Azara . Ulla resolves the difficulty. Rav Yosef infers from Ulla's resolution that in a parallel case—where zavim became impure through contact with the dead before Passover—the same ruling would apply. Abaye, however, raises two objections to Rav Yosef's inference.

Oct 15

Study Guide Various cases are examined involving combinations of "outside of time" and "outside of location" thoughts, with the central question being whether they incur the punishment of karet . The Mishna's statement, that a thought about eating and burning does not combine, is analyzed to address questions raised by Rav Ashi and Rava, and to highlight an apparent contradiction within the Mishna itself. That contradiction is ultimately resolved. Slaughtering may be performed by non-kohanim, including women, slaves, and even someone who is ritually impure, as long as the ritually impure person does not physically touch the animal. Consequently, a pigul -intent during slaughtering by such individuals can invalidate the offering and render it pigul .

Oct 12

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about "an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk" or "an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk." What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Oct 12

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent ( machshava ) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat "outside its time" or "outside its location." The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul . An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita , which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul . If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time , but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location , the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet . Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.

Oct 12

Study Guide In discussing various cases of improper intent that render a sacrifice pigul , the Mishna presents a scenario in which one intends to eat the skin under the tail either outside the azara or beyond the designated time. Since the skin of the tail of the sheep is generally not eaten, but burned on the altar, this case is difficult to interpret. Shmuel, Rav Huna, and Rav Chisda each offer distinct explanations. Rabba, Abaye, and Rava explore the Torah sources for the prohibition against improper intent that invalidates sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat " outside its time " or " outside its location ." An intent of " outside its time " renders the offering pigul and subjects one who eats it to the punishment of karet , whereas " outside its location " does not carry that penalty. These laws are derived from Chapters 7 and 19 of Vayikra, though there is disagreement over the precise derivation. Challenges are raised against the interpretations of Rabba and Abaye, and their views are ultimately rejected.

Oct 10

Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.

Oct 10

Study Guide If one leg of the animal was outside the azara at the time of slaughter or blood collection, does that disqualify the animal and on what does the ruling depend? If the meat of an animal with a lower level of sanctity leaves the azara before the blood is sprinkled, is the sacrifice disqualified? Shmuel's father poses several questions to Shmuel about whether the animal, the slaughterer, or the kohen who received blood that was suspended in the air would invalidate the sacrifice. When the blood was placed in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar, the Mishna rules that it is disqualified. Shmuel reads this to mean the blood is accepted and the owner receives atonement, while the meat itself is disqualified. A Mishna in Zevachim 32 is cited to raise an apparent contradiction with Shmuel, which is subsequently resolved.

Oct 9

In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word "right" appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term "kohen," the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava's drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava's interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet , from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal's throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan's response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel's airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita . The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.

Oct 8

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza —an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer's ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both "kohen" and "finger," the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either "finger" appears alone or "kohen" together with "finger". According to Rabbi Yochanan's rule that the mention of "kohen" implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava —a textual analogy—from the three mentions of "right" in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word "kohen"? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.

Oct 6

Several difficulties are raised against the conclusion that the elders of the South must hold that the Paschal sacrifice may be brought on behalf of someone who is impure from contact with the dead. After presenting a challenge based on a question posed by Rami bar Hama, the Gemara concludes that Rami bar Hama clearly disagrees with the elders of the South. He maintains that the Paschal sacrifice cannot be brought for someone who is impure, and if it is, the offering is disqualified. A baraita is cited as a challenge to Rami bar Hama's position, but the difficulty is ultimately resolved. Notably, there are two different versions of this challenge. Additionally, the Gemara discusses the case of a kohen who sits while performing the sacrificial rites. In such a case, the sacrifice is disqualified. The source for this ruling is examined, and two textual proofs are brought to support it.

Oct 6

Even though the basin in the Temple must be large enough for four people to simultaneously wash their hands and feet from it, a kohen may also perform this washing using a smaller utensil - provided the water originates from the basin and the utensil is sanctified (a kli sharet ). Reish Lakish ruled that a liquid suitable for completing the required volume of a mikveh may also be used to complete the volume of water in the Temple basin. However, such a liquid is not valid for the quarter- log amount required for netilat yadayim (ritual handwashing). The Gemara explores what types of liquids are excluded from use in netilat yadayim . Initially, it suggests excluding liquefied clay or aquatic organisms like red gnats, which are considered water-like. Both suggestions are ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara concludes that the exclusion applies to a case where one adds a se'ah of liquid to a mikveh that contains exactly forty se'ah , then removes a se'ah , repeating this process until half the mikveh consists of the added liquid. This method is acceptable for a mikveh and the Temple basin, but not for the quarter- log required for handwashing. Rav Papa introduces a unique case where such a liquid would be valid for tevilah (immersion) of very small items. Rabbi Yirmia, quoting Reish Lakish, stated that water from a mikveh may be used in the Temple basin. This raises a question: perhaps the basin requires flowing water rather than stagnant water. Although a tannaitic source seems to support this requirement, the Gemara resolves the issue by showing that it is a matter of dispute among the tannaim . The Mishna teaches that if an uncircumcised kohen performs sacrificial service in the Temple, the sacrifices are disqualified. This ruling is derived from Yechezkel 44:7,9. Similarly, a kohen who is impure disqualifies the sacrifices he offers. The elders of the South limit this disqualification to impurity from a sheretz (creeping creature), but not to impurity from contact with the dead, which is permitted when the majority of the community is impure. The Gemara challenges this view, noting that impurity from the dead is more severe as it lasts seven days and requires purification through the ashes of the red heifer. However, the elders argue that since communal sacrifices are accepted when the majority are impure from the dead but not from a sheretz , the same distinction applies to kohanim : a kohen's sacrifice is not disqualified if he is impure from the dead. To better understand the elders' position, the Gemara concludes that they must hold that someone impure from a sheretz on the 14th of Nissan may have the Paschal sacrifice offered on their behalf and eat it on the night of the 15th in a state of purity. Ulla explained that Reish Lakish strongly disagreed with the elders of the South. He argued that the laws governing the community are more lenient than those governing the kohanim. While the people may have their Paschal offering brought on their behalf when impure, a kohen's offering is disqualified if he is impure from a sheretz . Therefore, if the Paschal offering cannot be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead, then certainly a kohen who is impure from the dead should disqualify the sacrifice he offers. To resolve Reish Lakish's difficulty, the Gemara suggests that the elders of the South may have held that even the Paschal offering could be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead. This raises a question: how does this view align with the laws of Pesach Sheni ?

Oct 5

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Joanna Rom in loving memory of her mother, Rose Rom, Sura Razel, on her seventeenth yahrzeit. "She is still with me every day, my inner teacher." If one becomes impure, must one repeat the washing of hands and feet? A source is brought from Mishna Para 3:7 regarding the para aduma (red heifer) to suggest that re-washing is not required. However, this proof is rejected, as the laws concerning the para aduma are considered more lenient. Can a kohen immerse his hands and feet directly in the water of the basin, or must the water be poured over them? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak cites a source to support the permissibility of immersion, but the inference is ultimately rejected. Regarding the timing for sinking the water into its pit to prevent disqualification for the following day, three opinions are presented: Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef distinguishes between rites performed during the day and those at night. For daytime rites, the water must be sunk at sunset; for nighttime rites, at dawn. Rav Chisda maintains that for all rites, the water must be sunk at dawn. Rabbi Yochanan holds that once the water is sunk at the beginning of the night, it may not be raised again until morning. Rabbi Yochanan's position is examined in light of other statements he made that appear contradictory. The analysis also ensures his view is clearly differentiated from those of Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef, with whom he disagrees. A challenge is raised against Rav Chisda's opinion, but it is resolved.

Oct 3

Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen's hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple's basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni —which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull's slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon's opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi's view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni , to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon's view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam , matches Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon's opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi's view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava's interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one's hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.

Oct 3

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree. Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen's clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen's body. Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim . A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

Oct 1

Four distinct verses are cited to teach that a kohen who performs a service in the Temple without wearing the prescribed priestly garments renders the sacrifice invalid. Each verse contributes a unique aspect to this halakha, clarifying different scenarios. A braita further analyzes various garment-related issues—such as garments that are too long or too short, worn out, duplicated (e.g., wearing two pairs of pants), or missing one garment. It distinguishes between cases that invalidate the service and those that do not. However, statements by Shmuel and Rav regarding overly long or short garments appear to contradict the braita, which does not disqualify those cases. These apparent contradictions are addressed and resolved through deeper analysis. Additionally, several drashot are derived from the Torah's use of the word "bad" in describing the kohen's clothing. The term is interpreted to mean fine linen, and the derivation of this meaning is explored through textual and linguistic analysis.

Oct 1

A verse from Vayikra 21:6 is cited to demonstrate that if a tvul yom - someone who has immersed in a mikveh but must wait until sunset to complete their purification - performs one of the essential sacrificial rites, the sacrifice is invalidated. The discussion explores how this verse specifically refers to a tvul yom and not another form of impurity. The Mishna lists three distinct categories: an impure person, a tvul yom , and a mechusar kaparah - someone who has completed immersion and sunset but still needs to bring a sacrificial offering (e.g., a zav on the eighth day of his purification). The necessity of listing all three is examined, highlighting the unique halachic implications of each status. Sources are brought to prove that if a kohen performs sacrificial rites without wearing all the required priestly garments, the sacrifice is disqualified.

Sep 30

Study Guide Zevachim 16 The Gemara presents three proofs that the service of a non-priest ( zar ) in the Temple is invalid: one from a verse, and two derived through a kal va-chomer argument. It then brings four proofs that the service of a mourner, before burial ( onen ) , in the Temple is also invalid: two from verses and two from kal va-chomer reasoning. Rava attempts to limit the disqualification of the onen to the case of an individual offering, based on a kal va-chomer from ritual impurity that is permitted in communal offerings. In other words, if impurity does not invalidate a communal offering (when the majority of the community is impure), perhaps mourning should not invalidate it either. However, Rava bar Ahilai rejects this argument, claiming that accepting such a kal va-chomer would open the door to additional a fortiori arguments that could lead to incorrect halakhic conclusions, and therefore it should not be accepted.

Sep 29

Following Ulla's ruling that conveying the blood without moving one's feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla's position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon's own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava's reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye's position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va'chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.

Sep 28

In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul , the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, "and he dips his finger," and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul . In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, "the kohen takes the blood," without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon's position that an "outside its time" intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul , which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an "outside its time" intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul . The Gemara further derives that an "outside its place" intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon's position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son's view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam , since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara . Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar's ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one's feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

Sep 26

The Mishna teaches that improper intent ( lo lishma ) during a sin offering or a Pesach offering disqualifies the sacrifice if the intent occurs during one of the key rituals: collecting the blood, walking it to the altar, or applying it to the altar. Rabbi Shimon disagrees regarding the act of carrying the blood, arguing that it is non-essential since the slaughtering can be performed adjacent to the altar, rendering the walking unnecessary. The Gemara challenges the notion that intent during the collection of the blood can disqualify the offering, citing a braita that appears to contradict this. The resolution distinguishes between two types of improper intent: pigul (intent to consume the offering at an invalid time) and lo lishma (intent for the wrong type of offering). The braita addresses pigul , while the Mishna discusses lo lishma . However, this distinction is also questioned based on another braita concerning pigul . The issue is ultimately resolved by differentiating between the action to which the thought pertains and the action during which the thought occurs. A further question is raised regarding the sin offering, whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary and applied to the altar: does pigul apply during the kohen's act of dipping his finger into the blood in preparation for placing it?

Sep 26

Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase " bein ha'arbayim ," typically understood as "afternoon," Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as "between two evenings," encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya's interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira's position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered "its time" for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse " olah hu " ("it is a burnt offering"). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va'chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.

Sep 25

Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v'chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis' opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi's position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

Sep 22

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering. A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them. Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan's view, while Rabbi Ilai supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia's proof is based on a kal va'chomer , which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ilai's proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved. In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma —with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer's proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.

Sep 22

A Pesach offering that is slaughtered outside its designated time with the intent of a different sacrifice is treated as a peace offering—regardless of which specific sacrifice the intent was for. The Gemara seeks the source for this ruling. Back on Zevachim 8, a verse concerning a peace offering was suggested as the basis, appearing to allude to the Pesach offering. After raising a difficulty with this derivation, the Gemara offers a particular explanation, which is ultimately rejected. A second approach is then proposed, but it faces the same challenge as the first. Three possible resolutions are offered; the first is dismissed, while the third is subjected to four objections—all of which are successfully resolved. The Gemara then raises a further question: perhaps the verse in question refers not to the Pesach offering, but to a guilt offering. After addressing that possibility, the Gemara probes deeper, suggesting that the verse may not refer to the Pesach offering at all. This concern is also resolved. Later, a statement from Mavog is introduced regarding a sin offering brought with improper intent. However, it is unclear what specific intent he refers to and what his ruling implies. Several interpretations are presented, each offering a different understanding of Mavog's position than the one initially assumed.

Sep 22

Study Guide Zevachim 8 If any of the four sacrificial rites of a sin offering - slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying it, or sprinkling it - are performed with the intent of a different sacrifice or for a different owner, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara investigates the source of this law. Initially, it cites verses that establish the requirement to slaughter, collect, and sprinkle the blood with the correct intent, both for the appropriate sacrifice and for the proper owner, and that failure to do so invalidates the offering. However, these sources do not explicitly prove that intent for a different sacrifice disqualifies the offering, nor that slaughtering and collecting must be done for the correct owner. The Gemara first attempts to derive this from verses concerning the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper, but both are rejected due to unique stringencies in each case. It then explores combinations - nazirite and leper, nazirite and standard sin offering, or leper and standard sin offering - but each pairing is also dismissed, as each has its own distinctive stringency. Ultimately, Rava derives the requirement to perform all rites with the correct intent, from both the perspective of the sacrifice and the owner, from a verse that juxtaposes the peace offering with the sin offering, as the source for the basic law of proper intent is found in the laws of the peace offering, as explained in Zevachim 4. The verses previously cited in the sugya are then reinterpreted to teach that without proper designation, the offering is invalid—based on the principle that in kodashim (sacrificial laws), repetition in the Torah indicates necessity ( l'akev ). The proof from the verses above pertains to a standard sin offering. The Gemara then asks: how do we know the same applies to a sin offering brought for idol worship or to a sliding-scale offering ( korban oleh veyored )? These cases are derived through comparative analysis with other offerings mentioned previously. The discussion shifts to the case of a Pesach offering. If one designates an animal for the Passover sacrifice but slaughters it on a day that is not Pesach, the offering is not disqualified and is instead brought as a peace offering. The father of Shmuel cites a verse from Vayikra 3:6, which discusses peace offerings, as the source. However, a difficulty arises: the verse may only support the case where the animal was offered as a peace offering. If it were offered with the intent for a different sacrifice, it might be disqualified. To address this, the Gemara explains that the term zevach in the verse encompasses other types of offerings. Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory, as it could still be argued that if the Pesach was offered with intent for any other sacrifice, it should be brought as that sacrifice, not necessarily as a peace offering. To resolve this, the Gemara presents two alternative derivations from the verse and proceeds to analyze their validity.

Sep 21

In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa's reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court's postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya's question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat's blood and the second's implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda . Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.

Sep 19

Continuing the discussion surrounding Reish Lakish's response to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara examines whether heirs acquire the sacrificial offering of someone who dies. Various sources are presented supporting both sides of the debate. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the heirs do not acquire the offering, though they may receive a limited degree of atonement through it. Another question arises regarding a sacrifice brought lo lishma, with intent for a different type of offering. If the original sacrifice is still offered, does it fulfill its intended purpose? If not, why is it brought at all? And if it does, why is a second offering required? Rav Ashi clarifies that the first offering is brought due to the power of its original designation, while the second is needed to achieve full atonement. The Gemara also explores whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments that were neglected between the time the animal was designated and the time it was slaughtered, or only for those neglected before its designation. Sources are cited in an attempt to resolve this question.

Sep 19

Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering ( lo lishma ). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish's view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer's position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma . Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: "And he slaughtered it as a sin offering" (Vayikra 4:33). From the word "it," we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma . The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v'chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone ("And he slaughtered it as a sin offering"). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn't Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn't Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother's burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?

Sep 18

What is the source for the Mishna's ruling that if one intends a different sacrifice than the one designated, the offering is no longer valid to fulfill the obligation of the original owner? The Gemara investigates the derivation of this principle across each of the four sacrificial rites: slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar. Why is it not sufficient to derive the law from just one of these rites? The Gemara then poses a similar question regarding a change in ownership—specifically, if the sacrifice was offered on behalf of someone other than its designated owner. Again, it seeks a source for each of the four rites. If these requirements are mandated by Torah law, why do they not render the sacrifice invalid?

Sep 17

Study Guide Zevachim 3 This week's learning is sponsored by Tina Lamm in loving memory of her father, Mr. Mike Senders, A"H, Yitzchak Meir ben HaRav Tzvi Aryeh v'Esther Bayla, on his shloshim. "Reaching the age of 101 was not only a personal milestone for my father, but also a testament to the fullness of his life. He used those years well - building Torah institutions, nurturing family and living in intimacy with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Today's daf is sponsored by Lisa Malik & Adi Wyner in loving memory of Lisa's grandmother, Regina Post z"l. "Babi Gina was the one who insisted on her grandchildren going to the Yeshivah Flatbush and who was especially proud of her 2 granddaughters who were Hebrew valedictorians. She would also be so proud to know that one of her namesakes, Rivkah Gottlieb, made aliyah and that she now has 6 Israeli grandchildren and 3 Israeli great-grandchildren. May the memory of Rivkah bat Shmuel v'Chavah be for a blessing." From where do we know for certain that a get that is written without any specific intent for the woman is disqualified (the basis of a contradiction in Zevachim 2)? After four failed attempts, they eventually find a fifth case in the Mishna in Gittin that clearly proves this. Four contradictions are raised against statements brought in the name of Rav relating to cases in which sacrifices are/are not disqualified when offered for a similar but different intent or for a completely different intent. Comparisons are made to divorce documents, impurities in utensils (what things are considered a barrier that the impurity cannot pass through), and laws within the topic itself (various cases where wrong intentions disqualify/don't disqualify the sacrifices). Each contradiction is resolved. How do we know with certainty that a get (divorce document) written without specific intent for the woman is invalid? This question arises as part of a contradiction discussed in Zevachim 2. After four unsuccessful attempts to find the source, the Gemara ultimately finds a definitive proof in a Mishna in Gittin, which clearly establishes that a get must be written lishmah —with specific intent for the woman receiving it. The sugya presents four challenges to statements attributed to Rav regarding when sacrificial offerings are disqualified due to improper intent. These challenges explore cases where the intent is slightly off (e.g., for a different type of offering) or entirely unrelated. The contradictions are from: The laws of gittin (divorce documents) The laws of tumah in utensils (what constitutes a barrier to impurity) Internal comparisons within the sacrificial laws themselves Each contradiction is carefully analyzed and ultimately resolved, reinforcing the nuanced understanding of how intent affects the validity of offerings—and by extension, other halachic domains.

Sep 16

Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. "He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life." Today's daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of her mother, Yocheved bat Zvi and Sara, on her 4th yahrzeit. If one takes an animal that was designated for a specific sacrificial purpose and slaughters it with the intention that it be used for a different type of offering ( shelo lishma ), the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the sacrifice. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which slaughtering with the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering. The Mishna records four differing opinions regarding these exceptions: Tana Kamma holds that a sin offering ( chatat ) and a Passover offering ( korban Pesach ) - when brought at the proper time (the afternoon of the 14th of Nissan, or possibly even the morning) - are disqualified if slaughtered with incorrect intent. Rabbi Eliezer adds the guilt offering ( asham ) to the list, arguing that it is similar in nature to the sin offering. Yosi ben Honi expands the rule further, stating that any sacrifice slaughtered with the mistaken intent that it be offered as a sin offering or a Passover offering on the 14th of Nissan is disqualified. Shimon, brother of Azaria, maintains that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intent that it be offered as a higher-level offering than originally designated, it remains valid. However, if the intent is to downgrade it to a lower-level offering, the sacrifice is disqualified. The Mishna provides examples of what constitutes higher and lower offerings. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase "but [a sacrifice slaughtered with the wrong intent] does not fulfill the owner's obligation"? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling—one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. A further question arises: If a sacrifice is slaughtered without any specific intent, is that considered "no intent" or does it count as "intent"? Rava infers from the Mishna that such a case is treated as if it were done with intent. However, he notes a contradiction with the laws of lishma regarding a get (divorce document), which must be written specifically for the woman being divorced. Why, then, is the law different in each case? After addressing this question, the Gemara investigates the sources that underpin Rava's apparent contradiction: first, that a sacrifice brought without specific intent is still valid; and second, that a get lacking explicit intent is invalid.

Sep 15

Introduction to Masechet Zevachim

Sep 14

Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l'chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch ." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn't answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir's teachings were transmitted as " acherim" ("others"), and Rabbi Natan's as " yesh omrim" ("some say"). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as " acherim omrim." When his son asked why he didn't cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family's honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying " They say in the name of Rabbi Meir. " Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can "uproot mountains"? Rav Yosef was a sinai , while Raba was an oker Harim . Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba's tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku .

Sep 14

Today's daf is sponsored by Tova and David Kestenbaum in loving memory of Tova's father, Rabbi Dr. Israel Rivkin z"l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. "My father was a pillar of strength and love for our family, a passionate learner of Torah, and a man whose chessed for his community and Klal Yisrael knew no bounds. He was deeply grateful to be living in Israel, together with my mother, surrounded by generations of descendants — a dream he cherished and fulfilled with joy and pride. יהי זכרו ברוך" Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in memory of her mother Deera Tychman, Tzvia Bracha bat Mordechai v'Chaya Tova, on her 12th yahrzeit. "My mother was a lover of Israel and the Hebrew language. May her memory be a blessing." Today's daf is dedicated to my brother Jonathan Cohen on his 50th birthday! He has been learning daf yomi with me since Masechet Nidda of the last cycle. The bull offering of the kohen gadol precedes the bull offering of the community. This is derived both from a verse in the Torah and a logical argument. The bull offering of the community (sin offering) precedes the bull offering of the community in a case of idol worship (burnt offering), as a sin offering precedes a burnt offering, as is derived from a verse regarding the sliding scale offering when two birds are offered - one as a sin offering and one as burnt offering. The Gemara brings several other rulings regarding which sacrifice precedes another and the source for it in the Torah. Only in one case is there a tannaitic debate. If there are two lives to save or two people to feed or two people taken hostage, on what basis do we decide who to save, feed, or redeem first? The Mishnayot list who comes first, and a braita explands on this list. Lineage plays a key role in determining precedence, but a Torah scholar overrides this and comes before even a mamzer , as is derived from a verse in Mishlei 3:15. What things cause one to forget one's Torah, and what can one do to restore forgotten Torah? What are ten things that are detrimental to Torah study? A braita delineates the rules for showing respect for the Nasi, Av Beit Din and Chacham – each in a different manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the nasi ) on a day that Rabbi Natan, the Av Beit Din , and Rabbi Meir, the Chacham were not in the Beit Midrash.

Sep 12

How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha ? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason? The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed? Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year. Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir's position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question. The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama —the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling. Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded. The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l'mata and a regular kohen l'maala . Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context. The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly ( tadir ) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?

Sep 12

A braita explains that the words "מעם הארץ" — "from one of the land" — mentioned in the section about the individual's sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon's view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis' position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat ( cheilev ) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad , but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon's position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person's change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad . A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi , it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi . Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha , the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha , and that Shlomo's anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers.

Sep 11

Sep 10

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering ( korban oleh v'yored ) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol ( minchat chavitin ). Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering? The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol , the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry ( avodah zarah ). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings ( asham talui ), standard guilt offerings ( asham vadai ), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat. A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon's position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon's reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity. There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer's view—specifically, whether the king's obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

Sep 9

Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about the case in which a kohen gadol becomes obligated to bring a sacrifice for idol worship. According to one view, it involves a situation where he unknowingly worshipped idols. According to the other, it refers to a case where he unknowingly issued an erroneous halakhic ruling and then acted upon it. Despite this disagreement, both Rebbi and the rabbis agree that the sacrifice he brings is the same as that brought by an individual—a female goat. They also concur that the kohen gadol does not bring a provisional guilt offering ( asham talui ), though each derives this conclusion through a different method. The communal sin offering—whether for general commandments or for idol worship—is only brought for transgressions where intentional violation incurs karet , and unintentional violation requires a sin offering. This same criterion applies to the unique sin offering of the kohen gadol , the king and the individual. Rebbi derives this from a gezera shava based on the word עליה ("upon her"), which appears both in the verse about the communal offering and in the verse prohibiting a man from sleeping with his wife's sister. The rabbis, however, interpret the verse about the sister differently for another law, and instead derive the principle from Bamidbar (Numbers) 15:29–30. What does Rebbi derive from that verse? How do we know that the section in Bamidbar 15 refers specifically to the sin of idol worship? Three suggestions are offered, though the third is ultimately rejected. The communal sin offering is not brought for transgressions that are punishable by a sliding scale offering ( korban oleh ve'yored ). The source for this exclusion is also examined. Does the king bring his unique sin offering for a transgression that is punishable by a sliding scale offering? The Mishnah presents two differing opinions on this matter.

Sep 8

A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse "לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם" ("for the guilt of the nation"), which compares the kohen gadol's actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering. This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol's obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol's case aligns specifically with the communal model. Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin. The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol. A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi , but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse "עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא" ("for the sin which he sinned," Vayikra 4:3). Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places. The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain. The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol's sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase "מֵעֵינֵי" ("from the eyes"). When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, "And the same is true for the kohen gadol," as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence "And such is true for the kohen gadol" would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.

Sep 7

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm's children in memory of their grandfather, Mike Senders z"l, from Cleveland, Ohio, and later Boca Raton, Florida. "He dedicated much of his life to growing strong Jewish institutions, and his passion for Judaism, Torah, and Tefilla serves as a constant inspiration for us. May his neshama have an aliya and his memory be for a blessing." A braita is brought to raise a difficulty on Rabbi Meir's position. The braita mentions two specific sin offerings whose meat is not eaten – the Levites' miluim offering and the offerings brought in the time of Ezra by those who returned to Zion. The latter offering consisted of twelve bulls and twelve goats. The Gemara assumes they were a communal sin offering for idol worship by the people during the time of Zedekiah. This number of sacrifices accords with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion that each tribe brings a bull and goat, and Rabbi Shimon's opinion that both the tribes and the court bring (in a case where eleven tribes sinned), but it does not accord with Rabbi Meir's opinion that only the court brings the sacrifice, as there should be only one bull and one goat. This difficulty is resolved by the suggestion that they sinned on twelve separate occasions. Two other difficulties are raised on the braita. One, if the people of that time were already dead, how could the sin offering be brought, as an animal designated for a sin offering whose owners died is left to die, as the sacrifice can no longer be offered? Rav Papa suggests that the sin offering is left to die only for an individual offering, but not for one brought by the community. Three potential explanations are brought as a source for Rav Papa's view, but all are rejected, and Rav Papa's answer is rejected as well. The Gemara then answers that the people were still alive and proves it from a verse in Ezra 3:12. The second question is, didn't they sin intentionally, in which case a sacrifice would not be able to be offered? They answer that it was a horaat sha'ah , unique circumstances, under which this was permitted. This answer can also resolve the previous difficulties. A braita teaches that if one of the community died, the communal sin offering would still be brought, but if one of the judges who issued the ruling died, the community is exempt from bringing the offering. Which tanna is the author of this braita? Rav Chisda attributes it to Rabbi Meir, while Rav Yosef questions why it cannot be attributed to Rabbi Shimon as well. Abaye disagrees with Rav Yosef's suggestion, and there is a back-and-forth discussion between them. Ultimately, the Gemara sides with Abaye, based on a different source. In what cases does a kohen gadol bring a bull sin offering?

Sep 5

There are multiple opinions regarding who is responsible for bringing the communal sin offering. Is it the Sanhedrin that offers it? Do individual tribes that sinned each bring their own offering? Could it be both? If only some tribes transgressed, are the others still obligated to bring a bull offering? And is a communal offering required only when the Sanhedrin haGadol issues a mistaken ruling? What are the Torah sources and rabbinic interpretations that support these different views?

Sep 5

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch . Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court's reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans. The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court's erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering. There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.

Sep 4

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that the exemption discussed in the Mishna—for an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court—is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion. However, the other rabbis disagree and require the individual to bring a sin offering. In contrast, Rav Nachman, also quoting Shmuel, asserts that the Mishna reflects Rabbi Meir's view, with the rabbis again dissenting. This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis appears in a braita , though it is unclear whether the braita is actually addressing this specific issue. Rav Papa offers an alternative interpretation of the braita , followed by three additional suggestions. Rav Asi maintains that the majority required for a communal sin offering refers specifically to the majority of Jews living in Israel, as supported by a verse in Melachim I (8:65). A question arises: if the people sinned while constituting a majority, but by the time the offering is to be brought, they are no longer the majority (e.g., due to death), are they still obligated to bring the offering? The Gemara links this to a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding a king who sinned before ascending the throne and only later realized his error once he had become king. The rabbis hold that he must bring an individual sin offering, since obligation is determined at the time of the sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, argues that both the sin and its realization must occur while the individual is in the same status—thus exempting the king entirely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle can be applied to a case where the people sinned as a minority and later became a majority. It concludes that the comparison is invalid, since Rabbi Shimon's reasoning hinges on the sin and realization occurring during the same period of obligation, which does not apply in this scenario. A series of unresolved questions is posed regarding whether two distinct teaching errors could combine to obligate the community in a communal sin offering. None of these questions receives definitive answers. Rabbi Yonatan holds that a communal offering is only warranted if the court's ruling was unanimous. However, after three challenges are raised against his position, the final one leads to its rejection. Ultimately, all judges—and even students present during deliberation—share responsibility for the verdict. As a result, rabbis would often invite others to participate in the judgment process, thereby distributing the responsibility more broadly. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? Rabbi Shimon does not obligate in a sacrifice, but Rabbi Elazar requires an asham talui , a provisional guilt offering. However, their debate only applies in cases where the person was in the city. If they were out of town, all agree that there is an exemption, as they had no way to know about the corrected ruling. A communal sin offering is relevant for erroneous rulings regarding details of a Torah law, but not if they rule to uproot a Torah law completely. Rav explains Rabbi Shimon's position and the Gemara raises a difficulty to Rav from a braita, but resolves it.

Sep 3

This week's learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. "My dear Uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Deborah Dickson. "Happy birthday to Hadran's newest wonderful addition to the team. I'm excited to start another (school) year of learning with you, my friend!" The Mishna teaches that if the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and an individual follows, the individual does not have to bring a sin offering. However, the Gemara will later explain that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but the rabbis disagree and obligate the individual. If the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and a judge or student who has reached a stage of one who can issue halakhic rulings realizes they have made a mistake but follows their ruling anyway, he is obligated to bring a sin offering. If the court issues an erroneous ruling and the majority of the community follow it, there is an obligation to bring a special sacrifice called 'the bull offering of an unwitting communal sin ( par he'elem davar shel tzibur ). Shmuel and Rav Dimi disagree about the language that must be used by the court for it to be considered "an erroneous ruling of the court." Three sources are brought to support Rav Dimi's position. In a second version of the debate, they switch positions, and the sources are raised as difficulties against Rav Dimi. The Mishna described the actions of the individual who is exempt when sinning by following an erroneous ruling of the court using the words " shogeg al pihem , unwitting by their words." In two different versions of Rava's explanation of this term, it either refers to two different cases or to one. If it refers to two, it would include an exemption in an additional case – if the court ruled by mistake that a piece of forbidden fat was permitted, and the individual meant to eat a piece of permitted fat, but accidentally ate the piece that the court permitted. Even though Rava had an answer to that question (obligated or exempt, depending on the different versions of Rava's explanation), Rami bar Hama asked the same question and did not know the answer. Again, in two different versions, Rava answers the question by explaining the term in the Mishna. However, Rami bar Hama rejects his answer as the term is ambiguous. The Mishna lists various ways in which the individual or a judge/student can potentially follow a ruling of the court. What is the significance of the order in each case? How is a "teacher capable of issuing halakhic rulings" defined, and why was it necessary to include this category in addition to that of a judge? The Gemara quotes two braitot, one explaining the source for Rabbi Yehuda's position in the Mishna, exempting an individual who follows the court, and the other explaining the source for the rabbis' dissenting opinion obligating an individual who follows the court. The latter braita is complicated to understand, and the Gemara irons out its meaning and shows how it reflects the rabbis' position.

Sep 2

Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah is dedicated with love and pride to Terri Krivosha from her husband, Rabbi Hayim Herring, her children, Tamar, Avi and Shaina, and her grandchildren, Noam, Liba, and Orly, for completing her first Daf Yomi cycle. You embody the words of Micah 6:8, and "do justice, love goodness, and walk modestly with HaShem." A contradiction arises between the Mishna and a Mishna in Zevachim regarding the proper method for kashering a spit. Several sages present different approaches, prompting five proposed resolutions—though many are ultimately rejected. When it comes to kashering knives, the Mishna recommends polishing as the preferred method. However, Rav Ukva offers an alternative: inserting the knife into the ground ten times. The Masechet concludes with an intriguing anecdote involving the Persian king Shabur Malka, Mar Yehuda, and a Canaanite slave named Bati bar Tuvi. Before serving Mar Yehuda, the king inserts the knife into the ground, adhering to Rav Ukva's method. Yet he omitted this step before serving Bati previously. When Bati questions the discrepancy, the king responds with a dismissive remark, implying that Bati lacks the same level of halachic stringency. In an alternate version of the story, the king's reply is even more pointed and accusatory.

Sep 1

Introduction to Masechet Horayot

Sep 1

Today's daf is sponsored by Lisa Elon in honor of her steadfast chevruta, Rhondda Ma Today's daf is sponsored by Lisa Elon in honor of her steadfast chevruta, Rhondda May, "May G-d grant us many more years of great learning together. " Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel Alexander Levy in memory of Jack Schuster, father of my chevruta , Rabbi Jordi Schuster. May his memory be for a blessing. Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Dicker in honor of Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker on her birthday. There is a debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding the kashering process known as niguv . In one version of the debate, Rav requires that ashes be used once during the process, while Shmuel requires them to be used twice. In another version, there is no actual disagreement—Rav simply omits the final step of rinsing with water, since its sole purpose is to remove the ashes. Shmuel, however, includes it as part of the process. How are wicker nets in a winepress kashered? Rabbi Avahu derives from the laws of purifying wicker nets that they require niguv . If the nets are made of reeds, which are more absorbent, they must be left unused for twelve months—or, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, until the next wine-making season. What is the practical difference between these two opinions? Rabbi Yossi offers an alternative to waiting a year: pouring boiling water over them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel cites Rabbi Yossi, suggesting instead that the nets be placed under running water for an onah . What is an onah ? Some define it as either a day or a night, while others say it means twelve hours. Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak explains that both interpretations ultimately mean the same thing. How? The strainer and baskets used in the winepress are kashered differently depending on the material they are made from, since the level of absorption varies. If grape clusters are placed in the winepress and surrounded by the juice from the grapes, are they considered a single unit for the purposes of impurity? This has practical implications: if an am haaretz —someone who may not be trusted regarding purity laws—touches one cluster, does that render all the surrounding clusters impure? If one purchases utensils from a non-Jew, how are they to be kashered? The method depends on how the utensil was used: if used with cold food, rinse with water; if used with hot water, perform hagala (boiling); and if exposed to direct fire, apply libun (burning with fire). A knife must be polished. All these utensils also require tevila —immersion in a mikveh. Two different phrases in Bamidbar 31:23, following the battle with Midian, are cited to derive the requirement for tevila . Why are both phrases needed? Rav Nachman explains that even new utensils purchased from a non-Jew require tevila , since kashered old utensils are considered equivalent to new ones. Borrowed utensils from a non-Jew do not require tevila , but a question arises regarding utensils given to a Jew as collateral. Metal and glass utensils require tevila , but earthenware does not. If an earthenware vessel is coated with a lead glaze, should it be treated as earthenware or as metal? If utensils were used without being kashered, is food prepared in them forbidden? The answer depends on when the vessel was last used and whether one holds that a substance imparting a bad flavor is permitted or prohibited. y, "May G-d grant us many more years of great learning together. " Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel Alexander Levy in memory of Jack Schuster, father of my chevruta , Rabbi Jordi Schuster. May his memory be for a blessing. Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Dicker in honor of Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker on her birthday. There is a debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding the kashering process known as niguv . In one version of the debate, Rav requires that ashes be used once during the process, while Shmuel requires them to be used twice. In another version, there is no actual disagreement—Rav simply omits the final step of rinsing with water, since its sole purpose is to remove the ashes. Shmuel, however, includes it as part of the process. How are wicker nets in a winepress kashered? Rabbi Avahu derives from the laws of purifying wicker nets that they require niguv . If the nets are made of reeds, which are more absorbent, they must be left unused for twelve months—or, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, until the next wine-making season. What is the practical difference between these two opinions? Rabbi Yossi offers an alternative to waiting a year: pouring boiling water over them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel cites Rabbi Yossi, suggesting instead that the nets be placed under running water for an onah . What is an onah ? Some define it as either a day or a night, while others say it means twelve hours. Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak explains that both interpretations ultimately mean the same thing. How? The strainer and baskets used in the winepress are kashered differently depending on the material they are made from, since the level of absorption varies. If grape clusters are placed in the winepress and surrounded by the juice from the grapes, are they considered a single unit for the purposes of impurity? This has practical implications: if an am haaretz —someone who may not be trusted regarding purity laws—touches one cluster, does that render all the surrounding clusters impure? If one purchases utensils from a non-Jew, how are they to be kashered? The method depends on how the utensil was used: if used with cold food, rinse with water; if used with hot water, perform hagala (boiling); and if exposed to direct fire, apply libun (burning with fire). A knife must be polished. All these utensils also require tevila —immersion in a mikveh. Two different phrases in Bamidbar 31:23, following the battle with Midian, are cited to derive the requirement for tevila . Why are both phrases needed? Rav Nachman explains that even new utensils purchased from a non-Jew require tevila , since kashered old utensils are considered equivalent to new ones. Borrowed utensils from a non-Jew do not require tevila , but a question arises regarding utensils given to a Jew as collateral. Metal and glass utensils require tevila , but earthenware does not. If an earthenware vessel is coated with a lead glaze, should it be treated as earthenware or as metal? If utensils were used without being kashered, is food prepared in them forbidden? The answer depends on when the vessel was last used and whether one holds that a substance imparting a bad flavor is permitted or prohibited.

Aug 31

This week's learning is dedicated by Carolyn Hochstadter, Adam Dicker and family on the 17th yahrzeit of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla v'Baruch this Monday, 8 Elul. "'Dad' was a holocaust survivor who was saved via the Kindertransport, came to Canada and met 'Ma' in Montreal. Together, they built a family, business, community, and legacy of support and love for Medinat Yisrael. We miss you and are managing to catch up on some of your reading material, including Menachem Elon's Mishpat Ivri — to which Hadran's Daf Yomi has given so much background and context. We continue to laugh at your jokes and follow your wise guidance. And also in honor of today's pidyon haben of our first Sabra grandchild, Zecharia Ami - Zach. Saba and Savta would be proud." Today's daf is sponsored by Rochel Cheifetz in commemoration of her husband's, Aryeh Leib ben Yehuda, Lenny Cheifetz's, 33rd yahrzeit. "You were taken much too soon. But I thank HKB"H for the time we were blessed with your smile, goodness, sense of humor, and love. Yehi zichro baruch ." Today's daf is sponsored by Emma Rinberg for a refuah shlemah for her son Joseph, Yosef Yitzchak Nisan Ben Nechama Leah Esther, who is having surgery today to repair a broken femur after a bike accident. The Mishna lists various items that are forbidden to derive benefit from and remain prohibited even in the smallest amount when mixed with permitted substances. The Gemara asks and explains why certain items are not included in the Mishna's list. If yayin nesech falls into a pit, the entire quantity of wine becomes forbidden. However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel ruled that the mixture may be sold, provided the value of the yayin nesech is deducted from the sale price. There is a debate among the amoraim about whether we rule like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in all cases, or only in specific situations—such as when a barrel of yayin nesech is mixed with a barrel of permitted wine, as opposed to a smaller quantity of forbidden wine that is mixed into a jug or barrel of permitted wine. To kasher a winepress that was used by or prepared by a non-Jew, the process depends on the material from which the winepress is made and whether it was lined with pitch.

Aug 29

The Mishna discusses the laws of nullification regarding yayin nesech (wine used for idolatry) that becomes mixed with permitted wine. It distinguishes between wine mixed with wine ( min b'minu —same substance), which is forbidden in any amount, and wine mixed with water ( min b'she'eino mino —different substance), which is prohibited only if it imparts taste. Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yochanan as saying that if one pours yayin nesech from a barrel into a pit of kosher wine, each drop is immediately nullified upon contact. The Gemara raises three challenges to Rav Dimi's interpretation based on the Mishna, and resolves them by reinterpreting the cases in the Mishna. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef offers a narrower understanding of Rabbi Yochanan's ruling—limiting it to pouring from a jug into a barrel, but not from a barrel into a pit. Ravin also transmits a halakha in Rabbi Yochanan's name regarding a mixture that includes a forbidden item combined with both a similar and a different substance. In such a case, the forbidden item is nullified by the different substance (e.g., yayin nesech mixed with wine and water), while the similar substance is viewed as if it is not there. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda also quotes Rabbi Yochanan, but there are two versions of his statement. In one version, he disagrees with Ravin and limits the ruling to cases where the different substance was present first. In the other version, his comment refers to the Mishna, and he actually agrees with Ravin. A debate between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan also concerns a case where a forbidden item is mixed with both a similar and a different substance. What is the underlying basis of their disagreement? Rav and Shmuel dispute the position of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether the distinction between mixtures of the same type and mixtures of different types applies universally to all prohibited items, or only to yayin nesech and tevel (untithed produce). The Gemara explains why the rabbis would have adopted a stricter approach with those two prohibitions.

Aug 29

The resolution to the second difficulty against Rav Ashi's position is rejected, and the Gemara concludes that pulling does affect acquisition for a non-Jew. The Mishna on Avodah Zarah 71 stresses the issue of agreement on price as a precondition for acquisition. Some situations arose regarding this issue in selling property. At first, Rav Yosef and Abaye disagree about whether or not the same principle applies in a sale, as the Mishna only discussed it about yayin nesech . However, the Gemara concludes that Abaye is correct, that the same logic applies for both, based on a ruling of Rav Huna, which was based on a Mishna in Bava Batra 85b. However, in a different case, there is a further debate about whether this holds, albeit under more unique circumstances. The Mishna discusses two cases. In the first case, a Jew pours wine through a funnel into the non-Jew's jug. If there are some droplets of wine in the funnel, they are prohibited. If the Jew pours wine from a vessel into another vessel, the wine in the first vessel is permitted, while the wine in the second vessel is prohibited. The Gemara first quotes a Mishna in Taharot 8:9 relating to the issue of nitzok , a stream of water, as regards impurity. If water that streams down becomes impure, i.e., is poured into an impure vessel, it does not affect the water at the top that has not entered the vessel. Rav Huna, however, ruled that the upper liquid would be forbidden in a parallel case of yayin nesech .

Aug 28

Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of Mitzi's brother Dr. Dennis Lock on his yahrtzeit. He was a loving husband, father, uncle, and grandfather, a devoted physician; and had a love of learning Talmud. He is sorely missed. Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel Bayefsky and Michael Francus in honor of their baby daughter Avital Temima, born 12 Av/August 6. "She is already listening to Rabbanit Farber's podcast during feedings! May she grow up to love learning." If a fleet enters a city during peacetime, any open wine barrels are deemed forbidden due to the concern that the soldiers may have drunk from them. In contrast, during wartime, it is assumed they would not have had time to drink, and therefore the wine is not considered to have been used for libations. However, a conflicting source suggests that even in times of war, the women of the city may have been raped. Rav Meri resolves this contradiction by distinguishing between the concern of rape and the concern of wine consumption. The Mishna discusses how a Jewish laborer who is paid in wine by a non-Jew can request monetary compensation in a manner that avoids the prohibition of benefiting from yayin nesech (wine used for idolatrous purposes). It raises the question: can a non-Jew pay a wine tax to the king on behalf of a Jew, or would that be prohibited due to the Jew deriving benefit from yayin nesech ? The Mishna further rules that when a Jew sells wine to a non-Jew, the price must be agreed upon before the wine is poured into the non-Jew's container. If not, the wine is considered to be in the non-Jew's possession before the sale is finalized, and the Jew would be benefiting from yayin nesech . Ameimar and Rav Ashi debate whether the act of pulling an item ( meshicha ) constitutes a valid acquisition ( kinyan ) for non-Jews. Rav Ashi, who holds that it does not, cites Rav's instruction to wine sellers to ensure they receive payment before measuring out the wine. However, the Gemara offers an alternative explanation for Rav's directive. A challenge is raised against Ameimar's view, and two difficulties are posed against Rav Ashi—one stemming from our Mishna. Ultimately, all objections are resolved.

Aug 27

Rava ruled that if a Jew is with a non-Jewish prostitute and there is wine present, one can assume that the Jew ensured the prostitute did not come into contact with the wine, and therefore it is permitted. Although he may not be able to control his sexual desires, he is not presumed to be lax in the laws of yayin nesech (forbidden wine). However, in the reverse case—where a Jewish prostitute is with a non-Jew—since the non-Jew holds the dominant position in the relationship, we assume she has no way to prevent him from touching the wine, and thus it is forbidden. There are nine different cases in which a Jew's wine was left with a non-Jew, and Rava issued rulings on whether the wine was permitted or forbidden in each instance. In many of these cases, he permitted the wine based on his assessment that the non-Jew would likely not have touched it, due to the possibility of being caught by the owner or another Jew. In other cases, there was uncertainty about whether the non-Jew had even come into contact with the wine, or whether the individuals present were Jews or non-Jews. Two additional cases were brought before other rabbis. In the second case, Abaye introduces a comparison to the laws of impurity, and the Gemara addresses this comparison. It notes that the rabbis were stricter regarding impurity laws than they were with wine, citing a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to support this point. Three challenges are raised against the positions of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan—two against Rav and one against Rabbi Yochanan—and each is resolved.

Aug 26

This week's learning is sponsored by Danielle & Jason Friedman in honor of Anabelle Friedman on her siyum of Mashechet Rosh Hashana on the occasion of her Bat Mitzvah, and in honor and appreciation of Rabbanit Michelle for inspiring and enabling multiple generations of women, in our family and around the world, to engage in Talmud study. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in memory of Myer Senders a"h, beloved father of our friend and co-learner Tina Lamm. "May the Torah learned today by all of us be a zechut for his neshama ותהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים." What is the law regarding a mouse that falls into vinegar? Is the mouse nullified, and if so, at what ratio? The Mishna presents three distinct scenarios involving a Jew and a non-Jew, where wine is left in a location accessible to the non-Jew, raising concerns about potential libation (נסך) and thus rendering the wine prohibited. In each case, the Mishna outlines whether there is reason to suspect that the non-Jew offered the wine as a libation. The determining factor is whether the Jew stated they would be gone for a while or whether the Jew is considered to be supervising. The Gemara defines supervision as a situation in which the Jew could return at any moment, even if they are not physically present. The amount of time that must elapse to prohibit the wine (in a case where the Jew leaves for a while) is debated between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Rabbis hold that the wine becomes prohibited if enough time passes to pierce the stopper, reseal it, and allow it to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the required time is that needed to break the stopper entirely, fashion a new one, and let it dry. A fourth case involves a non-Jew dining in a Jew's home, with wine left either on the table or on a side table. If the Jew leaves the room, there is concern that the non-Jew may touch the wine on the table, but not the wine on the side table—unless the Jew instructed the non-Jew to dilute the wine. If the bottle is sealed and enough time has passed for the stopper to be broken, replaced, and dried, the wine is prohibited. Why are all three cases necessary? What is unique about each, and why did the Mishna include them all? Rabbi Yochanan limits the scope of the debate between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to stoppers made of lime plaster, excluding those made of clay. If a non-Jew were to pierce a clay stopper and reseal it, the tampering would be visibly noticeable. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan's explanation from a braita , but it is ultimately resolved. Rava rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as the final case in the Mishna reflects his opinion exclusively, without presenting the view of the Rabbis. The sugya concludes with a practical question: If the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—requiring a longer time to prohibit the wine—and also follows Rabbi Eliezer (Avodah Zarah 31a), who permits leaving a barrel with a single seal in the possession of a non-Jew without concern for tampering, why is the current practice to avoid leaving wine in a non-Jew's possession? The Gemara answers that the concern lies with the bunghole, which was used to smell the wine. The worry is that the non-Jew might widen the hole to drink from it and offer the wine as a libation. Bungholes were apparently not present in barrels during the time of the Mishna but were commonly used at a later time in Babylonia when the question was asked.

Aug 25

This week's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik and Professor Adi Wyner in honor of the birth of their first Israeli grandson, David Rafael, son of Rivkah & Charlie Gottlieb. Davidi was born at Sheba Medical Center on 26 Tammuz/ July 22. He is named after his great-grandfathers, David Malik z"l and Dr. Donald Stoltz z"l. As we begin the month of Elul with the recitation of Tehillim 27 ("L'David HaShem Ori v'Yishi"), we continue to pray for Davidi's refuah shleima as he meets the challenges of a cleft palate, including surgery sometime before his first birthday. דוד רפאל בן רבקה אריאנא ואליעזר בנימין Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha in memory of her mother, חני מנדל בת שימה פיגה וירחמיאל הכהן, on her second yahrzeit. She was an eshet chayil whom we miss and think of every day. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir dispute whether a mixture is prohibited when the forbidden component imparts a bad taste to the permitted food. Ulla and Rabbi Yochanan differ on the scope of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir: Ulla holds that they disagree when the forbidden item initially gives a good taste and only later turns bad, while Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in a case where the bad taste is immediate. A challenge to Ulla's view is raised and resolved. The Gemara then asks whether Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in both scenarios, but the question remains unresolved. Rav Amram raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's view, noting that this debate is absent from the Mishna. After further searching, he identifies what seems to be the same dispute in Mishna Orlah 2:9. Rabbi Zeira, however, rejects the connection, explaining that the prohibition there rests on a different principle. A braita is then brought that directly supports Rabbi Yochanan: it describes a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding two leavening agents — one of truma , one of chullin — each potent enough to leaven dough on its own. Since adding both would cause over-leavening and produce a bad taste, this proves that there is indeed a debate in cases where a prohibited item imparts a bad taste. The braita lists another disputed scenario — when both leavening agents are added simultaneously. Abaye explains the need for this case: it was brought to clarify Rabbi Shimon's position that even when the prohibited agent initially aids leavening, if it acts in tandem with the permitted agent, it is not considered to have been beneficial to the dough initially, and therefore, the dough is permitted. A case is brought where a mouse fell into a barrel of beer, and Rav prohibited the consumption of the beer. Some assumed Rav ruled like Rabbi Meir, prohibiting mixtures even when the forbidden element imparts bad taste. Rav Sheshet instead interprets Rav's decision as a special stringency regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures), and two objections to this reading are resolved. Rava rejects Rav Sheshet's explanation and holds that if a prohibited item imparts bad taste, the mixture is permitted, and suggests either that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav, or that Rav held the mouse imparted a good taste to the beer.

Aug 24

Today's daf is sponsored by Laura Warshawsky in loving memory of her mother, Evelyn Margolis, on her second yahrzeit.

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Study Guide Avodah Zarah 46

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Jul 25

Today's daf is sponsored by Marcia Baum in memory of Sam Baum חיים שמחה בן אהרון הלוי וליבה on his 22nd yartzeit. "My father was a larger-than-life individual whose impact is still felt to this day. He would be immensely proud of his daughters and their progeny! " What are the laws of bishul akum (food cooked by a non-Jew)? Under what conditions is it permitted and when is it forbidden? If a Jew is involved in part of the cooking process, it is permitted - what type of involvement is necessary?

Jul 25

Jul 24

Today's daf is sponsored by Doreen Samuels for the shloshim of her dear mother, Elaine Charlton, Ella bat Rachmiel v'Riva Leah, z"l, on 23rd July - 27th Tammuz 5785. She was so proud of my Jewish learning." Rav and Shmuel disagree about the reason and origin of the prohibition on consuming oil from non-Jews. Rav maintains that Daniel instituted the ban to prevent intermarriage, while Shmuel attributes it to concerns of kashrut, arguing that the oil was placed in vessels previously used for non-kosher foods, causing flavor absorption. Three objections are raised against Rav's view, prompting revisions based on other teachings. Rav holds that Daniel prohibited the oil within city limits, while Hillel and Shamai's students extended the prohibition to the fields as part of the eighteen decrees enacted on a day when Shamai's students outnumbered Hillel's and successfully passed rulings by majority. That same day, wine and bread from non-Jews were also banned due to concerns related to their daughters—potentially leading to idol worship and "something else." Two interpretations are offered regarding "their daughters." Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak claims that the rabbis designated all non-Jewish females as possessing nidda impurity from birth, while Genieva, quoting Rav, suggests the concern was intermarriage. The Gemara challenges Rav's reasoning—intermarriage is already prohibited by Torah law. After a chain of responses and further inquiries, the conclusion is that Rav saw the decree as either a prohibition on marrying non-Jews outside the seven nations (if Torah law applies only to those) or a ban on seclusion with a non-Jewish woman. To what was the "something else" referring?

Jul 23

The interaction in the Mishna between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yishmael regarding this issue is analyzed and is also brought as proof for the previous sugya about the difference between betrothing a woman with the dung of an ox who killed a person and the dung of an animal that was used for worshipping idols. What are the reasons that the rabbis decreed that cheese from idol worshippers is forbidden to eat, but permitted for benefit? Six possible explanations for the decree against cheese are brought by various amoraim. The Mishna lists other decrees the rabbis instituted regarding items of idol worshippers, such as milk, bread, cooked items, oil, etc. The oil in the end was permitted by Rebbi and his court. Why is their milk forbidden? Rabbi Yochanan said that their bread was not permitted by the court. Why did he need to make this declaration?

Jul 22

Do glazed earthenware vessels absorb, and if so, to what extent? Can they be kashered? Meriemar appears to issue contradictory rulings regarding this topic, particularly vessels that contained wine of idol worshippers versus the kashering of vessels for Pesach. How is this contradiction resolved? Rabbi Akiva was asked three questions, one of which pertained to clay jugs previously owned by non-Jews. Unable to provide answers on the spot, he went to the beit midrash, where he ultimately discovered the correct rulings. The jugs can be used after twelve months of not having been used for wine. Grape seeds, grape peels, and fish stew ( morayis ) mentioned in the Mishna are discussed in detail, along with the halachic issues they raise. Different sages mention items that can be used after twelve months without undergoing any kashering process. Why are cheeses from Onaiki forbidden? Reish Lakish proposes an explanation, but his answer is challenged based on a seemingly contradictory statement he made in a different context. The resolution of this difficulty involves a clarification of his original statement. Feces from an ox that gored and was sentenced to be stoned are not forbidden, even though the ox itself is. However, feces from an animal that was used for idol worship are forbidden. The distinction between these two cases is clarified through logical reasoning and supported by verses from the Torah. Rava adds that our Mishna can also serve as a textual basis for these rulings.

Jul 21

What are the distinctions when engaging in business with an idol worshipper, a practicing Jew, or a Jew who has become an idol worshipper while traveling to or returning from the Tarput festival? What are the reasons that Jewish law differentiates between each of these cases? What types of vessels are considered more or less absorbent? This characteristic determines whether they require kashering, how the kashering process should be performed, or if they need it at all. Vessels that previously held wine and are eligible for kashering should be soaked in water for three consecutive days, with the water being replaced every twenty-four hours. Alternatively, the vessels may be placed in a furnace and kashered using the method of libun (intense heat). Another method involves placing fish brine or fish stew in the vessel, as the wine is instantly absorbed by these substances. What is the law regarding glazed vessels?

Jul 20

Vinegar produced by idol worshippers from beer is prohibited if there is a concern that wine yeast may have been added during its preparation. The Hadrianic earthenware shards are prohibited for any benefit, as they were soaked in wine with the intention that the absorbed wine would later be used to produce more wine. Rav Dimi provides a description of their preparation and use. A question is raised regarding whether one may benefit from the shards when the benefit comes not from the wine but from the shard itself—such as placing them under the legs of a bed for support. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan hold differing views on this issue. A difficulty is posed from a braita that supports the permissive opinion, but it is ultimately resolved. A second, seemingly contradictory braita is introduced to challenge the first, and it too is resolved with two possible explanations. What are the necessary criteria to prohibit a hide of an animal with an incision found near the heart—specifically, when can it be assumed that such an incision was made to remove the heart as part of an idolatrous offering? The Mishna discusses the status of an animal slaughtered and handled by an idol worshipper when carried into or out of a house of idol worship. Under what circumstances is there concern that the animal is being offered as a sacrifice to an idol, thereby rendering it prohibited for Jewish benefit? Which tannaitic authorities does the Mishna align with in this context? Is it permissible to engage in business dealings with idol worshippers as they enter or exit Tarput (either a festival or house of idol worship)? How does this ruling differ from conducting business with a Jew in similar circumstances? What are the reasons for this distinction?

Jul 18

If one entrusts items to an idol worshipper for safekeeping, should there be concern that they might have substituted their own items in place of the originals? How many seals are required on the item to eliminate suspicion of tampering? Can one purchase wine from the Cutim? Is there a concern that idol worshippers may have come into contact with the wine, rendering it prohibited? Why is beer produced by idol worshippers forbidden?

Jul 18

Today's daf is sponsored anonymously in honor of Elisa and Morris Hartstein, the founders of the amazing Amuta (NGO) – Operation Ethiopia. "Good luck on the upcoming medical mission this week. Your dedication and drive to bring basic and state-of-the-art eye care to those who are in dire need are inspirational." Which types of wine are not forbidden due to the concern that an idol worshipper may have used them as a libation for idol worship? Yayin mevushal is permitted if it belonged to and was cooked before it got into the possession of the idol worshipper. Which types of wines are not of concern if left uncovered overnight, that a snake may have inserted its venom? What other types of foods or fruits that have liquids (are juicy) do we need to be concerned about—or not concerned—that a snake may have inserted its venom? If a person is sleeping next to the uncovered liquid, will that prevent a snake from inserting its venom? What else, besides drinking, is forbidden to do with water that was left uncovered?

Jul 17

What are the foods or activities that one should avoid before or after undergoing bloodletting? Remedies for other ailments are also suggested. Additionally, what are ten specific food items that someone who was ill should avoid, as they may cause the illness to return more aggressively? If one receives a haircut from an idol worshipper, what precautions can be taken to ensure that they are not harmed? A Jew may cut the hair of a non-Jew but must be cautious not to approach the area of the belorit —a section of hair that idol worshippers grow long and then cut and offer to their gods. Certain items belonging to idol worshippers are forbidden not only to eat but also to derive benefit from, as they may have been used in the service of idolatry. Examples include wine and wine-containing products. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree regarding various items—whether the prohibition applies only to consumption or also to benefit. Why are their cheeses prohibited for consumption, yet—according to the rabbis—still permitted for benefit? Rabbi Yishmael once asked Rabbi Yehoshua about this matter, but did not receive a complete answer. Wine from an idol worshipper is forbidden for both consumption and benefit. This ruling is derived from a verse that compares it to their sacrificial offerings. Their sacrifices are forbidden to benefit from, and this is derived from the status of a dead person. A corpse is likewise forbidden to derive benefit from, as it is compared to the case of the egla arufa , which is brought for atonement and thus shares a similar status to a sacrifice, which is forbidden to benefit from ( meila ). What does the Mishna teach us by stating that their vinegar is forbidden if it was in the idol worshipper's possession while it was still wine? A similar question is posed regarding a statement made about yayin mevushal —cooked wine.

Jul 16

Two different opinions are presented regarding if and when one may receive medical treatment from an idol worshipper. Rav Yehuda strictly prohibits it under all circumstances, except when treating one's animals. Rabbi Yochanan, however, permits it if the patient would otherwise die without treatment. Additionally, two versions of a statement by Rabbi Yochanan offer further nuance. In the first, he prohibits receiving treatment from an idol worshipper for an illness severe enough to justify desecrating Shabbat. In the second, he forbids it only in cases of internal injuries. What is the practical difference between these two versions? Rav and Rabbi Yochanan also offer differing criteria for when desecrating Shabbat for medical treatment is permitted. Rav defines this case as a wound requiring assessment to determine whether the person will survive. Rabbi Yochanan, by contrast, permits for internal injuries. This leads to a question: are tooth pains considered internal injuries? Two sources are brought to address this, though neither offers a conclusive answer. The second source recounts a story in which Rabbi Yochanan himself sought medication from an idol worshipper for a tooth ailment and was prepared to desecrate Shabbat for it. This seems to contradict his stated prohibition against seeking such treatment for illnesses that permit desecrating Shabbat. How, then, was his action permissible? Finally, the Gemara offers various remedies suggested by the sages for various ailments, such as a gash from a sword, boils, high fever, hemorrhoids, earaches, and a dislocated jaw or eye.

Jul 15

Can an idol worshipper perform a brit mila on a Jew? If no Jew is available, is it preferable for a Samaritan (Cuti) or an idol worshipper to perform it? What are the sources for the various opinions, and which authorities support each view? Is brit mila required to be performed lishma —specifically for the sake of the mitzva? Two different verses are cited to explain why an idol worshipper may not perform a brit mila on a Jew. What is the practical difference between the two interpretations? The Gemara offers three possible distinctions, though the first two are ultimately rejected. The remaining practical implication concerns whether a woman is permitted to perform a brit mila . Can an idol worshipper perform a medical procedure or prescribe medicine for a Jew? Under what circumstances is it permitted? Is there a difference between an idol worshipper and a heretic, and if so, why? Why did Rabbi Yishmael not permit Ben Dama to be healed by a heretic? If the Torah says "and you shall live by them," why wasn't healing allowed in this case? Rabbi Yishmael prohibits transgressing idol worship and other commandments publicly, even under threat to life. This approach differs from Rabbi Akiva's opinion in Sanhedrin, which holds that one must give up one's life rather than transgress the three cardinal sins: idolatry, murder, and forbidden sexual relations.

Jul 14

Today's daf is sponsored by the Sussman family on their aliyanniversary. Mazal tov! "As we stepped off the plane 21 years ago with two little boys, we could never have imagined all that Israel would give to us these many years; nor could we fathom what our boys would be giving back to the land and nation. Am Yisrael Chai." Today's daf is sponsored by Julie Mendelsohn in honor of her daughter Hannah's graduation from medical school in Italy last week. "The Talmud teaches (Bava Kamma 85a) that permission is granted to a doctor to heal, and that a doctor is an essential partner with G-d in the healing of human beings. May you have wisdom, compassion and help from Heaven all of the days of your profession. Your hard work and persistence inspire all of us." A Jew cannot be a midwife or nursemaid for an idol worshipper. Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether an idol worshipper can be a midwife to deliver a Jew's child or nurse the Jew's child. Rabbi Meir forbids out of fear they may kill the child, while the rabbis permit if there is another Jew in the room, as there is no concern for murder in that case. A braita permits a Jew to be a midwife for an idol worshipper if they get paid. Rav Yosef explains that the reason for this is to prevent enmity. Rav Yosef suggests extending this to three other situations, but Abaye explains why in each case the Jew has a legitimate excuse and therefore it will not cause enmity and is forbidden. One cannot put an idol worshipper or a shepherd of small animals in a pit, but it is also not required to save them from a pit. However, heretics, informers and apostates can even be put in a pit by a Jew. What is the definition of a heretic and an apostate? Rabbi Meir and the rabbis have a similar debate about circumcising idol worshippers. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a braita to Rabbi Meir's position and tries to resolve it.

Jul 13

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 25 Today's daf is sponsored Malka Louzoun in memory of her father, Gilbert Louzoun, Nissim ben Sultana, on his 9th yahrzeit. "A man of many accomplishments, he taught us to work hard, to act honestly and with integrity, to be charitable, and to explore the world. Despite his great successes, he was a person of incredible humility. His warmth and intelligence are missed daily by all who knew him. The life lessons he taught us by simply being who he was, are ones we hope to pass to our children, the grandchildren he so dearly loved." How long did the sun stop in the time of Joshua? Two different versions are brought regarding a debate between three sages. Who else did the sun stop for? What is the " Sefer HaYashar " that is referred to both in the verse about the sun stopping (Joshua 10:13) and also in the Kina of David for the deaths of Shaul and Yonatan (Shmuel II 1:18)? The Mishna relates that a woman can't be alone with an idol worshipper. To what is the Mishna referring, as even with a Jew this is forbidden? Additionally, why is there no concern that the idol worshipper will kill her, as appears later in the Mishna when referring to a man? What precautions should a man take when walking alone on a path with an idol worshipper, to prevent a situation where the idol worshipper may kill him?

Jul 11

Several challenges are raised against Shila's interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer, who prohibits purchasing a red heifer from pagans based on a drasha on the word " vayikchu ." The well-known story of Dama ben Netina—a non-Jew highlighted as a model for honoring one's parents, illustrating the extent to which one must go to fulfill this mitzva—is cited in objection. This story raises questions both about Shila's interpretation and about the alternative explanation that Rabbi Eliezer prohibits the purchase due to concerns about bestiality. Either way, if purchasing from pagans is not permitted, how did the rabbis intend to acquire the red heifer from Dama? Additional difficulties are posed against Rabbi Eliezer's ruling that animals may not be purchased from pagans for sacrificial purposes.

Jul 11

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 23 Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in honor of her daughter Rina. "With love to my incredible daughter who started me on my Daf journey with Hadran. I am continuously in awe of her, with gratitude for who she is and what she contributes to the world." Two additional explanations (three in total) are presented to resolve the contradiction between our Mishna and the braita concerning whether one should be concerned that pagans engage in bestiality with animals. Ravina proposes that ideally, one should not place an animal in a secluded area with a pagan. However, if the animal is already with the pagan, there is no concern that they engaged in bestiality. Ravina attempts to support this distinction by resolving a similar contradiction: our Mishna prohibits a woman from being secluded with a pagan, while a Mishna in Ketubot 26b does not express concern that a captive woman engaged in relations with her captor. This proof, however, is dismissed for two reasons. Rabbi Pedat addresses the contradiction by suggesting that each source follows a different viewpoint—either that of Rabbi Eliezer or the rabbis—who disagree about whether a red heifer may be purchased from a pagan. The Gemara explores three alternate explanations of this debate in an effort to refute Rabbi Pedat's comparison, but all three are ultimately rejected. The Gemara draws an inference from the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding the red heifer, as interpreted by Rabbi Pedat. Their discussion revolves around a case where it is uncertain whether the animal was involved in bestiality. If it were known with certainty, the animal could not be used for the purification process. This suggests that the red heifer carries the sanctity of offerings made on the altar, rather than the sanctity of bedek habayit —items designated for Temple maintenance. However, this conclusion is rejected on two grounds.

Jul 10

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 22 Today's daf is sponsored in memory of Deena Kalker's grandmother Tzipora Shoshana bat Bracha z"l. May her memory be a comfort and a blessing. Today's daf is sponsored by Becky Goldstein for the refuah shleima of David Mordechai ben Raizel who is undergoing a procedure this morning. Please Gd for a succesful operation with שליחים נאמנים. The Mishna prohibits one to leave one's animal in an inn alone with a pagan as they are concerned the pagan will engage in bestiality with the animal and the Jew will transgress the prohibition to put a stumbling block in front of a blind person. The Gemara raises a contradiction to this from a braita that permits a Jew to buy an animal from a non-Jew to use for a sacrifice. Why is there no concern that the animal was used for bestiality, which would disqualify the animal for sacrifice? Rav Tachlifa quotes Rav who distinguishes between the pagan's own animal and someone else's, as bestiality is bad for the animal (females become unable to birth and males become weaker). Two difficulties are raised against Rav Tachlifa's answer and are resolved. Two other questions are asked about the Mishna. Why would it be forbidden to seclude a female pagan with a female animal? Does the prohibition apply to birds as well?

Jul 9

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 21 Can one sell or rent property to non-Jews in Israel, Syria, or outside of Israel entirely? What are the issues involved? What is at the root of this prohibition? How is it that people sell property anyway? What explanations did later authorities provide to explain this? Is it applicable to all non-Jews, or only to the seven nations, or only to idol worshippers? An additional issue is raised with renting a field or bathhouse to a non-Jew who will use it on Shabbat. In what situations is it permitted, and in what situations is it forbidden? What is the difference between a non-Jew and a Cuti (Samaritan)?

Jul 8

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether one may sell an item that is still attached to the ground—such as a tree—to a non-Jew, on the condition that the non-Jew will cut it down himself, or whether the item must first be detached in order for the sale to be permitted. The basis for this prohibition is the Torah's ban on selling land in Israel to gentiles, which extends to anything attached to the land. The source for this prohibition is found in Devarim (Deuteronomy) 7:2, in the phrase "לֹא תְחָנֵם" (" lo techanem "). From this verse, two additional prohibitions are derived: (1) praising or complimenting non-Jews, and (2) giving them gifts without compensation. Whether giving gifts is actually forbidden is the subject of a tannaitic dispute. The prohibition against praising non-Jews is also examined—does it truly apply? Seemingly contradictory sources are introduced, but ultimately reconciled with the prohibition. An additional question is raised: Does the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda extend to the prohibition against selling animals to non-Jews when the sale is for the purpose of slaughtering the animal?

Jul 7

In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with " ashrei ha'ish ," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga , the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.

Jul 6

Today's daf is sponsored by Emma Rinberg in memory of her beloved father Dr. Eric N. Glick - Yitzchak Nisan ben Yaacov v'Etta Faiga. "Though you died 35 years ago, your wisdom and caring nature accompany me daily." Rabbi Chanina ben Tradion's death is described - for what was he punished? How and why were others in his family punished with him? Rabbi Yosi ben Kisma predicted his death and in the aftermath of Rabbi Yosi's death, Rabbi Chanina gets caught by the Romans and is killed in exactly the way Rabbi Yosi predicted. His daughter is punished by being sent to be a prostitute, and Bruria, her sister, convinces her husband, Rabbi Meir, to rescue her. This ultimately leads to his being wanted by the Romans and he flees to Babylonia. The Gemara quotes braitot that list different activities that are forbidden to be involved in on account of being connected with idol worship and others because of " moshav leitzim ," which is defined as those who sit around idle and scorn others. The antidote to moshav leitzim is learning Torah, as is derived from verses in Tehillim 1:1-2.

Jul 4

The story of Rabbi Eliezer continues as he remembers a situation where he heard the claim of a heretic and agreed somewhat to his interpretation of the verse and assumes that is why he was punished. The Gemara discusses how much one should keep one's distance from heretics and from prostitutes/those who are forbidden to have sexual relations with. If one repents from being a heretic, one will die immediately - why? Does this apply only to heretics or also to those who engage in promiscuous sexual relations? Rabbi Chanina ben Tradion and Rabbi Elazer ben Prata are captured by the Romans - one is saved and one is killed? What is the explanation given for each one's fate?

Jul 4

Today's daf is sponsored by Kobi and Miri Darkei in honor of the birth of their new grandson, son of Reshit and Shlomo Breitley, brother to Cherut Shira, who enters today the brit of Avraham Avinu. "May he merit to grow in joy and health for Torah, marriage and good deeds, for the glory of the people of Israel and as a Jewish source of pride for his parents and family." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig in memory of her mother, Sarah Rosenzweig, a Holocaust survivor, and daughter of Vitti and David Greenbaum who perished in the Holocaust. "May her memory be a blessing. We miss her." Today's daf is sponsored by Shira Dishon for Staff Sergeant Eitan Dishon HY"D. "His 23rd birthday is on the 8th of Tammuz. At the end of chapter 23 in Tehillim it is written 'And I shall dwell in the house of Hashem for the length of days' - this was his dream. Since Eitan fell, I have merited through him to join Hadran and to learn the daf each day and to feel a bit of this dwelling in the house of the Hashem." Can one sell defensive weapons to non-Jews? What is the basis of the debate on this issue? Rabbi Yehuda permitted broken animals to be sold to gentiles. Does this apply to broken calves as well? Were they kept for reproducing, in which case they would be kept for the long-term (not purchased for slaughtering) and therefore forbidden to sell as people would notice they were sold and would think it is permitted to sell animals in general to gentiles. An ox that is being fattened for slaughter, can that animal be sold, as one can assume the gentile is purchasing for slaughter? The question is asked both according to the rabbi's position and Rabbi Yehuda's, as is explained by the Gemara. Can one sell dangerous animals to non-Jews? Are large non-domesticated animals ( chayot ) considered the same as large domesticated animals in terms of forbidding selling them to non-Jews? What types of buildings can Jews aid in the building process for non-Jews? Those that are used for judging people are problematic, as they would judge many people to death. The story of Rabbi Eliezer ben Horkanus is brought where he is captured by the Romans on suspicion of being a heretic.

Jul 3

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz "in memory of my very special mother Shirley K. Tydor (Sara Raizel bat Mordechai Yitzchak and Freidasima) on my birthday. A birthday is a time to make the world a better place: do a cheshbon nefesh (soul searching), give tzedaka, and thank one's mother for what she went through. And so I do, with love." Today's daf is sponsored by Batsheva & Daniel Pava on the second yahrzeit of Batsheva's father, Reb Shlomo ben Yehuda Aryeh Vegh, z"l. "My father was an orphaned child survivor of Auschwitz. He lived to see 3 generations of descendants, including grandchildren and great grandchildren serving in Tzahal and Sherut Leumi. Every morning, my father would get up at 5 am and learn gemara. He would also complete the entire Sefer Tehillim each week. My Dad is, and will forever be, my hero." Today's daf is sponsored by the Shuster family in memory of Dr. Sandra Shimoff, the mother of Randi Shuster. "Her devotion to the study of Torah and Shas will always be remembered by her family and all those who knew her." Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude to HaShem on the occasion of my engagement to Laini Millar Melnick. "I never thought I would be this happy again in my lifetime. I stood under the chuppa once and it worked out pretty well; I can't wait to stand under the chuppa again." Today's daf is sponsored by Debbie Pershan for the 17th yahrzeit of her mother, Tziril bat Moshe Pinchus. Why is it forbidden to sell large cattle to a non-Jew? After deliberations, they conclude that this is a decree lest the Jew rent it out or lend it, or concern of a "test ride" that may be done as Shabbat begins. Rav Ada permitted selling through a broker because these concerns don't apply in that case. Rav Huna sold a cow to a non-Jew and claimed that perhaps he bought it for slaughter. Rav Chisda challenged him - why don't we worry about the matters mentioned previously? After deliberation, Rav Ashi defines in what situations it is permitted/forbidden. Rabba sold a donkey to a Jew who was suspected of selling to non-Jews. Abaye challenged him and convinced Rabba that he had made a mistake. Within Abaye's challenge, he quoted a baraita that forbids a Jew from selling weapons to a non-Jew. Rav Dimi expanded this prohibition to selling weapons to Jewish bandits/robbers. Can one sell defensive items to non-Jews? This is a subject of debate.

Jul 2

Today's daf is sponsored by Mark & Semé Cooper in honor of their 25th wedding anniversary. Today's daf is sponsored by Marc and Becki Goldstein with gratitude to the Almighty who will אי"ה celebrate the marriage of their first granddaughter Amiah to Neria today. שיזכו להוסיף עוד חוליה בשרשרת הדורות לבנין עדי עד Today's daf is sponsored by Hannah Piotrkowski, with prayers for the refuah shleima of Michal Naomi bat Zahava Gita, who is having major surgery for a life-threatening illness. What items are forbidden to sell all year round to idol worshippers? The Babylonian amoraim struggled to understand the terms used in the Mishna and relied mainly on the scholars in Israel to explain them. It is permitted to sell large quantities of items that are generally used for idol worship, as they are for resale, and there is no prohibition of putting a stumbling block indirectly (selling to someone who may sell to others who will transgress the prohibition). If one sells them with other similar items that are not used for idol worship, there is a debate whether or not it is permitted. Rabbi Yona explains that if the buyer asked specifically for the item used for idol worship, one cannot sell. But if the buyer was not specific about which type, it is permitted to sell even the one used for idol worship. The Gemara raises two difficulties with Rabbi Yonah's position, but resolves them both. Whether or not it is forbidden to sell a small animal (like sheep, etc.) to non-Jews depends on the local custom, dependent on whether the non-Jews there engage in bestiality. It is forbidden to sell large animals to non-Jews, as it may lead one to rent them or loan them, which would be forbidden, as animals owned by Jews are not allowed to work on Shabbat.

Jul 1

Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in memory of Gitta's father, Yosef ben Menachem Mendel v'Pesha a"h on his tenth yahrzeit. He cherished his family and Torah, and would be so proud of the generations following in his footsteps and adhering to his values and moral compass. וכתר שם טוב עולה על כולם Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in memory of Moshe Hartman, z'l, on his 6th yahrzeit. He continues to be missed dearly. He would delight in my learning, his children's and his grandchildren's learning, which we will honor with a family siyum on his yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored by Monica Steiner in honor of Rabbi David Abraham Kaplinsky, who begins his first pulpit in San Antonio, Texas today. May you find joy and strength in your work and community. I am so proud of you, David, and love you with all my heart. In an idolatrous city, one may purchase from stores that are not decorated for idolatry, but not from those that are adorned for such purposes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about both the reason for this prohibition and its scope. Reish Lakish is concerned with decorations that have beautiful scents, as the Jews will benefit from idol worship. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the issue is because those stores pay tribute to the idols. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. In resolving the difficulty, the difficulty is moved to Rabbi Yochanan's position, but is resolved as well. Items purchased in a forbidden manner are to be rendered useless. For animals, this means to cut off the hooves. A question is asked why this isn't forbidden on account of tzaar baalei hayim - mistreatment of animals? Why, in another context of sanctified items, is the penalty to close the animal in a room and let it die? What is the difference between the two cases? If an animal purchased from an idol worshipper needs to have its hooves cut off, does something similar need to be done to a gentile slave that is purchased? The Gemara brings a different source to prove that one is not allowed to cause physical damage to a slave. What items can one not sell to an idol worshipper as part of the prohibition to put a stumbling block in front of a blind person?

Jun 30

Today's daf is sponsored with gratitude to HKB"H by Tina and Shalom Lamm on the occasion of the brit and naming of their new grandson, Shilo Lavi, born to their children, Bracha and Akiva Berger. When a city contains idol worshippers but the surrounding areas do not, business dealings with those outside the city are permitted even when the city celebrates its holidays. Reish Lakish, citing Rabbi Chanina, defines "outside the city" by referencing the bazaar of Gaza as an example. In an alternative version of this teaching, Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Chanina specifically about shopping in Gaza's bazaar, which was located just outside the city limits. Rabbi Chanina permitted this activity, comparing it to a situation where a Jew and a Gentile cook in separate pots on the same stove—a practice the rabbis allowed. Three sages offer different interpretations of this comparison. Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagree about whether one may walk through an idolatrous city during their holiday celebrations when traveling to reach another destination. The Gemara presents four cases involving someone who bends down to perform an action directly in front of an idol. Even without intending to bow, such behavior is prohibited unless one can act in a way that clearly does not appear to be worship. Why did the rabbis need to mention all four cases? One example involves drinking water from a fountain where water flows from a human statue, since this creates the appearance of kissing the idol. This case leads to another case: one should not drink water directly from a pipe for health reasons, as this might result in swallowing a leech. Swallowing a leech was considered life-threatening, and Rabbi Chanina even permitted boiling water on Shabbat for someone who had swallowed one. Rav Huna also recommended drinking vinegar while waiting for the water to boil. Drinking water at night was also considered dangerous due to the evil spirit called shavrirei , which was believed to cause blindness and could be life threatening. The Gemara offers several possible remedies for those who are thirsty and need to drink water at night. In an idolatrous city, one may purchase from stores that are not decorated for idolatry, but not from those that are adorned for such purposes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about both the reason for this prohibition and its scope.

Jun 29

This week's learning is sponsored anonymously in gratitude to Rabbi Carl Perkins, a learned and compassionate rabbi, a gifted teacher, whose love of Judaism inspires all who are blessed to know him. Today's daf is sponsored by Paul and Danielle Nacamuli. "Mazel tov to our daughter and son-in-law on their marriage, may you enjoy many years of joy together!" Today's daf is sponsored by Natanya Slomowitz in loving memory of her mother, Haviva Lilka bat Necha and Avraham. Onkelos converted to Judaism. The emperor sent three different groups of troops to seize him, but he convinced each group to convert to Judaism by explaining to them that God takes care of his people better than the Roman leaders. The prophecy told to Rivka when she was pregnant with Esau and Yaakov, "There are two nations in your womb," is explained as meaning "two proud/great ones" and refers to Rebbi and Antoninus, who were both blessed with plenty. What is the basis of the argument between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding whether it is forbidden to do business with idol worshippers on the day of the death of their king, only if there is burning or even if there is not? How does that connect with the braita that says the Jews burn the items of a king, and it is not forbidden because it is the way of the non-Jews? They would burn items not only when kings died, but also heads of the Sanhedrin. What types of items would be burned? The Mishna mentions the day of shaving his beard and his locks. Is this referring to two separate days - one of shaving the beard and one of shaving the locks on the back of his neck to be offered to the idol, or the day where one shaved his beard, but kept his locks to grow, to later be offered to the idol? The Gemara concludes that both answers are correct. Another Roman holiday is described where they would celebrate their dominion over the Jews. This one is not listed in the Mishna as it happened only once in a lifetime, or very infrequently. What were the Babylonian and Persian holidays? Rav Huna son of Rav Chisda listed several pagan temples with which it was forbidden to ever do business, as they offered sacrifices daily to the idols. Shmuel was lenient with holidays in the Diaspora and forbade only the day of the holiday itself.

Jun 27

Today's daf is sponsored by Samuel Berlad in honor of Esther Sarah bat Sarah, in thanks for a good and speedy result of her oral exams. The Gemara finishes the discussion of the dating of documents and then attempts to identify the meaning of the different terms used by the Mishna in describing the holidays of the pagans. Antoninus asked Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi several questions, and stories are told of their relationship. These stories and discussions highlight that not all the Romans were bad and some relied on Jews for advice and risked their lives to save them. How did Ketia bar Shalom try to help save the Jews from the Romans? Despite his outwitting the emperor, he was executed by the Romans specifically for outwitting the emperor. Upon his execution, a heavenly voice called out that Ketia acquired a place in the World-to-Come. When Rabbi Yehuda haNasi heard this, he cried and said, "There are those who acquire their share in the World-to-Come in one moment, while there are those for whom it takes many years."

Jun 27

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 9 The next six weeks of learning are dedicated to Susan Silkes, Sheina Blima bat Faigel for a refuah shleima from her loving and adoring friends. "Susan, you are the absolute epitome of ואהבת לרעך כמוך always putting others' needs first. Besides being a super bike rider, swimmer, hallah and chocolate chip cookie baker, you also started learning Daf Yomi with Hadran just a few months ago, taking on yet another new challenge and finding the daf so meaningful. We have no idea how you manage to fit so many of us into your life, but we are so very blessed that you do! חודש טוב מלא בריאות, רפואה ונעם ה'" Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in honor of our first year aliya-versary. כי טובה הארץ מאד מאד! How are they able to prove that the Romans first ruled pleasantly with the Jews for twenty-six years before subjugating them for one hundred and eighty years before they destroyed the Temple? Different calculations are brought regarding historical events from the time of the Second Temple period and the creation of the world. It was clear that different people counted years from different historical events, and the Rav Papa gives some tips for calculating what year one is in on one calendar if one knows what the year is according to a different calendar.

Jun 26

Today's daf is sponsored by Aviran and Miki Kadosh on the occasion of their son, Avishai's bar mitzvah and in honor of him completing Shas Mishnayot, Masechet Tamid and Masechet Taanit during the past year. "We wish that you continue to persevere in learning, to advance and grow wise in all your hobbies and areas of interest! Mazel tov!" Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari for the refuah shleima of Shaiel Ram ben Rivka. Today's daf is sponsored anonymously, "To all the women who have served as my role models for Jewish learning." In which place in prayer are personal requests inserted? What are the different opinions, and what is the basis for the dispute? What are the holidays of the idol worshippers during which there is a prohibition to sell to or buy from them? The Gemara works on the list of holidays and explains the reason behind the establishment of each of the holidays. Kalenda and Saturnalia were established in response to the first year of the first man (Adam) when he saw in winter that the days were getting shorter and thought that, because of his sin, God was returning the world to chaos. When he saw that the days were getting longer, he realized it was just the way of the world and established a holiday before and after that day on which the days began to lengthen (winter solstice). Another holiday was established in response to the successes of the Roman kingdom against the Egyptians and the Greeks. Rav Dimi explained that the Jews helped the Romans in their victory over the Greeks and ruled together with the Romans for twenty-six years before the Romans subjugated the Jews.

Jun 25

Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia Klein in loving memory of her brother, Bobby Klein, who passed away 40 years ago. "He taught us about love and acceptance. His humor, friendliness, and loving spirit is greatly missed." Rav Huna ruled like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, who distinguished between loans with a promissory note and those without, and permitted Jews to collect loans without a promissory note from gentiles before their holidays. He also ruled like Rabbi Yehuda on the issue of a dyer who dyed someone's wool the wrong color. Rav Yosef did not understand why Rav Huna needed to explain the ruling like Rabbi Yehuda, as he thought it was obvious from the stam Mishna in Bava Metzia that corresponded to his opinion, as when there is a Mishna with a debate that is followed by a stam Mishna, the ruling is always like the stam Mishna. What was that not obvious to Rav Huna? The Gemara quotes several other debates between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha and others in which the ruling is like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha. Rabbi Yishmael forbade doing business dealings with gentiles three days before and three days after their holidays. Shmuel explained that based on Rabbi Yishmael, it is forbidden to have any business dealings with Christians, as every Sunday they have a holiday. The rabbis disagree and forbid business dealings before. The Gemara questions how their opinion differs from the tanna's opinion in the first Mishna of the masechet. Four suggestions are brought. The last relates to an opinion of Nahum the Mede. There are several issues brought in the Gemara where Naum the Mede disagreed with the sages or individual sages on a particular issue, and the rabbis were unwilling to accept his position.

Jun 24

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 6 Today's daf is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman in loving memory of Masha's grandfather, Jacob Maltz, Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Aaron, ztz"l, on his 65th yahrzeit, which was last Thursday. "Although my Zeidie died when I was still a child, I was inspired by the stories of his sacrifices to stay religious at a time when many were leaving the fold. I still remember his smile, radiant with warmth and love." Today's daf is sponsored by Cliff and Minna Felig in honor of Michelle and Seth Farber on the occasion of their daughter Chani's marriage in the throes of our war with Iran. div]:bg-bg-000/50 [&_pre>div]:border-0.5 [&_pre>div]:border-border-400 [&_.ignore-pre-bg>div]:bg-transparent [&>div>div>:is(p,blockquote,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6)]:pl-2 [&>div>div>:is(p,blockquote,ul,ol,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6)]:pr-8"> _*]:min-w-0"> When the Mishna mentions "three days before the holiday," does this include the holiday itself (making three days total), or does it refer to three complete days prior to the holiday (with the holiday being additional)? The Gemara brings four sources attempting to prove that the Mishna means three full days before the holiday. While three proofs are rejected, the final one provides conclusive evidence. What underlies this prohibition? Is it because the idol worshipper will thank their gods for their commercial success, and the Jew will have indirectly caused idol worship, thereby transgressing the verse in Shmot 23:13: "Make no mention of names of other gods, they shall not be heard on your lips"? Or is the concern the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before others, as the Jew causes the idol worshipper to engage in idol worship? What is the practical ramification of these different rationales? If someone transgressed and conducted business with a gentile during the prohibited days before their holiday, is it forbidden to benefit from the money or items received? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this issue. Each raises objections against the other's position, and each resolves the difficulties posed against him. A braita is cited supporting Reish Lakish's view that benefiting from such transactions is permitted. Why does the Mishna forbid all the listed activities both when the Jew benefits the non-Jew and when the non-Jew benefits the Jew? What makes each of these cases unique, making it necessary for the Mishna to list them all? Regarding collecting loans from gentiles three days before their holidays, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree in the Mishna about whether this is forbidden or permitted. The Gemara introduces a third position from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, who distinguishes between oral loans and those documented in writing. Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha's position.

Jun 23

Reish Lakish explains that if the Jews had not sinned with the golden calf, later generations would not have been born because the Jews would have been transformed into angels. After several objections are raised against this statement, the sages reinterpret his words to mean that the Jews would have become similar to angels in that they would have become immortal, yet still have children. Difficulties are raised against this interpretation as well, but these are resolved. Why is it forbidden to conduct business with gentiles specifically during the three days preceding their holidays? Objections are raised against this three-day restriction by drawing comparisons to Jewish practices before their own holidays. How are these discrepancies resolved?

Jun 22

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here . For more information about What is a Siyum, click here. Siyum Masechet Shevuot is dedicated by Raquel & Joe Bijou in loving memory of our dearest Grandpa Richard Cohen. Naftali ben Yosef HaKohen. "You always cherished family and valued learning. By completing this masechet, we have accomplished both. We love and miss you deeply, and we hope to continue fulfilling many more mitzvot in your memory." If one watches an item belonging to another ( shomer ), there are different levels of responsibility, depending on whether the shomer was paid/not paid or one borrowed or rented an object. When a shomer takes a false oath regarding the item, if the lie either didn't change the level of responsibility or created an obligation instead of providing an exemption, then there is no liability since there were no financial repercussions from the lie. However, even though one is exempt from liability for an oath concerning a deposit, Rav rules that the person is still liable for an oath of expression. Shmuel disagrees. What is the basis of their debate?

Jun 22

This week's learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Chaim Avraham HaKohen ben Alter Gershon HaKohen. Various statements are brought regarding differences between the way God relates to Jews and non-Jews, and particularly that God punishes the Jews in small doses to enable them to get their reward in the World-to-Come.

Jun 20

Jun 20

Avodah Zarah Bookmark Masechet Avodah Zarah is sponsored by the Talmud class of Congregation Beth Jacob in Redwood City, CA in honor of the staff of Hadran who make learning possible. "Pirkei Avot 1:6 teaches us עֲשֵׂה לְךָ רַב, וּקְנֵה לְךָ חָבֵר, make for yourself a Rav, and acquire for yourself a companion. We are blessed to have Rabbanit Michelle Farber as our extraordinary teacher, and we- Leslie, Joe, David, Sue, Helen, Batya, Adam, Alana, and Bill- are blessed to have the companionship of our learning." Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik & Prof. Adi Wyner in honor of the upcoming wedding of their daughter, Eva Wyner, who was just promoted to Director of Jewish Affairs for the State of NY in Governor Hochul's Executive Chamber. And in honor of their future son-in-law, Reuven Rosen, who just graduated with honors from Rutgers' MD/ Ph.D. program and who will be starting his medical residency at NYU. The Mishna says that all types of business dealings with idol worshippers are forbidden three days before their holidays. Rav and Shmuel discuss the spelling of the word used for holidays - " eidaihem " - is it with an aleph or ayin ? From which verse in the Torah is the meaning of the term derived from, according to each opinion? One of the verses mentioned is the basis of a long aggada about the nations coming before God in the World-to-Come, looking to get rewarded. God reprimands them for never having kept the Torah. Various claims are made by the nations trying to justify why they didn't keep the Torah.

Jun 18

Introduction to Masechet Avodah Zarah

Jun 18

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

Jun 17

When both parties are untrustworthy and cannot take an oath, Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Meir disagree about the proper procedure. A debate emerges about who holds which opinion, as one maintains the money should be split while the other argues that the oath returns to its original place, though it remains unclear which rabbi said which. Additionally, there is disagreement about the meaning of the position stating "the oath returns to its place." Rabbi Ami explains that one position is held by the rabbis in Israel while the other belongs to the rabbis in Babylonia. Rav Pappa clarifies that the Babylonian rabbis are Rav and Shmuel, while the Israeli position is represented by Rabbi Abba. Shimon ben Tarfon offers several statements concerning the importance of associating with the right people and avoiding the wrong ones. The Gemara examines the case of a storekeeper who was asked to pay someone's workers. The workers claim they never received payment while the storekeeper insists he paid them. The question arises whether Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agreed with the Mishna's opinion that each party can take an oath to get paid by the employer. Another issue concerns contradictory witness testimony. If two groups of witnesses contradict each other in court, can they be believed to testify in a different case? Or since we know one group certainly lied, should we reject both groups' testimony in future cases? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda each take different positions on this matter.

Jun 16

Jun 15

Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim (Weiss) on the occasion of the Bat Mitzvah of her granddaughter Tamar Chava Baumser. "She demonstrates that there are no boundaries to acts of gemulat chasidim." Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Chani Farber and Saar Har-Chen, on the occasion of their wedding. We wish you a new home that will be grounded in the happiness that is promised to one who brings their learning always, as we learned with Chani's mother, Rabbanit Michelle: אַשְׁרִי מִי שֶׁבָּא לְכָאן וְתַלְמוּדוּ בְּיָדו. If the person who is obligated to take an oath by Torah law is not trustworthy, i.e. if they lied in a previous case or are in the category of those who are exempt from testifying, the obligation to take the oath is placed upon the other person. If one asks a storekeeper to pay their workers and they will pay back the storekeeper later, and the storekeeper claims that he/she paid them and the workers claim they were never paid, each of them takes an oath and the person needs to pay them both. Ben Nanas agrees that the person needs to pay both, but does not allow each side to take an oath as it creates a situation where clearly one side is taking a false oath. The Mishna lists other cases where there is a disagreement between a storekeeper and a buyer about whether the money was already paid or the item was given to the buyer. Who takes the oath in each case? Generally, when one holds a deed in hand, they have the upper hand. However, the Mishna mentions cases where the one holding the deed needs to take an oath in order to collect the money. The Gemara explains why the worker is believed to say he/she didn't get paid for a job performed. However, this halacha is qualified as only applying in a case where the time in which the worker should have been paid hasn't passed yet - once that time passes, there is an assumption that the employer paid the worker. Shmuel and Rav both hold that the worker can take this oath to get paid only if there were witnesses who saw the worker being hired. If not, the employer can claim he/she never hired the worker at all and therefore is believed by saying the worker was already paid because of a "migo." Rava disagrees with this.

Jun 13

Study Guide Shevuot 44 Is Shmuel's opinion—that a creditor who loses collateral cannot collect the loan even if the collateral was worth much less than the loan amount—the subject of a tannaitic debate? The Gemara suggests two possible tannaitic debates that could relate to this issue, but rejects both, since the basis for each argument can be explained differently. Generally, oaths are used to exempt defendants from payment. However, in several unique circumstances delineated in the Mishna, a claimant can take an oath in order to receive payment.

Jun 13

Today's daf is sponsored by Binyamin Cohen to wish Mazel tov to Caroline Musin Berkowitz on completing Shas! "We're inspired by your amazing accomplishment and dedication to learning." What categories of items are excluded from oaths of the shomrim ? How is this derived from the Torah? What is the argument between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis in the Mishna regarding items that are or are not considered like land (to be exempt from oaths)? Another criterion for oaths is that the claim must be for a measured item. Rava and Abaye disagree about how to understand this. The Mishna lists several cases regarding a disagreement between the creditor and debtor about the value of an item given as collateral that the creditor claims was lost. In which cases would one side, or perhaps both, need to take an oath? If one loans money with collateral and the item gets lost, what type of responsibility does the creditor assume for the item? What if the creditor and debtor disagree regarding the value of the lost item? Shmuel holds that the creditor no longer owes any money even if the item is worth significantly less than the loan. How does his opinion work with the Mishna?

Jun 12

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould "in gratitude to HaShem for helping me to find a new partner to love and be loved by, and to walk with on a new journey." The Gemara continues by presenting cases involving disputes between lenders and borrowers regarding debt repayment, along with the ruling given in each case. In the Mishna there is a contradiction because it is written that we do not administer oaths to a minor and it is also written that we administer oaths to a minor. Rav and Shmuel each interpret the case of administering oaths to a minor in different ways. Rav says it refers to a child who makes a claim for their deceased father's money, and therefore we administer an oath because the loan was to an adult, even though he is not the actual creditor who gave the money originally. According to his explanation, the Mishna matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov because the Sages disagree in such a case and do not obligate. The Gemara brings two different explanations to understand what the point of dispute is between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the Sages. Shmuel's explanation is that the Mishna refers to the oath of one who tries to collect his father's loan from an orphan. There is no oath for cases of land, slaves, documents, and consecrated property. Also, there are no laws of double, four and five payment, and oaths of guardians for these type of items. From where is this derived in the verses?

Jun 11

Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima for Shmuel Henoch Yaakov Ben Chiyena. Rav Nachman instituted a shevuat heiset , a rabbinic oath, for defendants who completely denied a claim. There is debate about the exact circumstances under which Rav Nachman required this oath. What distinguishes a Torah-mandated oath from a rabbinically instituted one ( heiset )? The Gemara presents three possible differences. Under what circumstances can a creditor demand that a debtor repay money in front of witnesses, such that without witnesses, the debtor's claim of having already repaid becomes invalid? The Gemara quotes two different versions of Rav Asi's position, as well as two different versions of Shmuel's response to Rav Asi. Their opinions are then questioned and explained in light of our Mishna. The Gemara presents four actual cases involving disputes between creditors and debtors, explaining how each case was ruled. In some instances, Abaye and Rava disagreed about the proper ruling.

Jun 10

Study Guide Shevuot 40 Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to understand the line in the Mishna regarding an oath of a partial admission: "a claim must be two ma'ah of silver" - is it referring to the amount of the claim - meaning what the claimant's side is demanding or is it referring to the defendant's claim - how much is the defendant denying? There are four attempts to support Rav's understanding from the Mishna and other tannaitic sources, however the first three can be explained according to Shmuel as well. Two other rulings of Shmuel are brought, including a basic one that if one claims the other owes two different items and the other admits of having one of the items, the defendant takes an oath of partial admission. Two versions are brought about whether Rabbi Yochanan agreed or disagreed with this opinion. Proofs are brought to prove Shmuel's opinion but are proven to be inconclusive. Likewise, those same proofs are brought to disprove the opinion that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees but are rejected in the same way.

Jun 9

Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Maggie Sandler's birthday! "Your incredible work elevates not just the content of our daily learning, but its entire atmosphere, as you create a beautiful, seamless experience for all of us. You truly bring to life the principle of hiddur mitzva that we learned in Masechet Shabbat: ״זֶה אֵלִי וְאַנְוֵהוּ״, הִתְנָאֵה לְפָנָיו בְּמִצְוֹת" Before administering the oath to a defendant, the court delivers several cautionary statements about the severity of swearing falsely. These warnings are designed to deter the person from taking a false oath. A braita lists all these statements, and the Gemara both raises difficulties with them and clarifies their meaning and sources. The Gemara then turns to a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding the minimum amounts required for a claim, denial, and admission. They disagree about the interpretation of the sentence: "The claim is two maah of silver and the admission is one pruta ." Rav holds that for the oath to apply, the total claim must amount to two maah and a pruta —with the minimum denial being two maah and the minimum admission being one pruta . Shmuel, however, rules that both the minimum admission and the minimum denial need only be worth a pruta each, while the minimum total claim must be worth two maah . Rava explains that Rav's interpretation finds support in the Mishna, while Shmuel's position aligns with the biblical verses in the Torah.

Jun 8

Study Guide Shevuot 38 This week's learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Helen Cohen, Henna bat Yitzchak Nechemia. Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg, in memory of her father Zvi Tyberg on his yahrzeit today. If one takes an oath of deposit to several people at once, in what circumstances will that be required to bring multiple sacrifices? The Mishna listed three different opinions and a braita is brought with two opinions - Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan bring different explanations as to which wording Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about. If one takes an oath that one does not have several items of another, if it was a lie, are they liable also for the general statement that they do not have any item or only on the particular different items? There is a debate between amoraim about this issue. The sixth chapter discusses an oath administered by the judges, more particularly an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. What is the minimum value of the claim and the partial admission required in order to be obligated to take an oath? Another requirement is that the admission be about the same type of item as the claim. However, Rabban Gamliel disagrees about this.

Jun 6

Regarding an oath on a deposit, Rav Kahana questions: if witnesses warned the person before taking the oath, that in the event they are lying, they will receive lashes, will they receive lashes in addition to a sacrifice or in place of the sacrifice? Several attempts are made to answer his question from various sources, but none are conclusive. Raba then challenges Rav Kahana's question and suggests that there can never be such a case because if there are witnesses to warn, then they must also be witnesses to the act in which case the denial is irrelevant as the witnesses can make the person pay, regardless of their denial. The Gemara then attempts to prove and then disprove this assumption of Raba that if there are witnesses, one cannot be obligated for an oath of deposit. Only from the last source do they succeed in conclusively disproving this assumption. Is an oath of deposit relevant in a case relating to land?

Jun 6

Today's daf is sponsored by Meryll Page in loving memory of her father George M. Levine, Yosef Michael haLevi, on his 16th yahrzeit. "His memory is a blessing and a constant presence in my life." Words can carry different meanings depending on their context. Several examples are brought from the Tanach to show the meanings of various words. Rabbi Meir and the rabbis debate whether invoking God's name in various contexts requires using the actual divine name or whether a substitute designation suffices. What textual sources do they cite to support their respective positions? One should be careful to change the language of the Mishna and even a verse if it may sound like one is cursing someone else while reciting it. In the Mishna, Rabbi Meir disagreed with the rabbis that one can apply the principle that allows deriving a positive statement from a negative one. However, this creates a contradiction with his stance on stipulations, where he maintains that they must be formulated in both positive and negative terms. To resolve this inconsistency, the text reassigns the positions—switching who said what in our Mishna. Under what circumstances would someone be obligated or exempt from bringing a guilt offering for an oath of deposit? In which situations could a person become liable for multiple sacrifices regarding a single oath of deposit? An oath of deposit applies only to denying monetary claims, not to matters involving fines.

Jun 5

Today's daf is sponsored by Avishag Edri for a refuah shleima and rescue of Alon Ben Idit. In which cases are people not obligated in an oath of testimony? What exact phraseology can be used for it to be considered an oath of testimony for which one is obligated to bring a sacrifice? Does one need to include the name of God? Is a word that refers to God also considered using the name of God? What names of God can or cannot be erased. There are various places in the Tanach where it is unclear if a word references God or someone else. The Gemara lists a number of these cases.

Jun 4

Study Guide Shevuot 34 Four different opinions are brought to explain why an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases. Difficulties are raised about each one of the four opinions and are resolved.

Jun 3

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines ( kenas )? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

Jun 1

An oath of testimony is only relevant when the claimant has asked the witnesses to testify. Shmuel ruled that if the claimant was chasing the witnesses and they swore they did not know any testimony, this would not be considered an oath of testimony. Why did Shmuel need to specify this particular case? From where do we derive that an oath of testimony initiated by others (rather than the witnesses themselves) is only valid if the witnesses agree to it in court? If the witnesses agreed to the oath while in court but had denied knowledge of the testimony multiple times previously outside the court, from where do we derive that they are liable for each denial made outside the court? The Mishna discusses a case where both witnesses testified together. Since two people cannot testify at exactly the same moment, this is understood to mean one witness testified immediately after the other ( toch k'dei dibbur - within the time it takes to speak a few words). The Mishna ruled that if the two witnesses did not testify one right after the other, the second witness is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. This principle is a matter of debate when applied to an oath of testimony involving a single witness. What is the underlying basis of this debate? Abaye makes a statement that sounds like a riddle: all agree regarding one witness in a sotah case, all agree regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, there is debate regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, all agree regarding one witness, and all agree regarding a case where the person who should take the oath is unable to do so. What is the meaning of each part of this cryptic statement? Rav Pappa adds additional cases where all agree.

Jun 1

Study Guide Shevuot 31 This week's learning is sponsored by Joy Benatar in memory of her mother, Miriam David, Malcah bat Meechael v'Esther, on her 9th yahrzeit. "A devoted wife, mother, grandmother, and educator." This week's learning is sponsored by Naomi Kadish for a refuah shleima for Mordechai Getzel ben Reizel and Chana bat Leah. Several bad practices are discouraged based on the verse in Shmot 23:7, "Distance yourself from false matters." After listing in the Mishna that women, relatives and disqualified witnesses are not obligated for an oath of testimony, there was a general line saying "And all who are not qualified to testify." Rav Pappa understands this line to include a king and Rav Acha to include a gambler. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding an oath of testimony taken outside the court on one's own? What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding an oath on a deposit initiated by others taken outside the court? Rav Pappa and his students disagreed about whether the root of the debate in both situations was the same. One is obligated to bring a sacrifice for an oath of testimony that was taken intentionally (the witnesses intentionally lied) and one for which they knew they were lying but did not understand the severity of the offense (that they would be obligated to bring a sacrifice. However, they do not bring a sacrifice if the witnesses do not remember that they knew the testimony. What part of the oath of testimony needs to take place in the court? In what situations can the witnesses be liable to bring several sacrifices?

May 30

What is an oath of testimony for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale sin offering? Anyone who cannot testify is excluded from responsibility, including women. The Gemara asks from where in the Torah is it derived that women cannot testify. They bring various braitot that all prove from the same verse, Devarim 19:17, each using a different drasha, that women cannot be witnesses. They learn other laws from that same verse regarding court cases, i.e. who stands and who sits, and requirements of the judges to be fair and balanced. What types of exceptions are made if a talmid chacham is being judged in the court?

May 30

Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in memory of Joy Rochwarger Balsam on her 21st yahrzeit. A pioneer of women's Jewish learning who cared for every Jew near and far. May her memory be a blessing for all her nephews and nieces serving in the IDF and protecting am Yisrael during these difficult times. What is an oath made in vain? There are three basic categories of this type of oath. Details regarding these categories are analyzed. The Mishna compares the cases where oaths of expression and oath in vain apply - men and women, non-kosher witnesses, in court or out of court, one who takes the oath on one's own or is sworn by another, etc. The laws are the same, other than the sacrifice, which only applies to oaths of expression. Shmuel states that one who answers amen to someone else's oath is as if they took an oath themselves. This is derived from two different places, one of them being our Mishna.

May 29

Today's daf is sponsored by Batsheva and Daniel Pava. "Eighty-one years ago, on bet Sivan, the deportation of Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz began. May our learning be dedicated to the memory of my great-grandmother, Raizel, my grandmother, Batsheva bat Yisroel, the Steinmetz and Vegh families of Apsha, and all the Jews of Marmarosh who were murdered in Auschwitz. May their memories be a blessing." Rava rules that one who takes an oath to not eat a loaf of bread, even if they have already eaten most of it, as long as there is still an olive bulk of bread left, the person can go to a chacham to repeal the oath retroactively. How can this case work with both the language of "I will not eat any of it" and "I will not eat it in its entirety"? A source is brought regarding a nazir to raise a contradiction to Rava. However, it is resolved in three possible ways. Ameimar disagrees with Rava and holds that one has even longer to repeal the oath, as long as the punishment has not yet been implemented. Rava explains that if an oath is made with a condition, if the condition is fulfilled without intention, the oath does not take effect. If the person remembers the condition but forgets the oath when eating the forbidden item, one is liable to bring a sacrifice. If the person remembers both the condition and the oath when eating both, and first eats the one fulfilling the condition, they will receive lashes. If the person first eats the forbidden one and then eats the one fulfilling the condition, it is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a warning given in doubt, hatraat safek . Rava continues with another case where a person said that each item is forbidden on condition that they eat the other item. He discusses four possible permutations of what the person did unintentionally and intentionally and explains the law in each case. Rav Meri brings support from a Mishna and braita for Rava's principle in the above cases that if the condition is fulfilled unintentionally, the oath does not go into effect. Avimi asks his brother Eifa about the ruling in different cases of a double/overlapping oath. Each time Eifa answers, Avimi disagrees with Eifa's ruling.

May 28

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in honor of Shira Krebs, our fearless Minneapolis Hadran convener, on yesterday's frailich wedding of her daughter Yonit to Yaakov Zinberg: Mazal tov!!! Tali Oberman sponsors today's daf in honor of her grandmother, Barbara Oberman, who has contributed greatly to the Jewish people and celebrated her 90th birthday this week. Would one be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one takes an oath of expression to fulfill a mitzva? There is a debate in the Mishna on this issue between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the rabbis. A braita teaches that one who takes an oath not to observe a mitzva or to observe a mitzva is not a valid oath. From where do they derive this? The working assumption is that the topic of the verse in the Torah is optional actions. From where is this derived? The Gemara brings three suggested answers, while the first one is rejected. If one takes an oath that repeats itself without adding on something new, the subsequent oaths are not valid and if one breaks them accidentally, one would be only obligated to bring one sacrifice. However, if the person were to go to a chacham to repeal the oath, the second oath would apply.

May 27

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg , unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet . Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

May 26

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa." Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression ( shevuot bitui ), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut , one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories.

May 25

This week's learning is sponsored by Dvora Lopez in loving memory of her mother on her 51st yahrzeit. "She had great strength and abundant love." This week's learning is sponsored by the Futornick family in honor of Shira's 21st birthday. This week's learning is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman, for a refuah shleima, a complete and speedy recovery, for Elisheva Mindel bat Masha Tzivia. The Mishna appears to contradict itself regarding general oaths about eating. It implies that a general oath "not to eat" would not include foods that cannot be eaten (which would encompass non-kosher food), yet another case in the Mishna rules that someone who makes a general oath "not to eat" does include non-kosher food in that prohibition. Two different resolutions are offered. The first resolution distinguishes between someone who made a general oath ("I will not eat") and someone who made a specific oath ("I will not eat regular and non-kosher foods"). The sages provide two different interpretations for why an oath that specifically mentions both non-kosher and kosher foods would be effective. Difficulties are raised against both positions, and one remains unresolved. The second interpretation explains that the previous implication from the Mishna is incorrect—"foods that cannot be eaten" refers to truly inedible items and does not include non-kosher foods, which are technically edible. The final case in the Mishna is cited as proof for this position but is ultimately rejected. What distinguishes issur kollel from issur mosif ? Issur kollel occurs when a second prohibition encompasses additional prohibited items, while issur mosif occurs when a second prohibition adds further restrictions to the same item or extends the prohibition to additional people. Based on this distinction, Rava explains why someone who accepts that issur mosif applies would not necessarily accept the same for issur kollel . Since issur mosif relates to a single item—adding a prohibition to the item itself or prohibiting the item to more people, it can apply. However, when additional items are included in the prohibition, it will not necessarily apply to what was already forbidden. Rava further explains that just as issur kollel takes effect, the same principle applies to an oath that includes other items. He needed to specify this because one might have assumed it only applies to prohibitions that arise independently, not to oaths where a person creates the prohibition. Rava the son of Raba raises a challenge to Rava's statement based on a Mishna in Kreitut, which suggests that an oath adding additional prohibitions would not apply to what was already forbidden. Six different explanations are offered to resolve this contradiction.

May 23

From where can one derive that the word "food" includes drinking? Does our Mishna support this understanding? In the cases in our Mishna where someone detailed a number of items that are forbidden, why is it assumed that they meant to create a separate oath for each item rather than to exclude other items from the oath? How does an expressive oath differ from an oath in which one denies having another person's item in one's possession? The debate regarding an oath that combines forbidden and permitted items, which was discussed previously, is now examined more in depth.

May 23

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot . A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot . There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta ). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot . If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law.

May 22

Study Guide Shevuot 21 Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan, Jessica Shklar, and Emily Michelson in commemoration of the seventh yahrzeit of their mother, Kadimah Freedman Michelson -- קדימה בת הרב אברהם זבי וחיה. We miss her every day. What is the type of oath that is included in the negative commandment - do not swear falsely in my (God's) name? There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yochanan's opinion on this matter - is it referring to an oath on future actions or on past actions? Difficulties are raised on both approaches and are resolved. When Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna says that one is obligated for not keeping to one's oath by eating a minuscule amount, meaning there is no requisite amount, does he hold this across the board (as per Rabbi Shimon's opinion), or only for oaths? The Gemara proves from other sources that it is a unique ruling only for oaths.

May 21

Today's daf is sponsored by Helen Danczak in memory of her beloved mother on her 28th yahrzeit. "Her love of family is a guiding force for me." Today's daf is sponsored by Debbie and Yossi Gevir on the birth of two new grandchildren. "With joy and gratitude to Hashem! Mazal Tov to our beloved children Elazar and Sarah on the birth, two months ago. of their daughter, Shaked Tova. And to our beloved children Eliav and Noya, upon the birth of their son Ofek Shalom, whose Brit was yesterday. שירבו שמחות בישראל! A contradiction is brought between a braita and the Mishna regarding the language "I take an oath that I will eat." This contradiction is resolved in two different ways. A braita explains what " mivta " is and what " isar " is. They are both languages of oaths. But an isar can be liable a sacrifice and also not necessarily. The meaning of this braita is a subject of debate between Abaye and Rava who disagree about whether isar is a language of being matpis on an oath or not. Rav Dimi explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan what negative commandments are transgressed by different types of oath of expression (past and future) and for vows. He explains that oaths about something that one will do in the future are "false oaths" and in the past are "vain oaths." However, there is a braita that says that false and vain oaths are the same. How can this braita be explained in light of Rav Dimi's statement?

May 20

Study Guide Shevuot 19 Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it. A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

May 19

The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing. Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal. Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control ( ones ). Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate.

May 18

Today's daf is dedicated to Mimi and Rafi Schachat on the birth of a daughter! Rava and Rav Ashi each pose a series of unresolved questions concerning the minimum duration one must spend in the Temple to incur the obligation of bringing a sacrifice if they became ritually impure while inside. They debate whether these requirements apply only to unwitting impurity or also to intentional cases, and whether similar requirements would apply to a nazir who unknowingly entered a cemetery. The Mishna states that one who leaves the Temple by the shortest path after becoming impure will be exempt from bringing a sacrifice, while one who takes a longer path will be obligated. The Gemara then questions whether this distinction is measured in terms of time or physical distance. Rabbi Oshaya offers a ruling regarding a leprous house: if one enters backward with only their nose remaining outside, they would not become impure, as the Torah imposes impurity only when entering a house in the typical manner. A braita supports this reasoning, noting that an impure person entering the Temple through the roof would not be liable for entering the Temple while impure, as entering through the roof is not the conventional method. The Mishna clarifies that entering the Temple while impure is excluded from cases where the community would bring a bull offering for an erroneous court ruling. The bull offering applies only to sins requiring a fixed sin offering, not to those requiring a sliding scale offering. However, a bull sin offering would be brought for an erroneous court ruling involving nidda, specifically in a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then attempts to understand the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment.

May 16

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Storch in honor of Patti Evan's birthday. " יומולדת שמח to my dear friend and c hevruta partner! Wishing you many more years of good health, Mazal and bracha . Loads of love." Are all the elements mentioned in the Mishna that are needed for sanctifying additional space essential or is it sufficient for just one of them? This has ramifications for expansions in the second Temple period where not all these elements were present. This debate is dependent on whether or not the kedusha from the first Temple remained forever or did it need to be resanctified in the time of Ezra. From where is it derived that one who becomes impure while in the Temple will need to bring a sliding-scale sacrifice if one doesn't leave the temple immediately? What are the measurements for how long one needs to be in there to be obligated in the sacrifice? Would it be the same measurements for one who did it intentionally and will be punished by lashes?

May 16

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of Tzeela Gez and for the refuah shleima of her newborn son. The ceremony for consecrated additional space in Jerusalem and the azara of the Temple is discussed at length. Consecrating additional space was done in the same way that the Temple was dedicated as is derived from a verse in Shmot 25:9. If so, why were Temple vessels consecrating differently? Two thanksgiving offerings were carried during the procession of consecrating additional space to the city of Jerusalem. This is derived from the ceremony in Nechemia of consecrating the city of Jerusalem. How is it clear that it was bread from the thanksgiving offering, not animals? Just as Jerusalem is consecrated with thanksgiving breads, which are only permitted to be eaten in the city of Jerusalem, so the consecration of the azara is with the remainder of the meal offerings, which are only permitted to be eaten in the azara. Why are they also not made from chametz, as the thanksgiving breads are? What songs (Psalms) were recited? Why? In what formation were the breads carried?

May 15

Study Guide Shevuot 14 Questions on the braita at the end of Shevuot 13b are raised and answered. The second chapter starts with a description of the 4 cases of " yediot ha'tuma " and explains the four cases. It also describes the laws of one who becomes impure while inside the Temple. Rav Papa challenges the number four used in the Mishna and the Gemara brings 2 versions of his answer to his own question. A few questions for which there are no answers regarding the criteria for having known something and then forgotten it, for which one is obligated to bring a sacrifice.

May 14

This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi to the continued health and good outcome for Chesya Rut bat Chana. The Mishna explains that Yom Kippur atones for positive commandments. If one has already repented, they receive atonement immediately. Therefore, it is assumed that the Mishna is referring to one who has not yet repented. This accords with the opinion of Rebbi who holds that Yom Kippur atones even for sins for which one has not yet repented. The rabbis disagree and hold that Yom Kippur only atones for sins if one has repented. A difficulty is raised as the next part of the Mishna accords with Rabbi Yehuda's position that the goat sent to Azazel atones for kohanim as well. This issue is resolved - both parts of the Mishna are attributed to Rebbi, and on the issue of the goat to Azazel, he adopts Rabbi Yehuda's position. Abaye asked Rav Yosef if Rabbi Yehuda holds by Rebbi's position regarding one who did not repent before Yom Kippur. Rav Yosef explains that he does not and brings a source from Safra to support his answer, as it is known that an unattributed Safra is assumed to be authored by Rabbi Yehuda. There is a contradiction between two different sources in the Safra - one says that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance and the other says it only atones with repentance. Abaye and Rava each resolve the contradiction differently. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which sacrifices on Yom Kippur atone for all the kohanim's sins - the goat that is sent to Azazel or the bull of the high priest. What is the basis in the verses in the Torah for each of the approaches? A braita is brought regarding which sacrifice atones for the sins of the kohanim. Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the braita's author is Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda.

May 13

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Idan Alexander after 584 days in captivity. Wishing him a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages. According to Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether or not animals left over from the previous year that were designated for the Tamid sacrifice can be redeemed without a blemish. The Gemara tries to find a source for Rabbi Yochanan's understanding that the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon, but they are not successful. According to Rabbi Shimon, they cannot - so what does one do with them? If they were designated for communal burnt offerings, they would sacrifice them as voluntary communal offerings on the altar meant to keep the altar busy at all times. If they were designated for communal sin offerings, they could not be used directly as voluntary burnt offerings so they would wait until they were blemished, redeem them, and buy animals with the money to be sacrificed as voluntary burnt offerings. There is a concern that if this were to be permitted, one may think that one can change the destination even at an earlier stage (before the atonement for that sacrifice is achieved. The rabbis bring three tannaitic sources to support this. Another braita is brought to support the explanation that the extra animals designated for the Tamid sacrifice are used for voluntary burnt offerings. Can one purchase birds for the burnt offerings used to fill the altar? Shmuel also held like Rabbi Yochanan that according to Rabbi Shimon, the extra animals could be used as voluntary burnt offerings. What is the source for the fact that the goat offering brought inside on Yom Kippur atones also for intentional sins of impurity in the Temple?

May 12

Study Guide Shevuot 11 Today's daf is sponsored by the Pittsburgh daf yomi group for a refuah shleima for Rabbi Amy Bardack, haRav Ahuva bat Liba who is having surgery today. "Wishing our organizer and leader a speedy recovery." In support of Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that leftover animals designated for communal offerings can be redeemed at the end of the year, Raba brings an example of incense which has inherent sanctity and can be redeemed at the end of the year. Rav Chisda disagrees with Raba as he holds that incense does not have inherent sanctity until a later stage when it is brought into a sanctified vessel just before being offered on the altar. Raba proves his position that it has inherent sanctity. The Gemara then returns to Rav Chisda's original question of how can one redeem items with inherent sanctity. Raba answers that the court stipulates at the beginning of the year that any animals not needed will be only sanctified for their value. Abaye raises a difficulty from other communal offerings that cannot be redeemed if lost and replaced and then found. However, Raba answers that the stipulation is for typical, not atypical cases. Why, then, can the red heifer be redeemed in certain circumstances? The Gemara concludes that a stipulation is made because of its high value. Abaye raises a further difficulty from our Mishna, as Rabbi Shimon answers a question about whether animals designated for one sacrifice that are leftover can be used for another with a particular answer instead of answering that the court stipulated such, as Raba would have said. Raba answers that Rabbi Shimon doesn't agree with the rabbis that the court can stipulate. Rabbi Yochanan and Raba's approach is based only on the rabbis' position.

May 11

Study Guide Shevuot 10 This week's learning is sponsored by Moshe Silver in loving memory of Rebbitzen Miriam Maxine Elkins who passed away on Yom haAtzmaut. "Her love of Torah, the Jewish people, and the land and State of Israel was unsurpassed. Her loving family - Rabbi Dov Pearetz Elkins and her children - bear the lasting imprint of the passion she brought to everything she did, as do all of us who loved her." This week's learning is sponsored by Vicky Harari in loving memory of her father Abraham Eckstein. "He had a smile that could light up the room. He taught me what I know about love. As a Holocaust survivor, he taught me gratitude and resilience something that I have been relying on more today than ever." The Gemara continues to extrapolate verses to explain the basis of the opinions of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishna regarding which sacrifices do each of the communal sin offerings atone for. Ulla explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the extra sheep left at the end of the year that were designated for the Tamid (daily) sacrifice, but were not needed, are redeemed and repurchased with money from that next year's funds. When Raba explained this halakha, Rav Chisda raised a difficulty - how can an item that is sanctified with kedushat haguf be redeemed? Raba responds by bringing an example from the incense, which is sanctified and can be redeemed. However, this is rejected as the sanctity of the incense is kedushat damim , its value is sanctified, not kedushat haguf .

May 9

Study Guide Shevuot 9 Today's daf is sponsored by Leya Landau in loving memory of her mother Ita bat Zvi on her 3rd yahrzeit. "She loved learning and encouraged me to start learning the daf." Today's daf is sponsored by Naama Tal in loving memory of her grandmother Devorah Cohen, who always valued learning. The Gemara analyzes the different opinions brought in the Mishna regarding the purposes of the goat sin offerings brought on the outer altar on Yom Kippur and on the regalim and Rosh Chodesh. What is the basis for each opinion?

May 9

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?

May 8

From where is it derived that the verses that obligate one to bring a sliding scale sin offering if one is impure refer to one who entered the Temple or ate sacrificial items? Four different answers are brought and analyzed. Some are rejected. From where is it derived that the sin offering of Yom Kippur offered inside is to atone for one who entered the Temple impure or ate sacrificial items when they knew at first they were impure, then forgot and then didn't remember?

May 7

This week's learning is sponsored by Audrey Mondrow in loving memory of Bessie "Nanny" Mauskopf, Basha Leah bat Tzivia Chaya and Meyer Yehuda. "A very special mother. By example she taught me how to be a mother and grandmother. We miss her dearly. May her Neshama have an Aliyah." The Mishna in Negaim is similar to the Mishna in Shevuot regarding the two shades of white that are considered leprous in the Torah and the two that the Rabbis added, and elaborates a little more. The Gemara explains that the Mishna there doesn't match Rabbi Akiva's opinion as the Mishna connects between avot , main categories and toladot , sub-categories and Rabbi Akiva connects between the order of the shades of white, which would mean one main category, baheret , then the next main category, se'et , and then each of their sub-categories – first the one for baheret , then the one for se'et . From where do we know that this is Rabbi Akiva's position? The first attempt to find the source is unsuccessful but it is proven from a second source. From where do we derive that baheret also has sub-categories if the word in the verse mentioning sub-categories, sapachat , is said in connection with se'et ? From where is it derived that the verses that obligate one to bring a sliding scale sin offering if one is impure refer to one who entered the Temple or ate sacrificial items?

May 6

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle Altman in honor of her husband, Daniel Altman, on his fourth completion of the Daf Yomi cycle. "May he continue teaching the Daf and inspiring people to learn the Daf for decades to come, in good health." When Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi wrote in the Mishna "Shevuot there are two that are four," was it his own opinion also or was he just quoting Rabbi Akiva's opinion but he actually doesn't hold that way? At first, they tried to prove it was Rebbi's own opinion, but this option failed and they adopted the other explanation. Rebbi holds that " v'neelam " means he knew and then forgot - does that word necessarily translate in that manner? By a woman who is a sotah , that word is mentioned and it doesn't mean that. The Mishna states "Taking things out on Shabbat there are two that are four" - this is different from the Mishna in Shabbat which lists two that are four inside and two that are four outside. What are the mishnayot in each place referring to and why are they referring to different things? The Mishna states "Leprous marks two that are four" - does the Mishna not accord with Rabbi Akiva's position?

May 5

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim ." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.

May 4

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her." The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar , leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei , for which one is exempt from lashes.

May 2

Shevuot bookmark Study Guide Shevuot 2 Masechet Shevuot is sponsored by Janet Hod "With immense gratitude to Hashem and also to Michelle and the Hadran team for all that they do" The Mishna lists four topics, each with four types of cases - two mentioned explicitly in the Torah and two that are extensions of the rabbis. the first topic is an oath of expression, when one takes an oath to either do or not to do something. The second is a person who is impure and forgets about their impure status and goes into the Temple or eats sacrificial items. The third and fourth relate to laws of carrying from one domain to another and a leprous mark. The first two cases incur the same type of sacrifice - a sliding scale offering, what one brings depends on the financial means of the one obligated to bring the sacrifice. The Mishna elaborates on the second category - one who goes to the Temple while impure and forgets momentarily about being impure or ate sacrificial items while being in a state of impurity. The process of atonement is through an individual sin offering. If one never realizes one's mistake or one does not even know that one became impure, one receives atonement from communal sin offerings. There are several communal sin offerings - brought on Rosh Chodesh, the three holidays ( regalim ) and Yom Kippur. For what sins do each of them atone? Are they meant to atone for the same transgressions or for different ones? What do the other sacrifices brought on Yom Kippur atone for (the two goats that are determined by a lottery - one is offered inside the Temple and one sent to Azazel )? There are several opinions about the purpose of each of the above sacrifices. For what purpose is the bull offering of the High Priest on Yom Kippur?

May 2

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here . For more information about What is a Siyum, click here While there are 613 mitzvot in the Torah, King David and some of the prophets narrowed it down to a smaller list of the most basic mitzvot. Why were these specific ones chosen, most of them relating to justice and righteousness and involving relations between people? The masechet ends with the famous story of Rabbi Akiva laughing when seeing a fox running out of the kodesh kodashim or hearing the Romans on their way to attack, after the Temple was already destroyed, while his friends were crying. When questioned about his reaction, he explains, based on verses, that in order for the positive prophecy of Zecharia to be fulfilled, first the negative prophesy of Uriah needs to be fulfilled.

May 1

Introduction to Masechet Shevuot

May 1

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers. We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters. How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet . According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet ? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition.

Apr 30

Today's daf is dedicated to the memory of the fallen soldiers of the IDF and security forces who fell in defense of Am Yisrael and Eretz Israel , and to the memory of those whose lives were tragically lost in terrorist attacks. May their memories be blessed. We are especially thinking of our Hadran learners who have lost children, grandchildren, siblings and close friends in the past year and a half. We continue to pray for the safety of our soldiers, for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers. Today's daf is sponsored by Naomi Cohen in loving memory of her mother, Elisheva bat Yehuda, Elisabeth Maybaum, on her 6th yahrzeit. "Having fled the Nazi regime as a child, it gave her such joy and hope to see her children and grandchildren living Jewish lives, learning Torah, settling in Eretz Israel and defending it. Tehi zichra baruch ." Does one get multiple punishments for an act on yom tov that involves multiple melachot (as is the case for sacrifices for one who violates Shabbat)? If so, why isn't planting also listed in the Mishna? The Mishna listed a case where one plowed and received eight sets of lashes because of unique circumstances. Seven other suggestions are made to cases that could have been brought in the Mishna that would have added an additional set of lashes. Cases are brought regarding cross breeding with animals that are considered both hekdesh and chulin . How many lashes does one receive? If one cannot receive that many, the court assesses how many they can handle (must be a number divisible by 3). What if they change the assessment? Does it depend on whether they already starting giving the person lashes or not? On what else does it depend? How does an assessment work when there are multiple sets of lashes? How does the actual giving of lashes take place? What type of whip do they use? Where does the person receive the whipping?

Apr 29

Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's father, Dr. Abraham Geffen, on his 10th yahrzeit. "He was the youngest of 8 children of Rav Tuvia and Sara Hene Geffen of Atlanta, and was devoted to his wife Ethel, his three children as well as his parents, siblings and extended family, synagogue community (Beth El of New Rochelle, NY) and was a dedicated physician, the Director of Radiology at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York for many years." What are the parameters of the prohibition to make an incision in one's body as an act of mourning? How are these details derived from the verses? Why is it forbidden to shave the corners of the beard specifically with a razor? Rabbi Eilezer adds other implements - tweezers and a plane. Why those and not scissors? What are the parameters of the prohibition of imprinting a tattoo? The Mishna lists various ways that one can be liable for many sets of lashes for the same action, or receive multiple sets of lashes for one action as one violated many negative commandments.

Apr 28

Today's daf is sponsored by Rochelle Cheifetz in loving memory of her mother, Chana Cohen, Chana bat Rav Moshe and Tzipora Mashbaum, on her 4th yartzeit. "You graced us all with your glorious smile, innate wisdom and beautiful neshama. To say that you are missed every day is an understatement." Today's daf is for the refuah shleima of Elad ben Netta. The Gemara questions Rabbi Yochanan's statement that one only receives lashes for eating maaser sheni outside Jerusalem after it was brought into Jerusalem, based on a derivation from Rabbi Yosi's words ina braita. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the derivation from Rabbi Yosi's as referring to a case where the produce had already been brought into Jerusalem, and the innovation is that it entered while still being tevel (untithed produce), and he holds that gifts that have not been separated are considered as if they have been separated. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with this resolution (because it seems R' Yosi doesn't actually hold this position). The Gemara then presents two answers from Rabba and Ravina to resolve this difficulty. One who makes a bald spot on his head as a sign of mourning for the dead, who rounds the corners of his head or destroys the hair on his beard, or who makes a cut in his flesh for the dead receives lashes. The Gemara discusses the details of these commandments and the minimum measurements for which one would be liable.

Apr 27

This week's learning is sponsored by Sara Averick & Jose Rosenfeld in loving memory of Sara's beloved Aunt Rose, Rachel bat Chaim Nisan haLevi v'Nechama. "She was a Yiddish scholar who adored all her nieces and nephews. She was a beacon of light, laughter and joy." Rava bar Ada said in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak that a non-kohen is only liable for eating bikkurim once they have been brought into the azara , since until that point, they are still considered chulin . , not sacred. Rav Sheshet ruled that placing the bikkurim in front of the altar is critical, but reading the mikra bikkurim is not. The Gemara brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael trying to prove that Rav Sheshet holds by his opinion. However, this suggestion is rejected. In the braita, Rabbi Yishmael derives the source for not eating maaser sheni after the destruction of the Temple. First, he tries to prove it from bechor , a firstborn animal, But after he rejects this suggestion, he proves it from a heikesh , a juxtaposition, from a verse in the Torah. The Gemara raises some questions against some of the content in the braita. Why couldn't they derive the law about maaser sheni from bechor and bikkurim together? Secondly, why was it so clear that the meat of a bechor could not be eaten after the Temple was destroyed, if, for example, the animal had already been offered as a sacrifice before the destruction? The first and second Mishna in the chapter both mention lashes for eating maaser sheni . To explain why the repetition, Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina establishes the second Mishna in a case of an impure person eating it in Jerusalem or the produce itself was impure and the person ate it in Jerusalem, whereas the first Mishna related to one receiving lashes for eating it outside Jerusalem (in a pure state). What is the source for receiving lashes for impurity of either the maaser sheni or the person eating it? From where is it derived that maaser sheni can be redeemed in Jerusalem if it is impure? From where is it derived that if a person bringing maaser sheni to Jerusalem is one step outside the walls of Jerusalem, one can still redeem it? What if the person is carrying it on their back and their body is in Jerusalem but the produce is not yet in Jerusalem?

Apr 25

The braita brought on Makkot 17 with Rabbi Shimon's position is amended, as the original version was rejected. Rava ruled that a non-kohen who ate from a burnt offering before the blood was sprinkled transgressed five different transgressions. The Gemara questions why there aren't more than five transgressions, and suggests four more that could have been mentioned. They explain why each one was not in rava's list. Rav Gidel quoted a halakha in the name of Rav that a kohen that ate from a guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled would receive lashes. After raising a difficulty on this statement, they emend his words to be referring to a non-kohen andhe does not receive lashes for eating guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Elazar, and then Rabbi Yochanan are quoted as having said that placing the bikkurim is critical to the fulfillment of the mitzva, but reading the text is not. A contradiction is raised on each of them from other statements they made. However, they are resolved.

Apr 25

Rav holds that if even the poor person's tithe wasn't separated, the produce is considered tevel and one who eats it receives lashes. The tannaitic opinion of Rabbi Yosi supports this. Rav Yosef explains that this is a tannaitic debate, as seen in a disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. However, Abaye rejects Rav Yosef's explanation of the debate and claims it could be based on a different issue. The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the Mishna regarding the requisite amount that one must eat of untithed produce to receive lashes - is it any amount or an olive-bulk? Rabbi Shimon, who holds it is any amount, questions the rabbis from the prohibition to eat an ant, for which one receives lashes even for eating just one. The rabbis counter by explaining that an ant is a complete creature and therefore has significance. But Rabbi Shimon responds that a complete grain of wheat also has significance. Rav Bivi and Rabbi Yirmia disagree about what Reish Lakish held about this debate - is it only about a grain of wheat or even about flour, as the flour is ground and not a complete grain and perhaps it loses its significance? Other sins are listed regarding sins concerning the Temple for which one would get lashes. The opinion in the Mishna matches Rabbi Akiva's opinion, which was also his student Rabbi Shimon's opinion, as can be found in a braita. Rabbi Shimon's derivation in the braita is questioned and rejected.

Apr 24

Study Guide Makkot 16 Today's daf is dedicated in commemoration of Yom HaShoah, in memory of all those who perished in the Holocaust. Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in loving memory of her father, Ivor Rhodes, Yisrael ben Meir v'Sara. "Please send me Dad jokes and bad puns--the worse, the better. Dad was a quiet man who cared deeply about doing the right thing. In the words of my sister-in-law to him 15 years and 2 days ago: 'You are a true gentleman... with a wicked sense of humour!' As the years go by, I find myself missing him more and more." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in memory of her mother-in law, Mrs. Mindy Lamm, on her 5th yahrzeit. "My mother-in-law was an extraordinary woman and the full partner of her husband, Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm, zt"l. Together, through 68 years of marriage, they raised a beautiful family while leading the Modern Orthodox world with brilliance, vision, and incredible dignity. We miss her every day." The debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether one gets lashes for a doubtful warning (a warning given when it wasn't clear whether the person was going to violate the prohibition) can be found in another case regarding one who takes an oath that they will eat a loaf of bread today. They also disagree about whether or not one gets lashes for a negative prohibition that does not have an action associated with it. Both are derived from the same tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and the sources they use to support their opinions are brought. At first, they suggest that both derive it from the same statement of Rabbi Yehuda regarding notar , but that suggestion is rejected completely as neither opinion corresponds to that opinion. Two different sources of Rabbi Yehuda are brought - each one corresponding to a different opinion. Rabbi Yochanan says that there are only who mitzvot where one can get lashes for a negative commandment that has a positive commandment intended to fix it, as he holds that one only gets lashes if one nullifies the possibility for fixing it. There are only two cases where it is possible to nullify the possibility for fixing the mitzva. The first is the mitzva of sending the mother bird away, as if one takes the mother bird and her chicks and then kils the mother bird, there is no possibility to send away the mother bird. The other one he leaves to his student to figure out and the student makes various suggestions before arriving at a conclusion that it is peah. leaving over the corner of the field for the poor. The next part of the Mishna is discussed regarding lashes for creepy crawling creatures and it is explained that since there are various negative commandments in the Torah regarding this prohibition, and there are various cases where one could receive multiple sets of lashes. If one eats produce where only the tithe for the poor wasn't taken, one receives lashes. This accords with Rabbi Yosi's opinion.

Apr 23

Study Guide Makkot 15 This week's learning is sponsored by Elana Storch for the refuah shleima of Avraham haLevi Ben Eidel. Today's daf is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Chaya Golda Bat Esther. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island for the refuah shleima of our friend and co-learner, Leah Brick, Leah Breindel bat Gittel Yenta בתוך שאר חולי ישראל. "We have watched and admired Leah as she meets this challenge with grace, equanimity and absolute faith, and look forward to sharing many smachot in good health with her - especially our Hadran LI trip to Israel!" Rabba bar Hana quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying that if a positive commandment precedes a negative commandment, one receives lashes and this is not considered a lav hanitak l'ase , a negative commandment that can be corrected/uprooted by a positive commandment for which one does not receive lashes. Rabbi Yochanan denies having said that. Raba doesn't understand why Rabbi Yochanan would deny it, as a case in our Mishna can prove Rabbi Yochanan's rule. However, the Gemara bring a case of a rapist, trying to prove why Rabbi Yochanan changed his mind and did not accept the above rule. Ulla (in three different attempts) and Rava each try to explain why the case of a rapist does not fit into the category of the rule (a positive commandment the precedes the negative commandment). All attempts by Ulla are rejected, but Rava's is accepted.

Apr 22

Presentation in PDF format Study Guide Makkot 14 The debate between Rabbi Akiva, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Yitzchak is discussed regarding whether or not one gets lashes for sins that one gets karet or death by the court. After bringing a third explanation for RAbbi Akiva's position, the Gemara brings the source for Rabbi Yitzchak's opinion. What do Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva derive from that verse? This question leads to a long back and forth discussion about what they each derive from various verses. The Mishna taught that one gets lashes for eating sacrificial items, kodashim , when they are impure. Where can the warning for this be found? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different opinions. There is a back and forth discussion regarding their sources.

Apr 21

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael? https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

Apr 18

More details regarding the accidental killer are discussed - Where are they buried? What happens if the Kohen Gadol is found out to be a chalal (son of a forbidden marriage)? Is the relative of the victim allowed to kill the accidental murderer if the murderer leaves the city? What if the murderer is by a tree on the border where part is inside the border and part outside?

Apr 18

The sages expound some verses in Yehoshua that relate directly or indirectly to setting up the refuge cities. The accidental killer leaves the city of refuge at the death of the Kohen Gadol. Who qualifies as a Kohen Gadol for this purpose? If there are multiple Kohanim Gedolim, do they all need to die or just one of them? Out of concern that the people in the city may pray for the death of the Kohen Gadol, their mothers would provide food and clothing for the accidental murderers. The Gemara digresses to discuss prayers that have no basis (like praying for the Kohen Gadol to die) - do they come true? Different scenarios are brought regarding the timing of the death of the Kohen Gadol - after the killing but before the court determined that the killer needs to go to the city of refuge, or after the court's ruling but before the killer got to the city, etc. In each of these scenarios, does the accidental murderer go free or not?

Apr 18

There were certain areas with more murderers and that affected where the refuge cities were set up. There are certain criteria for refuge cities: they should not be too small or too large, they should have a water supply, a market, etc., to allow for proper protection, and they should not need to leave the city for anything. There is a debate between Rabbi Nechemia and the rabbis whether or not weapons can be sold there. One's rabbi goes to the refuge city with the accidental murderer. If a rabbi murders accidentally, his yeshiva goes with him to the refuge city. The Gemara raises a difficulty with a rabbi going to a refuge city as it is known that Torah learning protects - so why should he need a refuge city? Two suggested answers are brought. Several drashot are brought relating to the importance of setting up refuge cities. From one of the verses, the gemara digresses to discussing the importance of learning Torah, teaching Torah and group learning. Reish Lakish explains a verse in the Torah that God orchestrates things from above that one who kills accidentally and it is not known to anyone, and one who kills on purpose without witnesses, will both end up in the same place and the murderer will get killed accidentally by the one who killed accidentally before and each will then get their punishment they are deserving of. Similarly it is derived from various verses that God guides a person in the direction that the person wishes to go. If the relative kills the killer on the way to the city of refuge, does he receive a death penalty?

Apr 17

Today's daf is sponsored by Shulamith and Joel Cohn for a refuah shleima for Phyllis Hecht, Gittel Pesha bat Masha Rachel. Today's daf is sponsored by Batsheva Pava for a refuah shleima for Phyllis Hecht, Gittel Pesha bat Masha Rachel. "To my wonderful neighbor and dear friend, Phyllis, who is the person who sends me daily lists of shiurim that range from Daf Yomi, to Navi, to Parshat Hashavua, and Chaggim. She is a 24-hours-a-day Torah learning source. We cannot forget that it is the month of miracles and kriyat yam suf. May Phyllis continue to see many miracles. May our learning be for her zechut!" For what cases is a ger toshav allowed to go to a refuge city? Contradictory sources are brought and the contradictions are resolved. There is a debate one who killed someone and claimed "I thought it was allowed" - is that considered close to intentional or is it considered circumstances beyond one's control? Potential proofs are brought from the Torah for each position from the story of Avimelech when he took Sarah from Avraham. Does a blind person go to a city of refuge? What is the halakha if the accidental murderer hated the one who was murdered? How many refuge cities were there and where were they located?

Apr 16

This week's learning is sponsored by the Hadran family for the refuah shleima of Phyllis Hecht, Gittel Pasha bat Masha Rachel. "Phyllis, you are a true fighter, a y ereat shamayim a mega baalat chesed , and a "fellow" daf learner. May your surgery on Thursday go well, with the wonderful shlichim at Sheba Hospital. עברת את פרעה, תעברי גם את זה!!! We are behind you and continue davening for you with all our might." Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about whether one gets exiled for killing if the blade fell off the handle and killed someone and if one was killed from wood chips that splintered off while chopping. Rebbi holds that the case described in the Torah in Devraim 19:5 refers to the latter case and the rabbis hold that it refers to the former. A braita brings two proofs from the text for Rebbi's reading of the verse. Rav Chiya bar Ashi explains the root of the debate is whether there is em l'mikra , we follow the way the verse is traditionally read, or em l'masoret , we follow the way the verse is written. There are different rules for accidental murder depending on what domain the death occurred and whether the victim was already there or put his head out the window after, for example, a rock was thrown in that direction. Abba Shaul rules that if one accidentally killed while performing a mitzva, the murderer is exempt from exile. This is derived from Devraim 19:5. A rabbi raised a difficulty with this derivation to Rava, but it is resolved. In a different version of the sugya, the rabbi asked the same question but on a different sugya. The Mishna rules that a child is exiled to a refuge city for killing a parent, but a braita rules the opposite. Rav Kahana and Rava each reconcile the contradiction in a different manner. A braita rules that slave or a Cuti are exiled to a refuge city for killing a Jew and can receive lashes. Likewise, a Jew is exiled and receives lashes for doing the same to a Cuti or slave. For what offense are the lashes?

Apr 15

Today's daf is sponsored anonymously for a refuah shleima of Mia bat Yonina, for the safety of our soldiers and for the safe return of the hostages. If one is convicted to death by the court, runs away, and is caught by the same court, the court upholds the original decision and does not try to look for a reason to exonerate. However, if the convict is brought before a different court, under what circumstances do they reopen the case? The courts of twenty-three judges can rule in capital crimes. These courts can even be outside of Israel. If so, what are the differences between the rules for setting up courts in and out of Israel? Should the courts be using capital punishment? If so, how often? There are several opinions - once every seven years, once in seventy years, or never at all. An accidental murderer is exiled to a city of refuge which is punitive, restorative (provides atonement) and protects from the relatives of the deceased who may seek to avenge the death. However, not all accidental murderers are exiled to a refuge city. Some are more negligent and aren't permitted to go there, as they do not deserve the atonement and protection, while others are closer to oness , and are not required to be exiled. Which cases of an accidental murderer fall into which categories?

Apr 11

Apr 11

When the conspiring witnesses pay/get lashes do they split the amount or do they each have to pay the full amount or get the full amount of lashes? The Mishna discusses the definition of conspiring witnesses. What is the difference between conspiring witnesses and contradictory testimony? What happens in a case where every group that comes to testify is turned into conspiring witnesses by the same group of witnesses - do we assume the group saying "you were with us" to every group of witnesses is lying? Would it be the same if someone keeps bringing false witnesses to testify on their behalf and then brings witnesses who are not proven to be false? Do we suspect they are lying just because they were brought by someone already known to bring false witnesses? There is a basic argument between the Perushim and Tzedukim - do the conspiring witnesses get killed only if they succeeded in convicting the person but didn't succeed in getting them killed ( Perushim ) or only if they actually succeeded in getting him killed ( Tzedukim )? The verse in Devarim 17:6 says that one gets killed based on the testimony of 2-3 witnesses. There are several drashot brought in the Mishna explaining what can be derived from the unnecessary mention of "three witnesses" in the verse.

Apr 11

Different statements of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav are brought regarding mikvaot . The Mishna brings a basic argument between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis about whether or not conspiring witnesses get the punishment of what they conspired to do and also get lashes for the negative commandment of testifying falsely. The Gemara discusses their opinions.

Apr 11

Today's daf is sponsored by Samuel Berlad in honor of Esther Sarah bat Sarah to get good passing grades in the exams and parnassah tova . Also in loving memory of Devorah bat Avraham, for the refuah shleima of Shmuel Lev ben Bracha. Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey and Jake Levant in honor of Deborah and Michael Dickson. "Wishing you a huge mazel tov on the engagement of Dalia to Yared Posnasky." Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav that a conspiring witness pays according to his share. After four unsuccessful attempts to explain the meaning of his statement, they explain it to be a case where the witness said he was convicted and charged money in a court for being a conspiring witness. Based on his testimony, he can be obligated to pay his share, even though his testimony cannot incriminate the other witness. If conspiring witnesses testify that a man divorced his wife and did not pay her the ketuba money, how is the payment for their punishment assessed, as they tried to obligate him to pay money that he may have had to pay later if he predeceases his wife or divorces her? If conspiring witnesses testify that a debtor who had a ten-year loan had a thirty-day loan, how is the payment for their punishment assessed? Both these cases are explained in the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that a ten-year loan is canceled when the shmita year arrives. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on his statement from the Mishna as it implies that a ten-year loan can be collected. Rava resolves the contradiction. According to an alternative version of the sugya, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav the opposite - that a ten-year loan is collected. Rav Kahana supported his statement from our Mishna.Rava rejects the support from the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that if one loans another upon the condition that the shmita year not cancel the loan, the loan is canceled anyway as the condition is invalid. However, this contradicts a different statement of Shmuel regarding ona'ah , that a condition that goes against the Torah is valid if the issue relates to money. How is this resolved? Two other statements are brought by Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav and Rav Kahana raises a difficulty against them - one about laws of Shabbat and one about laws of mikveh.

Apr 10

Makkot bookmark Masechet Makkot is sponsored by Terri Krivosha and Rabbi Hayim Herring in loving memory of Terri's father Judge Norman Krivosha, Nachum Meir ben David Beer v'Malka, on his 4th yahrzeit, and in honor of Dr. Judith Hauptman. "Our dad instilled in us a lifelong love of learning and in honor of Dr. Judith Hauptman, their first Talmud teacher and one of the pioneers who opened the doors of Talmud study to women." There are certain exceptions to the rule when conspiring witnesses ( eidim zomemim ) do not receive the punishment "that they tried to do to their brother." In those cases, they receive lashes. For example, if they testify about the status of a person (about a kohen that his father married a divorcee) or that a person killed accidentally and should go to the refuge city. Why does the masechet begin with an exception to the rule, instead of beginning with the basic rule of conspiring witnesses? From where is it derived that in the two cases in the Mishna, conspiring witnesses do not receive the punishment "as he tried to do to his brother?" For each case, two suggestions are brought - one a drasha from a verse and the other a kal v'chomer argument. In both cases, the kal v'chomer argument is rejected. Where can one find an allusion in the Torah for the ruling that conspiring witnesses receive lashes in exceptional cases? A braita is quoted which adds two more exceptions to the rule where the conspiring witnesses do not receive the punishment that they tried to bring upon the defendant.

Apr 9

Siyum Sanhedrin is sponsored in loving memory of Anita Dinerstein by her children and grandchildren on her second yahrzeit. "Her dedication to learning, interpersonal connection and creation of community has been a model for us as we have learned Sanhedrin and the rest of Nezikin." Siyum Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jeff and Jill Shames in memory of Jill's mother, Seena Baker, שפרה בת ברכה וזאלה. Ten years on, love beyond words from your children, your children's children and your children's children's children. What happens to all the items in a city of idol worshippers that have some level of sanctity to them? Can the destroyed idolatrous city be used for gardens and fields or can it never be rebuilt for any purpose? The city of Jericho can also never be rebuilt. In the book of Kings, it is told that Chial rebuilt Jericho and his sons were killed, as per Joshua's curse. The Gemara explains that he rebuilt a different city but called it Jericho, which was forbidden as well. This story was a lead-in to the drought in the time of Achav when Eliahu received the "key" for rain from God and brought a drought. How did God manage to get the key back from Eliyahu and end the drought? The masechet ends with a discussion of righteous and evil people and their effects on the world.

Apr 8

Introduction to Masechet Makkot

Apr 8

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina and Shalom Lamm on the occasion of the brit and naming of their new grandson, Naveh Shimshon, born to their children, Peninah and Eitan Kaplansky. The Gemara delves into various issues regarding an " ir hanidachat, " idolatrous city. Can a city become an idolatrous city if there was no subverted, but they decided on their own? If individuals get stoned, but if the majority of the city is convicted, they get killed by the sword, how does the court rule on the first half of the inhabitants before it is clear that the majority of the inhabitants will be guilty? Temporary residents are also considered part of the city, but how long do they need to live there to be considered temporary residents? Even though the righteous people of the city are not killed, their possessions are destroyed. What is the difference between the possessions of the righteous people and those of the idol worshippers different and how are there laws derived from the Devarim 13:16? Rav Chisda ruled that deposits of inhabitants are not burned. To what is he referring? If there is no square in the town, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yismael disagree about whether or not the city can be judged as idolatrous city. How does each derive their position from the verse in the Torah? The Mishna explained what is done with various sanctified items in the city - whether animals designated for sacrifices, second tithe produce and others. The Gemara brings a braita that expands on this list. What are animals designated for sacrificed left to die and cannot be redeemed and the money used so sacrifices? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each bring a different answer to this question. The first explanation of Reish Lakish is rejected and an alternative is suggested. Why didn't each one hold by the other's position? In the braita, Rabbi Shimon excludes firstborn animals and tithed animals from the burning. Is this referring to unblemished or blemished animals? Ravina and Shmuel each take a different position on this.

Apr 7

Today's daf is sponsored by Rikki and Alan Zibitt in loving memory of their mothers, Helen Zibitt, Hena bat Yaacov v' Rachel Leah, whose 20th yahrzeit was 28 Adar and Friedl bat Meir v' Rivkah, whose 10th yahrzeit is 9 Nisan. "They were true Women of Valor, who lived lives of hesed , loshon tov and ahavat Yisrael . We miss them every day! May their neshamot have the highest aliyah." Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about how to understand three different verses relating to Gehenom and the final redemption - Reish Lakish interprets them all harshly and rabbi Yochanan more leniently. The language of redemption used in the Torah describes both getting out of Egypt and coming into the land of Israel. Rabbi Simai makes a heikesh - just like the Jews entered the land with only two out of the 600,000 that came out of Egypt, they also came out of Egypt with the same percentage of people that were there. If 600,000 came out, it must be that there were 180 billion people there, and they died before the Exodus. The same will hold e for the days of the Messiah, as is derived from Hosea 2:17. Two situations are described in which Moshe is critical of God. The people of a wayward city, that were convinced by members of their city to worship idols, do not have a share in the World-to-Come. The halakhic details of this city are discussed.

Apr 6

Today's daf is sponsored by Abby Sosland in loving memory of Rabbi Henry Sosland. "He taught us that daily learning could be the ultimate source of comfort and sipuk nefesh ." Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of our friend and co-learner, Bracha Rutner, whose completion of Masechet Sanhedrin marks her siyum on all of Shas. "You dedicated the last seven and one-half years to this monumental achievement, and we are so proud that you are one of our group, and that we are able to share in your simcha! לכי מחיל אל חיל." Korach's wife convinced him to rebel against Moshe, despite Korach initially arguing against her persuasion. What were her specific complaints against Moshe and Aharon? Based on inferences from Bamidbar 16:14 and Tehillim 106:16, Rabbi Yochanan explains that they accused Moshe of engaging in relations with their wives. Moshe approached Datan and Aviram, seeking reconciliation. From this action, Reish Lakish teaches that one should actively work to resolve disputes. Different verses are brought to prove that anyone who challenges their teacher is considered as challenging God directly. There is a debate regarding Korach's fate: Was he swallowed by the earth or burned with the others who offered incense? This remains unresolved due to different interpretations of the verses. However, the Torah clearly states that Korach's sons survived. Regarding the generation that wandered in the desert, sages debate whether they will have a share in the World-to-Come. Various verses are cited to support both positions. Similarly, the fate of the ten tribes is disputed. Will they eventually return to the land or were they permanently exiled? This discussion centers on different interpretations of Devarim 29:27. Scholars also debate whether these tribes will receive a portion in the World-to-Come, with various verses brought as evidence. In both these controversies, Rabbi Akiva takes the stricter position that they will neither return nor have a share in the World-to-Come. Rabba bar bar Hanna quotes Rabbi Yochanan questioning Rabbi Akiva's stance, noting that Rabbi Akiva typically adopts more lenient positions. What is the source for Rabbi Akiva's general tendency toward leniency? From what point in development can one merit entry to the World-to-Come: from conception, birth, the ability to speak, or the ability to say "amen"?

Apr 4

A story is brought of Nahum ish Gamzu and how he is saved from death by the Romans on account of magical dirt that came from the dirt that Avraham used against the four kings, which magically turned into swords. What was the generation of those who built the Tower of Bavel try to accomplish? What were the acts of Sodom? God gave them everything they could want, which made them self-sufficient, leading to arrogance, which led to their isolationist policy. They mainly engaged in two categories of trangressions - not treating guests properly and perverting justice. There is a debate about Korach and his followers - whether they are deserving of the World-to-Come. The Gemara extrapolates the names of the people in Korach's group and explains how On ben Pelet didn't rejoin Korach's group on account of his wife's actions.

Apr 4

Today's daf is sponsored by Mitzi and David Geffen in loving memory of Mitzi's mother, Ruth Toll Lock, Rut bat Miriam and Avraham z"l on her 39th yahrzeit. "She was a loving wife, mother, and mother-in-law; a devoted Zionist and wonderful educator in Harrisburg, PA. All 4 of her children made Aliyah and her many grandchildren and great-grandchildren, as well as her great-grandchild, all live in Israel." The Mishna lists groups of people throught our early history that do not have a share in the World-to-Come and deliberates about whether they will be ressurected. Arrogance caused the sin of the generation of the flood, as they had everything and therefore thought that they didn't need God. Was Noah a real righteous peerson or just in relation to his generation? How did Noah try before the flood to get the poeple to repent and what was their reposnse? What was the purpose of the seven days before the flood? How did they deal with animals while they were in the ark? These and other issues related to the flood are discussed.

Apr 3

Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein for a refuah sheleima for her grandson Eitan Ephraim ben Ayelet and her husband David Mordecai ben Reizal for a successful operation. " Refuat hanefesh v'haguf. " In connection with Achitofel, the Gemara diverts to the story of David and Batsheva. Why was David tested in this way and why did he fail the test? What was the reaction of those around him? How did he get forgiveness from God? How in the end was it made obvious to others that he received forgiveness? For what reason did Geichazi not get a portion in the World to Come? Elisha is also criticized for how he dealt with Geichazi, just as Yehoshua ben Perachia is criticized for not encouraging Yeshu (Jesus) to repent.

Apr 2

"Better are the wounds from a friend than the kisses of an enemy" (Proverbs 27:6). An example of this is Achiya the Shiloni and Balaam's prophecies. The Gemara continues to analyze Balaam's words about the Jewish people and other nations. When Balaam was unsuccessful in cursing the Jews. he devised a plan, and advised Balak how to entice the Jews to sin in order to get God to punish them. The next character mentioned in the Mishna is Doeg HaEdomi. Why did he lose his share in the World-to-Come? Being that he was a great Torah scholar, the sages explain what was wrong about the Torah he learned that enabled him to speak lashon hara about David, which ultimately caused the death of the inhabitants of Nov.

Apr 1

Today's daf is sponsored by Pnina Lipskier in memory of Yoav Har Shoshanim. A verse is brought that is explained in a way that the Jews in the time leading up to the destruction thought that they had a winning answer to counter God and his prophets when they told the people to repent. There are three possible explanations of what was this "winning answer." Balaam in on the list of those who have no portion in the World-to-Come. What did he do wrong? How did he succeed in convincing God to let him go? What was the nature of the conversation he had with his donkey? Why did he get his own donkey ready instead of letting his servants do it? How did he think he would succeed in cursing the Jewish people? And finally, did he really not succeed in cursing them?

Mar 31

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom Family in loving memory of our fellow Daf learner Carol Robinson, z"l. "In all the spaces she touched she was an אישה כגפן פוריה, fruitful in all her endeavors." Micah was saved from losing his share in the World-to-Come because he gave food to travelers. Rabbi Yochanan, partially based on a statement of Rabbi Yosi bar Kisma explained that hospitality is so important that one can see its effect in several ways throughout Tanach history. Why were Achaz, Amon and Yehoyakim not included in the list of those not receiving a share in the World-to-Come? Even though hospitality is an important value, sometimes it is not. This is highlighted by Chizkiyahu who invited Babylonian messengers and fed them a lot of food, treating them with a lot of respect, which partially caused the destruction of the Temple. Several verses from Eicha are expounded to explain many different issues relating to the destruction. Rav Ashi explained that anshei kneset hagedola were the ones who created the list of those who did not receive a place in the World-to-Come. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav that they wanted to include King Solomon in the list, but God disagreed with them. Others, dorshei reshumot , held that all of them had a place in the World-to-Come (other than Bilam), deriving it from a verse in Tehillim 60:9-10.

Mar 30

This month's learning is sponsored by Linda and Jay Marcus in honor of the recent birth of their granddaughter; and the anniversaries and birthdays of their children and grandchildren during Nissan. "בניסן נגאלו ובניסן עתידין להיגאל. May we merit to see the גאולה שלמה במהרה בימינו." Today's daf is sponsored by Lisa Kolodny in honor of Nancy Kolodny's birthday! "So happy you are spending more time in Israel this year, spreading your light, your wisdom and your love to all those around you." There is a debate about whether Menashe received a portion in the World-to-Come. Rabbi Yochanan brings three drashot in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, each relating to different kings of the Judean kingdom, highlighting how far God goes to allow repentance. He also brought another drasha relating to the disgrace of the Sanhedrin at the time of the Babylonian exile. Rav Chisda says in the name of Rabbi Yirmia bar Abba three statements - one relating to the bad actions of some of the Judean kings, one relating to types of people who are not worthy of receiving the Divine Presence, and one explaining the verses in Tehillim 91:11-13 about evil not coming upon a person. Why is the letter ayin in ' reshaim' suspended above the other letters in the verse in Iyov 38:15? A braita explains that Menashe, Achav, and Yeravam all learned Torah, highlighting that their sins were worse, as they clearly understood the Torah and sinned nevertheless, with full intent. Other braitot suggest that other kings lost their portion in the World-to-Come. Descriptions are brought about some of the bad kings and how their action led to the destruction of the Beit Hamikdash.

Mar 28

Why did Yeravam, Achav, and Menashe lose their portion in the World-to-come? Despite the fact that they did terrible things, the rabbis also highlight that they did good things in their lives, particularly as it related to talmud Torah and respect for Torah scholars.

Mar 28

Can one sing verses from Shir HaShirim in a tune other than the taamei hamikra ? In what manner/context is it problematic to read verses from the Torah? What is "someone who uses incantations" that will not get a part in the World-to-come? Are there ways to do this that are permitted? Is calling to demons allowed? Some stories are told about the rabbis visiting Rabbi Eliezer ben Hurkanus while he was sick and their conversations about suffering. Yeravam is listed in the Mishna as one who did not receive a portion in the World-to-come. What is the meaning of his name? Why did he lose his share in the World-to-come? What caused him to sin?

Mar 27

What is the definition of an apikoris ? Several suggestions are brought, mainly related to one who does not treat the rabbis with the proper respect as it undermines belief in rabbinic Judaism. What is the definition of sefarim chitzoniyim , external literature, that if one reads them, one does not get a portion in the World-to-come, according to Rabbi Akiva? A braita says it is book of the Saducees. Rav Yosef says it is the book of Ben Sira. Abaye tries to understand what is wrong with learning it since many of the ideas there appear in the Tanach or in rabbinic thought.

Mar 26

Today's daf is dedicated in honor of the engagement of my daughter Chani to Saar Har-Chen. "May their love for each other continue to grow and may they always enjoy learning Torah together." How long will be the duration of time of the mashiach ? Eight different answers are suggested. Many verses from the prophets explain the great blessings that will be in the future. However, another verse says that the blessings will be of the kind that no one has seen until this day, meaning they are indescribable. Rabbi Yochanan reconciles this contradiction in three different ways. One who doesn't believe that the Torah is from God has no share in the World-to-come. This is derived from a verse in the Torah. A braita is brought that derives other offenses from that braita as well. Since learning Torah was mentioned, the Gemara digresses to discuss the importance of learning Torah and ways to ensure that one's Torah is not forgotten. What is an apikores ? What is the difference between an apikores and a " megale panim b'Torah "

Mar 25

Today's daf is sponsored by Hillel Gray in loving memory of Raizel Shoshana bat Rachel Perel on her shloshim. "She loved reading, teaching others to read, and Jewish education." Today's daf is sponsored by Abby Flamholz in honor of her daughter in law Sigal's hebrew birthday. "She continues to be a constant inspiration to me and especially to her daughters and husband. Happy birthday Sigal!" The sages extensively discuss various signs, both auspicious and ominous, that are believed to herald the coming of the Messiah. Rabbi Yochanan explained the Messiah will arrive during an era that is either entirely virtuous or completely corrupt. This binary perspective highlights the spiritual extremes that might precipitate messianic redemption. The prophetic texts contain seemingly contradictory verses, such as "It will come in its time, I will hurry it." Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi resolves this apparent contradiction by explaining that the timing of the Messiah's arrival depends on the generation's spiritual merit. If the generation proves worthy, God will accelerate the redemption; if not, it will unfold according to the predetermined time. Why is the Messiah depicted as arriving on a donkey rather than a more noble animal like a horse? In an aggadic story, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi encounters Eliyahu at the entrance to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai's cave. He seeks answers about whether he will enter the world-to-come and the timing of the Messiah's arrival. Eliyahu directs him to the entrance of Rome, instructing him to seek out and directly ask the Messiah. In a parallel account, Rabbi Yosi ben Kisma's students similarly inquire about the anticipated redemption. Some rabbis acknowledge the inevitability of the Messiah's arrival but express trepidation about witnessing this momentous event. They fear that their personal sins might cause them to be consumed in the " chevlei mashiach " - the birth pangs of the messianic era. While they recognize that good deeds and Torah study offer spiritual protection, they remain acutely aware that sin can precipitate divine judgment. Intriguingly, the Messiah's name itself becomes a matter of interpretive tradition. In each beit midrash they named the future redeemer with a name that resonated with their own teacher's name.

Mar 24

When is the Messiah going to come? What kind of destruction/change of world order will precede the coming of the Messiah? There are several different descriptions of the signs to be expected. Some sages offered suggestions for what year to expect the Messiah. However, some hold that one cannot try to estimate when the Messiah will come. However, we are commanded to wait in hope for the Messiah's arrival, as is derived from Yeshayahu 30:18. From that same verse, it is derived that there are thirty-six righteous people in every generation who greet the Divine Presence. Other sources indicate other amounts of righteous people and these differences are reconciled. Rav holds that all the times the Messiah was supposed to come have now passed, and it is all dependent on the people repenting and doing good deeds. Shmuel holds that even without good deeds and repentance, eventually, the mourning will be so great that God will redeem the people. Their debate is similar to a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. They each bring verses in the Torah to prove their side of the argument - will the repentance come from the people or will God force it upon them when God decides it is time?

Mar 23

Today's daf is sponsored by Dina Kaufman and Rob Ginsburg to celebrate the wedding of their son Aaron to Dana Houri. "So good to have a simcha in these difficult times. Mazal tov!" Today's daf is sponsored by Mark and Rena Septee Goldstein in loving memory of Moe Septee, on his 28th yahrzeit. "A truly wonderful man." Sancheriv's humiliation by God after he fails in the battle of Jerusalem and his death by the hands of his sons is explained in detail. How did Avraham beat the four kings? He was also helped by an angel, according to one interpretation, just as Chikiyahu was. Yirmiyahu asked God: why do evil people live good lives? God answers, using Nevuchadnetzer as an example. Nevuzaradin, the army officer of the Babylonians, was intimidated while trying to conquer Jerusalem as he was concerned he would meet the same end as Sancheriv. However, he was encouraged by a heavenly voice. When he entered the Temple, he saw the blood of Zecharia boiling. As a result, he killed many Jews, but eventually called on Zecharia to stop causing so many people to die. When that happens, he is so amazed that he converts to Judaism. There were others as well whose descendants converted to Judaism, including Sanheriv. God wanted Nevuchadnetzer's descendants to convert, but the angels stopped him. How did Nevuchadnetzer decide to go conquer Jerusalem? He was encouraged by Israel's neighbors Amon and Moab who gave him inside information that the time was right. Even so, he was very hesitant, after what happened to Sancheriv, but was encouraged that he would be successful.

Mar 21

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v'Yehuda Tzvi on her 2nd yahrtzeit. "Carol was the tent-pole, the driving force, the glue that held our family together. No matter what happened, Carol knew what to do. Michalle, Miriam and I miss her terribly, even though she is in our thoughts every single day." Today's daf is sponsored by Risa Tzohar in loving memory of Fruma bat Risel and David. Sancheriv had the opportunity to destroy Jerusalem but he delayed and missed his chance. The day he got to Jerusalem was the last day before the opportunity to punish for what happened in the city of Nov expired, but he waited until the next morning, on account of his arrongance, and therefore didn't succeed. King David was punished for what happened in Nov, holding him indirectly responsible for the death of all the inhabitants of the city. A whole encounter between him and Yishbi, the brother of Goliath is described as being connected to this. How many people did Sancheriv bring to fight against Jerusalem? With What did the angel strike the people? Who was left of Sanheriv's camp after the battle?

Mar 21

Today's daf is sponsored by Nancy Kolodny in honor of her daughter-in-law Lisa Kolodny's birthday. "She brings light, love and learning into the lives of her family and friends." Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in loving memory of her mother, Daphne Rhodes, Daphne Devora bat Avraham v'Chana on her 8th yahrzeit. The story of the battle between Hizkiyahu and Sancheriv is discussed in detail, beginning with the tradition that Hizkiyahu was destined to be the messiah but was ultimately deemed unworthy because he failed to express gratitude to God after being saved from Sancheriv's attack. In recounting this story, the Gemara uses it as a platform to emphasize the critical importance of Torah study. It specifically highlights that Hizkiyahu's merit in encouraging the people to learn Torah is what ultimately saved them from destruction.

Mar 20

When Chanania, Mishael and Azaria were saved from the fiery furnace, it shed a bad light on the rest of the Jews, as the gentiles said, if their God is so great, how can the rest of the people be worshipping idols! God wanted to destroy the rest of the Jews because they were worshipping idols, but when God saw the actions of Chanania, Mishael and Azaria, his anger subsided. The sages try to fill in some missing details from the story. What happened to Chanania, Mishael and Azaria after they were saved, as they are not directly heard from again? Several options are brought by amoraim and their opinions match those of tannaim. Where was Daniel when Chanania, Mishael and Azaria were thrown into the fire? Several possibilities are offered. According to a braita, God, Daniel and Nevuchadnetzer each did not want Daniel to be there - each for their own reason. Two false prophets named Achav and Tzidkia were also thrown into a fire by Nevuchadnetzer, but were killed. What is the background story? According to the midrash, Yehoshua the High Priest was sent in with them, but was only singed and came out alive. Why was Yehoshua punished? In the book of Ruth, Ruth tells Naomi that Boaz gave her six grains of barley. Bar Kapara extrapolated this verse to mean that by giving her six grains, he was alluding to her that six sons would be born to her who were each blessed with six blessings - David, the Messiah, Daniel, Chanania, Mishael and Azaria. Verses are brought to show how each was blessed in six ways. There is a debate, however, about Chanania, Mishael and Azaria's lineage and whether or not they were from the tribe of Judah. Yishayahu prophesizes to Chizkiyahu that his descendants will be taken to Babylonia and will become sarisim . The Gemara understands this to be referring to Daniel, Chanania, Mishael and Azaria. What is the meaning of the word sarisim in this context? Rav and Rabbi Chanina disagree. Does it mean they were eunuchs? Or does it mean they were cut off from worshipping idols? The Gemara raises two difficulties against Rav, that they were eunuchs, and one difficulty against Rabbi Chanina, that they were cut off from worshipping idols. The difficulties are brought from verses in Daniel and Yeshayahu but are resolved. Why was the book of Ezra, which much of it was said and written by Nechemia, not called Nechemia? Two suggestions are brought.

Mar 19

Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah , leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

Mar 18

Today's daf is sponsored by Sharona Shuster in loving memory of her father, Elliot Shimoff, Eliyahu Chaim ben Harav Ephraim. "He enjoyed his family, learning Torah, and Israel. He was loved by all and a true talmud chacham . His love of learning encouraged me to learn Daf at a later age and I now see his passion. Yehi zichro baruch ." Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein for a refuah shleima of her grandson Eitan Efraim ben Ayelet. "Tfilot for the success of a long and complicated surgery for Eitan to repair the nervous system from his shoulder to his fingertips from his injury in Gaza. May the operating team be shlichim neamanim B"H ." In three separate encounters with either the emperor or a heretic, the question is asked: how could God possibly bring back to life those who have died? In each incident, the Jew offers a different answer. In the third encounter, Geviha ben Pesisa responds. Three additional stories describe when Jews were brought to trial before Alexander of Macedon by other nations. In each case, Geviha argues on behalf of the Jews. The pattern is consistent: the opposing nation uses a verse from the Torah to attack Jewish actions, and Geviha counters with a different verse that refutes their claim. Antoninus raises several questions to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Some questions Rabbi Yehuda resolves, while on others, Antoninus convinces him of a different view. The first question concerns how both body and soul can claim exemption from judgment after death, each blaming the other for causing sin. The second asks why the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. The third explores when the soul enters a person—at conception or during fetal development. The fourth examines when the evil inclination begins to influence a person—during fetal development or at birth. Reish Lakish, Ulla, Rav Chisda, and Rava each present seemingly contradictory verses about life after death, mortality, or resurrection. Each sage then resolves the contradiction he identified. Five additional verses are presented as proof of resurrection from the Torah. Rav Yehuda, citing Rav, teaches that withholding a halakha from a student is equivalent to stealing from their inheritance, since the Torah was given as an inheritance to all Jewish people.

Mar 17

Study Guide Sanhedrin 90 Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel Savin in loving memory of her father, Shalom ben Shmuel, on his third yahrzeit. Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about the death penalty for a prophet who tries to sway the people to worship idols. Rav Chisda and Rav Hamnuna disagree about whether their debate extends to a prophet who tries to sway the people to uproot a different commandment entirely or is it limited to idol worship only. A braita relating to this issue is quoted and Abaye explains it according to Rav Chisda, and Rava explains it according to Rav Hamnuna. Two approaches are brought to explain why the Torah specifically brought a verse about a prophet who uses signs to show he is telling the truth and then tells the people to worship idols. Is it because idol worshippers have the power to make signs, or is there a concern that a true prophet may turn bad and try to sway people to worship idols after having shown signs as a true prophet? The eleventh chapter of Sanhedrin begins with a list of who has a part in the world-to-come and who does not. The first topic the Gemara delves into is the resurrection of the dead, as one who does not believe in that does not have a part in the world-to-come. What is the source for the resurrection of the dead in the Torah? Several debates are brought between gentiles or heretics who argued with the rabbis about belief in the resurrection of the dead and the proofs of the rabbis.

Mar 16

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her mother, Carolyn Barnett-Goldstein on her sixth yahrzeit. "Mom - I miss your knowledge of music, art, and literature. You were gone way too soon." Further conditions are brought under which the rebellious elder can get killed. Only the High Court in the Temple is allowed to execute the rebellious elder. There is a debate about how his death is publicized - is his death delayed until the next holiday and killed while everyone is in Jerusalem or is he killed immediately and the court sends letters to all the communities? A false prophet, who tells of a prophecy that he either did not hear or was told to someone else, and one who prophesizes in the name of an idol receive the death penalty of strangulation. Three other cases regarding false prophets are subject to death by the hands of God - one who suppresses a prophecy, one who does not listen to the instructions of a prophet, and a prophet who doesn't listen to their own prophecy. The Gemara brings examples from the Tanach for each of these six categories. A difficulty is raised against one who doesn't listen to the words of a prophet - how does the person know that the prophet is a real prophet? The answer is that this would only be true in a case where the person was already proven to be a true prophet. The Gemara brings examples of situations where it was clear that they needed to listen, such as Yitzchak at the akeida , as Avraham was already proven to be a true prophet. Also, Eliyahu at Mount Carmel was trusted already when he told the prophets of Baal to bring sacrifices outside the Temple. The Gemara digresses to the akeida story and brings two explanations to the verse introducing the section "And it was after these matters that God tested Avraham." The first explanation relates it to the celebration of Yitzchak's weaning and introduces the Satan character from Job as pushing God to test Avraham. The second explanation connects it to the circumcision of Yishmael and Yitzchak and to sibling rivalry. Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about which penalty is given to a prophet who tries to sway the people to worship idols and a person who sways an entire city to worship idols.

Mar 14

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandmother, Ann Barnett on her yahrzeit. "Her strength kept us going and she maintained her dedication to seeking knowledge all the days of her life." How do all the cases in the previous braita accord with Rabbi Meir's opinion that a rebellious elder can only be in a case that can lead to a prohibition of karet ? In what way does a rebellious elder need to disagree with the court in order to be convicted? Rav Kahana rules that only if he dares to disagree based on his own logic with a tradition of the rabbis of the court, he is convicted. Rabb Elazar disagrees and says that the purpose of convicting a rebellious elder is to prevent debates and therefore any disagreement of any sort will lead to a conviction. Two sources (one of them from our Mishna) are brought to raise a difficulty with Rav Kahane's position and the second is left unresolved. What is the hierarchy of the courts? How were judges chosen? The rebellious elder is convicted only if he either goes back and teaches against the ruling of the High Court and he himself acts according to his ruling or people follow his ruling. A difficulty is raised on the former possibility as if he follows his own ruling, he should already be liable for the death penalty for the action, not for being a rebellious elder. The Gemara offers a few possibilities to resolve this difficulty. The Mishna explains that there is a stringency with Rabbinic law for a rebellious elder - if he tells people to go against Torah law, he is not convicted, but if he differs from the court regarding the rabbinic definition of a Torah law and adds to it, like five compartments in the tefillin , he can be convicted. Rav Oshaya says that this would be the only possible case. Why not the four species? Why not tzitzit ?

Mar 14

Today's daf is sponsored by Devorah & Binyamin Radomsky on the occasion of the Bat Mitzva of their daughter Tamar. Today's daf is sponsored by Daphne Lazar Price " Excited to meet fellow Daf learners at the upcoming JOFA conference in NYC!" The verse describing a rebellious elder in Devarim 17:8 is extrapolated in a braita, explaining what types of cases could lead to a rebellious elder situation, as well as other related issues. Three different opinions are presented regarding what categories of disagreements would cause a rebellious elder to incur the death penalty: disagreement about Torah law, disagreement about matters punishable by karet, or about a rabbinic interpretation of Torah law, or even a very minor point of interpretation. How do all the cases in the previous braita align with Rabbi Meir's opinion that a rebellious elder can only be liable in a case that involves a prohibition punishable by karet?

Mar 13

This daf is sponsored by Miriam Adler in loving memory of her mother whose first yahrzeit is today. "When I started this round of daf yomi in January 2020, my Mom who was 98 years old at the time, told me that she'd like to celebrate the siyum with me! She made it to Bava Metzia. We hope to carry on her optimism and love of family and Am Yisrael ." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz. "May the learning of the daf be in memory of my dear mother-in-law, Sarah Berelowitz, Sarah Teyuva bat David Shlomo, on her sixth yahrzeit. We miss you Granny. Yehi zichra baruch ." If one kidnapped a person and sold them to the father/brother of the kidnapped, is the kidnapped liable the death penalty? One who kidnaps one's own son, there is a debate between Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka and the rabbis. On what basis do the rabbis exempt? The Torah mentions the prohibition to steal in the Ten Commandments and in Vayikra Chapter 19. From the context of each section, it is evident which one refers to kidnapping and and which refers to stealing objects. Since there are two actions involved in kidnapping in order to be convicted (kidnapping and selling), could two witnesses testify that one kidnapped and a different two testify that one sold? Would that be considered two separate testimonies that each stands alone or is each only half a testimony? If it is half a testimony, there is a debate between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan about whether partial testimony is acceptable or not. How does the case of kidnapping compare to a rebellious son, where there are also two stages - as first witnesses testify that he ate and drank, he is flogged and then if he repeats the offense in the presence of witnesses he is killed? What is the procedure for convicting one as a rebellious elder, zaken mamre ?

Mar 12

This month's learning is sponsored by Fally Klein "in honor of "Klein birthday month" where each of our children have celebrated a milestone coming of age: Shimi, an adult at eighteen, Dassa, a mature and beautiful sixteen, Yedidya, at three with his upsherin , And, of course, Elimelech whose bar mitzvah is today. May we have the merit to see them all grow in their Torah, avodat Hashem , and ahavat Yisrael ." This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi in loving memory of her great-grandmother, Sarah bat Shlomo v'Chana. Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Plunka in loving memory of Moshe ben David, Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt"l. Is one allowed to perform a medical procedure on a parent? Is one allowed to administer lashes in the court or cursing (during the process of excommunication) to a parent as a messenger of the court? Does the commandment not to curse or hit a parent apply to those who are no longer "part of the nation" as they have sinned? Do they apply after death? Is there a distinction between hitting and cursing regarding these two issues? To be liable the death penalty for kidnapping, one must kidnap, exploit, and selling the person into slavery.

Mar 11

Study Guide Sanhedrin 84 This week's learning is sponsored by Sara Averick and Jose Rosenfeld in memory of Sara's father, Dr. Nathan J. Averick, נפתלי יוסף בן חיים ניסן הלוי ונחמה, who gazed at the heavens above the Pacific as a WWII merchant marine and recognized the בורא עולם. Thank you Dad. Today's daf is sponsored by Betsy Mehlman in loving memory of her father Harold Mondshein, Zvi Menachem Mendel ben Shlomo z"l, on his 42nd yahrzeit. "He would be so proud of all his grandchildren and sabra great grandchildren in Israel." The Gemara derives the last few halachot mentioned in the braita quoted on the previous page which delineated which acts relating to teruma and the Temple obligate one in death by the hands of God or just a regular negative commandment (lashes). They also elaborate on the debate in the mishna regarding a stranger who works in the temple and what punishment he gets. The tenth perek begins with a list of who gets killed by strangulation and starts to delve into the first one - one who hits one's parents. What type of hitting is referred to? What if it is done for healing purposes?

Mar 10

Study Guide Sanhedrin 83 Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia Klein in loving memory of her father, Sherman Israel Klein, Shnayor Yisrael ben Yerachmiel v'Sara, on his yahrzeit. "May his neshama have an aliyah." Rav Sheshet answered Rav Acha that a kohen who served while in a state of impurity does not receive the punishment of death by the hands of God. After they challenged him from our Mishna, they brought two more challenges against him. They resolved one of them, but the final challenge remained unresolved because they quoted a braita where it explicitly states that a priest who served in a state of impurity is liable to the punishment of death by the hands of God. The braita mentioned various other cases where someone would receive the punishment of death by the hands of God. The Gemara goes through each case and finds the source in the Torah for each matter.

Mar 9

Today's daf is sponsored by Avi Yonitzman for finishing Mashechet Shekalim. "I've now closed the gap from Berakhot to Shekalim and may we be zoche to finishing the 14th cycle together." Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima to Pesha Etel bat Sara. If a man engages in intercourse with a gentile woman, a zealot can kill him if they are still engaged in the act. Rav Kahana asked Rav what punishment is given if a zealot did not kill him at the time of the act. Rav did not remember, but Rav Kahana heard a verse from Malachi 2:11 in a dream and when he recounted it to Rav, Rav remembered that the person gets karet , death by the hands of God. Rabbi Chiya bar Avuya taught that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman is as if he married an idol, as he derived from the verse Rav Kahana heard in his dream. He also brought a story about the skull of Yehoyakim that would not be buried and was subsequently burned, which he derived from a verse in Yirmiyahi 22:19. The Hasmonean court made a decree that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman could be liable for four violations. Rav Dimi and Ravin disagreed about which four. Both Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explained that even though a zealot can kill a man who engages in relations with a gentile woman, if one consults with the court about it, the court will not tell the person to kill. The person is also not permitted to kill once the couple is no longer engaged in relations. And if the man engaged in relations kills the zealot, he is not liable as the zealot is considered a rodef . The Gemara recounts the story of Pinchas killing Zimri and Cosbi and elaborates on the details provided in the Torah. Rav Acha asked Rav Sheshet is a kohen who serves while impure punished by death by the hands of God? Can the answer be found in our Mishna?

Mar 7

Today's daf is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of Miriam's father Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Nachum haLevi on his 21st yahrzeit "He raised his family with the positive ethos of אבא, כתיב בתורה כך. Yehi zichro baruch !" If one sees one's father doing something wrong, what is the proper language one should use to correct one's father? If one is supposed to get two death penalties for two separate actions or for one action involving two prohibitions, the ruling goes by the harsher death penalty. Rabbi Yosi disagrees in the latter case and holds that it goes by the one that was first prohibited to the person. What is the source for the former? The Mishna explains that if one sins and gets lashes and then sins again, the third time they are put into a kipa , a small cell, and fed barley until their innards explode and they die. The Gemara limits this to a case of a sin punishable by karet, death in the hands of God, and explains that since the person is actually considered like a dead person since they have a death penalty hanging over them, which allows for the law of kipa to go into effect. Is the Mishna like Rebbi only who holds that one creates a chazaka after two times, or can it be explained according to Rashbag as well? Ravina explains it according to Rashbag, as the chazaka is created by the sins, not the lashes, which are repeated three times. A difficulty is raised against Ravina's explanation, but is resolved. What is the source in Tanach for the law of kipa ? A murderer who can't be convicted also is put in a kipa. The sages offer various possibilities of a murderer for whom this would be relevant. There are certain transgressions that do not need to be ruled in court, but a zealous person who is on the scene is permitted to take the law into his/her own hands and kill the person. In what situations?

Mar 7

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her father Chaskel Tydor, R. Yechezkel Shraga ben R. Yehuda Leib Halevi and Esther on his 32nd yahrzeit. "A Torah scholar who survived Auschwitz and Buchenwald, founded "Kibbutz Buchenwald" after the war, and merited living in Eretz Yisrael. He would have been amazed and happy to know that his youngest daughter and two granddaughters learn Daf Yomi with Hadran." Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Plunka in loving memory of Moshe ben Amram, "Moshe Rabbenu". Rava challenges the two previous interpretations of the Mishna, citing a contradictory braita. He offers a third explanation with supporting evidence. According to Rava, the two opinions in the Mishna address different scenarios: the tanna kama discusses a case where an arrow was shot from between two people, making it impossible to identify who shot it. Both individuals are exempt from punishment, even if one is known to be righteous. Rabbi Yehuda, however, refers to a case of a bull that killed someone and then was mixed up with other bulls. Since all these bulls are now forbidden for use, they are all placed in a kipa (small enclosure) until they die. A braita is presented that supports Rava's interpretation of the Mishna. The first section discusses a pregnant cow that kills a person and is sentenced to stoning. The status of its unborn calf depends on whether the verdict was issued before or after birth. This appears to be independent of when the cow became pregnant, which doesn't make sense in light of Rava's statement that if the cow was pregnant at the time of killing, the offspring shares responsibility since it is considered part of the cow. The Gemara initially suggests the pregnancy occurred after the verdict, but rejects this solution. The conclusion is that the pregnancy happened after the killing but before the verdict was issued. Does a warning to a potential transgressor need to specify the exact type of death penalty they would face? Rav Yehuda amends his father's version of the Mishna regarding people sentenced to stoning who were mixed up with those sentenced to burning, explaining that without this correction, Rabbi Shimon's language in the Mishna would be implausible. Had the original version been correct, Rabbi Shimon would likely have offered a different explanation altogether.

Mar 6

Study Guide Sanhedrin 79 Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandfather, Ben Goldstein on his yahrzeit. What type of intent is needed in order for one to receive the death penalty for murder? Rabbi Shimon has a unique approach, that one only gets capital punishment if one intends to kill that particular person. The rabbis disagree but also have their own set of criteria. Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse in Devraim 19:11, "and he ambushes him and stands up against him and kills him." The rabbis derive a different law from that verse - that if one throws a rock into a group of people and kills one of them, the murderer is not held liable. The Gemara tries to establish the exact case that the rabbis derive and conclude that it must be a case where there were nine Jews in the group and one gentile. The law is lenient here as even though the majority are Jews, if they are fixed, then the doubt is considered 50/50 and we are lenient in cases of capital punishment. After questioning Rabbi Shimon from a case in Shmot 21:22 when a pregnant woman is accidentally killed and the murderer is killed, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon must hold like Rebbi, that the murderer there is not actually killed, but needs to pay money. A third opinion is brought, of Chizkia, who rules that the murderer is not even obligated to pay, as the laws that we hold by the more severe punishment, and exempt from a less severe punishment apply even in cases where the death penalty could have potentially been there, but is not. If a murderer gets mixed up with a group of people and there is no way to identify who the murderer is, what can be done? The Mishna brings a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. Three different interpretations are brought to explain the case that they are debating.

Mar 5

This week's learning is sponsored by Anne Rubin. "I would like to thank two people that have had the greatest influence on my Jewish life and learning in the most recent years. Michelle Farber who has become my study partner through her podcast since I started Daf Yomi in January 2020. I have not missed a day of reading or listening. And to Rabbi Elliot Cosgrove who has inspired me in more ways than I can say in reconnecting with my Jewish soul." Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Weil in memory of Rabbi Eliahu Chaim Greenberg, z"l on his 50th yahrzeit, this past Monday. "My grandfather was an ilui who grew up in difficult circumstances. He didn't know how to tell you he loved you in words, so he'd tell you by sitting you down to learn a daf of Gemara together. Yehi zichro baruch ." Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in loving memory of her brother-in-law Michael Desroches who passed away February 26th. "Michael was a self-described Christian Zionist, devoted to Israel and the future of the Jewish people." If a group of people beat up one person to death, none of them receive the death penalty. But if they beat them one after another, there is a debate whether no one receives the death penalty, or the last one does, as the last person brought the death upon them sooner. How does each interpret the verse in Vayikra 24:17 differently? What are the laws regarding a person who is a treifa - one who is assessed to die within twelve months - what if a person like that is killed, kills, or testifies against another? If one puts a snake up to another's body to bite, is the person killed or is the snake killed? The rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? On what basis? If one hits another and is assessed to die but then recovers somewhat and then subsequently dies, can the one who hit be killed as punishment for the death or not? Rabbi Nechamia and the rabbis disagree. How does each interpret the verse in Shmot 21: 19 differently?

Mar 4

The rabbis discuss various cases of indirect murder and establish in which situations one is liable for indirectly murdering another and in which cases one is exempt.

Mar 3

Presentation If we compare a man's relatives to his wife's relatives, as was stated in the braita quoted earlier, then just as his daughter-in-law is forbidden, why isn't his wife's daughter-in-law forbidden to him? Abaye and Rava each explain differently why the comparison would not work for this case. What is the source for deriving that a man's daughter from rape or out of wedlock would be forbidden by penalty of burning? Where is the negative commandment for this in the Torah? Three different answers are brought. The last opinion derived the negative prohibition from Vayikra 19:29 "Do not disgrace your daughter to zenut ." That verse also teaches that a father can't sell his daughter to be a prostitute. How are two things derived from the same verse? Rava and Abaye, who do not derive the original law (forbidding a father to his daughter from rape) from here, derive another law from here, that a father cannot marry of his daughter to an old man, as that may lead her to commit adultery. Other statements are brought to prevent a father from marrying or not marrying off his daughter out of self-interest. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael disagree about how to interpret the verse regarding the death penalty for a man who engages in sexual relations with his wife and mother-in-law. It says in the verse that he dies and they die. To who is "they" referring? Rava and Abaye explain their debate in two different manners. Who gets punished by decapitation by the sword? A murderer and members of an idolatrous city ( ir hanidachat ). If one prevents another from getting out of the water and they drown, the murderer is liable, but if one pushes another into the water and the person can get out, but instead they die, the one who pushed the person in, is exempt.

Mar 2

The Gemara tells of a man who was dangerously ill due to his unfulfilled sexual desires with a particular woman. The doctors determined he would die unless these desires were satisfied. When consulted, the rabbis ruled that even allowing the man to merely be in the presence of the woman he desired was forbidden. The Gemara discusses whether this woman was married or single, and examines why the rabbis took such a strict position in this life-threatening situation. The Gemara then discusses which relatives are liable to the punishment of death by burning. It examines which of these forbidden relationships are explicitly stated in the Torah and which are derived through interpretation. A debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael centers on whether the prohibition against relations with one's grandmother-in-law (punishable by burning) is explicitly stated in the Torah or derived through rabbinic interpretation. A braita is presented that lists three categories of forbidden relationships, all derived from the case of relations with a mother-in-law. Due to the braita's complex language, the Gemara carefully analyzes each section, clarifying its meaning and specifying which forbidden relationships fall under each category. The Gemara raises a logical challenge based on the second category of the braita: if relations with one's grandmother-in-law are forbidden, shouldn't relations with one's own grandmother be forbidden as well? However, it is established that relations with one's grandmother are not prohibited. Both Abaye and Rava offer explanations for why this logical extension does not apply and why one cannot derive a prohibition against relations with one's grandmother from this case.

Feb 28

Two more answers (altogether five) are brought to reconcile the contradiction between the braita and the Mishna in Ketubot 29a. From where does Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul learn that if one can neutralize the pursuer, one is not allowed to kill him? When one is pursuing another and either the pursuer, the pursued or the one trying to stop the pursuer causes damage - who is exempt from payment and who is liable to pay? Why? What is the basis for the opinions of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Eliezer who add more cases to the list where one can kill one who is about to commit a certain transgression? Rabbi Yochanan quotes Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak saying that the rabbis sat in an attic in Lod and ruled that if one is threatened by death unless they transgress one of the commandments, they should transgress the commandment and not be killed, as the commandments were given to "live by them." However, there are three exceptions to the rule - idol worship, inappropriate sexual relations and murder ( yehareg v'al yaavor ). What is the source for the three exceptions? There are also certain circumstances in which one must give oneself over to be killed rather than transgress any commandment - if it is in public and if it is a time of religious persecution. What is the definition of public? How was Esther permitted to engage in relations with Achashverosh if it was public? Rava and Abaye each provide an answer. Are Bnei Noach also commanded to give themselves over to be killed if asked to transgress one of the Noahide laws in public?

Feb 28

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases. The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

Feb 27

This week's learning is sponsored by Nira Feldman in loving memory of her mother Faye Darack z"l. "A devoted Hadran learner, she approached each day with a renewed curiosity to learn and grow, she continues to inspire us each day." Today's daf is sponsored by Phyllis & Yossie Hecht in loving memory of Phyllis's father's, HaRav Yerachmiel Binyanim ben Zalman Tzvi Witkin on his 16th yahrzeit, "Jerry Witkin, the יושר לב, חבר לכל רואך וכל כך שמח בחלקו. We can only imagine the pride Dad must feel peeking down on his impactful legacy of 6 children, 28 grandchildren and continuous growth of great-grandchildren living lives of Am Yisrael b'Eretz Yisrael im Torat Yisrae l! Dad, you are so missed and we have been so blessed. Yehi Zichro Baruch ." Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in loving memory of Carol's mother, Irma Robinson, Hudda Bat Moshe on her 8th yahrzeit. "Irma built a rich life in the Chicago area. She loved to have the family over for special events. Sadly, four years after she was widowed, Irma developed Alzheimer's. Carol and her sister Debbie were blessed that though her illness progressed, she never forgot who they were." She and Carol are together in a different world, and this dedication will always remain the same. Today's daf is sponsored by Naomi Cohen. "Mazal Tov to Jack, Rivka, Itzik and Yoni on the birth of a daughter and sister, Elisheva bat Yaakov v'Rivka, Ella - with love from Mum and Dad/Savta and Sabba." Assumptions are made about a rebellious child regarding the course his future will take and therefore he is killed to prevent him from sinning further. Similar assumptions are also made regarding a robber - the assumption is that a robber will come to kill if the owner of the house stands up against the robber, and therefore it is permitted to kill a robber. The Gemara discusses the circumstances in which one can assume the robber is coming to kill. Additionally, if at the time of the robbery the robber is viewed as a pursuer, there is a "death penalty" on the robber. Therefore, the robber is exempt from damages caused to property because of the law that if one incurs two punishments simultaneously, one is exempt from the more lenient one. Rav takes this even further to say a robber who can be killed is exempt from returning the stolen items. Rava disagrees and only exempts the robber if the item is broken or gone. Our Mishna is brought to support Rava's interpretation. Another source is brought to raise a difficulty against Rava's position. The difficulty is resolved. Other drashot are brought on the verses regarding robbery, including laws that one can even kill a robber on Shabbat, in any way they want, and anyone can kill the robber, not only the one being robbed. Two different drashot highlight why the verse specifically brought the example of a robber in a machteret , i.e. breaking in, even though the law would also apply to one who climbs up to the roof or enters the courtyard (easily). One explains that it is the typical manner of robbers, while the other learns from here that one who breaks in is already considered forewarned and no warning is necessary before killing the robber. Rav Huna rules that a minor pursuer can be killed as well, as there is no need for a warning. Rav Chisda raised a difficulty from a Mishna in Ohalot 7:6 that if the mother's life is endangered during childbirth, if the head has emerged, one cannot kill the baby to save the mother, even if the baby is acting like a pursuer. The resolution is that the baby is not intending to kill the mother, as it is an act of God. In the earlier part of that Mishna it is explained that before the head has emerged, one can abort the fetus if it is causing risk to the mother, as the life of the mother takes precedence to an unborn fetus. A braita is brought to support Rav Huna's position and another is brought to contradict. However, both are rejected as inconclusive.

Feb 26

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in loving memory of Art's mother Shirley, Sarah bat Avraham v'Ziche Reicha on her 9th yahrzeit. "She was a life-long learner, a striver, she sewed and made mosaics. Once her three children were old enough, she went back to school, earned a master's degree, created a new career doing social work and counseling, and published four books on raising a family. She lives on in the tallitot and quilts she made. Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim Weiss is loving memory of Elsie Muller on her 30th yahrtzeit. "Elsie was a family friend, 50 years my senior. She had no children of her own, so she adopted my family as hers. We were close friends and we confided in each other. She devoted her retirement to Jewish causes and would be very proud of her adopted children and grandchildren in Israel and USA." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in loving memory of her mother, Peppy Senders, Pesha Rivka bat Gershon HaCohen and Bina, on her yahrzeit. "It has been 21 years, and my mother's wisdom, kindness and patience are still my North Star." Today's daf is sponsored by the Shuster family in loving memory of Ozer's mother Devora bat Yisroel. "May her devotion to Torah and mitzvot be a merit to the entire Jewish people." A rebellious son will only be convicted if he steals money from his father and eats in the domain of others, as only in that situation will it be likely that the son continue to act in this way. Why? Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda rules that he must steal from both parents. Since the wife does not generally own her own property, two explanations are brought to understand his opinion. Both parents have to agree to bring the son to the court. Rabbi Yehuda adds that if the mother is not worthy for the father, the son cannot be convicted. The Gemara establishes the meaning of his statement - they must have the same voice, height, and look alike. This is derived from the verse in the Torah, Devarim 21:20 "he doesn't listen to our voice." The braita that says that a rebellious son never existed, nor will it ever exist, presumably accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is impossible to find a couple who are identical in appearance, voice, and height. Rabbi Shimon also agrees that a rebellious son never happened and never will. Rabbi Yonatan disagrees and says he sat on his grave. There is a similar debate about an ir hanidachat , a city that all worship idols, and a leprous house. The Mishna also excludes any case where one of the parents is lame, mute, blind, etc. as the parents will be unable to complete the process as defined in the Torah. Can we infer from here that when the Torah describes how a process is supposed to happen, it must be done exactly in that way? After the son steals and eats meat and wine in a large quantity, the parents bring the son to a court of three judges and he is flogged. If he continues in his ways, he is brought to a court of twenty-three and judged to be stoned. The obligation to flog is derived by means of a gezeira shava from the word " v'yisru " by the one who slanders his wife (Devarim 22:18) to that same word in the rebellious son (Devarim 21:18) and from " ben " to " ben " (Devarim 25:2) in the verse regarding lashes. If the son is brought to court but then runs away and by the time they catch him, he is no longer within the age range of one who can be killed for being a rebellious child, can he be executed? It depends on whether he was convicted before he ran away. Rabbi Chanina rules that a ben Noah who curses God and then converts is not convicted as the laws for judging him and the death penalty have changed. Four sources, including the two parts of our Mishna, regarding a rebellious son who aged out before the ruling/execution, are brought to prove or disprove this ruling, but all comparisons are rejected. A rebellious son is killed because of the concern for where these actions will lead him in the future.

Feb 25

This week's learning is sponsored by Minna and Cliff Felig in honor of their newborn twin grandchildren Naveh and Lia. "Naveh is an oasis, safe space, in the desert. Lia means God is with me. We wish for them a safe space to protect them and that God will be with them at all times." Today's daf is sponsored by Art Gould in loving memory of Art's father Joseph, Yosef ben Shlomo Shabtai v'Rachel on his 24rd yahrzeit. "My father was an ordinary man of extraordinary dignity, decency and dedication. He loved to watch my brother and I play on the tennis courts directly opposite our living room window. One day he came out and shocked us both with a huge, booming, topspin forehand. We didn't know he played! I wish we had had more time together." Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in loving memory of her parents, Binyamin ben Ze'ev v'Hinda Yosepha and Fruma bat Nachum Natan v'Ester, whose yahrzeits are 4 days apart, 23 and 27 Shvat. "They would have supported and admired my learning." Why is a daughter not able to be judged as a rebellious child? To be convicted as a rebellious son, he must eat a certain amount of meat and drink a certain amount of wine. However, there are also specific conditions regarding the type of meat/wine, the nature of the meal, the company present, and other factors. If he is eating as part of a seudat mitzva (ritual meal) or consuming forbidden food, he is not liable. The dangers of wine are discussed through the lens of various stories and texts in the Tanach, including those about Adam, Noah, and the rebuke of King Solomon by his mother in Proverbs Chapter 31. However, wine also has beneficial qualities, as it can help soothe the pain of those who are suffering. There is a debate between Rav and Shmuel about what Ham, Noah's son, did to him after Noah became drunk. One says he castrated him, while the other maintains that he sodomized him, with each sage providing textual support for their position. Some hold that the tree of knowledge was a grapevine, emphasizing the negative aspects of wine. Others claim it was either a wheat plant or a fig tree. King Solomon's mother rebuked him and bound him to a pillar to be flogged for pursuing earthly pleasures that led him to sin, much like a rebellious son. Details regarding the cases in the Mishna where a rebellious son is not liable are discussed, explained, and compared to other sources that appear to contradict some of the situations mentioned in the Mishna. These contradictions are ultimately resolved.

Feb 24

Today's daf is sponsored by Elisheva Gray in loving memory of Gidi Nahshon, z''l, Yoel Melech ben Moshe v'Sarah, on his tenth yahrzeit. "Gidi was a wonderful mentor, friend and chevruta. He made Aliyah to Israel from Prague and was in the IDF during both the 1967 and Yom Kippur wars. I feel his presence in my Daf Yomi studies every day, and I am grateful that he passed on to me his d'vekut for Israel and for Torah. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Miri Darchi in loving memory of her father Aharon Shimon ben David and Malka Tzirel. Abaye raises a difficulty against Rabba's position, that males before reaching maturity cannot father a child, from a verse in the Torah regarding a man who engages in relations with a shifcha harufa . The drasha on that verse includes a male over the age of nine. However, the difficulty is resolved, as this is not an indicator that the child can impregnate a woman at that age. Another difficulty is raised against Rabba from a braita of Rabbi Yishmael that derives an exemption for a ben sorer u'moreh who himself is a father - how could he be a father if he did not impregnate the woman before reaching maturity, since according to Rabbi Kruspedai, there is only a three-month window after reaching maturity to be a ben sorer u'moreh ? This is resolved as well by explaining Rabbi Yishmael's drasha as the source for Rabbi Kruspedia's ruling - the three months is based on the fact that the child could potentially be called a father within three months of reaching maturity as his wife could become pregnant and would be showing it after the first three months. Rabbi Kruspedai's opinion is based on the majority of women who give birth at nine months and begin showing at three months and doesn't consider a woman who gives birth at seven months and would be showing at two and a third months. Could this prove that woman who gives birth at seven months also begins showing at three months and not at a third of her pregnancy (two and a third months)? This suggestion is rejected as he follows the majority. However, is that really true? This contradicts the concept that in capital law we try to find any possible way to exonerate the accused from the verse "and the congregation shall save." Two Mishnayot are brought to prove that we do follow the majority even in capital cases, but the second one is rejected as it can be explained differently. Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about a mother who has an incomplete sexual encounter with her minor son. Does this disqualify her from marrying a kohen, as she could be considered a zona from the interaction? Rav Chisda (either quoted someone else or he was quoted by someone else) explains that they all agree if the child was nine, that she would become disqualified, and if he was younger than eight, then she would not. Their disagreement is about a child who is between eight and nine, as in the days of the Tanach men were able to father children at eight, even though already in the time of the tannaim, this was no longer the situation. The debate is whether we learn from those times or follow what is true presently. What is the source that in the times of the Tanach men fathered children at age eight? At first, they try to prove from Shlomo, as his great grandfather Achitofel was twenty-six years older than him. However, this proof is rejected, as the lineage includes Bat-Sheva who was a woman and she could have been younger, and the men were older. The second attempt is brought from Avraham and Sara, but this is rejected as well as it is not clear whether Avraham was older than Sara's father, Haran or younger. The final proof comes from Bezalel who was the great-grandson of Caleb, who was twenty-six years older than him. If two years are deducted due to three pregnancies, then the remainder of the twenty-four years prove that each father was eight years old at the birth of his son. Why are girls exempted from being a ben sorer u'moreh ?

Feb 23

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of Shiri Bibas and in honor of the release of Tal Shoham, Omer Shem Tov, Omer Wenkert, and Eliya Cohen who returned to Israel after 505 days, and Avera Mengistu and Hisham Al-Sayed who returned after being held for a decade. Wishing them a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages. The Mishna quoted Rabbi Akiva who said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua that two people can gather cucumbers - one uses sorcery and will be liable, and the other who makes it look like they are gathered, but they are not really, is exempt. The Gemara brings the story of the death of Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus to question this, as in the context of that dramatic story, a different incident is recounted where Rabbi Eliezer shows Rabbi Akiva how using magic one can gather cucumbers. Upon his death, the rabbis wanted to see if Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrkanus changed his mind and if they could repeal the ex-communication they had placed upon him. However, he was still strongly holding onto his position. But since the word "pure" (*tahara*) was on his lips as he died, they took it as a sign that they could repeal the ex-communication. A rebellious son, ben sorer u'moreh , can only be convicted if he has reached puberty and until he has significant hair growth by his genitals. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav derives this from the verse in the Torah regarding a rebellious son that juxtaposes the words son and man. Rav Chisda learns a different drasha from that verse, that if the father of the child was a minor when the son was born, he cannot become a rebellious son. How can both be derived from the verse? Rabba disagrees with Rav Chisda as he holds that a minor is not capable of fathering a child.

Feb 21

Study Guide Sanhedrin 67 Today's daf is sponsored by Aviva Appleman Jacobowitz in loving memory of Joseph Appleman, Yosef Ben Hillel, on his second yahrzeit. "May his neshama have an aliya!" Today's daf is sponsored by Miki Kadosh in loving memory of her father, Daniel ben Avraham. What distinguishes between two types of idol worship inciters: a meisit , who persuades individuals to worship idols, and a meidiach , who leads an entire city to idol worship? There is a unique legal provision regarding a meisit : witnesses may be hidden to observe when the meisit attempts to convince someone to worship idols - a practice not permitted for any other violation of law. The Mishna states that a meisit can only be a regular person, but what case does this specification exclude? Furthermore, is this Mishna ruling consistent only with Rabbi Shimon's interpretation, or can it also align with the position of the rabbis? What constitutes a mechashef (sorcerer)? The Mishna provides a detailed classification of which actions qualify as sorcery and which do not. Why does the Torah use mechashefa , the feminine form of this term? What is the scriptural source indicating that a mechashef is executed by stoning? What is the linguistic origin of the word mechashef ? Several stories involving people who used magic are recounted.

Feb 21

This week's learning is sponsored by Ruth Rotenberg in loving memory of their eldest daughter Tanielle Gavre"ea Margalit on her 20th yahrzeit. "Hashem gifted us a beautiful neshama for 18 years. She remarkably accomplished so much, and so many continue to carry her passions and deeds." Today's daf is sponsored by Miki Kadosh in loving memory of her father, Daniel ben Avraham. Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her mother Shirley K. Tydor, Sarah Raizel Bat Mordechai Yitzchak and Freida Sima, and her grandmother, Esther bat Sinai and Chaya. "My beloved mother had the zechut of living in Israel, my beloved grandmother, who I never knew, died of typhus in the Lodz ghetto. May their memories be a blessing." Today's daf is dedicated in memory of Ariel and Kfir Bibas, and Oded Lifshitz, and pray for the safe return of Ariel and Kfir's mother, Shiri. Our hearts are with the families. One who desecrates Shabbat gets stoned. What exceptions to the rule are there? One who curses one's father and mother gets stoned. However, this is limited to one who cursed them using the name of God. There is a debate about whether it is only if one uses the name of God and not a nickname. The verse regarding the punishment for this is extrapolated. The warning for this is derived from the verse in Shmot 22:27 from the prohibition to curse Elohim (either judges or God) and a Nasi . How is it derived from this verse? One who engages in sexual relations with a betrothed young woman receives the punishment of stoning. To receive this specific punishment, the woman must be a naara (the stage between a ketana and a bogeret ), virgin, betrothed, and still in her father's domain. If two men engage in relations with her, only the first is stoned, the second receives the typical punishment for adultery of strangulation. All these details are derived from verses in the Torah. The Mishna corresponds to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as the rabbis disagree and obligate one even if the woman is younger, a ketana . There is a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshea about whether according to Rabbi Meir there is a punishment of strangulation for the man if the girl is under the age of a naara or if there would be no punishment at all. Each establishes his position using a verse from the Torah. What does each one derive from the verse supporting the other's opinion?

Feb 20

Study Guide Sanhedrin 65 Today's daf is dedicated to the Bibas and Lifschitz families on this difficult day. A baal ov and yidoni are punished by stoning. Baal ov raises the dead and they speak from between the baal ov 's armpits. Yidoni . a sorcerer, takes a bone from an animal called yadua and puts it in their mouth and it speaks. Why are baal ov and yidoni mentioned in this Mishna as receiving the punishment of stoning, but in the Mishna in Keritot only baal ov is mentioned for being obligated to bring a sin offering? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish offer two different answers. Their opinions are analyzed in the Gemara - why doesn't each hold by the other? What is considered an action? Generally one is only obligated for actions, according to the rabbis. How much of an action is needed to obligate one? Is moving one's lips an action? Bowing to an idol? Rabbi Akiva obligates even without an action - but does he include any non-action? Or does he have some minimal criteria? What are the differences between the different types of witchcraft/magic mentioned in the Torah?

Feb 19

Today's daf is sponsored by David and Ruth Leah Kahan in honor of Dr. Jody Dushay and Prof. Paul Gompers, in celebration of the birth of their first grandchild, Aidan Oz Shulman. Did the Jews worship idols because they believed in them or for other reasons? How is it that the evil inclination for idol worship doesn't exist anymore? A story, based on the elaboration on a verse in Zecharia is brought to illustrate how this transpired. How does one violate the prohibition to pass one's son or daughter to Molech? Is the Molech considered idol worship?

Feb 18

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in loving memory of Honorable Myriam Altman, Myriam Bat Shlomo z"l. "It's been 20 years without her, and her love and wisdom still guides our every path." Rabbi Ami held that if one does various forbidden acts of idol worship unwittingly and then realizes one's mistake, one is obligated to bring only one sin offering. Abaye explained the source for Rabbi Ami, "Do not worship them," but he disagreed with Rabbi Ami and held that one would need to offer separate sin offerings for each action. The Mishna rules that one receives the death penalty for saying to an idol, "You are my God." Rav Nachman quoted Rav as having said that also. The Gemara infers that Rav's statement must have referred to obligating one to bring a sacrifice, as the death penalty was already derived from the Mishna. They also explain that his opinion only accords with Rabbi Akiva's position in his disagreement with the rabbis (according to Reish Lakish's understanding of their debate) about whether one who curses God unwittingly can be obligated to bring a sin offering. The rabbis rule that since the person sinned with words only, there is no sin offering, while Rabbi Akiva disagrees. Rav's opinion is derived from a verse relating to the sin of the golden calf. The Gemara continues to bring a different drasha from the words in that verse Shmot 32:8, " heelucha " in plural, mentioning the idol and God, reflecting that the Jews did not reject God completely. However, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the meaning of the word in that context. The Mishna listed various actions for which one does not receive the death penalty. Does one get lashes for them? And if so, for which of the actions? There are two different traditions relating to this and each one is challenged as some fall into the category of a negative commandment that does not have an action (words only) and a negative commandment that includes many different prohibitions, both of which are exempt from lashes. The first version is rejected, but the second is explained according to the position of Rabbi Yehuda, who obligates one to receive lashes even for a negative commandment without an action. One cannot go into a partnership with an idol worshipper as it may cause the idol worshipped to vow in the name of the idol. One cannot mention the name of an idol, unless it is a name mentioned in the Tanach. Is idol worship something that people have a strong desire to do?

Feb 17

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Sagui Dekel-Chen, Alexandre Troufanov, and Iair Horn after 498 days in captivity. Wishing them a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages. Rabbi Zakai brought a braita which stated that one who performs multiple acts of idol worship in a single lapse of awareness is only liable for one sin offering. Rabbi Yochanan told him to teach this braita outside the study hall because the braita was corrupted. Rabbi Abba tried to justify Rabbi Zakai's words based on Rabbi Yosi's opinion in his dispute with Rabbi Natan regarding the laws of Shabbat - whether the prohibition of kindling fire was singled out as a negative commandment or to divide liability. However, Rav Yosef rejects this comparison as even Rabbi Yosi holds that if one does several actions in a single lapse of awareness, one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each one. The Gemara raises another difficulty and resolves it. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda brought a different version of the braita that Rabbi Zakai had presented to Rabbi Yochanan, which also dealt with someone who performs multiple acts and is only liable for one sin offering. The Gemara brings four possible explanations to understand the braita, concluding with the final one, and explaining why Rabbi Yochanan did not accept this braita from Rabbi Zakai.

Feb 16

Rabbi Yirmiya explains that there are two verses about idol worship - one about bowing and one about slaughtering - each teaching different principles. The verse about slaughtering teaches that if someone performs any Temple-like ritual for idols, they are punished by stoning, even if that's not the typical way to worship that particular idol. The verse about bowing teaches that bowing specifically is punishable even if it's not the usual way to worship that idol, while other acts are only punishable by stoning if done in the manner that particular idol is typically worshipped. Rava bar Rav Chanan challenges Rabbi Yirmiya's interpretation. He suggests the opposite - that we should learn from the bowing verse that any act of idol worship is forbidden regardless of whether it's the typical way of worship. He argues that this must be the only relevant verse, since the slaughtering verse could be teaching a different law: that someone who slaughters an animal for their own use but intends to use its blood for idol worship is liable for the death penalty. This challenge only works according to Reish Lakish's view that the animal remains permitted despite such intent, making the verse necessary to teach about the person's punishment. However, according to Rabbi Yochanan, who holds the animal becomes forbidden (based on the laws of pigul ), no verse would be needed to teach about punishing the person. Yet Rav Papa suggests the question works even according to Rabbi Yochanan's view. Rav Acha dismisses the entire question, arguing that both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish were only discussing the animal's status - the person's liability for the death penalty would clearly follow from the laws of pigul , making this verse unnecessary for that purpose. The Gemara raises and resolves two additional challenges to Rava bar Rav Chanan's question. Rava asks Rav Hamnuna about an apparent contradiction in our chapter's mishnayot : one Mishna indicates that while actual idol worship is forbidden, merely declaring an intention to worship is not, while another Mishna states that simply saying "I will worship idols" is enough to make one liable. Seven different resolutions are offered to resolve this contradiction. There's a debate about whether someone who worships idols out of love or fear for another person is liable. Rava and Abaye disagree on this point, with Abaye presenting three proofs to support his position that such a person is indeed liable.

Feb 14

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Eliezer each proposed an additional Noahide law – sorcery and kilayim (forbidden mixtures) respectively. From where did they derive this? . The Mishna details the courtroom procedure for cases involving blasphemy. It describes how witnesses testify about someone cursing God's name and how the judges must respond. Several key questions are examined: Which divine name must be blasphemed to incur the death penalty? What is the biblical source requiring judges to stand when hearing the testimony? What is the textual basis for the requirement to tear one's garments upon hearing God's name blasphemed? Is this rending of garments also required when hearing a non-Jew blaspheme? How is it permissible for a second witness to simply confirm "I heard the same" without repeating the blasphemous statement, when such indirect testimony is typically not accepted in Jewish courts? Which specific acts of idol worship are capital offenses and how these are derived from Torah verses? Which forms of idolatrous worship merit lashes rather than capital punishment for violating a negative commandment?

Feb 14

Rabbi Yochanan holds that a gentile is not permitted to learn Torah. He views it as part of the Noahide laws - either under theft or forbidden sexual relations. This is derived from Devraim 33:4 as the Torah is considered morasha , an inheritance, and that is either understood that it belongs exclusively to the Jewish people, or it is understood as a reference to meurasa , that we are betrothed to God. A contradiction to Rabbi Yochanan is brought from a statement of Rabbi Meir that a gentile who learns Torah is like a kohen gadol , a high priest. The resolution is to differentiate between learning the seven Noahide laws and the rest of the Torah. What is the source in the Torah for Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel's position that blood from a live animal is forbidden as part of the Noahide laws? If a commandment was given to the sons of Noah and then repeated when the Torah was received, that is an indicator that the rule is meant both for the sons of Noah and for the Jewish people. But a commandment sons of Noah and then not repeated after the Torah was given, is meant to be for Jews only. this is Rabbi Chanina's position. First, the Gemara questions these rules as they seem counter-intuitive. After explaining the logic, they proceed to raise difficulties from actual commandments. Those, too, as resolved. Noach was permitted to eat meat but Adam was not. The Gemara raises four difficulties on this and through the questions, several interesting issues are raised including, why did the snake seduce Adam and Chava? What is the status of meat that falls from the sky - can it be presumed to be kosher?

Feb 13

Study Guide Sanhedrin 58 Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's grandmother, Sara Hene Rabinowitz Geffen, on her Tu b'Shevat yahrzeit. "She and her husband, Rav Tuvia Geffen, Rabbi of Sherith Israel Synagogue in Atlanta for 60 years, brought up their eight children with love and learning. Seven of their grandchildren made aliyah and many great, great-great, and great-great-great grandchildren live in Israel." Rabbi Meir states that only forbidden relations that are punishable by death by the court are forbidden by Noahide laws. However, in a different braita it says that Rabbi Meir holds that certain forbidden relations not punishable by death in the court are forbidden to gentiles (sister through one's mother) and one that is punishable by death in the court is permitted to gentiles (father's wife). This is reconciled by explaining that there are two different versions of Rabbi Meir's position - one passed down by Rabbi Eliezer and one by Rabbi Akiva. Each derives his position from the verse in Bereishit 2:24, "Therefore a man shall leave his father and mother," implying that certain relations are forbidden to him. Several questions are asked of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva on each of their derivations, suggesting that perhaps they should have derived other prohibited relations instead. Other difficulties are raised against their positions (one against Rabbi Eliezer and two against Rabbi Akiva) from verses in the Torah from before the Torah was given - Amram who married Yocheved, Avraham's words to Avimelech about his relationship to Sara and why Adam did not marry his daughter, but gave her to Cain instead. All of the difficulties are resolved. Four laws are stated by different rabbis relating to either forbidden or permitted sexual relations regarding a gentile and one about the severity of the action of a gentile who hits a Jew. Three more laws are brought by Reish Lakish, the first one referring to the previous law by stressing the severity of one who even holds up one's hand to hit another. Other rabbis mention punishments or names that they would call a person who raises one's hand to hit another. The second law is that one who works hard cultivating one's land will have plenty of bread and one who does not, will not. The third is that a gentile must not rest on the Sabbath as they are commanded to work every day. Rava adds that even to make any day of the week into a day of rest would be forbidden.

Feb 12

Study Guide Sanhedrin 57 This week's learning is sponsored by Efrat Avraham for the refuah shleima of a very brave soldier, Itamar Avraham ben Merav. A braita from the school of Menashe taught a different version of the seven Noahide laws, replacing the establishment of courts and cursing God with the prohibitions of castration and forbidden mixtures ( kilayim ). From what verses in the Torah are these seven laws derived? A debate follows between Rav Yosef and Rav Sheshet, who share a tradition from Rav that not all Noahide laws carry the death penalty. They disagree on the number - either three or four are capital offenses. Contrasting this, Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna cite Rav as saying all Noahide laws are punishable by death. The Gemara raises a challenge from a braita about theft, but resolves it. This braita discusses legal distinctions between cases of gentiles stealing from other gentiles or Jews, and Jews stealing from gentiles. The braita mentions theft, the beautiful captive woman ( eshet yefat toar ), and "similar cases" - prompting questions about what cases are considered similar to theft and similar to the beautiful captive woman. The legal requirements for convicting a gentile are less stringent than those for convicting a Jewish person. A single judge can render the verdict, testimony from one witness is sufficient, even if the witness is related to the accused, and no formal warning is required beforehand. However, testimony from women is not accepted. Rabbi Yishmael holds that a gentile who strikes a pregnant woman causing fetal death is subject to capital punishment. What are the scriptural sources of these legal principles? There are two different verses used to establish that forbidden sexual relations are included in the Noahide laws, and the Gemara explains why two separate sources are necessary, as there are some cases where a Noahide will be judged according to Jewish law.

Feb 11

This week's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha and Rabbi Hayim Herring in loving memory of Terri's father Judge Norman Krivosha, Nachum Meir ben David Beer v'Malka on his 4th yahrzeit. "Our dad was a mentor to all who knew him and exemplified the words of Micah: "עשות משפט, ואהבת חסד, והצנע לכת עם אלוקיך" - "do justice, love goodness and walk humbly with God." Today's daf is sponsored by Bracha Stuart in loving memory of her father Simcha haKohen ben Shlomo on his first yahrzeit. Under what circumstances is one obligated the death penalty for cursing God? How do the witnesses testify in this situation as we do not want them to say exactly what they saw as that would require uttering a curse against God? One incurs the death penalty for cursing God only if one cursed God in God's name. Shmuel derives this from Vayikra 24:16 " V'nokev shem Hashem mot yumat...b'nokvo shem yumat. " Nokev means to curse, as is found in a verse regarding Bilam, Bamidbar 23:8. The Gemara raises other possibilities for defining nokev , to reject Shmuel's derivation, but then explains why each would not be relevant to the verse, " v'nokev shem Hashem. " A different possible source is brought to prove that nokev means to curse from Vayikra 24:14 in the context of the person who cursed God in the desert, " Vayikov... vayikalel ." Cursing God is also one of the Noachide laws. This is derived from the repeated words in Vayikra 24:15, "A man a man who curses God." Why is this not derived from Bereishit 2:16, the verse from which all of the seven Noachide laws are derived? Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha explains that the basic commandment is derived from Bereishit, but the added verse in Vayikra is meant to add that a Gentile, like a Jew gets the death penalty even if they curse using a nickname of God. This accords with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The rabbis disagree with rabbi Meir and hold that both a Jew and Gentile are forbidden to curse God using a nickname, but would not receive the death penalty. However, Rabbi Meyasha disagrees with Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha and holds that the rabbis distinguish between Jew and Gentile. A Jew would not get punished for cursing with a nickname, but a Gentile would. He derives this from Vayikra 24:16 from the words, " k'ger k'ezrach ." What are the seven Noachide laws? There are different opinions regarding which commandments they are obligated to keep. Some hold that there are more than seven. Rabbi Yochanan explains that they are all derived from Bereishit 2:16. Rabbi Yitzchak derives them also from the same verse but differently.

Feb 10

Study Guide Sanhedrin 55 Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Plunka in loving memory of his grandfather, Yirachmil Hersh ben Yisrael, Harry Plunka. Today's daf is sponsored by Blima Shorchein in loving memory of her father, Yitzchak Tzvi ben Blima v'Chaim Shimon. Today's daf is sponsored by Raya, Lily, Kyra, Aliza, Lucy, and Eden, students of Abby Sosland, in loving memory of her mother, Judy Sosland z"l. "Though we did not know your mother personally, we know that her love, compassion, and wisdom made you the role model you are for us today, and for every student you've taught. We hope to be here for you and want to celebrate your mother's life with all of our timbrels." The Gemara delves into more issues regarding both homosexual relations and bestiality. They asked Rav Sheshet: If a gentile has relations with an animal, is the animal killed? Does there need to be both a calamity (sin) and shame or is it enough for there just to be a calamity? Rav Sheshet brings an answer from one source and the Gemara suggests another source, but the Gemara's suggestion is rejected. That suggestion leads to another question they asked of Rav Hamnuna: If a Jew has relations with an animal unwittingly, is the animal killed as there is no calamity, but there is shame. Three sources are brought to answer that question, but all are inconclusive.

Feb 9

Study Guide Sanhedrin 54 Today's daf is sponsored by Roslyn Jaffe in loving memory of her mother, Dita Muhlrad, Duba Feiga bat Menachem. "My mom was a true Yiddishe mama who instilled Torah values in her children. She was so proud of all my academic accomplishments and would have gotten much nachat from my Daf Yomi studies." Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Ohad Ben Ami, Or Levy and Eli Sharabi after 491 days in captivity. Wishing them a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages. Rabbi Yehuda according to the version in our Mishna, holds (against the rabbis) that if one has relations unwittingly with one's mother who is also one's father's wife, he is only obligated one sin offering. How are the verses in Vayikra that relate to the forbidden relations with one's mother/father's wife understood according to Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis? The Mishna then discusses homosexual relations and bestiality and the Gemara proceeds to extrapolate the verses relating to those situations - from where do we learn the punishment and the warning for both the initiator and the one to whom relations were initiated?

Feb 7

What specific transgressions are punished by stoning? For some transgressions, the punishment is explicitly mentioned in the Torah, while for others it is derived from a gezeira shava using the words " demaihem bam " that appear in the context of a necromancer and a sorcerer. Why is the derivation is not made from the words " mot yumatu " instead. According to the version in the Mishna, Rabbi Yehuda holds a different view from the rabbis regarding a specific case: if a man has intercourse with his mother who is also his father's wife, he is only obligated once (in an accidental scenario, he would bring only one sin offering). The Gemara first presents an alternative version of Rabbi Yehuda's position, stating that if the mother was forbidden to marry the father, then the son is only obligated once for relations with his mother, not because she was his father's wife. To properly understand this interpretation, it seems that Rabbi Yehuda follows Rabbi Akiva's opinion that a marriage to someone forbidden by a negative prohibition is invalid. The version of Rabbi Yehuda in the Mishna is subsequently confirmed by Rabbi Yitzchak. Abaye, Rav Acha, and Rava each provide explanations for this version of Rabbi Yehuda. However, both Abaye and Rav Acha's suggestions are ultimately rejected.

Feb 7

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment?

Feb 6

Study Guide Sanhedrin 51 A braita is quoted in which a range of possibilities are suggested regarding the verse about the daughter of a kohen who gets burned for disgracing her father. After each suggestion, the braita concludes with what the verse is actually referring to. The Gemara questions most of the suggestions, trying to understand why they were even suggested. And they suggest various ways of understanding the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer which is hard to understand. Within the discussion of Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yishmael's unique opinion is raised, that a daughter of a kohen who gets burned is only if she is betrothed. From where is this derived and on what basis does Rabbi Akiva disagree?

Feb 5

Study Guide Sanhedrin 50 The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon present conflicting views on how to rank the four death penalties by severity. The Gemara examines both positions in detail, exploring the textual and logical proofs each side uses to support their ordering. For the rabbis' position, the Gemara investigates the basis for claiming that stoning is the most severe, followed by burning, then execution by sword, and finally strangulation as the least severe. It similarly examines Rabbi Shimon's reasoning for ranking burning as more severe than both death by the sword and strangulation, stoning as more severe than the sword and strangulation, and finally, strangulation as more severe than the sword. This fundamental disagreement about the death penalties' relative severity is based on other disputes between the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding capital punishment. One such case involves a betrothed daughter of a kohen (priest) who commits adultery. The rabbis maintain she should be stoned, following the law for any betrothed woman who commits adultery. Rabbi Shimon, however, rules she should be burned, treating her case like a married kohen's daughter. They also differ on the punishment for someone who leads a city into idol worship - the rabbis prescribe stoning, while Rabbi Shimon advocates strangulation.

Feb 4

Today's daf is sponsored by Blima Shorchein in loving memory of her mother, Mazal (Tina) bat Rina and David. When King Shlomo executed Yoav ben Tzruya, what was his legal justification? The Gemara details a series of trials: First, Shlomo tried Yoav for killing Avner ben Ner, but Yoav defended himself by claiming it was justified vengeance for Avner's murder of his brother Asael. Next, Shlomo tried him for the killing of Amasa ben Yeter, but again Yoav provided justification for his actions, as Asael rebelled against the king. Finally, Shlomo tried him for an unambiguous crime - joining Adonijah's rebellion against King David - and it was for this act of treason that Yoav was ultimately executed. While the Gemara demonstrates that Yoav's execution was legally justified, it also acknowledges that he possessed notable positive qualities. Regarding the four death penalties prescribed by the Jewish courts: What is their hierarchical order in terms of severity? Which is considered the most severe and which the least? When we find lists of items or actions in the Mishna presented in a specific order, should we understand this ordering as deliberately meaningful or merely incidental?

Feb 3

Rava and Abaye engage in a debate over the permissibility of using burial shrouds that were originally woven for a deceased person. The core of their disagreement lies in whether the mere act of designating an item for use for the dead is enough to prohibit others from using it. The Gemara analyzes the source each sage presents for his position, as well as their reasons for not accepting each other's sources. The Gemara presents eight tannaitic sources that challenge both positions equally - four questioning Rava's stance and four questioning Abaye's. While the Gemara successfully resolves the first seven difficulties, it struggles to directly address the final challenge to Abaye's position. Instead, it finds resolution by demonstrating through another tannaitic source that the Rava-Abaye debate actually mirrors an earlier disagreement between the rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Regarding the possessions of those executed by royal decree, a tannaitic debate exists over whether these belongings should pass to the deceased's heirs or revert to the king. While both sides cite supporting evidence from the biblical accounts of Achav and Yoav in the book of Melachim, the Gemara shows how each narrative can be interpreted to support either position.

Feb 2

Study Guide Sanhedrin 47 Today's daf is dedicated in honor of the release of Yarden Bibas, Ofer Calderon, and Keith Siegal after 484 days in captivity. May we see the speedy release of all the rest of the hostages! Are eulogies primarily intended to honor the deceased or to comfort their relatives? After examining nine different textual sources, the Gemara concludes definitively that eulogies serve to honor the deceased. The Gemara discusses why there must be separate burial places for those executed by the court, explaining that righteous people cannot be buried alongside wicked people. The discussion explores the source in the Tanach for this requirement. Rabbi Yochanan makes two statements about sin offerings: If someone designates an animal as a sin offering but then becomes disqualified from bringing it (either by leaving Judaism or becoming mentally incompetent), that sacrifice can never be offered, even if the person later returns to a qualified state. This follows the principle that once an animal is rejected as a sacrifice, it remains permanently invalid. Rav Yosef reinforces this ruling by comparing it to the law of animals designated for sacrifice in an idolatrous city, arguing that just as the city's inhabitants receive atonement through death and yet the animals can never be brought for sacrificing. Abaye challenges this, as he holds that death does not automatically atone for sins. Rava attempts to support Rav Yosef by distinguishing between different types of death, but Abaye rejects these distinctions. While Abaye brings our Mishna to support his position, his proof is rejected. A practical case arose where people were taking soil from Rav's grave as a remedy for illness. When concerned individuals asked Shmuel to prohibit this practice, citing the general prohibition against deriving benefit from grave-related items, Shmuel permitted it because soil still connected to the ground is not subject to this prohibition. The Gemara explores the source for this ruling, and although several challenges are raised to Shmuel's position, they are all successfully addressed. Rava and Abaye debate whether shrouds embroidered for a deceased person are prohibited from being used by others. Their fundamental disagreement centers on whether merely designating an item for use by the dead is sufficient to prohibit others from benefiting from it. The Gemara examines the textual sources each sage uses to support his position.

Jan 31

Study Guide Sanhedrin 46 Today's daf is sponsored by Joyce Bendavid. "In tremendous appreciation of Rabbanit Farber who inspired me to begin learning the daily Daf." Today's daf is sponsored by Lori Schuldiner Schor. "With gratitude for the constant love and support of her husband, Joshua Schor." Those who were stoned were also hung, but it's unclear whether this applied to all or only some of those who were stoned. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis engage in a debate about these issues, basing their arguments on different interpretations of the verses in Devarim 21:22-23. They also discuss whether women were also hung as part of this process. The source for burial in the Torah is derived from these same verses. In a discussion with the Persian king (Shpur Malka), Rav Hama did not use this verse as proof. This raises questions about why he chose not to do so and why he couldn't find alternative verses in the Torah to support his argument. The hanging process was specific and brief. Those who were hung were immediately taken down and were hung only for a short moment. This practice was derived from the verses in Devarim, with the explicit purpose of not desecrating the name of God. The dead body must be buried by nightfall. Furthermore, these verses establish a broader principle that anyone who has a relative who dies must bury them by nightfall, with exceptions only for important reasons directly related to respecting the deceased. Two questions were asked: Is the purpose of burial to prevent the disgrace of the dead body or to provide atonement? Similarly, are eulogies meant to show respect for the deceased or out of respect for the relatives? Various verses are brought to address these questions, though each verse can be interpreted in multiple ways to support the different possibilities.

Jan 31

Study Guide Sanhedrin 45 This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Galasko in loving memory of her mother-in-law, Carol Galasko, Chaya bat Avraham Michael v'Feyga Liba. "I wish everybody could be blessed with as wonderful a mother-in-law as I have. Baruch Dayan Emet." Today's daf is dedicated in honor of the release of Agam Berger, Arbel Yehud, Gadi Mozes, and five Thai hostages after 482 days in captivity. May we see the speedy release of all the rest of the hostages! Today's daf is dedicated in memory of the 67 victims of the tragic aircraft collision in Washington. The stoning ceremony required stripping the condemned person of their clothing and then covering just their private parts. For a male, this was undisputed. However, there was a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the other rabbis regarding whether a woman should also be stripped (and then covered). This seemed to contradict a Mishna in Sotah where their positions were reversed. Rabba and Rava offered resolutions to reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions within their respective interpretations. The execution itself followed a specific procedure: First, one of the witnesses would push the condemned person from a designated height. Then, another witness would throw a large stone upon them. These roles were specifically assigned to the witnesses who had testified against the condemned. The Gemara explores the textual sources for these procedural details. Throughout these laws, there is a guiding principle that the execution should be carried out as swiftly as possible to minimize the suffering of the condemned person. Shmuel taught that if one of the witnesses lost a hand, the condemned person would be freed, as it would be impossible to fulfill the biblical requirement that "the witnesses' hand should be the first to kill him." This position faced several challenges: two related directly to the stoning procedure, and another drawn from a case involving a murderer where literal fulfillment of the biblical verse was not necessary. While these challenges were ultimately resolved, those who questioned Shmuel's position were questioned based on the laws of the wayward child, which demand precise fulfillment of biblical verses. This too was resolved. Additional support for Shmuel's position came from the laws of a city that collectively practiced idolatry ( ir hanidachat ). However, the Gemara notes that Shmuel's interpretation aligns with only one side of a debate among tannaim regarding the purification process of a leper. Does post-execution hanging applies to all who are stoned, or only to those specifically stoned for cursing God or worshiping idols? https://youtu.be/F5TGe47r9m8

Jan 30

This month's learning is sponsored by David and Ariella Merklin in loving memory of their grandparents, Liebe and Abraham Merklin, Jack and Tora Dabrosin, Ethel and Arthur Rosenthal, and Helen and Julius (Jack) Herman. The story of Achan teaches an important principle: even when the Jewish people sin, they retain their status as Israel, as shown in Joshua 7:11. From this same verse, the rabbis derive that Achan's actions constituted violations of all five books of the Torah. Various rabbis identify specific transgressions based on their interpretation of the verse. During Achan's execution, both his family and the entire nation were present as witnesses. This raises the question: why was such a public display necessary? Following his death, all his possessions were either burned or stoned. Among the items Achan stole was an aderet shinar , though its exact definition is debated. When Achan was ordered to produce the stolen items, Joshua displayed them before God. The rabbis interpret this as Joshua demanding an explanation from God for the deaths of thirty-six people, equivalent to half a Sanhedrin. An alternative view holds that only one person died - Yair ben Menashe - but his importance equaled that of half a Sanhedrin. Joshua's bold confrontation with God was viewed as inappropriate. This raises another question: why was Joshua's boldness considered worse than similar instances of forthright speech by Pinchas and Moshe? Rabbi Shila and Rav offer different explanations for Joshua's culpability in the deaths of the thirty-six: one faults him for delaying the erection of stones upon entering the land, while the other criticizes his prohibition against taking spoils from Jericho. The text also references another incident where Joshua encounters an angel of God and, according to the Gemara, is rebuked for preventing the people from studying Torah. Building on the previous section's discussion of angels, another verse from Proverbs is extrapolated. It is understood to be connected to a story told of the angel Piskonit as the supreme guardian angel of the Jewish people. If a person being executed claims innocence and calls upon the witnesses to bear responsibility, the execution proceeds regardless, even if the witnesses explain why they lied. This is illustrated by a case involving the son of Shimon ben Shatach, which Rashi discusses though it isn't detailed in the Gemara itself.

Jan 29

Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in honor of her grandson Oriya Hartman's marriage to Shira Shahar Katzav. "May they live long lives together inspired by Torah and love." Today's daf is sponsored by Marcia Baum in loving memory of Helena K Baum, Chaya Chana Alta bat Chana v'Yekutiel Yehuda on her 9th yahrzeit. "Mom was a strong proponent of women's Torah study long before it became mainstream. She studied at the Drisha Institute with women half her age. She is missed every day by those of us who loved her and we hope we are making her proud!" Today's daf is sponsored in memory of Shayna Malka bat Shlomo Yosef on her yahrzeit. Rav Ashi derives a third source for the requirement that stoning executions must take place outside the city, finding support in the verses discussing the blasphemer. All basic execution expenses are covered by communal funds. However, two questions arise about additional costs: First, regarding the wages of those stationed outside the court to assist potential last-minute defenders of the condemned, and second, concerning the cost of wine and frankincense given to the convicted person to reduce their suffering before execution. The Gemara resolves the second question using a verse from Proverbs, establishing that these measures must be funded by the community since it bears collective responsibility for minimizing the condemned's suffering. Rav Acha bar Huna poses a question to Rav Sheshet: How should we handle a case where a student rises to present evidence for acquittal but becomes unable to speak before explaining his reasoning? Rav Sheshet initially dismisses this as obvious - since no argument was actually presented, it cannot be considered. Despite Rav Acha's persistence, the Gemara attempts to resolve this by comparing it to a case where a student presented an argument for acquittal and then died, whose vote was counted. This might suggest that only fully explained arguments can be counted, but this conclusion is ultimately rejected. If someone being led to execution claims to have new evidence that could overturn their conviction, the court must evaluate this claim - but only if it appears to have merit. However, a braita teaches that during the first two times the condemned makes such claims, they must be heard regardless of apparent merit. Rav Pappa reconciles this with the Mishna's stricter standard, and the Gemara explains why later claims are treated differently. Abaye adds that after the first two attempts, Torah scholars accompany the condemned specifically to evaluate whether any new claims have substance. A portion of the Gemara discussing Jesus of Nazareth's execution was later censored and removed from the manuscripts. Before execution, the condemned is asked to confess their sins. This practice is derived from the biblical story of Achan. The Gemara analyzes this story in detail, deriving both practical laws and ethical teachings from its verses. This leads to a broader discussion about collective responsibility within the Jewish community - specifically, to what extent are Jews responsible for both the public and private transgressions of their fellow Jews?

Jan 28

Study Guide Sanhedrin 42 Why do we make a blessing on the new moon and what is the wording of the blessing? If a student has something to say to help acquit the accused, he is brought to sit with the judges. When does he return to his place and on what does it depend? What if after adding extra judges, they still do not have a majority on one to acquit or two to convict? Once convicted of stoning, they would take the convict to the beit ha'skila (house of stoning) which was far from the court. This was to enable time to pass and allow for new evidence to be brought that could possibly acquit the convict. The Gemara brings a braita that explains that the beit ha'skila was far out of the court - the distance of the three camps in the desert. This is derived in the braita from the bull sin offerings that were burned outside the camp. Rav Papa derived it from the verses that discuss stoning the blasphemer.

Jan 27

There are four sources in the Torah to derive the law that the accused must be warned before committing the crime in order for the court to convict. Why were all four necessary? Rav Chanan ruled that eidim zomemim who falsely testified against a betrothed woman that she engaged in relations with another man are not killed as they can claim they were only trying to forbid her to her husband and not to get her killed. However, a question is raised regarding laws of warning - as when they testified, mustn't they need to testify that they warned her that if she engaged in relations with this man, she would receive the death penalty, and then it would be clear that they were trying to get her punished with murder?! The Gemara answers that Rav Chanan must have made his statement regarding a case where the woman was a chavera , a woman who adheres strictly to mitzvot and according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda who does not require a warning for chaverim . Rav Chisda explains which types of contradictions are accepted in testimony and which ones are not. However, four sources are brought to raise difficulties with Rav Chisda's statement, but each is resolved. One source was from our Mishna regarding Ben Zackai who asked about the stem of the fig. Is Ben Zackai Rabban Yochanan ben Zackai or not? The Mishna explains that if one witness says "I don't know" regarding a bedika question, the testimony is accepted, and also if both say "I don't know." The latter case is unnecessary and that leads Rav Sheshet and Rava to offer alternative versions of that line in the Mishna. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Safra and Rav Kahana: if both bedikot and chakirot are required by Torah law, why if the witnesses say they don't know in a chakira question, the testimony is cancelled but in a bedika question, their testimony stands? They answered that chakira questions are necessary to establish the testimony since without it, it is testimony that cannot be cancelled by eidim zommemim , as they establish where and when the event transpired. If the witnesses have a discrepancy of one day regarding the date, it can be assumed that one did not know when Rosh Chodesh was, and that they are actually referring to the same day. However, this is limited to the first part of the month, as once it is the middle of the month, one can assume that they know the correct date. There is a blessing that is recited each month on the new moon, birkhat (kiddush) ha'levana . Until what day of the month can it be recited? Rabbi Yochanan answered, however, there are two opinions to explain what date he was referring to - the seventh of the month or the sixteenth.

Jan 26

Study Guide Sanhedrin 40 Today's daf is sponsored by Chavie Kahn and Heshy Kofman in loving memory of their father Yisrael ben Yehoshua Heschel on his first yahrzeit. Today's daf is dedicated in honor of the four tatzpitaniot that were released yesterday from captivity - Liri, Naama, Karina, and Daniela. We continue to pray for the safe release of all the other hostages. How many essential questions ( chakirot ) are the witnesses asked? What other questions are asked in specific cases, like idol worship or murder? What is the difference between chakirot and bedikot ? From where is the number of chakirot (7) derived? What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis about whether there are three chakirot or two?

Jan 24

Today's daf is sponsored by Lindsay Simmonds in loving memory of her father Baruch ben Eliezer v'Rachel. "His infectious 'joy of life' was a gift to all who were blessed to know him." The emperor challenged Rabban Gamliel with several questions about God's actions and God's power as described in the Tanach, including verses that seemingly suggest the existence of multiple deities. While the emperor's daughter addressed the first question, Rabban Gamliel responded to the remaining ones. The text also describes similar debates between heretics and other rabbis. The discussion then relates to verse quotes in the Mishna about rejoicing when evil people fall. Rabbi Acha applies this concept to the celebration following King Ahab's death. However, this interpretation raises a conflict, as Rabbi Yonatan explains that God does not rejoice at the downfall of evil people, since they too are His creations. This principle is derived from multiple sources, including a verse related to the splitting of the Red Sea. The resolution offered is that while God Himself does not rejoice, God permits humans to do so. The text then examines Ovadia, who served as the supervisor of Ahab's household and was known for his devotion to God. This raises several questions: Why does the text specifically mention his devotion to God? What textual evidence demonstrates that his fear of God surpassed even that of Abraham? Furthermore, what factors led to his selection as a prophet, and why was he specifically chosen to prophesize about Edom?

Jan 24

When the Jews were exiled under the rule of Tzidkiyahu, the verse states that God quickened the exile as God is righteous. Two interpretations are brought to explain what was righteous about this. The Mishna has brought various explanations for why Adam was created alone. A braita is brought which repeats some of the explanations and brings others. Several braitot and statements of amoraim are brought to answer various questions about the creating of humans. Why did God create humans so that each one is different? Why was Adam created on Friday? From where was the earth taken to create Adam? What were the events that took place each hour of the day in which Adam was created? Why were there angels who thought that God shouldn't create humans? How great was Adam before he sinned and how was his greatness diminished after sinning? From where do we know that Adam spoke Aramaic? Some say that Adam was a heretic or worshipped idols. Several verses are quoted which were used by heretics to question the rabbis' beliefs and responses are brought. Is it a good idea to engage in polemics or not?

Jan 23

Today's daf is sponsored by Helen Danczak in loving memory of her Aunt Doris. "Remembering my Aunt who passed away yesterday. May her neshama have an aliyah." How were the rows of students who stood before the court organized and why? The court of twenty-three judges and the Great Sanhedrin (of 71) were organized in a semi-circle. This is derived from a phrase in a verse in Shir haShirim 7:3. The verse in its entirety is extrapolated, teaching other virtues of the court and the Jewish people. How would they intimidate the witnesses in capital cases? The intimidation tactics were to prevent false witnesses, those who heard about the act but didn't witness it themselves, and also to encourage those who really saw what happened to come forward and not to withhold testimony out of laziness or fear. The Gemara provides an example for one of the things mentioned in the intimidation of the witnesses - not to testify from circumstantial evidence. And a case is brought of Shimon ben Shatach who saw a murder based on circumstantial evidence and did not testify about it. Drashot about Kayin and Hevel (Cain and able) are brought as a verse from there is quoted in the intimidation speech of the court.

Jan 22

Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein in loving memory of her father, Cantor Yoel ben Meir Fromm. "A lone survivor who served his kehilla in Canada devotedly. His advice to me, spiced with midrashim, encouraged my learning and independent thinking. My grandchildren are his legacy. I miss his nigunim and stories. He was my guiding light." Abaye proposes a kal v'chomer argument regarding someone sentenced to death who is working in the Temple: if he is engaged in communal sacrifices, he should not be taken for execution. He interprets the verse, "From my altar you will be taken to be killed" (Shmot 21:14) as referring only to individual sacrifices. Rava challenges this interpretation, noting that since some authorities permit individual offerings on Yom Tov, one cannot differentiate between communal and individual sacrifices on this basis, as both override Shabbat/Yom Tov while execution does not. According to that opinion, accepting Abaye's kal v'chomer would render the verse meaningless, as execution would never override Temple service. Rava therefore concludes that court-ordered execution takes precedence over all Temple service. In Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's court, Rav would speak first in monetary cases, despite the rule that the most senior judge should begin deliberations. Rava's son explains that this exception was due to Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's unique status - from Moshe until his time, no one matched his combined greatness in both political leadership and Torah scholarship. While the Gemara suggests other potential candidates from this period, each is dismissed because they had contemporaries of equal stature. Rav Ada bar Ahava notes that this singular combination of political and Torah leadership remained unmatched from Rabbi Yehuda haNasi until Rav Ashi. The Gemara brings two verses supporting the Mishna's requirement that in capital cases, deliberations begin with the junior judge. It then addresses Rav's ruling that a teacher can instruct his student about a case and later both can serve as judges. This seems to conflict with Tosefta Sanhedrin 7:2, which states that in capital cases, a teacher-student pair counts as one vote since the student's opinion is influenced by the teacher. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between different types of teacher-student relationships. Rabbi Abahu rules that while a case of an ox that killed a person requires twenty-three judges, other aspects follow monetary rather than capital case procedures. He references ten differences between monetary and capital cases in the Mishna, though the Gemara initially counts only nine, resolving the discrepancy by citing an additional difference from the Tosefta. The Gemara then examines why converts and mamzerim are disqualified from judging capital cases, questioning why each disqualification requires its own derivation. It also explores the source for disqualifying witnesses based on lineage. The semicircular arrangement of the twenty-three-judge Sanhedrin enabled all judges to see each other and the witnesses. How many scribes were there to record the judges' opinions during the deliberations?

Jan 21

Today's daf is sponsored by Susan Cashdan in loving memory of her father Yitzchak ben Moshe Chona. Today's daf is sponsored by Hannah Piotrkowski. "May our learning be a segula for the safe return of the five "תצפיתניות" (IDF observers) Liri Albag, Karina Ariev, Agam Berger, Daniella Gilboa, and Naama Levy." Today's daf is sponsored by Susan Kurzmann in honor of the yahrzeit of her mother, Rivkah bat h'Rav Simcha Bunim, A"H. "My mother showed my siblings and me through her example how wonderful and important it is to always keep learning." The derivation for the law that capital cases can only be judged during the day comes from Bamidbar 25:4 when those who had worshipped ba'al peor were hung in broad daylight. The verse there uses the verb " v'hoka " which is explained to mean that they were hung. The proof for that definition comes from the verse Samuel 2 21:6 when King David allowed the Gibeonites to kill the sons of Saul in an act of revenge. If the court wants to convict in a capital case, they wait until the following day, halanat hadin . Two different verses from Isaiah Chapter 1 are brought as a possible source for this law. Because of that law, capital cases cannot begin on a Friday as if they would convict, the case would need to be finished the next day and if the person was found guilty, they would need to execute on Shabbat and that is forbidden, as it is a violation of Shabbat. From here it is clear that capital punishment doesn't override Shabbat. Several kal v'chomers are suggested regarding what types of things could possibly override Shabbat, and whether or not they do is clarified. The first suggestion is of Reish Lakish, that burial of a met mitzva should override Shabbat. If a met mitzva overrides worship in the Temple and worship in the Temple overrides Shabbat, then shouldn't met mitzva override Shabbat!? The derivation that a met mitzva overrides worship in the Temple is learned from a verse about the nazir, Bamidbar 6:7. Rabbi Yochanan responds to Reish Lakish that the kal v'chomer he suggested is invalid as can be proven from implementing the death penalty which does not override Shabbat but does override worship in the Temple. The Gemara questions Rabbi Yochanan by suggesting another kal v'chomer that could teach that implementing the death penalty perhaps overrides Shabbat. Rava rejects this suggestion as a braita of Rabbi Yishmael brings a derivation from Shmot 35:3 "You shall not kindle a fire throughout your settlements on Shabbat" that teaches that the court cannot implement the death penalty on Shabbat.

Jan 20

Study Guide Sanhedrin 34 Today's daf is dedicated in memory Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul whose body was returned by the IDF to Israel yesterday and to Emily, Romi and Doron - who were released yesterday after 471 days in captivity. Their courage is a model to us all! We pray for the speedy return of the rest of the hostages. The Mishna teaches that anyone present may argue in favor of acquitting the defendant, but arguments for conviction are restricted. The Gemara explores whether this rule applies only to the students observing the proceedings, or if it extends to the witnesses as well. The Mishna further states that once a judge initially supports acquittal, they cannot later argue for conviction. Rav clarifies this rule, explaining that it only applies during the preliminary deliberations. However, when the court reaches its final decision-making phase, a judge may change their position, even to favor conviction. Though four tannaitic sources are presented to challenge Rav's interpretation, the Gemara successfully reconciles each one. Regarding the timing of court proceedings, the Gemara discusses the source of the rule that monetary cases must commence during daylight hours but may continue after nightfall. Rabbi Meir presents a dissenting view on this matter, and the Gemara examines the textual basis for his position.

Jan 19

Study Guide Sanhedrin 33 Today's daf is sponsored by Leah Brick in memory of her great niece Nava Tova bat Yehoshua Yisrael Leib v'Liora Charna Cherney, on her third yahrzeit. "In her zechut may we see all of the hostages released now, and refuah shleima to all cholei Yisrael ." The Mishna states that monetary rulings can be overturned in either direction - whether to find someone liable or to exempt them. However, this contradicts a Mishna in Bechorot 28b which rules that when a court makes a mistake, their ruling stands and the judge must personally compensate for any monetary difference. Three approaches have been suggested to resolve this contradiction and the Gemara raises difficulties with each approach and resolves them. In capital cases, a verdict can only be overturned to acquit the defendant, never to convict them. This principle derives from the Torah, though there is one notable exception: in cases where someone has seduced others to worship idols, the verdict can be changed from innocent to guilty. What verses in the Torah serve as the basis for this principle and the exception? This rule about overturning verdicts applies beyond capital cases to two additional categories: cases involving exile to a city of refuge (for accidental killing), and cases involving corporal punishment (lashes). Both of these extensions are derived through a gezeira shava (textual comparison) from the laws of capital murder. There exists one additional exception to this rule: if the court's mistake involved a clear and explicit Torah law, then the verdict can be overturned in either direction.

Jan 17

In both monetary and capital cases, the judges thoroughly question the witnesses. This is derived from a Torah verse that equates monetary law with capital law. The Mishna delineates many differences between monetary and capital cases, such as how many judges, what kind of majority is needed, how much of a push is made to find the person innocent. The Gemara questions the need for thoroughly questioning the witnesses in monetary law from a Tosefta Makkot 1:4 where it seems there was no thorough questioning as the document's date did prove to be the correct date. First, the Gemara asks why the question wasn't asked from a Mishna Shvi'it 10:5. Then Rabbi Chanina, Rava and Rav Papa each suggest a different answer. The first difference listed in the Mishna is that in capital cases, they start first by looking to exonerate the defendant. How do they do this? The rabbis suggest six different answers, the first two are rejected.

Jan 17

Today's daf is sponsored by Cheryl & Avi Savitsky and family in loving memory of Cheryl's father, Dr. Steven F. Stein, Shimon Feivish Ben Yirsroel Yitzchak haKohen, on his 41st yahrzeit. "His simchat hachayim was palpable to anyone who met him and that is something we strive to emulate each and every day." Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Suri's father, haRav Reuvain ben Chaim. "He loved learning Torah and particularly the daf. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel and Oren Seliger in loving memory of Allen Kronisch, Avner Yosef ben Zelta Priva v'Yehuda Aryeh on his 35th yahrzeit. "He made the decision to be a chozer b'tshuva and in turn his children and grandchildren are following in his footsteps. Both of his children learn the daf. He is missed." The court in Nehardea established that for monetary cases, witness testimony is admissible even when witnesses disagree about details like the currency's color during their detailed questioning ( bedikot ). Initially, this ruling was attributed to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha's view, which accepts testimony from two witnesses who observed an event separately. However, this explanation was later rejected. Instead, Nehardea's ruling was aligned with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's interpretation of Beit Hillel: when one witness testifies to a loan of one hundred zuz and another to two hundred zuz , the debtor must pay one hundred zuz , since both witnesses agree on at least this amount. The rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree about deadlines for submitting new evidence in two distinct cases. The accepted law follows the rabbis' opinion in one instance and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's view in the other. When a loan document is held by a third party, there is a question about whether that person can credibly testify that the loan was repaid. Rav Nachman made a ruling in such a case, but the Gemara presents two different versions: in one, he trusted the woman holding the document; in the other, he did not. Each version includes Rava raising an objection to Rav Nachman's decision. Rav Dimi brings Rabbi Yochanan's ruling on the dispute between the rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. However, since his ruling was unclear, the Rav Shmuel brings a different version of Rabbi Yochanan to clarify his position. Regarding whether one party can compel the other to have their case heard in a larger court in another city, the answer varies depending on which side makes the request.

Jan 16

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Yedid ben Shai Tzvi and Esther Shifra. When a legal document of admission is written in formal judicial language but bears only two signatures, should we be concerned? The issue is whether this indicates the document was approved by only two judges instead of the required three, potentially invalidating the document. A braita discusses three scenarios involving orphans and hidden money. In these cases, the orphans learn about money their father had concealed - either from a third party during their father's life, from their father before his death, or through a dream after his death. The money in question was either owed to others or was maaser sheni (second tithe). The text examines whether the orphans may retain this money, analyzing how the different circumstances affect the ruling. Regarding judicial disagreements, there is a three-way debate about how to record the verdict. Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Elazar each propose different approaches: recording only the final verdict, naming which judges held which positions, or using the formula "from the statement of the judges... was deemed innocent." Their reasoning has practical implications, particularly in cases where judges err and must compensate for losses their mistakes caused. The Mishna describes court proceedings and mentions bringing "them" back in after the judges reach their decision. There is a discussion about whether "them" refers to the witnesses or the litigants. Two key questions arise regarding witness testimony: Must witnesses observe the event together, and must they testify together in court? A related issue is whether testimony is valid when two witnesses describe identical circumstances (such as a loan of the same amount between the same parties) but are actually describing separate events. These matters are debated, with arguments based on both logic and Torah verses. The resolution may differ depending on whether the case involves land or moveable property. Finally, Rav Yehuda ruled that in monetary cases, we accept witness testimony even if there are discrepancies in the bedikot (detailed questioning). The rabbis debate which types of details this ruling encompasses.

Jan 15

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in honor of the first birthday of her granddaughter, Hallel Ruth bat Shai Zvi and Esther Shifra Goldman. Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in loving memory of her grandson, Ephraim ben Liat and Shmuel (Jackman) H'YD, on his first yahrzeit. "He fell in Gaza one year ago. He was a faithful daf yomi learner, even in his " namer " tank, and an inspiration to us all for his dedication to Torah, his beautiful " middot ," his maturity and humility, and the love he shared with his family." Today's daf is sponsored by Michelle Feiglin in loving memory of her father, Natan ben Devorah v'Shlomo Elimelech on his 9th yahrzeit and in loving memory of their grandson, Neriya Yosef Hoshea ben Gidon v'Avital. "My father was liberated from Buchenwald and rebuilt his life in Melbourne, Australia. He inspired my love of learning Torah and every lunchtime in the middle of his working day could be found in front of his Gemara. He had great success in business, but he always said that his biggest success was his family." Rabbi Yehuda ruled in the Mishna that if two people were related by marriage and the marriage ended, but there were children from that marriage, they are still considered relatives. Do we follow Rabbi Yehuda's ruling? Rabbi Yehuda also ruled that a close friend is disqualified from being a witness. However, the rabbis clarify that this only applies to a friend from the wedding party, and only during the week of the wedding or perhaps only on the wedding day itself. Rabbi Yehuda's ruling that a close friend or enemy is disqualified from testifying is derived from Numbers 35:23. The Mishna outlines court procedures: First, witnesses are warned to tell the truth, then they are questioned separately. In monetary cases, only designated witnesses can testify. After a majority decision is reached, it is forbidden for a judge to leave court and reveal that they disagreed with the ruling, wanting to acquit when others voted to convict, as this constitutes rechilut (gossip), a form of lashon hara (harmful speech). What warning is given to witnesses to ensure truthful testimony? Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Rav Ashi each propose different warnings, with each successive suggestion addressing perceived flaws in the previous ones. The Mishna supports Rav Yehuda's position that borrowers must formally designate witnesses. If undesignated witnesses hear a borrower's admission of debt, the borrower can claim it was said in jest. However, if the borrower denies making any admission and witnesses testify otherwise, Abaye rules that the admission is valid and the debt must be repaid. Rav Papa son of Rav Acha bar Ada quoting Rava disagrees, arguing that the borrower might have been joking and forgotten about it, since people typically don't remember trivial interactions. Another way to invalidate an admission is to claim it was made only to appear less wealthy. Can this argument be applied to deathbed statements? Do we assume that someone on their deathbed would want their children to appear less wealthy, or does this concern only apply to protecting oneself? Under what circumstances can witnesses document an admission? For loans, documenting creates a lien on the borrower's property. Therefore, documentation is permissible only when this was clearly the creditor's intention.

Jan 14

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Jan 13

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Ronit and Shlomi Eini in honor of their son Avichai Avraham's marriage to Shilat. If someone is convicted as a false witness ( ed zomem ), when does their disqualification begin - from the time they testified falsely or only from the time of conviction? Abaye rules it begins from the time of the false testimony (retroactively), while Rava holds it begins only from the time of conviction. Two explanations are offered for Rava's position. The first suggests that we only believe the second group of witnesses who contradict the first because of a unique ruling derived from the Torah, and therefore the original witnesses are only considered liars upon conviction. The second explanation proposes that while Rava theoretically agrees with Abaye, he only disqualifies them from the time of conviction to prevent losses to those who relied on their testimony before knowing they had lied in court. What is the practical difference between these two explanations? This debate is one of only six cases ( ya'al k'gam ) where we rule like Abaye against Rava. If someone eats non-kosher meat specifically to express contempt for God, rather than for financial reasons or personal desire, are they disqualified from being a witness? This case is also debated between Rava and Abaye, and is another instance where we rule like Abaye. Does the debate between Rava and Abaye parallel a debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether an ed zomem who lied in a monetary case is also disqualified from testifying in capital cases? Initially, the debates are compared, with Abaye's position aligned with Rabbi Meir and Rava's with Rabbi Yosi, but this comparison is ultimately rejected. We follow Rabbi Meir's ruling that a witness who lied in a monetary case is disqualified from testifying in capital cases because there is an unattributed Mishna that holds his position. A story is brought where witnesses were disqualified as per Rabbi Meir's position and the ensuing discussion in the court was to find the Mishna which holds like Rabbi Meir to support the court's ruling. Which relatives are disqualified from serving as witnesses? What is the Torah source for the prohibition against relatives testifying for each other?

Jan 12

Those who sell produce during the Sabbatical year are disqualified from testifying. Rabbi Shimon (in the Mishna) explains that initially, these people were called collectors of Sabbatical produce. However, when tax collectors ( anasim ) became more numerous, the term changed to "sellers of Sabbatical produce." The Gemara presents two interpretations of this unclear passage, with the first interpretation being rejected. Reish Lakish was following two rabbis who were traveling to Asya to intercalate the year, as he wanted to observe their process. During their journey, they encountered people plowing and harvesting during the Sabbatical year. When Reish Lakish questioned why the rabbis weren't stopping these apparent violations, they offered possible explanations for how each person's actions might be permissible. Upon reaching their destination, the rabbis went to the second floor to deliberate about the intercalation. They climbed up using a ladder and immediately removed it to prevent Reish Lakish, whom they considered bothersome, from following them. Reish Lakish later complained to Rabbi Yochanan, declaring the rabbis to be a kesher reshaim (conspiracy of wicked people) who should not participate in the year's intercalation. The Gemara then traces the origin of the term kesher reshaim through stories about Shevna, who served as Hizkiyahu's steward. Rabbi Abahu, citing Rabbi Elazar, states that the court must publicly announce when someone is found to be disqualified from serving as a witness. Until such an announcement is made, the witnesses retain their qualification to testify. There is a specific debate regarding whether this announcement requirement applies to shepherds. Regarding wrongdoers such as those who accept charity from gentiles, engage in forbidden sexual relationships, or eat from fields during harvest season - there is a discussion of their eligibility to testify. Rav Nachman presents his views on these three cases, and the Gemara either restricts the scope of these rulings or presents opposing viewpoints.

Jan 10

Can Rami bar Hama's interpretation that gambling is prohibited due to asmachta (conditional commitment) align with the Mishna's position? What factors determine this alignment? Rava expanded the disqualification of witnesses to include not only those who lend with interest, but also those who borrow with interest. How should we understand mafrichei yonim (dove-handlers) in the Mishna? Two interpretations exist: either those who engage in bird racing (a form of gambling) or those who train doves to lure other birds. When someone repents, what evidence must they show the community to regain their eligibility as a witness? Does the path to rehabilitation differ between a butcher who fraudulently sold non-kosher meat as kosher and other disqualified witnesses like gamblers or usurers? Which other categories of people were initially qualified to serve as witnesses but later became disqualified? What led to these changes in status?

Jan 10

Today's daf is sponsored by Shulamith and Joel Cohn in loving memory of "Bubby," Rebbitzen Esther Predmesky whose yahrzeit is today, asara b'tevet . Today's day is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the birth of a grandson, son of Naomi and Dani Weinberger, to our friend and co-learner, Deena Rabinovich. "May the entire family enjoy much nachat from the new arrival as he grows l'Torah (and l'daf ), l'chuppa and l'maasim tovim . May we all continue to celebrate smachot " ad beli dai ." Ravin brings (in the name of Rabbi Yochanan) a fourth explanation for Rabbi Meir's position that allows litigants to disqualify witnesses. Reish Lakish's choice of words showed respect for Rabbi Meir, which leads the Gemara into a broader discussion about scholarly respect for one another. Through various interpretations of verses (primarily from Zechariah), the Gemara contrasts the behavior of scholars in Israel and Babylonia. The Israeli rabbis are portrayed as having mutual respect, while the Babylonian rabbis are described as lacking such respect. The text then explores complex scenarios about litigant rights. If someone accepts a single witness, a relative of the opposing party as witness or judge, or agrees to a weaker oath than required, can they later change their mind? This raises questions about whether this debate applies only to cases where the litigant is forgiving a claim (making it more likely they intended to commit to the outcome), or even to cases where they must pay (less likely they intended to commit). There's also discussion about whether this applies before or after the court's ruling. Who is disqualified from being a witness? Why is someone who gambled not allowed to testify - is it because of asmachta (problematic conditional commitments) or because not having legitimate employment raises concerns they might be bribed to give false testimony?

Jan 9

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of three IDF soldiers who fell in Gaza: Nevo Fisher, Matityahu Ya'akov Perel, and Kanaoo Kasa. Nevo was a friend of my daughter. Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about the selection process for three judges in monetary law cases. According to Rabbi Meir, each litigant selects one judge, and then both litigants together choose the third judge. The rabbis, however, maintain that after the initial two judges are chosen, these judges themselves select the third. It remains unclear if this Mishna specifically addresses an alternative arbitration court. A second point of disagreement concerns whether one party can disqualify the other party's judges or witnesses without valid cause. The Gemara initially struggles with interpreting the selection method. They think that when the Mishna says each side chooses "one," it means one complete court, which would result in nine judges! To resolve this confusion, they initially propose that the Mishna only applies to cases where neither side accepts the other's court. This interpretation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Mishna is understood to present an ideal system for selecting judges: each side chooses one judge, and then the third judge is chosen jointly - either by the two litigants (according to Rabbi Meir) or by the two selected judges (according to the rabbis). This creates a balanced court. What is the source of the debate between them? The Gemara then addresses a difficulty in Rabbi Meir's position: how can he allow either side to disqualify judges? The only reasonable interpretation is that disqualification is only permitted when the judges lack expertise. But this raises another question: how can Rabbi Meir permit the disqualification of two witnesses, given that the strength of witnesses in two is equal to the strength of judges in expert judges? Reish Lakish resolves this by explaining that the Mishna actually refers to disqualifying only one witness. Though this answer faces some challenges, the Gemara presents two additional explanations each playing off a case where one litigant brings another and the two testify against the other litigant's two witnesses.

Jan 8

Today's daf is sponsored by Marc and Becki Goldstein. "In honor of our 50 years of Aliyah, our son Kobi bought and dedicated a bavli Shas to the Nezarim shul in Gaza." Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of her grandmother Esther bat Menachem Mendel. "Her husband, Chaim Davis, brought the first daf yomi shiur to the five towns in 1974." There are two opinions regarding the Torah's original script - was it initially written in ancient Hebrew characters and later changed to Ashurit (modern Hebrew script), or was it written in Ashurit from the beginning? Out of respect for the monarchy, one is prohibited from riding the king's horse, sitting on his throne, or using his scepter. Additionally, one must not view the king while he is getting a haircut or when he is naked or in the bathhouse. The text discusses Avishag the Shunamite, who served King David in his final years. Though he could have married her, he chose not to, as he already had eighteen wives. This teaches us about the gravity of divorce - rather than divorce one of his existing wives to marry Avishag, David was permitted to be secluded with her unmarried. This leads to a broader discussion about marital bonds, particularly the deep connection between spouses in their first marriage. Rabbi Yochanan compared the complexity of matchmaking to the splitting of the Red Sea. When confronted with a seemingly contradictory teaching from Rav - that forty days before a fetus's creation, a heavenly voice declares a child's future spouse, they resolve that Rabbi Yochanan was referring specifically to second marriages. Regarding grooming regulations: a king must have his hair cut daily, a kohen gadol weekly, and regular kohanim monthly. The source of these laws is discussed, along with the prohibition of wine for serving priests. There's a debate about these laws' current applicability: Rebbi maintains neither applies today, while the rabbis argue that the wine prohibition remains in effect, as the Temple might be rebuilt suddenly and intoxicated priests would be unfit for immediate service. The Gemara explores why they distinguish between the grooming and drinking regulations, offering two explanations, with the second raising an unresolved difficulty. Notably, these priestly regulations are derived from the prophet Yechezkel rather than the Torah, raising the question of how these laws were known before his time. The text concludes with a description of the kohen gadol 's distinctive hairstyle.

Jan 7

Today's daf is sponsored by the Greenstone family in honor of Adina Haggege and Amy Fredj's birthdays! The Gemara discusses the rights and obligations of kings: A king has the right to take half of all war spoils, which is derived from the kohen gadol's portion of the showbread. Regarding the number of wives permitted to a king, Tanna Kama rules a maximum of 18 wives. Rabbi Yehuda says there is no numerical limit, only restricted if the wives turn his heart from God. Rabbi Shimon holds that even one wife is forbidden if she turns his heart from God, and even if they are righteous, the king is still limited to 18. This creates an apparent contradiction in their approaches to deriving laws from reasoning, as here Rabbi Yehuda follows reasoning behind the commandment while Rabbi Shimon doesn't, while in other places, Rabbi Shimon typically follows reasoning while Rabbi Yehuda doesn't. The number 18 comes from verses about King David (Samuel II 3:2-5), though some sources derive 24 or 48. The Gemara identifies Egla as Michal, creating a difficulty since Michal is known to have been childless while Egla is mentioned with a child. King David had 400 children from captive women who served as warriors in his army. His daughter Tamar, who was from a captive woman, was tragically assaulted by Amnon, which led to the institution of new protective laws. The Gemara discusses Amnon's tactics and his subsequent hatred of Tamar, followed by the laws that were established to protect women from such assaults. The king may only keep horses, gold, and silver needed for royal and military duties. The Torah generally avoids giving reasons for commandments because when reasons were given for royal laws, King Solomon misinterpreted them, thinking he could circumvent the commandments while adhering to their reasoning. The king requires specially written Torah scrolls for his use, which must be prepared specifically for him. How many? for what purpose?

Jan 6

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the birth of a grandson to our friend and co-learner Suri Davis. "May she and her family enjoy much nachat from the new arrival as he grows l'Torah (& daf), l'chupa and l'maasim tovim , and may his birth be the harbinger of smachot for all." Palti ben Layish is praised for refraining from relations with Michal, his wife, as she was still married to King David. His self-restraint is considered greater than Joseph and Boaz, who also overcame their desires. Regarding unique laws pertaining to kings: Their mourning practices are distinct. A king does not leave his palace to attend burials. However, Rabbi Yehuda challenges this, citing that King David accompanied Avner ben Ner's body. The rabbis explain that David did this specifically to prove to the people that he had not ordered Avner's death. During the seudat havra'a (mourner's meal), while the people sit on the floor, the king sits on a dargash . The Gemara presents two interpretations of what constitutes a dargash . The first interpretation is rejected. Concerning funeral processions, there is a question about whether women should follow or precede the bier. The rabbis defer to local custom, while Rabbi Yehuda cites King David's example to prove that women should walk in front. The rabbis' response to his proof is discussed. For what action was Avner punished? Rav explains that Avner could have protested King Saul's decision to kill the inhabitants of Nov (or King Saul's many attempts to kill David) but failed to do so. Rabbi Yitzchak contends that Avner did protest, but Saul did not listen. According to this interpretation, his sin was crowning Ish Boshet as king, which delayed David's reign over all of Israel by two and a half years. The requirement that a king must obtain permission from the Great Sanhedrin before engaging in optional warfare is restated here, despite being mentioned in the first chapter of Sanhedrin. A king has the right to create a path through private property. During wartime, when spoils are collected, the king claims his portion first, before the people may take their share. Shmuel and Rav debate whether a king is permitted to exercise all the powers that the prophet Shmuel warned about when the people requested a king (taking their sons, cattle, etc.). Was this a genuine description of royal prerogatives, or merely a warning to instill fear of the monarchy? This discussion parallels a debate between the tannaim Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Nehorai offers a third view: Shmuel's words were meant to discourage the request for a king. Rabbi Eliezer takes a middle ground, suggesting that while the elders' request for a king was appropriate, the amei haaretz sought one for improper reasons—to emulate other nations. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi explain that upon entering the land, the Jews received three commandments: to establish a king, to destroy Amalek, and to build the Beit haMikdash. Rabbi Yosi derives this sequence from verses in the Tanach. King Solomon initially ruled over both the celestial and terrestrial realms, but his marriage to non-Jewish wives diminished his authority in both spheres. There is disagreement about whether he regained his full authority after his downfall.

Jan 5

Today's daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of Yovel MorYosef and Yossi Cohen who were killed in a terror attack (ה טבת תשע"ט/ December 13, 2018) at Givat Assaf, on their 6th yahrzeit, and for the continued refuah shleima of her son, Netanel Ilan ben Shayna Tzipora, who was critically injured in the attack. Today's daf is sponsored by Aimee Kahan and Rabbi Joshua Waxman in loving memory of Alex Kahan, Eliyahu ben Shlomo ha-Kohen v'Aliza, on his first yahrzeit. "May his gentleness and wisdom continue to guide us all." Today's daf is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie, who continues to learn with her each day on the fifth anniversary of starting daf yomi. A kohen gadol cannot perform yibum - why doesn't the positive commandment to fulfill yibum override the negative commandment to not marry a widow? Rabbis Meir and Yehuda disagree about whether a kohen gadol can escort a close relative's dead body until the city limits (at a distance) or is he not allowed to escort the body at all. This debate centers on a verse in the Torah, "And he shall not leave the Temple." How can this verse be explained according to both positions? When the kohen gadol would go to comfort mourners in a shura (line meant to comfort mourners), where would he stand and where was everyone else positioned? What about when a shura was created to comfort the kohen gadol ? How does a shura work? Originally the people walked in a line and the mourners stood in one place. Later it was changed to be the reverse due to a fight that ensued between people who each wanted to walk first. In Tzipori, Rabbi Yosi reinstated the original custom. He also instituted that a mother should never walk in the marketplace with her child behind her, as a child was once kidnapped from behind her and when she went and screamed for the child, someone showed her where the kidnappers were and she was raped. A third takana of Rabbi Yosi was that women should always talk when going to the bathroom in an outhouse so that a man who may approach will know she is there and will not accidentally be secluded with her ( yichud ). Rabbi Yoshiya ruled that to have a shura , there is a minimum requirement of ten people, in addition to the mourners. Rav Yosef narrows the law in the Mishna that a king cannot be a judge or be judged to the Israelite kings, not from the Davidic dynasty, as kings from the Davidic dynasty were commanded to judge. This law limiting other kings from being judged was created as a reaction to a story where Shimon ben Shatach demanded that King Yannai (his brother-in-law) appear in court regarding one of his slaves who had murdered someone. Yannai challenged Shimon's decision to judge him and beseeched the other judges to side with him. When they did not get up to defend Shimon's position, they were struck down by Gabriel (the angel) and killed. At that moment they realized the dangers of judging a king. If a king is not allowed to relinquish the honor due to him, how can Rabbi Yehuda permit a king to do yibum ? For the sake of a mitzva, this can be overridden. The student of Rabbi Yosi asked him how David was able to marry two sisters, Meirav and Michal? Rabbi Yosi answered that he married Michal after Meirav had died. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha brings a different answer - the betrothal to Meriav was never effective. The details of the story and how to explain certain complicated verses are explained according to both commentaries. One who raises someone else's children, those children are considered their own. This is proved by several verses in the Tanach.

Jan 3

The High Priest ( kohen gadol ) and the king are subject to special legal considerations. The Mishna examines their unique status within the judicial system by addressing several key questions: Are they subject to judgment by courts? Can they serve as judges themselves? Are they qualified to serve as witnesses, and can others testify against them? While outlining these judicial matters, the Mishna also compares and contrasts other unique laws that apply to the king and the High Priest. The Gemara then proceeds with a detailed analysis of these distinctions and regulations as presented in the Mishna.

Jan 3

This week's learning is sponsored by Elisheva Gray. "With much appreciation to Rabbanit Michelle, Maggie and all the Hadran teachers and staff, along with the rich abundance of learning resources they provide. And special thanks to the Hadran Zoom family. It is a comfort, a privilege and a blessing to be part of this wonderful learning community. You are all an inspiration, and I learn from all of you." Today's daf is sponsored in loving memory of Bubbie Molly Andelman by her granddaughters. "She was a dearly loved wife, mother, grandmother and great-grandmother, who was an inspiration to all her descendants, a woman wise in the ways of the world, who taught us the importance of family and tradition." There is a debate in the Mishna between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the number of judges in the Great Sanhedrin - seventy or seventy-one. Initially, the Gemara suggests this debate stems from interpreting the phrase "with you" in Bamidbar 11:16, where God instructs Moshe to gather seventy elders to "stand there with you." This interpretation is rejected. The Gemara then considers Bamidbar 11:17, "and they shall bear with you the burden of the people," but this too is rejected. Finally, the source is identified as Shmot 18:22, "and they shall bear with you." Although this verse originally refers to the small Sanhedrin, the principle is applied to derive the composition of the Great Sanhedrin. The mention of selecting elders in the desert leads to a braita discussing Eldad and Meidad. The Sages and Rabbi Shimon offer differing explanations for why these two remained in the camp rather than joining the other elders. The core question is whether they stayed behind out of fear of not being chosen or out of genuine humility. This raises several questions: How did events actually unfold? What was the content of their prophecy? The Mishna stipulates that conviction requires a majority of two judges. This raises the question: How does this requirement align with the total number of judges needed? The law states that if all judges unanimously vote to convict, the verdict is invalid. This is because courts must delay conviction verdicts until the following day to allow time to find grounds for acquittal. A unanimous conviction would preclude this possibility. What qualifications must one meet to serve as a judge? The Gemara uses various phrases to refer to different rabbis - which phrases correspond to which scholars? Why does one opinion require a minimum population of one hundred and twenty people to establish a court of twenty-three in a city?

Jan 2

Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Atik for the refuah shleima of Tzvi Dov Ben Sara. A tribe that sins is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. To what is this referring? What was their sin? After rejecting the possibility that it is a regular sin with capital punishment like Shabbat or idol worship, several possibilities are suggested. Rav Matna says it is the Nasi of a tribe who sins. Ulla says it is a dispute between two tribes over property. Ravina returns to the rejected answer of idol worship and resolves the earlier difficulty by explaining that they are judged in a court of seventy-one, even though they receive the same punishment as individuals who worshipped idols. A false prophet is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived through a gezeira shava from the rebellious elder who is punished only if he rebels against a decision of the Great Sanhedrin, even though he is judged in a court of twenty-three. The High Priest is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived from the words " davar gadol " - issues relating to a gadol , a prominent person. However, others explain this as referring to a difficult matter. Rabbi Elazar asks about an ox of the High Priest that gored - would that be judged in a court of twenty-three or the Great Sanhedrin? There is no answer to this question, but Abaye infers from the question that it was obvious that a financial dispute of the High Priest is ruled in a court of three. The Great Sanhedrin needs to be part of the decision to go out to an optional war. From where is this derived? Only the Great Sanhedrin can expand the borders of Jerusalem and the azarot , and establish courts of twenty-three. These are derived from Moshe's actions, as his actions are considered equivalent to those of the Great Sanhedrin. From where is it derived that an idolatrous city is judged before the Great Sanhedrin? The derivations of other laws regarding idolatrous cities are brought - why not near the border and why not more than two cities? There are different opinions regarding how many cities can be designated as idolatrous cities, depending on location, different courts, and other factors.

Jan 1

Study Guide Sanhedrin 15 Today's daf is sponsored by Duli and Nehemia Sasson in loving memory of their father, Solomon ben Leah. The Gemara gives three different explanations for the case in the Mishna 'valuations of moveable items'. Why does Rabbi Yehuda require one kohen ? Why in land valuations does it need to be nine Israelites and one kohen ? What is the case of a person that requires ten to evaluate as one cannot consecrate a human being? What is the status of a person's hair ready to be cut - is it like moveable items or is it considered part of the person's body and therefore needs ten people or is it considered detached and therefore like movable items that require three? What cases are included in the nirba and rovea ? An ox who gores a person - from where do we derive this halacha of twenty-three? Abaye questions Rava about his derivation and Rava brings three potential answers (two are rejected). Wild animals are judged by twenty-three, but Rabbi Eliezer holds that anyone can take the law into their own hands and kill the animal. Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan disagree about whether or not Rabbi Eliezer is only referring to a case where the animal already killed a person.

Dec 31, 2024

Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word ' kohen ' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.

Dec 30, 2024

How is the calculation to determine whether or not to intercalate the year based on the equinox performed? Is it determined by the autumnal equinox or the spring equinox? Does all of Sukkot need to fall in the autumn, or is it sufficient if just one day (the last) is in the autumn season? Additionally, is the equinox considered the last day of the previous season or the first day of the upcoming season? These questions are the subject of debate among the Tannaim. How many elders are required for semicha on the bull offering? Rabbi Yehuda holds that five are needed, while Rabbi Shimon says three. From which verses in the Torah does each derive their opinion? Another braita mentions " semicha " and " semicha of the elders "—one of which is interpreted as referring to the ordination of a rabbi. From where do we derive that three judges are required, and is it truly the case that it can only be done in the presence of three?

Dec 29, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Mona Fishbane in loving memory of her beloved mother-in-law and best buddy Bernice Fishbane z"l. The decision to intercalate the year must take place after Rosh Hashanah, and the only way to do so is by adding an additional month of Adar. The year cannot be intercalated during a famine or in the Sabbatical year, as this would delay permitting the new crop to be eaten, compounding difficulties during already challenging times. There is a debate regarding the year following the Sabbatical year. This debate hinges on another discussion about whether or not one can import produce from abroad. It is prohibited to intercalate three years in a row or to decide in one year to intercalate the following year. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis disagree about whether the impurity of the community regarding the Passover sacrifice can be a factor in adding a leap year. A story from the time of Chizkiyahu is cited to shed light on this topic. However, there are several interpretations of the story's details and its relevance to this issue. Shmuel maintained that one cannot intercalate the year on the thirtieth day of Adar, as that day could potentially be the first day of Nissan.

Dec 27, 2024

On what criteria is the decision made to intercalate the month? One of the criteria is that it needs to be done by those chosen by the Nasi. A case is brought where an uninvited individual participated, and Rabban Gamliel asked whoever was not invited to leave. Shmuel HaKatan, to avoid embarrassing the individual, took the blame upon himself. Other rabbis have also acted in similar ways in different situations to prevent causing embarrassment to others. The decision to intercalate the year requires the approval of the Nasi. When making this decision, several factors are considered, while others are not. In addition to practical concerns like roads still being wet, three primary factors are evaluated: The readiness of the new grain crop, the ripening of new fruits, and the date of the equinox. Furthermore, the majority of the three main regions of Israel—Judea, the Galilee, and Trans-Jordan—are taken into consideration. The decision to intercalate must be made during the day, not at night.

Dec 27, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Mindy and Eric Hecht in loving memory of Dr. Charles Feldman, z"l. "He would have loved to have been part of this learning community and is surely looking down on his many family members who learn the daf with much pride. He is missed every day." Today's daf is sponsored by Naomi Oxman in loving memory of her mother, Sara "Bubaleh" Younger on her 6th yahrzeit. "We miss you much and think of you and Dad every day!" Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island for the refua shleima to our friend and co-learner Rikki Zibbit, who is recovering from surgery. "We daven that you will continue to recuperate, and be able to use your new knee to dance at many smachot." Today's daf is sponsored by Vicky Harari in loving memory of her mother Tzipora bat Rachel. "Her persistent inner strength, resilience and eternal optimism inspire me daily." Rava teaches that self-incriminating testimony is not accepted in court, and this principle extends to testimony against one's spouse. However, this does not apply to testimony about one's possessions. There is a dispute regarding the required court size for cases involving lashes. The rabbis hold these cases require three judges, while Rabbi Yishmael requires twenty-three. Abaye explains that Rabbi Yishmael derives this through a gezeira shava (textual comparison) from capital cases. Rava, however, views lashes as a substitute for capital punishment. The term " ibur hachodesh " in the Mishna has four different interpretations. Regarding the intercalation of the year, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel outlines a three-stage process: beginning with three judges, deliberating with five, and concluding with seven. The Tosefta Sanhedrin 2:1 elaborates on this view. Two explanations are offered for the significance of these specific numbers (3, 5, and 7).

Dec 26, 2024

Study Guide Sanhedrin 9 Today's daf is sponsored by Adina Gewirtz in loving memory of her father, Mel Rishe. "He loved learning, loved and served the state of Israel as a lawyer, and would be thrilled to see the learning that has flourished with Hadran." Today's daf is sponsored by Art Gould in loving memory of Carol Robinson's father Louis Robinson, Yehuda Leib ben Moshe, z"l. "Today, the first day of Hanukkah, we mark his 25th yahrtzeit. Lou was a devoted family man and active participant in his synagogue. He could fix anything. When one of his girls was on a date, he never went to bed until she was safely home." Under what circumstances do Rabbi Meir and the rabbis debate whether a defamation case should be heard by a court of three or twenty-three judges, and what underlies their disagreement? Four additional suggestions are presented (bringing the total to eight) to address this question. Rav Yosef presents a law concerning defamation. Generally, when someone faces both capital punishment and a monetary obligation for the same act, they are exempt from the monetary payment. However, in a defamation case, there can be a situation where both penalties apply. If a husband brings witnesses against his wife, and then the father brings witnesses who prove the first group to be eidim zomemim (false witnesses), and subsequently the husband brings witnesses who prove the father's witnesses to be zomemim , the father's witnesses receive both capital punishment (for attempting to have the first group of witnesses executed) and must pay the husband (the penalty he would have owed his wife had their testimony been accepted). These dual punishments are possible because the death penalty stems from their attempt to execute the husband's witnesses, while the monetary payment relates to their attempted financial penalty to the husband himself. Rav Yosef offers a second ruling: When someone testifies against another person but incriminates themselves in the process, their entire testimony is inadmissible because they are considered a sinner, and a sinner's testimony is not accepted in court. Rava, however, disagrees. He maintains that we can divide the testimony, accepting what the witness says about others while disregarding their self-incriminating statements, since one's testimony against oneself is not legally binding for self-incrimination.

Dec 25, 2024

Study Guide Sanhedrin 8 Today's daf is sponsored by Gila Pollack in loving memory of her mother in law, Menorah Rotenberg, Menora bat Sara Gittel v'Yechezkel, who passed away suddenly last week. "Menorah was in the first kindergarten class at Ramaz, and was upset that the girls had to learn sewing instead of Gemara like the boys. She complained to Rabbi Lookstein and was given permission to learn Gemara with the boys. This was just the start of her fighting for equality for women in Jewish life and practice. She will be greatly missed by her children, grandchildren and friends." The sages derive various laws relating to judges by analyzing the verses at the beginning of Devarim, where Moshe explains how he established the court system. A braita then introduces another matter requiring three people - zimun . Initially, the Gemara interprets this as referring to the blessing after eating, but this interpretation is rejected, and zimun is instead explained as a subpoena, which needs to state that three people decided to summon the person to the court. The Mishna states that cases involving double payment for theft must be judged by a court of three. Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda asked: Can payment of a fine be judged by one specialist as in theft and injuries (that require three judges, but are also able to be ruled by one specialist)? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers from an inference of a statement of Rav that it requires three specialists. The Mishna also presents a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding a defamer (one who falsely accuses his new wife of not being a virgin when they married). They disagree about whether a court of three or twenty-three should judge such a case. The Gemara explores several explanations for the root of this debate, with most explanations limiting the disagreement to specific scenarios.

Dec 24, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Rochel Cheifetz in loving memory of her father, Shragai Cohen, שרגא פייוול בן אברהם בן ציון הלוי, whose yahrzeit was 8 Kislev,and her maternal grandparents,רב משה בן יהודה לייב, whose yahrzeit was 4 Kislev and חיה צפורה בת ר׳ יהודה משה, whose yartzeit is today, 23 Kislev. "My father's smile, HUGE love for Israel and sage wisdom are sorely missed." Today's daf is sponsored by Leah Brick for the refuah shleima to her colleague and friend Jonathan Cohen הרב יהונתן איתן הכהן בן בתשבע ברכה. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of and as a zechut for our friend and co-learner, Tzippy Wolkenfeld, Fayga Zissel bat Shayna Yosefa, בתוך שאר חולי ישראל who is donating her kidney this morning to someone she has never met. "May both Tzippy and her recipient have an easy and speedy recovery. We salute Tzippy for her willingness to literally give a part of herself to help someone - but we aren't surprised! May her act of chessed be a zechut for all!" The Gemara delves into the different positions regarding compromise. It explains, based on the braita, that there are four different opinions about whether or not one should use/suggest compromise be used as an alternative to judgment. What should judges be conscious of when they are ruling? What responsibility do they have? What responsibility is upon the community to appoint the proper judges. What responsibility is on the litigants to prevent perversion of justice?

Dec 23, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Marcel Loewenberg on his 75th birthday, with love from his children and grandchildren. "We are grateful for the joy of Torah learning you've instilled in us." While Shmuel maintains that a ruling by two judges is valid, Rabbi Abahu disagrees with this position. Rabbi Abba challenges Rabbi Abahu's view from a Mishna in Bechorot 28b, which appears to validate even a single judge's ruling. This apparent contradiction is resolved by explaining that the Mishna refers to a specific case where both litigants explicitly accepted the authority of the single judge to rule on their case. The Mishna in Bechorot addresses a case where the litigants accepted a judge's authority, but he subsequently made an error in his ruling and became liable for any resulting losses. However, if his mistake involved ruling contrary to an explicit Mishna, he bears no liability since such a ruling is automatically void. Consequently, the Gemara concludes that the judge's error must have involved a matter of judgment - specifically, determining which opinion to follow. Rabbi Meir and the rabbis dispute whether mediation requires one or three people. The Gemara initially suggests that this debate parallels the disagreement between Rabbi Abahu and Shmuel, as mediation is likened to judgment based on the verse in Samuel II 8:15. However, this parallel is ultimately rejected. Instead, their disagreement centers on whether mediation should be equated with formal judgment at all. Rav Acha explains that the requirement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel for two people in mediation serves only to ensure proper witnessing of the proceedings - in principle, a single mediator would suffice. Is it necessary to perform a kinyan , act of acquisition, in a mediation proceeding? If judges have concluded proceedings ( gmar din ) in a case, they can no longer switch to mediation. Rav later provides a precise definition of what constitutes gmar din . The text then explores several fundamental questions regarding mediation and compromise: Is it merely permitted or actually preferred? Could it sometimes be forbidden? If mediation is permitted, at what stage in the legal proceedings does this option expire? Multiple opinions are presented addressing these questions. In Tehillim 10:3 it says that God scorns a botzea who blesses or one who blesses a botzea . Three different interpretations of that verse are brought - one of which relates to mediation and how it is despised by God. The Gemara also explores multiple interpretations of two other relevant verses: Samuel II 8:15, which discusses the relationship between law and charity, and Deuteronomy 1:17, which instructs judges not to fear any person. The discussion concludes with several statements emphasizing the gravity of judicial responsibility and the solemnity with which judges must approach their rulings.

Dec 22, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored by Jordana Schoor in honor of their son Saadya's marriage to Odel Perets. "Wishing them a home full of love, mazal, and Torah values." Even though it says in the Mishna that a court comprises three judges, there are exceptions. An expert can judge on his own. What determines that someone is an expert judge? Even though an expert does not need to get permission from the Nasi or Exilarch, if the Nasi or Exilarch gives him permission to judge, and he errs in a particular case, he is not obligated to compensate for the loss he caused. While it is clear that the Exilarch's permission exempt a judge ruling in Israel, but can the Nasi's (in Israel) appointment of the judge exempt the judge from liability in Babylonia? The answer is no, as learned from a story regarding Raba bar Hana who received permission from Rabbi Yehuda haNasi to rule, just as he was leaving Israel. In what cases does a judge who makes a mistake, need to pay to compensate for the loss he caused? Rabbi Yehuda haNasi also granted permission to Rav to rule as an expert, just before he went to Babylonia. However, he did not grant him the authority to permit firstborn animals to be eaten by identifying blemishes. Both Rav and Raba bar Hana were nephews of Rabbi Chiya, who was the one who asked Rabbi Yehuda haNasi to permit them both to judge. However, he called Raba the son of his brother and Rav the son of his sister, even though Rav was also the son of his brother. To explain this, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Chiya's half-brother and half-sister married each other and were Rav's parents. Another possible explanation is provided as well. Why did Rabbi Yehuda haNasi not allow Rav to permit firstborn animals? The Gemara brings two possible suggestions. The first explanation is that it was to ensure people would respect Raba bar Hana when he and Rav arrived in Babylonia, as they would see that he had the authority to do something that Rav did not. The second suggestion is that Rav was such an expert that Rabbi Yehuda haNasi was concerned he would permit certain blemishes and people would conclude on their own that blemishes that seemed similar were also permanent blemishes and incorrectly permit firstborn animals. Why did Rabbi Chiya ask Rabbi Yehuda haNasi not only to grant permission to Rav and Raba bar Hana to rule, but also to teach? An answer is brought from a story of a teacher who taught but was misunderstood and caused many people to make a mistake regarding laws of impurity. Therefore, one must also receive permission to teach only if they can teach clearly. Other stories relating to issues about teaching are brought, relating to not issuing a ruling in a city if one's teacher is nearby. Shmuel ruled that if two judges ruled in a case, their judgment would be effective, even though this is considered to be impudent. However, when mediation is done, only two judges are needed to mediate.

Dec 20, 2024

Study Guide Sanhedrin 4 The Gemara suggests that the basis of the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda about whether we rule monetary law by three judges or five judges is based on how they extrapolate the verse - is there em l'mikra , we rule by the way it is generally read, or em l'masoret , by the way it is actually written? According to Rabbi Yochanan there are five rabbis who all hold that when there is a contradiction between the way the text is read/pronounced and the way it is written, we follow the way it is pronounced. Each case where the rabbis ruled in this manner is brought and explained. Rav Acha bar Yaakov challenges Rabbi Yochanan as he thinks that everyone holds yesh em l'mikra , as everyone follow the way it is generally read, as can be proven from the prohibition of cooking meat with milk. as it is read as milk - chalev - and not forbidden fat - cheilev . This assumption is disproven and a different explanation is brought to explain why everyone agrees in the milk/meat verse.

Dec 20, 2024

Study Guide Sanhedrin 3 This week's learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak in loving memory of her father on his yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Adina Hagege's birthday with love from her sisters and brother. "Her dedication and passion for learning are an inspiration to her family. With love from her whole family." Today's daf is sponsored by Heather Stone for the physical and psychological wellbeing of Yaacov (Kobi) Levy, ben Shaul v'Ruti, a war veteran who has PTSD and is assisted by Morpheus, a Labrador service dog. Kobi and Morpheus were terribly mistreated by a bus driver and the Israeli police this week, and are still recovering. There are three different ways to read the first six words of the Mishna: "Monetary laws are judged by three, theft and injuries by three." Are the first three coming to explain the second three or are they referring to a different case/different rule? All conclude the same bottom line law - that for loans and admissions, you would need three regular people to judge and for theft and injuries you would need three judges. However, how they read this into the words of the Mishna, what was the original Torah law, and how the Rabbis changed it, and why is a subject of debate. Why are damages and half damages listed in the Mishna - why aren't they included in injuries? From where do we derive that monetary law is ruled in front of three judges? There is a debate between Rabbi Yoshia and Rabbi Yonatan - is there debate just about the derivation or do they have a different understanding of how judgments are decided? Rebbi holds that monetary laws are ruled by five judges. From where does he derive five?

Dec 19, 2024

Study Guide Sanhedrin 2 Sanhedrin bookmark Masechet Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jina Davidovich in loving memory of her father, Vladimir Davidovich, Zev ben Yitzchak v'Chana, on his first yahrzeit. "My father always encouraged my learning and was my greatest chevruta. He instilled within me, and his many students, a deep love of Torah. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Norman Eliaser in honor of Shira Eliaser birthday. "Thank you for being an amazing study buddy, in addition to being the best wife in the world!" Today's daf is sponsored by Lana Kerzner and Adina Hagege in memory of their grandmother, Ethel Wolinsky Greenstone, whose yahrzeit is this week. "Although she passed away 79 years ago, her legacy lived on through her children. They passed on to us a hunger for learning, a quest for equal rights for women and scholarship, and an analytic spirit that spans the generations. We believe that she would have taken such joy knowing that two of her granddaughters bear her name and her spirit, as they learn Daf Yomi virtually across oceans together." The court system was made up of different-sized courts. The Mishna delineates which types of cases would be brought in front of a court of three, twenty-three, and seventy-one. Some tannaim require five or seven judges for certain types of cases. The size of twenty-three and seventy-one are derived from the Torah - how? The Gemara notes that loans and admissions are excluded from the list, even though they also require three judges, like for theft and injuries. They are excluded because they do not require three expert judges, but can be ruled by any three people. The reason for this is to ensure that people are not deterred from loaning money to others.

Dec 18, 2024

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here. For more information about What is a Siyum, click here Siyum Masechet Bava Batra is sponsored by Lesley Glassberg Nadel in loving memory of her father Bernie Glassberg, Berel ben Herschel haLevi, whose 50th yahrzeit is Kislev 17 - May his memory be blessed.

Dec 18, 2024

Introduction to Masechet Sanhedrin

Dec 17, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 155 If one says on one's deathbed that money is owed to someone - is that statement believed or should we assume that the person was only trying to make it look like their children do not have a lot of money? Would the same apply in a case where all the money was dedicated to the Temple rather than to the person's children? Can an heir claim that even though their bequeather may have said they owed someone money, they subsequently said they had paid them back? In what case are they believed and in what case are they not believed? What are the differences between a loan with a contract and a loan with an oral agreement? One who has a loan with a document can collect from liened property that has been sold, but an oral loan can only be collected from free (unsold) property. If a guarantor signs after the loan takes place, can one collect from the guarantor, and if so, are there any limitations? Is the property of a borrower liened to the creditor by Torah law or by rabbinic law? Raba and Ulla each take sides on this debate. Rav and Shmuel disagree with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish whether an oral loan can be collected from orphans or from purchasers. Rav Papa comes up with a unique ruling - not fully matching either position, as he saw a need in society to prevent creditors from refusing to loan money and to prevent a breakdown in the market where buyers are hesitant to purchase land.

Dec 16, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 174 Areivut and kablanut are two different methods of guaranteeing a loan. What is the difference between them? There are several different opinions about which language indicates one or the other. One's land acts as a guarantee for a loan and therefore the creditor cannot directly collect from the borrower's land before demanding repayment from the borrower. If a guarantor pays a debt on behalf of orphans for their father's debt, and then goes to get repaid from the orphans, they do not need to pay the money back until they are bar mitzva age. Two reasons are brought - what is the practical difference between them? A guarantor for a ketuba different than a guarantor for a loan - in what way and why?

Dec 15, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of my grandfather, Joseph Cohen, Yosef ben Moshe HaCohen, z"l. "My grandfather was hard working, loved to sing, especially as a chazan, and brought up his family to be strongly committed to Judaism." If two people have the same name, can they collect from other people if we cannot be sure that the document in their hand is really their own? It can be inferred from our Mishna that they can collect, but a braita rules that they cannot. The root of the debate is either regarding whether documents can be acquired by passing them from one to the other ( otiyot niknot b'mesira ) or perhaps both hold that they can, but the root of the debate is whether one needs to prove the document was passed to them from the other. Rava and Abaye debated the latter issue and a braita is quoted from which each one tries to prove his position. Another braita rules against both the Mishna and the previously quoted braita, holding that two people with the same name can pull out a loan document one on the other. The root of the debate is whether or not a borrower can have a scribe draft a promissory note not in the presence of the creditor. If it can be done, one can pretend to be the borrower, draft the note, and then use it to collect from the other. If a person tells one's children on their deathbed that one of their promissory notes in their possession is already collected, the children cannot claim any of the loans, as the burden of proof is on the one who collects. If there are two promissory notes for the same person, they can collect the one with the smaller amount. When one has a loan with a guarantor, can the creditor collect from the guarantor? If so, under what circumstances? What is the source from the Tanach for the responsibility of a guarantor? At first, they try to learn it from Yehuda and Reuven, when they each promised to take responsibility for bringing Binyamin to Egypt, but that source is rejected and instead, verses from Proverbs 20:16 and Proverbs 6:1-3 are used as the source. Ameimar views a guarantor's commitment as asmachta (a commitment that the guarantor never really meant to keep) and would then be a subject of debate between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehuda if it is a valid commitment. Rav Ashi rejects this explanation and explains why it is not viewed as asmachta .

Dec 13, 2024

Rava and Rav made suggestions to scribes how to avoid writing documents that could raise suspicion of not being fully truthful. Rava did not allow a creditor to trade in promissory notes of large amounts to be divided in half, or two notes to be combined into one for the combined amount, as there is concern for deceit. Rav Ashi did not permit a credit even to trade a promissory note for a large amount into a smaller amount as also that could be used to cheat the borrower. If two brothers inherited an item, such as a bathhouse or an olive press that was more useful to one than the other, as one was wealthy and had more household members or more produce, can the poor brother have a claim on the rich brother? On what does it depend? What rules apply to documents when there are two people with the same name in the town? Is there a way to avoid confusion? And if not, what documents can/can't be collected? A person came into court before Rav Huna with a docuemnts that said that a certain person borrowed money from "him" and the "him" was not mentioned by name. Can the person holding the document collect it? Can the court assume that since it is in his possession, he is the one who the "him" is referring to? Rav Huna ruled that he could not collect the money, but Raba ruled that he could. On what basis? How does it relate to the case in the Mishna with two people with the same name?

Dec 13, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Meir and Ahuva Balofsky in loving memory of Ahuva's grandmother, Basia Chava bat Yirmiyahu, on her shloshim, and in honor of their son Moshe's engagement to Maya Wind. "May Bubbie Chava's legacy carry on in this auspicious new beginning." Today's daf is sponsored by Sigal Spitzer in loving memory of her Grandma "GG" Rhoda, Raizel Bat Gital, whose first yahrzeit is today. "I love you and miss you. May her neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of Mitzi's father, Jack Lock, of Harrisburg PA, who passed away four years ago. "He was so proud that all four of his children made aliya to Israel, and that his "tribe" grew during his lifetime to nearly 100 family members, spanning three generations (now four!) all in Israel. He was a generous and loving husband, father, grandfather, uncle, and brother who is sorely missed." When a borrower pays back part of a loan, two tannaitic opinions are proposed to prevent the creditor from attempting to collect the full original amount. Rabbi Yehuda suggests writing an entirely new loan document that reflects the reduced outstanding balance, replacing the original document to ensure clarity about the remaining debt. Rabbi Yosi recommends creating a receipt that the borrower keeps as proof of partial payment, serving as evidence that a portion of the loan has already been repaid and protecting the borrower from potential future claims. Rav diverges from both opinions, requiring a new document to be written specifically by the court and pre-dated to the original loan's date. This position is challenged by a braita that allows witnesses to rewrite and predate the document. However, Rav maintains his stance, arguing that witnesses lack the court's authority to create a lien on the buyer's property from the original date. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi also disagree about post-dated documents, specifically in cases where the post-dating is not explicitly clear. Rabbi Yehuda's position stems from his earlier view that receipts cannot be written, thus allowing post-dating as it cannot lead to deceit. Rabbi Yosi, who permits writing receipts, warns that a receipt pre-dating the post-dated document could potentially enable the creditor to collect on the loan twice. A broader question emerges regarding receipts: Are they applicable only for partial loan payments or also for fully paid loans? The conclusive view is that if a creditor claims a lost document cannot be torn, they may demand payment upon providing a receipt to the borrower. This approach is justified by the creditor's initial act of kindness in providing the loan. A Mishna in Shviit 10:5 distinguishes between pre-dated and post-dated documents. Since documents create property liens, pre-dated documents are disqualified for incorrectly placing liens on lands sold after the document's date. Post-dated documents, however, are acceptable. Rav Hamnuna limits post-dating to loan documents but raises concerns about post-dated bills of sale that could facilitate deception. He warns that a seller could repurchase land before the sale date, and the buyer might then use the deed to prove incorrect ownership. When questioned about why similar concerns do not apply to loans, the Gemara suggests that Rav Hamnuna must not permit receipts. Subsequently, post-dated documents became permitted, and people were also writing receipts. To prevent potential deceit, Rabbi Abba advised his scribes that when they wrote post-dated documents they should add to the document that it was post-dated, while Rav Safra suggested avoiding dating the receipts.

Dec 12, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 170 This week's learning is sponsored by Audrey Mondrow in loving memory of Irving "poppy" Mauskopf, Yechezchel Ben Rachel and Abraham, whose yahrzeit is tomorrow. "A person of complete emuna that always had a smile for everyone. It is an honor and privilege to be his daughter. May his neshama have an aliya ." Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of Mitzi's brother, Jerry Lock of Efrat, who passed away five years ago. "He was the first in the family to make Aliyah to Israel and was a loving husband, father, grandfather, uncle, and brother who is sorely missed." Today's daf is sponsored by Naomi and Adam Ferziger in loving memory of Naomi's father David Weiss, Chaim Ze'ev Ben Yoel and Pessel on his 12th yahrzeit. "He was a Holocaust survivor, kind, generous, with a good sense of humor, devoted to family and community." A braita is brought regarding one who comes to court claiming one has proof of ownership of the land both in the form of a deed and a chazaka (lived on the land for 3 years without the owner protesting). There is a debate between Rebbi and Rashbag about whether one needs to bring the deed or the chazaka as proof (or either or). The Gemara brings five explanations as to what the case is and what is the root of the debate. The first explanation contradicted the conclusion of the previous section regarding the debate between Rashbag and the rabbis about whether or not a document can be acquired by passing it on to another. That led to the impetus to find other explanations to the debate. If one pays back half of a loan – what is done to ensure the creditor won't try to collect the entire amount later by bringing the original document? Rabbi Yehuda holds that we write a new document. Rabbi Yosi says that we write a receipt that the borrower keeps to prove that part was already paid back.

Dec 11, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her Bobe, Ita Rosa Sonabend on her 30th yartzheit. Today's daf is sponsored by Chemed Tov in honor of Tzila Goldberg's 102 birthday! If one lost a document of sale, can the buyer request that a new document be written to replace the old one? If the document includes a guarantee, there is a concern that the buyer may pull out the old document later and claim land from two different properties of the buyer that were sold to others. There are two suggestions as to the details of the case in which we would be concerned for this type of deceit. The first is rejected. After explaining the details of the situation, the rabbis inferred from here that a shovar , receipt, is not written as if it were, writing a receipt could have neutralized the concern for deceit. However, this inference is rejected in two different ways. Two very basic disagreements are discussed - is a guarantee a basic part of any sale - meaning that if it isn't written in the document does one assume that it was sold with a guarantee? Does passing on a deed of sale to another affect a kinyan - is the item acquired by the receiver, even though the name on the deed does not match that of the receiver ( otiyot niknot b'mesira )?

Dec 10, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Miriam Benson in loving memory of her mother, Evelyn Benson, Yocheved bat Avram Leiv v'Chaya Batya. "She died on October 20th, 2024 at the age of 100. She was a wonderful mother and role model. I miss her terribly and am deeply grateful for her life. How lucky I am to have a mom such as this mom." Why did the Mishna need to specify which side needs to pay for the document in each case - is it not obvious? The Gemara brings explanations for each case. The Mishna explains that if one pays back part of a loan and both sides agree to give the document to a third party (instead of writing a receipt that part was paid) and the borrower declares, "I will the balance by a particular date and if not, return the document to the creditor," there is a debate about whether or not the creditor can claim the whole amount (if the loan is not paid back on time). This is a case of asmachta , an exaggerated claim, and Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis disagree about whether asmachta is valid or not. Even though Rav and Rabbi Yochanan held by Rabbi Yosi, that asmachta is valid, the Gemara ruled that we do not rule that way. If a document is erased/partially erased, if witnesses can testify that they saw the document, they can write a new document testifying to the validity of the erased one. How does one treat a torn document - under what circumstances is it valid? If one claims a document is lost, can a new one be written instead?

Dec 9, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Gila Pollack in loving memory of her father, Moshe Pollack, on his 7th yahrzeit. "He is missed greatly by all his children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren." Abaye suggests never to sign at the bottom of a blank page, someone can forge a document by adding a line saying that the person who signed borrowed money from them. Since a document signed by the borrower is admissible in court and can be collected from 'free' (not liened) property, this forged document could be used. Abaye also suggests not to put numbers from three to ten at the end of a line as the letters yud and nun can be added to turn 3 into 30, 4 into 40, and so forth. Two cases were brought before Abaye where one erased part of a letter or added a letter to change the document's meaning. As this messed up the spacing, Abaye realized the issue and forced the one who tampered with the document to confess. In another case, someone forged Rava's signature and Rava realized it was forged as his name appeared before Rav Acha bar Ada, the other witness, and since Rav Acha was more senior, Rava never would have signed before him, out of respect. The Mishna lists several cases of documents written for arrangements between two people. In each case, the Mishna explains who can write the document not in the presence of the other, and who cannot. It also explains who is the one obligated to pay for the document to be written. The first case listed regards a get , divorce document, and a receipt that the woman received her ketuba money. The Mishna adds that the scribe must recognize them to ensure that the person will not pass the document to someone else to use for collecting money. The reason for this is that the man can the get written not for himself but to give to a different woman to claim her ketuba money, even though she may still be married and the woman can get a receipt written to give to a different man who can claim he already paid his wife her ketuba money. Rav explains that the need for the scribe to recognize is for the man for the get and the woman for the receipt for the reason described above. However, some rabbis were sitting with Abaye and questioned why Rav did not require the scribe to recognize both, since even if the scribe knows the man/woman, it is still possible the man will pass it to a woman/man married to a man/woman with the same name? Abaye responds that Rav actually required the scribe to know them both. However, there is still a possibility that the man/woman can pass the document on to someone who has the same name as their wife/husband and the spouse has the same name as them. That possibility is avoided by a ruling that if two couples in the same town share the same names, they can only get divorced in the presence of both couples.

Dec 8, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in loving memory of her father Albert Tychman, z"l on his 17th yahrzeit. "He would love that on this day of his yahrzeit, my husband and I are enroute to Israel to visit our daughter and her family. He was very proud of all his grandchildren." Today's daf is sponsored by Lesley Glassberg Nadel in loving memory of her sister Ruth Lewis, Rachel bar Berel haLevi v'Tova, whose yahrzeit is Kislev 7. "May her memory be blessed." Today's daf is sponsored by Shira Dishon in memory of her son, Eitan Ben Shira, hy"d, on his first yahrzeit. 'Eitan was a student at the Kiryat Shmona Yeshiva, which he loved so much. In a wonderfully symbolic way, a day after the memorial, the Kiryat Shmona Yeshiva, which was evacuated to the center of the country for more than a year, returns to Kiryat Shmona with joy and dancing. Surely Eitan will join the joyful dancing from above." The Gemara continues to examine the details of a braita discussing different interpretations of unclear language in a document regarding dinarim , specifically whether the document was referring to silver or gold dinarim . In resolving a difficulty with the braita, a distinction is drawn between ' dinarei ' (gold) and ' dinarim ' (silver). To further support this distinction, a Mishna in Keritut is cited, which describes how Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel modified a law, relating to the sacrifices of a mother who had given birth and a zava, to break the market price on birds that had risen to an astronomical level. The Mishna explains a principle regarding document interpretation: when there is a contradiction between the text at the top and bottom of a document, the bottom text is followed. This is based on the assumption that the change was intentional, reflecting a deliberate modification by the seller or creditor. The purpose of writing the top section is to assist in deciphering any missing letters or numbers in the bottom section. A braita further qualifies this principle, limiting such corrections to a single letter or number. If two letters or numbers are changed, it would be interpreted as a deliberate modification from the document's outset, and the text at the end would be followed or perhaps the document would be deemed invalid. In a specific case, a document came before the court stating "six hundred and one zuz ." The precise denomination of the six hundred was unclear. Abaye ruled that it did not refer to prutot , as large numbers of prutot are typically not written in documents but are converted to larger denominations. Given the remaining possibilities of sela (four dinarim ) coins or zuzim (one dinar ), Abaye ruled to follow the lesser amount. This decision was based on the principle that the party holding the document has a weaker position and cannot demand money from the other side without clear proof.

Dec 6, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Leah Caroline in loving memory of her brother Baruch Binyamin z"l ben Tzvi Thaler on his shloshim . "Baruch encouraged my learning and often asked where I was up to in the Gemara. We all miss you very much." When Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in the Mishna "it goes by the local custom" what did he mean? In what case does he disagree with the tana kamma? Abaye categorizes Rashbag's opinion with two other rabbis who ruled in different cases based on the same approach. Why does the Mishna need to specify that one witness in a get pashut is invalid - isn't that obvious? Two answers are brought. According to one answer, the case is where there is one witness on the document and one who is not signed on the document but testifies about what is written in the document. There is a debate about whether or not this case is valid. Abaye ruled that it is invalid, which Ameimar ruled that it is valid. Ameimar brings proof from a question that was asked to Rabbi Yirmia and on account of his answer, he was permitted to reenter the Beit Midrash after being kicked out. There are four versions regarding the question they asked Rabbi Yirmia. The Mishna discusses cases where there is a contradiction in the amount of money mentioned in the document. Depending on the situation, there are different ways of deciding which amount is "correct." What is done if the amount of money is not specified, but just the coin, or just "silver" or "gold"?

Dec 6, 2024

If, as Rav holds, a document comes before the court that has been completely erased and written over and signed, it is acceptable, why is there not a concern that the text was erased a second time and the signatures of the witness were on a version that was erased? The reason is that it is noticeable if a document is erased once or twice. To answer a follow-up question about another concern for forgery, Abaye also explains that if witnesses are to sign on an erased document, they must also be present when the document is erased. A difficulty is raised against Rav's ruling from a braita, but is resolved. However, two difficulties are raised against the resolution but are resolved as well. On a tied document ( get mekushar ) the dating system differed from a regular document. Based on that, Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel's opinion in the Mishna is questioned by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi as he said that a tied document can be turned into a straight one and if the dating system is different, that could lead to issues of one collecting a debt that has already been repaid. How can this be resolved? Other issues regarding the dating system are discussed which include references to the Greek numbering system. In the context of a story showing that Rabbi Yehuda haNasi was not familiar with a tied document, he reprimands his son for speaking lashon hara . The Gemara digresses to discuss different types of lashon hara , some of which include just speaking about a person, not even saying something negative, or even complimenting someone. This is called avak lashon hara , as it can lead to lashon hara . Rav Amram in the name of Rav explains that three sins are unavoidable daily - having sinful thoughts, thoughts during prayer, and lashon hara . As it is difficult to say that people daily speak negatively about others, Rav's words are explained to be referring to avak lashon hara .

Dec 5, 2024

A braita established that one can leave one blank line in a document before the signatures, but not two. Several issues are raised regarding the lines discussed. Is it two lines with a space above and below and if so, how much? What size font - the size of a scribe or the size of witnesses? Rav and Rabbi Yochanan disagree about whether one can leave a space between the witnesses' signatures and the judges' ratification. Rav says more space can be left than before the witnesses's signature and Rabbi Yochanan says no space can be left. The Gemara is concerned according to each interpretation for possible forgeries and discusses why there is no concern and if there is, how it can be detected.

Dec 4, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored by Debbie and Yossi Gevir for the refuah shleima of Eitan Asher ben Dvora v'Haim Zelig. "Eitan was wounded while protecting Am Yisrael in Lebanon two and a half weeks ago. May he and his buddies continue to heal steadily along with all of Tzahal's wounded soldiers." Rav Amram explained the reasoning behind Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that the last line of a document should contain a review of the main part of the document. Since there is often a bit of space between the end of the document and the signatures, there is concern that the last line could have been added after the witnesses signed. Therefore, nothing new is added, as it would not be upheld, and instead, the last line should include a review of the document's content. Rav Amram supports his explanation from a braita that permitted one line of space but forbade leaving two lines of space between the end of a document and the signatures. He explains that one line is permitted because the last line contains only a review, but two would be a problem as something additional can be added. A question was then raised about leaving a line and a half. Initially, they attempted to answer the question from the braita, but inferences could be made in either direction. They quoted another braita from which it was clearly stated that anything less than two lines would be valid. The braita continues with another ruling about witnesses' signatures. If four or five witnesses signed on a document and some were disqualified witnesses or relatives, those signatures are ignored and the document is validated by the other signatures. This supports Chizkiya's ruling that if more than two lines were left blank before the signatures but were subsequently filled in with disqualified witnesses' signatures, the document is still valid. He draws a parallel to the laws of s'chach in a sukka , where a space of three handsbreadths disqualifies the sukka , but if the space is filled with disqualified s'chach , it is only problematic if it is four handsbreadths wide.

Dec 3, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik & Adi Wyner in honor of their first grandchild, Azriel David's first birthday today, son of Ariel Wyner & Sofia Chiarandini, and in honor of their daughter, Eva Wyner, upon her engagement to Reuven Rosen. "We love Reuven and look forward to welcoming him into our family!" According to Rabbi Yirmia bar Abba, the witnesses' signatures in a tied document ( mekushar ) would be at the bottom of the document (as opposed to Rav Huna who held they were at the top, on the tied part), ensuring that no extra lines were added. There would be no need to then add the words " hakol sharir v'kayam " at the end of the document. However, this could still lead to forgery as an extra line could be added and an additional witness could sign at the bottom. Therefore, they then explain that Rabbi Yirmia bar Abba must hold that the signatures are on the back and run perpendicular to the text, beginning at the bottom opposite where the text ends, thus preventing the possibility of a forgery. However, this can still lead to forgery as it is assumed at first that only the first signature starts at the bottom and the others are higher up. If so, there is concern that one could cut out a line in the document and it could be accepted as valid by the court as a partial signature (son of...) is valid. After some back and forth, Gemara explained why this was not a concern. However, Mar Zutra explains that all the signatures must line up at the bottom, thereby precluding the possibility that one could cut off a line (as all the names would never be able to be cut in a way that would go unnoticed). Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef brings two laws in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. If one erases something in a document, one must write a note testifying to the change at the bottom. The last line before the end should always include a review of the content of the document since if something new is written in the last line, it is not upheld, as there is a concern it was added after the signatures.

Dec 2, 2024

The tenth chapter begins with a comparison between two different types of documents - a regular one ( pashut) and one that has folds ( mekushar ). The differences include the number of witnesses required and where they sign. Several verses are brought to find a source for these two documents and their differences in the Torah and in Yirmiyahu. However, since these verses can be explained in another manner, the Gemara concludes that these differences are rabbinic and are merely connected to verses as an asmachta . The get mekushar was instituted in a particular place where many kohanim lived who were known to be short-tempered and would decide in a moment of anger to divorce their wives. Since kohanim cannot remarry their wife after divorcing her, the rabbis instituted a takana that the kohanim would need to give their wives a get mekushar , which is very time-consuming. This would buy time so they could calm down from their anger and hopefully decide not to divorce their wives. Rav Huna and Rav Yirmia bar Abba debate where the witnesses sign on a get mekushar , either between the folds or on the back of the document opposite the writing. Rami bar Hama asked about Rav Huna's opinion, why are we not concerned that someone will add words to the text below after the witnesses sign.

Dec 1, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Heshie and Rookie Billet in honor of the bar mitzva of their grandson Elihai Yonah Jacobson in Neve Daniel. "May you continue to grow in Torah learning, middot tovot , chesed , and identification with Klal Yisrael . So proud of you!" A ruling was sent from Israel to Babylonia with a halakhic ruling that was said to be one of the more difficult monetary laws to understand. However, the Gemara initially does not understand the details of the case and offers five suggestions. After rejecting each suggestion because there was no real difficulty with the logic of the ruling, they reinstate the first suggestion and explain the difficulty. The first two suggestions relate to a grandson inheriting from a grandfather directly as the father had previously died. Does inheritance go through the father to the grandson or does it go directly from the grandfather to the grandson. If it goes through the father, does the grandson inherit the double portion that was meant to be given to his father? The last three suggestions relate to one who signs a document and later becomes a disqualified witness (for different reasons). Is there an issue with ratifying that document? They asked Rav Sheshet: does a son who predeceases his mother inherit from his mother "in his grave" thereby passing on the inheritance to his half brothers through his father or does her inheritance stay with her father's family? Rav Sheshet answers it from a braita and Rav Acha bar Minyumei answers it from our Mishna. Both conclude that the son does not inherit his mother in the grave, but her money is given to her heirs from her father's family. The reason for this law is derived from a gezeira shava in the Torah from Bamidbar 36:7, 9. The chapter ends with a sale where there was a doubt regarding what was sold and the two sides each claim that the land in question belongs to them. Rava and Rav Nachman disagree. The Gemara raises a different debate between Rava and Rav Nachman where they seem to side the other way. However, the issue is resolved as one can differentiate between the two cases and see that the logic of each of their positions is consistent.

Nov 29, 2024

If a husband and wife die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first, there is a question regarding various types of property. The wife's heirs claim the husband died first and therefore they should collect her ketuba money, her tzon barzel property, and usufruct ( melog ) property. In contrast, the husband's heirs do not want to pay the ketuba money and they want to keep her possessions. The husband's heirs claim the wife died first, meaning there is no obligation to pay the ketuba money and all her possessions were inherited by the husband upon her death. Beit Shamai rules that they split the money in half, which Beit Hillel differentiates between the three issues -the ketuba , tzon barzel , and usufruct property. The ruling of Beit Hillel regarding the tzon barzel property is unclear and the amoraim offer different opinions about what he meant. If a mother and only son die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first, there is a question about who died first and who inherits the mother's property - his heirs or hers. In this case, Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree that they split it equally. However, Rabbi Akiva rules that the money remains where it is. Ben Azai is bothered by the fact that Rabbi Akiva created a debate in the case where both Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agreed.

Nov 29, 2024

If a father and a son die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first and the son did not leave enough money to pay his wife's ketuba or a creditor, the wife/creditor and the father's heirs each bring a different claim. The father's heirs claim the son died first and they inherit all the father's money, leaving the son's estate with nothing to pay the wife/creditor. The wife or creditor claim that the father died first and the son inherited the father's property and his heirs can now pay what is owed. Beit Shamai ruled that they split the disputed property equally. Beit Hillel holds that the money remains in the hands of the father's heirs as ain safek motzi m'yedai vadai , meaning they have a definitive claim as they inherit the father and the creditor's claim is uncertain so we follow what is certain. Shmuel asked if one who borrowed money and added into the deed that the land from property that the borrower will acquire in the future is lined to the loan, is that effective even to those who hold that one cannot acquire items that have not yet come into this world? Several sources are brought to attempt to answer the question but each is rejected as either the case details are different or they can each be attributed to Rabbi Meir who holds that one can acquire items that are not in this world. A follow-up question is asked regarding one who took one loan and then another and then acquired more land - does one have more of a lien on that property than the other?

Nov 28, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored by my parents, Paula and Robert Cohen, in loving memory of my grandmother, Sonja Waschitz, Sara bat Yitzchak z"l, on her third yahrzeit. My grandmother was always optimistic, despite the many challenges she endured, beginning with leaving her parents behind in Vienna to forge a new life in America at age 14 in 1939. She continues to serve as a role model for our entire family. Ameimar ruled that children not old enough to sell their inheritance could give it away as a gift. After being questioned by Rav Ashi, he explains the logic behind his ruling by differentiating between a sale and a gift. Rav Nachman brings in the name of Shmuel a list of cases where one must check if the person has signs of maturity to see if the action was valid. The Gemara analyzes why he brought each of the cases. The Mishna bring the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that one on one's deathbed cannot pass on possessions through words but must do an actual kinyan , act of acquisition. A debate between him and the rabbis regarding a few cases is brought - each one explains the cases in a way that supports their position. The Mishna explains a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua regarding the differences between whether an act of acquisition is not needed only on Shabbat or is not needed at all. The logic of their positions matches the logic of their argument regarding the concept of zakhin l'adam shelo b'fanav as applying only for a minor or everyone else as well.

Nov 27, 2024

Even though the Gemara concluded that Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan hold positions that were originally attributed to each other, the difficulty that Rabbi Yochanan raised against Reish Lakish can still be explained as such and does not need to be reversed. At what age can one sell one's father's possessions? There is a debate about whether one can sell at eighteen or twenty. Rabbi Zeira tries to prove from the story in Bnei Brak where they wanted to see if there were signs of maturity on the dead body must prove that the age was eighteen as a Mishna in Nidda 57b states that over age twenty the child can sell even if they show no signs of physical maturity. Therefore, the child must have been eighteen and that explains why they want to check. However, this is rejected as they explain that the Mishna is only true in a case where there are other signs that the twenty-year-old was a saris . In the absence of those signs, they would still need to see if the child shows physical signs of maturity to enable the sale, until the child reaches mid-life, at thirty-six (into the thirty-sixth year). Can one sell the property they inherited at the age of seventeen and a day (into the eighteenth year) or nineteen and a day, according to the other opinion? The Gemara explains there is a debate here as well. However, one of the opinions was derived mistakenly from a misunderstanding of a ruling in a case that came before Rava. Gidel bar Menashya asked Rava if the sale of a fourteen-year-old girl could be accepted if she showed a clear understanding of business relations. Rava ruled that her sale was valid. The Gemara explains that the details of that case were specifically that age and a girl because that was the situation that came before him, but the same would hold at a younger age (over bar/bat mitzva) and for a boy. Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehushua ruled that even though a child under the age of eighteen/twenty cannot sell inherited property, they can be accepted as witnesses. Mar Zutra limits this to movable property, not land. Ameimar ruled that a child can give away inheritance as a gift, even under eighteen/twenty. Rav Ashi questions the logic of this ruling.

Nov 26, 2024

When a gift document lacks language indicating either a deathbed or healthy status of the giver, and there is a dispute between the giver claiming it was written while dying and the recipients claiming otherwise, who bears the burden of proof? Rabbi Meir holds that we presume the person was healthy until proven otherwise. The rabbis, however, rule that the gift remains with the giver until proven otherwise. There are two different approaches to understanding this debate. Some hold that the proof necessary according to each opinion is witnesses who will corroborate the facts, whether the giver was healthy or not when the gift was given. According to that understanding, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree along the same lines as Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov - do we rely on the present state of the giver or the earlier presumption of ownership over the item? Others hold that the rabbis hold that the gift remains with the given unless the recipients can prove that the document is valid. The debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis is whether or not a document where the one who wrote it admits it is a document but raises a problem with its validity needs to be ratified. A difficulty is raised against the second understanding, as Rabbi Meir and the rabbi debate this issue elsewhere regarding witnesses who bring a document but raise a doubt on its validity. However, this is resolved as one could have thought to distinguish between a case where witnesses question the validity and where the giver questions the validity. Raba holds by the first explanation. When Abaye questioned his understanding, Raba explained the rabbi's position: since the document should have included that the giver was either sick or healthy and included neither, it creates a doubt on each side and therefore the gift remains in the original owner's property until proven otherwise. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis is about who needs to prove whether the giver was sick or healthy or whether the issue surrounds the ratification of the document. At first, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds the debate is about who needs to prove whether the giver was sick or healthy. He then questions Reish Lakish from a braita about a similar case where they needed to prove the seller's age, that he was not too young to have sold the property, rather than ratifying the document, thus proving that ratification alone would not have been effective. To resolve the difficulty, Reish Lakish explains the details of the case differently, in a way that ratification of the document was irrelevant. Reish Lakish brings a Mishna of Bar Kapara to Rabbi Yochanan that implies that a document where the owner admits to having written the document but claims that it is invalid is valid even without ratification. Reish Lakish asks Rabbi Yochanan if this only follows Rabbi Meir's position and not the rabbis, as discussed earlier. Rabbi Yochanan explains that it follows the rabbis' position as well as they both agree on this topic. Two questions are raised against Rabbi Yochanan's answer from sources quoted previously. One is resolved but the second is not. As a result, the entire sugya unravels as Rabbi Zeira explains Rabbi Yochanan's answer in a different manner, that the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis is about ratification of the document and Bar Kapara matches the rabbi's position. This explanation requires switching the positions of Rabbi Meir and the rabbis in both Mishna and the braita quoted previously about the witnesses and switching Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's explanations of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis in our Mishna.

Nov 25, 2024

Rav and Shmuel disagreed regarding a case where one promised a gift using the phrase "in life and in death." Rav held that this language indicated a deathbed gift, with "in life" being mentioned merely as an expression of hope. Shmuel, however, interpreted it as a gift from a healthy person. In Nehardea, they followed Rav's ruling. Later, Rava introduced a distinction: he argued that Rav would agree that using the phrase "from life" (rather than "in life") would be treated as a gift from a healthy person. Ameimar, however, rejected Rava's interpretation of Rav's position. When a case of this nature came before Rav Nachman in Nehardea, he sent it to be adjudicated in a different city, not wanting to rule against Shmuel in Shmuel's own city of Nehardea. In another instance, Rava ruled against a woman who tried to reclaim her gift, which was consistent with his position (as she had used the phrase "from life and in death"). When she persistently complained about his ruling, Rava arranged for another rabbi to write her the ruling she desired, but instructed him to add a citation at the bottom of the document from Bava Metzia regarding deception, signaling that he was deceiving her and the ruling should not be followed. Upon realizing this subterfuge, the woman cursed Rava that his boat should sink—and indeed, his boat sank. When a gift document lacks language indicating either a deathbed or healthy status of the giver, and there is a dispute between the giver claiming it was written while dying and the recipients claiming otherwise, who bears the burden of proof? Rabbi Meir holds that we presume the person was healthy until proven otherwise. The rabbis, however, rule that the money remains with the giver until proven otherwise. A case arose involving a deathbed gift that used appropriate deathbed gift language, but the document didn't record that the person had died. After the person's death, the recipients claimed the gift, while the heirs argued that their father had recovered from his illness (thus invalidating the gift) before becoming sick again and dying. Raba ruled in favor of the recipients, reasoning that since the person was now dead, it was likely they died from the original illness, making the gift valid. Abaye challenged Raba's ruling by citing the case of a sunken ship: even though we presume the passengers died, we must consider the possibility they survived if their bodies aren't found. Similarly, he argued, we should consider the possibility of recovery, as most sick people do recover. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, resolved the difficulty by explaining that Raba was following Rabbi Natan's position. Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov disagreed about a case where the document did not include whether given while healthy or on one's deathbed. Rabbi Yaakov held that we follow the last known presumption of ownership, regardless of current possession. Rabbi Natan ruled that we follow the current presumption - if the person is currently on their deathbed, we assume the gift was given on their deathbed; if healthy, we assume they were healthy at the time the document was written. Rabbi Elazar noted that this same dispute between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov applies to a case in Mishna Taharot 6:7 regarding ritual impurity. The case involves a valley enclosed by a fence that is defined as a public space in summer (due to heavy foot traffic) but as a private space in winter (due to minimal traffic). When there's a known dead body present but uncertainty about whether someone passed over it, the rule is: doubt in a public space yields ritual purity, while doubt in a private space yields impurity (based on Sotah laws). If it's unknown whether the person was there in summer or winter, Rabbi Yaakov would rule based on the last known presumption of the person, which means they are deemed pure, while Rabbi Natan would rule based on the current season - they would be declared impure if the issue arises in the winter, and pure if it is summer.

Nov 24, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored in honor of Elana Storch on her birthday. With love from her kids - Ruth, Ira, Elsa, Julianna, Reuben, Elia, Adele, Emanuel and Arianne. "We are inspired by the example you continue to set for us in your commitment to your learning." Rav and Shmuel disagree on a few different situations regarding a gift given on one's deathbed. If there was a document in which it states that a gift was given on one's deathbed with an act of acquisition - Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether the kinyan was added to override the laws of one on one's deathbed and only wanted it to be effective with a document, which cannot be given after one's death (Shmuel), or do we assume it was done to strengthen the ownership of the receipt of the gift (Rav)? Rav and Shmuel's position on this issue seems to contradict their opinions in a different case where one says to write and give a document to another and then dies before it is given. The Gemara resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the cases. The contradiction regarding Rav's position is resolved by explaining that there was no act of kinyan in the second case. The contradiction regarding Shmuel's position is resolved by establishing ( u'kimta ) the second case as one in which the giver was clear about the document's purpose - that it was only to strengthen the recipient's power. A second difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position in the first case (there is a concern that the gift was only to be effected with a document, which cannot be done after death) from a ruling of Shmuel regarding one who gave away all of one's possessions with a kinyan , whose gift can be retracted if one gets better, implying that if the person dies, the gift is effective. This too is resolved by establishing the latter ruling in a case where the giver was clear that the kinyan was done to strengthen the recipient's power. If one writes to give all one's possessions to one and gives them a document and then does the same to another, does the first one acquire it or the second? Rav and Shmuel disagree as they do in the first case discussed earlier. Why was there a need to say they disagreed in both cases? In Pumbedita there was a different version of Shmuel's opinion.

Nov 22, 2024

What else does the word "possessions" include? Some stories are brought of women on their deathbeds who promised their property to one person and then changed their minds and promised it to someone else. The rabbis debated what the ruling should be - if one's word on one's deathbed and as if they were already acquired, is one not able to change one's mind? A case is brought of a woman who gave her possessions to her son before her second marriage to prevent them from going to her husband. When she later got divorced, was she able to retrieve her possessions from her son? Another case was a woman who would give her orchard to her brother every time she got sick, as she thought she was dying. Each time she got better, the gift would be canceled. One time, at her request, he acquired it in a way that it would be effective even if she lived - he had her leave over a bit and did a kinyan . However, Rav Nachman ruled that since she said she was giving it to him because she thought she would die, once she got better, the kinyan was ineffective. The Gemara clarifies the case of a gift on one's deathbed where one only gives away part of one's property. Some understand that the gift is effective even if there was no kinyan and quoted this in the name of Rav Nachman. But Rava corrects them and explains that Rav Nachman holds that the Mishna was referring only to cases where a kinyan was effected, meaning that if one gave away not all of his possessions and then died or got better, if the gift was given without a kinyan , the person would not acquire the possessions. Additionally, if one did do a kinyan and didn't give away all of one's possessions but stated that it was because the person thought they were dying, then if they got better, the gift would be returned to him/her.

Nov 22, 2024

Abaye questions Rav Yosef's difficulty with Rav Yehuda and Rav Yirmia's interpretation of the Mishna by showing that sometimes the Mishna uses the word " karka (land)" to include movable items ( metaltelin ) and " kol shehu (any amount)" can refer to a particular size (larger than just any amount). One Mishna is in Peah 3:8 regarding the language used to free a slave. The other is in Chulin 11:2 regarding the first shearings where " kol shehu " means a particular amount. However, in conclusion, they explain these words in the above-mentioned Mishnayot as exceptions to the rule, and Abaye's difficulty against Rav Yosef is resolved. What is the difference between one who says "My metaltelin (movable property)should be given to...," "All my metaltelin (movable property) should be given to...," and "Anything that is metaltel (can be moved) should be given to..."? Are slaves considered property ( karka ) or movable items ( metaltelin )? Two sources are brought to prove that they are categorized as movable property, but both suggestions are rejected. Five cases are brought where the halakha will only be effective if ALL of one's property is included. Regarding four out of five of these rulings, "all of one's property" includes movable and non-movable items, meaning that even if one were to leave out some movable items, the halakha would not be in effect. The one case where it does not include movable items is a woman who forfeits the right to collect her ketuba if all of the property is divided between her and the sons. If movable items were not divided, we can still assume she forfeited her right to collect the ketuba , as a ketuba can only be collected from land. If one gives away all of one's " nechasim (possessions)," what items does that word include?

Nov 21, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 149 What language must be used for a gift stated on one's deathbed to be valid? If one sells all of one's property on one's deathbed, is it a valid sale if one recovers from one's illness? If one admits on one's deathbed that one owes money, do we believe the admission or is it possible the person is lying and just wants to show they don't have a lot of money? A story is brought with Issur the convert and how he was able to use this (an admission) as a solution to passing on his money that was in Rava's possession (as Rava was watching it for him) to his son, who was conceived before his conversion and therefore was unable to inherit the money. The Mishna says the gift is valid if one divides up one's possessions on one's deathbed but leaves over land of any amount, and then recovers. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that "any amount" actually means an amount worthy of sustaining him/her. Rav Yirmiya bar Abba says that even if one leaves movable items worthy of sustaining the person. Rav Zeira supports their opinions and Rav Yosef questions them based on the wording in the Mishna ("land" and "any amount"). Abaye supports Rabbi Zeira from a Mishna in Peah where land includes movable items.

Nov 20, 2024

Rav Nachman ruled that one cannot transfer intangible items, like the right to live in a house or the right to future fruits from a tree even on one's deathbed. By doing this, he equates a gift on one's deathbed to a regular gift. However, he ruled elsewhere that the rights to collect a loan with an oral agreement can be transferred to another on one's deathbed, even though this right can't be transferred from one who is not on one's deathbed. The Gemara brings two resolutions. If one gave a tree to one person and the fruits to another, can we assume that when the giver gave the tree to one, he retained the space on the tree where the fruits grow and passed those on to the other, making it an effective gift as he is giving a part of the tree that is in existence. Or did the giver not retain the space where the fruits go and gave the second person the right to collect fruits that will grow that are not yet in existence, which is not a valid gift? If the answer is that it is not effective, would it be the same work in a case where one gives the tree to someone but retains the fruits for oneself? A different version of this question is brought by Rabbi Abba. In his version, this differentiation between selling to two people and selling to one person and retaining part for oneself was asked on a statement that Reish Lakish made about one who sold a house without the upper level. According to both versions, the answer is that we can definitively say in the case that one sold/gave part to someone else, the part they retained would remain in their possession as surely people retain generously when it affects themselves. If one begins dividing up one's possessions and stops in the middle and then continues and gives away the rest, are the first gifts viewed as regular gifts (as one was only giving part of their possessions at that point) or are they viewed as gifts on one's deathbed since in the end, all of the possessions were given away? Rav Acha rules that even if one gave away one's possessions on one's deathbed and then healed, even if those were all of that person's known possessions, one should be concerned that maybe the person has other possessions in another country and therefore the gift is effective. This seems to contradict the Mishna. How can this be explained? If one gives away money on one's deathbed and then changes one's mind about part of the funds, does that cancel the entire first gift or only part? What are the ramifications of this? The Gemara brings a braita to prove that the first gift is completely canceled. At first, the Gemara rejects the proof but then reestablishes it and concludes that the first gift is completely canceled. If one consecrates all of one's property on one's deathbed, or declares it all ownerless, or gives it all to charity, and then gets better, is this canceled?

Nov 19, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 147 Today's daf is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of Manny Gross on his 2nd yahrzeit. "May his memory forever be a blessing." Today's daf is sponsored by Marc and Debbie Pershan in loving memory of Marc's mother, Perel Bayla bat Simcha, on the occasion of the shloshim. From where do we learn that a declaration of a person on their deathbed is effective as if an act of acquiring was performed? The sages brought sources for the law from two verses in the Torah and two from the Prophets. Rava says in the name of Rav Nachman that this law is not derived from the Torah, but the rabbis instituted it to prevent the person from being overly distressed. The Gemara questions Rav Nachman from a different statement of Rav Nachman on a ruling of Shmuel. Shmuel held that if one sold a promissory note of a loan to another and then pardoned the original loan, the loan would be canceled, and even the heir of the original lender could cancel the loan. Rav Nachman explained that even Shmuel would agree though that if the promissory note were not sold to another but given as a gift from the lender on his/her deathbed, the heir cannot cancel the loan. This seems to show that the power of the words of a person on their deathbed is valid by Torah law as they are stronger than a regular gift. They resolve this difficulty by explaining that Rav Nachman gave it the strength of Torah law, even though it is rabbinic. Rava quoted Rav Nachman that one cannot transfer intangible items - like the right to live in a house or the right to future fruits from a tree, even on one's deathbed. This seems to show that Rav Nachman treats a gift on one's deathbed like laws relating to gifts of one who is healthy. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this assumption.

Nov 18, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her Zayde, Israel (Ignacio) Marmurek on his 41st yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in honor of our fellow Daf learner Elana Weinberg and her husband Rabbi Brahm Weinberg on the occasion of the Bar Mitzvah of their son Joseph Asher in Silver Spring, Maryland, Parshat Vayera, this past Shabbat. "Joseph is already following in the footsteps of his parents with his demonstration of confidence, knowledge, and humility." After a betrothal, a groom would bring gifts to the bride called sivlonot . If the marriage was canceled, under what circumstances would the sivlonot be returned? This depends on what kinds of gifts were given (perishable or long-lasting), whether they were (small) gifts meant to be used in her father's house or (large) gifts for the couple's future home. If the groom ate in her father's home when bringing the gift, he would not be able to retrieve the gifts. What if the husband drank but did not eat, or ate outside the house, or the husband's messenger ate the food? If the groom ate less than a dinar's worth, can he claim back all the presents or only a percentage? If the gift went up in value and was then returned, who gets the enhanced value? Rava asks: If the gifts were to be consumed, but were not yet consumed when the marriage was canceled, are they returned? Almost all these questions remain unanswered. Two stories are brought relating a situation that happened with an engaged couple. In one, the husband sent gifts and in the other, there was a rumor that the bride had no sense of smell and the groom wanted to cancel the betrothal, but he tested her to see if it was true, and it was not. Each comes to teach something unique either about Israel or about a claim a husband could make and whether it would be accepted. Ravin ruled that even though we distinguished between perishable and non-perishable gifts, this distinction does not hold if the woman is the cause of the canceled wedding. In that case, all gifts are returned, even a bundle of vegetables. What assumptions can be made about a declaration on one's deathbed? A distinction is made between one who gives away all of their possessions and one who only gives away part. If they gave it all away, it is assumed they thought they were dying. Therefore, if they heal, the gift is ineffective. If only part were given away, the gift would be effective. This is based on an " umdana " - an assessment of their intent. The Gemara tries to match the opinion in our Mishna to tannaim who said the same thing regarding other cases in other places to determine who is the author of the Mishna.

Nov 17, 2024

A contradiction was brought from a braita against the Mishna regarding returning reciprocal gifts for a wedding ( shushbinim ). There were three resolutions. The third established the case of the Mishna of one when the groom died and left a yabam , a brother to perform levirate marriage. When the gifts are given to the yabam , he must share them with his brothers. To raise a difficulty against this answer they compare the case to one where the groom dies after betrothal and before the marriage. Just as in that case, the money from the betrothal does not have to be returned as the woman can claim that it is not her fault that they are not getting married, likewise with the shushbinim , the family that first received gifts can claim that there is no need for them to send gifts if the groom is no longer alive since they did not rejoice with him at the wedding. However, Rav Yosef explains that the cases aren't comparable as the case with the yabam was one where the other family did join the brother's wedding before he died and rejoiced with him, but did not yet bring the gifts. The Gemara attempts to establish that the opinion mentioned previously, that a woman does not have to return the money of the betrothal if the husband died as she can claim it was not her fault they never got married, is a subject of a tannaitic debate. However, this suggestion is rejected and the tannaitic debate is explained to be regarding a case where the woman, not the man, died and the debate is whether or not betrothal money was meant to be given and kept even if the marriage never happened. If one holds that it was not intended to be kept even if the marriage never happened, the woman's heirs would need to return the money if that was the custom in the place where they lived. That issue was not only a debate between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the source quoted previously, but also can help explain a debate in a different braita between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yossi. In the time of the amoraim, there were different opinions about whether the betrothal money would be returned or whether other gifts given from the groom to the bride were to be returned. The five unique laws that govern the shushbinot gifts. The court can enforce its collection. It is returned only when the one who gave first gets married. There is no interest if the reciprocal gift is larger than the first. It is not canceled in the shmita year like other loans. And a firstborn would not collect a double portion if the father was owed shushbinot gifts for his sons. If one doesn't attend the wedding, one is still obligated to bring reciprocal gifts. However, if he was not invited to the wedding, while he still needs to pay, he can hold a grievance against the person. However, since he did not eat at the wedding, he can deduct the amount he would have eaten from his gift. How is the amount of the deduction calculated? A braita sets up various cases in which one is not obligated to return the shushbinot . In the context of that braita, they mention a public wedding ( pumbi ) and therefore another braita that mentions this word pumbi in a different context is brought. That braita quotes various drashot comparing one who is wealthy in different types of property to one who is wealthy in different types of Torah knowledge. What is the ideal? Rav and Rava deliberation about whether it is better to master Mishna or better to matter Talmud. They each derive their opinion from Proverbs 15:15. Other drashot are brought on that verse which relate to middot or other things that will make a person happy or will cause them to lead an unhappy life. Some of these sources view having a happy life as a good thing whereas others do not view it in a positive light.

Nov 15, 2024

How are estate profits divided if only some or one of the heirs invested either time or money in improving it? What are the factors that affect the law? When are some exceptions to the rules? It was customary that a father who married off his oldest son in a house adjacent to his own house, would give that house to the son as a gift. Since this was the generally accepted practice, even if the father didn't specify it as a gift to the son, the law presumes that the house was given to the son. This is one of three laws that are declared "A halakha without a clear explanation." If brothers are living off the father's estate, in what situation would a brother's salary be shared with the other brothers? Are doctor bills for one of the heirs paid for by the estate? The Gemara differentiates between those who get sick because they brought it upon themselves and those who get sick due to circumstances beyond their control. Reciprocal marriage gifts (which were common in those days and could be demanded in a court) - how are they divided among heirs? On what do those laws depend?

Nov 15, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Geri Goldstein Geudalia's grandson, Moshe, on his bar mitzvah in Ottawa, Canada this Shabbat. In explaining why the commitment of the father to his son, "I will give you a portion with all your yet-to-be-born children" is ineffective, it is compared to one who says "Acquire it like a donkey." If one says to another, "You and a donkey shall acquire the item" is the kinyan effective? Rav Nachman holds that the person acquires half, Rav Hamnuna holds this is entirely ineffective and Rav Sheshet holds that the person acquires the entire item. Rav Sheshet brings a source regarding teruma to prove his position. However, this proof is rejected. Rav Avia brings a difficulty against those who were against Rav Sheshet's position from a case regarding a man who betrothed five women, two of whom could not be betrothed by him in this way as they were sisters ( kiddushin that are not able to be consummated, shelo nimseru l'bia ). Since the betrothal is effective to some, it can be compared to the "you and the donkey" case. However, this is also rejected as the case was misunderstood by Rav Avia and in fact, the man only had already excluded the sisters in the act of betrothal as he said, "Whoever is eligible to have relations with me will be betrothed." Therefore, the case is not similar at all to the donkey case. If one says, I will give my wife and my sons my possessions, does she get 50% or an equal share with all the sons? Rav Yosef ruled that she receives half and proved it from a verse about the lechem hapanim (shewbread) being divided between Aharon and his sons, where Aharon received half. Abaye rejects the comparison and rules that she receives an equal share. This is questioned in light of rulings where rabbis granted the wife half, and a ruling of Rebbi regarding a division of taxes. However, the ruling of Rebbi is rejected as it is more similar to the case of Aharon and his sons, than to the case of the woman and her sons. A difficulty is raised against Rav Yosef's ruling from the laws regarding dividing up a large meal offering into two vessels. However, the comparison to the meal offering is rejected as well. The halakha is like Rav Yosef in this case and in two others previously cited in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 12b and Bava Batra 114a). If one sends silk to his family, how is it divided between sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law? If one has one son and one daughter and promised his property to his "sons", does that wording include the daughter as well? If one has one son and a grandson and promises his property to his "sons" does that include his grandson? When the estate is not yet divided and the older children invest the property, are the proceeds divided evenly between all the brothers or only the ones who invested? On what does it depend?

Nov 14, 2024

If one gives a gift to an unborn child, while it is a fetus, Rav Huna rules that the gift is not acquired. Rav Nachman holds that one can give a gift if they say, "I am giving this gift when the baby is born." Rav Sheshet holds that a fetus can acquire items in all cases and brings a braita to support his position. Abaye and Rava each provide different explanations for the ruling in braita to show that it does not necessarily prove Rav Sheshet's position. The Gemara brings a Mishna in Nidda 44a to reject Rav Sheshet's opinion. But this is dismissed as Rav Sheshet himself explained the Mishna as referring to a particular case, without ramifications for this debate. Another explanation of that Mishna is brought in the name of Rava can also resolve the difficulty raised against Rav Sheshet. Rabbi Yochanan holds that in most situations, a gift given to an unborn fetus is not effective, but our Mishna is an exception to the rule as a father feels a closeness to an unborn child and it can therefore effectively transfer ownership of the gift to the fetus. The Gemara rules like Rabbi Yochanan. A case is brought where a man promised his wife that the sons she would have with him in the future would inherit all of his property, excluding his sons from a previous wife. When the son of the other wife complained, the father promised him a portion with his future brothers. The rabbis were split about whether or not that son would receive an extra portion when the inheritance was later divided between him and the other sons. Those who hold he does not deserve an extra portion claim that the promise was that he would get a portion like his unborn brother, but since the father cannot give them a portion at that point, as they were unborn, the statement was meaningless.

Nov 13, 2024

Abaye and Rava disagreed on their understanding of the Mishna regarding the ruling of a tumtum who tries to collect money form a father's estate. A difficulty is raised against Abaye's explanation from a braita, but is resolved. Why in the case of the Mishna did the husband commit 200 zuzim to his unborn child if she is a girl and 100 if he is a boy - wasn't there a preference in those days for male children, as per the words of Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai? Three answers are brought. Two tannaitic sources are brought with cases similar to the ones in our Mishna but without enough details so the Gemara establishes the details of the cases discussed. A case happened where a man on his deathbed promised all of his property to his unborn baby. Rav Huna ruled that this was ineffective as one cannot effect a transaction with someone who is not yet in existence, Rav Nachman questions this ruling from our Mishna where in all the cases the father promised money to an unborn child. Rav Huna rejects the Mishna saying, "I don't know who is the author of this Mishna!" The Gemara questions why Rav Huna couldn't have given a different answer. It raises seven possibilities but ultimately rejects them all.

Nov 12, 2024

The Mishna established the division of the father's possession when there is a lot of money and when there is not a lot of money. What if the financial status of the estate changes after the father's death? Does the distribution change as well? After the Gemara had discussed how the amount in the estate is determined, Rabbi Yirmiya asked if other things enter into the calculation - do we deduct the amount needed to feed the deceased's widow until she gets remarried or dies, or her daughter from a previous marriage in a case where the husband committed to supporting her for some time, or a loan that is owed to a creditor? If there is a widow and only a daughter left to inherit and not enough money for both of them, which one receives money from the estate? Why did Admon disagree with the rabbis and hold that the male children should receive inheritance at the expense of the daughters losing their food payments? Rava and Abaye each suggest different explanations. How is a tumtum viewed regarding these laws - as a lame, female, or neither? If a man on his deathbed left a pregnant wife and stipulated: if the baby is male give him this gift, if female, this gift, what do they receive if twins are born or if the baby is a tumtum ?

Nov 11, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 139 Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Shapiro in loving memory of her brother David Tychman z"l on his eleventh yahrzeit. "He was a passionate Zionist and a wonderful uncle to my children." If a father gives their land as a gift to one son "from today and after death," the father has exclusive rights to all the produce detached from the ground throughout his lifetime. Upon his death, the heirs receive any produce detached from the ground, not the gift recipient. However, in Tosefta Ketubot, the ruling is that if the son sold the field and then the father died, the buyer would have to return the value of produce attached to the ground at the time of the father's death to the heirs, as even produce attached to the ground belongs to the giver. Ulla resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the generosity of a father to a son as opposed to a non-relative (the buyer). If a father died and left older and younger children, before the inheritance is divided, they all get an equal portion for their needs - food, clothing, dowry. However, if some children were married in the father's lifetime, the younger children who were not yet married cannot demand the same amount of money for the wedding/dowry as the older ones received when the father was still alive. Rava brings an exception to the rule - if the oldest brother is managing the inheritance money and he takes money from the estate for clothing so he can dress respectfully when dealing with the inheritance, we do not insist that all the other brothers receive an equal share for their clothing. The son of Geneiva asked Rava: If a woman takes out a loan without a document (oral loan) and then gets married - since her husband has rights to her possessions, is he considered a "buyer" in which case, the creditor can't collect the loan (as an oral loan is not collected from land that is sold) or is he considered an inheritor and the loan can be collected. Rava tries to prove that he is considered an heir from our Mishna, but the proof is rejected. Rav Papa and Abaye each bring other sources to prove that a husband is considered an heir, but Rava raises a difficulty based on the takana in Usha which treats the husband as a buyer since a woman who sells her usufruct property and dies, the husband can demand it back from the buyers. This would only make sense if he was considered a buyer. Rav Ashi resolves the contradiction by explaining that sometimes the rabbis gave the husband status like an heir and sometimes like a buyer, depending on the situation - whatever is in the husband's or someone else's best interest, i.e. providing for a widow. Sons have rights to the inheritance but daughters have rights to sustenance from the estate. If there aren't sufficient funds for both, the rabbis give the girls rights to sustenance before giving rights to the sons. The sons are expected to ask for charity. Admon questions their position and Rabban Gamliel supports Admon. The amoraim discuss what is considered sufficient funds for both the sons and daughters.

Nov 10, 2024

If one receives a gift and doesn't immediately say, "I don't want it," the gift is acquired by that person, even if they later scream that they don't want it. However, if someone else accepted the gift on their behalf and they were in the room and did not protest, there is a debate between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the rabbis about whether or not the gift is acquired. If on one's deathbed, one promised different amounts of money to a few different people in one sentence, it is assumed that the person intended to gift it to them each at the same time. Therefore, if a creditor of the deceased comes to collect a debt, it is collected proportionally from each of them, depending on the amount they were given. However, if the person promised the gift in a particular order, the creditor collects first from the one who received last, and then from the second-to-last, etc. If on one's deathbed one said he was giving an amount of money to one who was "owed" money by them (i.e. a firstborn, wife, or creditor), was the intention to return the money owed or was this a gift in addition to money owed. This depends on how the promise was worded. If he said, "as is appropriate for him/her," the money is considered an addition to what was owed. But if the promise was "for his portion as a firstborn/for her ketuba, then the son/wife receiving can choose to accept either the amount of money promised on the deathbed or the double portion/ketuba. If it is a creditor, the amount promised is taken for the debt. Rav Nachman explains that this is based on Rabbi Akiva's position that if one adds unnecessary words, they must be adding something. Therefore, when one says "as is appropriate," it is understood to be adding something more than what was owed. If on one's deathbed one says that someone owes him/her money, can witnesses document the statement without verifying? Is there a concern the court will act upon it without checking into it (therefore the witnesses can't write it) or can we assume the court will do their homework (and therefore the witnesses can write it)? According to a braita, Rabbi Meir holds that it can be written without verifying and therefore when the heirs want to collect based on the document, they must prove they are owed the money. The rabbis hold that it cannot be written unless it is verified and therefore do not require any further proof to collect. However, Rav Nachman explains that there is a different version of the braita that Rabbi Meir says the document cannot be written based on the statement of the person on their deathbed, whereas the rabbis permit. He further explains that Rabbi Meir is concerned about a court that may rule without checking for further proof and therefore the document should not be written. The ruling is that we are not concerned that a court will err and not check into the details. However, this is true for a case of witnesses, not for a previous court ruling. If a court supervises a chalitza or mi'un , they must check the details carefully as a later court will rely on it, permitting a woman to remarry, without checking that it was all done properly. However, a document signed by witnesses testifying to what a person said on their deathbed can be written without checking the details, as the court will check the veracity of the contents of the document before ruling based on it.

Nov 8, 2024

In resolving a contradiction between two braitot, the Gemara answers that there is a tannaitic debate (between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel) regarding the same issue that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish were debating - when one acquires the produce do they acquire rights to the property itself, meaning do they have rights to sell it? The case where they disagree is one who promised one's possession to one person and after that person's death, they will go to another person and after them to a third person. If the first person sold the property, would the second person be able to demand the property after the death of the first person? Rebbi holds a sale of the property would be invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the sale would be valid even though in the case discussed, he thinks one should not be able to sell it ab initio. Rabbi Yochanan held like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with one exception. He also added a few cases that would be included within this ruling. If one received an etrog as a gift that was to be passed on after their death to another or taken from the estate's funds before they were divided, is one able to fulfill the mitzva or not? While in the former case, they can fulfill the mitzva, Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would disagree about whether they could sell the etrog. Is a gift given upon the condition that it be returned considered a gift? Can one fulfill a mitzva with an etrog that they received in this manner?

Nov 8, 2024

What is the language in a document that makes it clear that the document itself only served to strengthen the commitment of the person on their deathbed, and was not meant as a document necessary for affected the transaction? What wording must be used to designate one's property to others in his lifetime when he is healthy? Rabbi Yehuda holds that one must write "From today and after my death." Rabbi Yossi does not require adding "From today." Once this is written, the property is considered to belong to the recipient, while the proceeds belong to the giver. Can either of them sell their rights to their share? Why does the language of "From today and after my death" work here, but it is not effective in a divorce document? Raba bar Avuha accepted Rabbi Yossi's opinion because the date on the document makes it clear that it is in effect from the date it was written, even without adding the words "from today." If an act of acquiring was performed from the giver to witnesses on behalf of the recipient, this would preclude the need for writing "from today," even according to Rabbi Yehuda. However, there is a debate about whether this applies across the board or is it dependent on the language used in the document. If the recipient sells their rights and then predeceases the giver, does the buyer acquire the property upon the giver's death or does it revert to the giver's heirs? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this based on a debate about whether one who acquires proceeds to an item (in this case the giver retains rights to the proceeds) is considered the main owner of the item. They debate this issue in another case as well. Why is there a need to mention their debate here if it could be inferred from the other case? To answer this question, the Gemara explains why one could have differentiated between the cases. Rabbi Yochanan raises a difficulty from a braita on Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved.

Nov 7, 2024

Two statements in the name of Rabbi Yochanan contradicted each other. In one he ruled that a husband is believed to say he divorced his wife and in the other, he is not believed. The resolution was that the former meant that we accept his statement regarding her status from this moment forward and the latter is retroactive. Despite this resolution, Rava was unwilling to rule using this principle in a case that was before him where a man said his wife was exempt from levirate marriage (and should be believed since he could have said he divorced her) and preferred to be stringent and require chalitza . In another case, where it was presumed the man had no brothers and as he was dying, he also said he had no brothers. Abaye was stringent as there were rumors that there were people far away who could testify that he had brothers. Even though in the case of a woman taken captive, Rabbi Chanina did not forbid her to her husband based on rumors that people far away could testify that she engaged in relations with her captors, Abaye distinguishes between that case and this one. The Mishna brought a case where one brother claimed they had another brother, but the other brothers denied the claim. The Gemara establishes that the other brothers must have said "We don't know if he is our brother," meaning, their claim was one of uncertainty. This qualification is meant to explain why they receive an inheritance from that brother if they deny he is their brother. Can we learn from here regarding other cases where one has a confident claim ( bari ) and the other is unsure ( shema ), such as, one claimed money from another and the other responded, "I don't know if I owe you"? If the comparison is true, the ruling would be that the claimant who is unsure would not have to pay, like the brothers who do not have to give up their inheritance to the others. Rava agrees with this comparison, but Abaye denies it and rather compares our case to one where the confident claim is that the other owes money to a third party, not to the claimant. In the ruling of the Mishna, if the brother whose status is unclear dies, the property he received from the inheritance from one of the brothers is returned to that brother. Rava asks what happens if the property goes up in value. Would the brother receive the added value as well or would it be like money that the brother in question acquired on his own, which would be divided evenly between all the brothers? If one has a will wrapped around one's leg at the timeof death, it is invalid, even if it is later found in the hands of the person to whom the money was promised in the will. But if before the person died, they transferred ownership of the document to someone else, it is valid. What wording must be used to designate one's property to others in his lifetime when the person is healthy? The person needs to say, "From today and after my death. If one intended to transfer money to another using a document, i.e. on one's deathbed one said, "Write and give this document to...," if the person dies before the document was given, we do not write and give the document as one cannot transfer items using a document after one's death. However, if it is clear that the document was intended just as proof of the property transfer, one can write and give the document even after the person dies.

Nov 6, 2024

A story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct. Yonatan ben Uziel was considered the greatest of Hillel the Elder's students. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai was on the opposite end of the students. And yet, he was well versed in all areas of Torah study, and more. Is one believed for inheritance and levirate (yibum) marriage to say that one has a son or a brother? On what basis? With what claims is a man believed to exempt his wife from levirate marriage? On what basis is he believed? Can a court split testimony in half and accept only part of what a person says?

Nov 6, 2024

A story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct. Yonatan ben Uziel was considered the greatest of Hillel the Elder's students. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai was on the opposite end of the students. And yet, he was well versed in all areas of Torah study, and more. Is one believed for inheritance and levirate (yibum) marriage to say that one has a son or a brother? On what basis? With what claims is a man believed to exempt his wife from levirate marriage? On what basis is he believed? Can a court split testimony in half and accept only part of what a person says?

Nov 5, 2024

Some cases are brought, with different circumstances, where the wife received property from the husband with her children and the rabbis deliberated whether she was able to also demand her ketuba money. Rav Huna explained that if a person on their deathbed wrote all of his property to another without specifying a language of inheritance or gift, we see whether the heir was a relative or not. If the heir was a relative who was in line to inherit, they received it as inheritance. If not, they receive it as a gift. Rav Nachman questions Rav Huna, "Why didn't you say directly that you hold by Rabib Yochanan ben Broka!" Rav Nachman answers his own question by quoting a case where the ruling was worded in the same way as Rav Huna's ruling. Still, it was unclear what was the relevance of the inheritance/gift differentiation in both rulings. Rav Ada bar Ahava suggested that the ramification was whether the deceased widow could demand food supplements from the heir. However, Rava rejected this suggestion and explained the ramifications - if the deceased had promised it only to the heir until their death, and after the property would go to someone else. If it is considered an inheritance, this statement is disregarded, but if it is a gift, it is upheld. Is it permitted to bypass one's son's inheritance and give one's property to someone else? Does it make a difference if the son does not behave appropriately or does not behave appropriately toward the father? Is there a debate about the latter question in the Mishna or do both tannaim agree? Two sources are brought to answer this question. The first source explains that Yosef ben Yoezer bypassed his son and a story is told about the aftermath. However, the story is inconclusive regarding this question as there are two different versions of the punchline of the story. A second source, a statement of Shmuel to Rav Yehuda, proves that there is a debate between the tannaim. Another story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who in turn returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct.

Nov 4, 2024

If one wrote all of his possessions to his wife it assumed that the man intended only to appoint her as a steward and wrote it in that manner so that the recipients of the will would respect the executor. Would this be the case only if he wrote it on his deathbed or would it apply even if it was written when the husband was healthy? The answer to this question is brought from a braita relating to a case where the husband wrote to give his wife all of his property and on account of a debt of the husband, the property was collected from the wife, does she forfeit the right to collect her ketuba . Although there is a debate about this, it is clear that if he wrote to give her all of his property, she inherits it all and is not appointed to be a steward. First, the Gemara assumes that it is a case where the husband is not on his deathbed, as on his deathbed, she would be appointed to be a steward. However, this answer is rejected as the rule on one's deathbed has some exceptions, like a woman who was only betrothed or divorced. If the case was in one of those situations, then it could have been even if he was on his deathbed, thus leaving the original question unanswered. Rav Nachman ruled in the ketuba case above that the woman forfeits her right to collect the ketuba when she accepts all of the husband's property. A difficulty is raised from a braita, from a different case where Rav Nachman ruled that we assess one's intention and allow one's possessions to be returned, which we do not do by the woman regarding her ketuba . It was resolved by differentiating between the cases. A Mishna in Peah is quoted, as later Rava will ask if the ruling also applies only if it was done on a man's deathbed or even if he was healthy. If a husband writes all of his possessions to his son and gives his wife any size portion of land, she loses her right to her ketuba . Three amoraim suggest different explanations for this puzzling ruling - each suggesting that the woman indicated (although not explicitly) her acceptance of this arrangement. The Gemara quotes the continuation of the Mishna to raise a difficulty on the three opinions as Rabbi Yossi holds that even if the husband did not write a document to her granting her the land, but the woman accepts it she gives up her rights. This implies that the first tanna requires both a written document and the woman's explicit consent. There is no resolution to the difficulty against the three amoraim. Rav Nachman ruled that the woman forfeits her right to collect the ketuba in the case described above. He explained that the woman is willing to give up these rights as the husband made her his partner is dividing the property to the sons and this affords her honor on account of which she is willing to forfeit her right to her ketuba . Rava asked if this ruling applies also to a man who divided his property in this manner when he was healthy, or only on his deathbed. The Gemara explains the two sides of the question but leaves the question unresolved.

Nov 3, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Aviva Appleman in loving memory of Florence Appleman on her first yahrzeit yesterday. "May her neshama have an aliya ." Rava asks if Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka's allowance for the father to favor one child over the others is only when one says so on one's deathbed or even when healthy. Rav Meshashia answers from a braita where Rabbi Natan the Babylonian questions Rabbi Yehuda haNasi about the fact that the Mishna Ketubot 52b, in discussing the commitment in the ketuba to the wife's male children, seems to follow Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka's position. As the case related to a healthy person, it is clear Rabbi Yochanan Ben Broka also held his opinion for a healthy person. There is a further discussion between Abaye and Rav Pappa regarding the content of the braita and the question of why Rabbi Yehuda haNasi specifically answered the way he did and didn't suggest a different answer. If one writes that one is selling all of his possessions to his wife, or his oldest son, or his youngest son, or some random person, is it understood literally, that he is giving them all the possessions instead of giving to all his sons, or is it assumed that the man intended only to appoint them as an executor of his will and wrote it in that manner so that the recipients of the will would respect the executor?

Nov 1, 2024

The Mishna brings a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka regarding one who wants to bequeath to one's heirs in a way different than the Torah law - is it allowed and if so, in what cases is it allowed? The Mishna can be understood in two different ways - that there is a debate or that there is just one opinion and that depends on whether Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka is referring to a person who wants to give one son all of the inheritance and nothing to the others sons (or prefer one daughter over the others, in a case where there are no sons) or to a case where one wants to bypass the heirs and give it to the next heir in line, i.e. daughter, instead of son. The Gemara quotes various amoraim in Babylonia and in Israel who all ruled like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka who allows one to favor one son over the others or one daughter over the others (in a case where there are no sons). There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi's ruling - whether he said, "The halakha is like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka" or whether he ruled in a case like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka. This leads to a discussion regarding what the best way to learn the halakha - by what someone says or by case law? What are the pros and cons of each approach? A braita explains that one cannot learn from either unless the rabbi says " halakha l'maase, " i.e. tthis is the halakha and you can act upon it.

Nov 1, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 129 This month's learning is sponsored by Sami Groff in loving memory of her father, Rabbi Avraham Yair Groff, whose Yahrzeit was this week and Rabbi Raymond Harari, who sadly passed away this week. "Both Rabbis taught me that a woman's place in Judaism is in the Shul and in the Bet Midrash. To my father, Rabbi Avraham Yair Groff, who passed a Torah to the women's section every Simchat Torah. And to Rabbi Raymond Harari, who taught us Gemara in Yeshiva of Flatbush, who challenged his female students to delve into the Talmud and make it our own and whose Thursday night Mishmar class after school, we were excited to voluntarily stay late to attend. Rabbi Harari's legacy in inspiring women to learn lives on directly in the hundreds of women taught by Rabbanit Michelle Farber every day." Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel and Oren Seliger in loving memory of her mother Rifka Esther bat Sara Gitel and Yishaya Halevi. "14 years and I still see your beautiful smile and your shine in your eyes, also in memory of the fallen soldiers friends of my son from the tank brigade 401/52 that have fallen this week. ברק ישראל ,אלישי יונג, אופיר ברקוביץ, אחסאן דקסה, גיא ניזרי may their memory be a comfort to all of am yisrael עם של גיבורי על" When Mar Zutra stated that we follow Rabbi Abba's rulings, to which cases was he referring? The Mishna discusses what constitutes valid gift language at the beginning, middle, and end of a statement, that would allow one to pass on property to those who were not his direct heirs. In what cases would this work? There are four different opinions about this: - Does it only work with one field and one person? - Does it also work with two fields and one person? - Does it work with two people and one field? - Or does it even work with two fields and two people? Both amoraim from Israel and Babylonia disagreed on this matter. Rav Sheshet tries to prove his position but then rejects his proof. Rav Ashi does succeed in proving Rav Sheshet's approach. However, we also rule according to Reish Lakish. How can we explain this apparent contradiction?

Oct 31, 2024

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari who inspired me to love learning Gemara in high school. He brought each case in the Gemara to life, making the material engaging and relevant. He was a master teacher who cared deeply about his students and their growth. He was a true role model whose legacy will live on in the countless lives he touched. Tanchumim to his wife, Vicky, a Hadran learner, and to the entire family. Yehi zichro baruch . Today's daf is sponsored by Miri Kadosh in memory of her dear friend Yafit Yaffa bat Yitzchak Mazal who passed away this morning. Seven teachings of Rabbi Abba from Israel are sent to Babylonia on various topics and Mar Zutra in the name of Rav Shimi bar Ashi paskens like him. If one claims that the person in another's house is his/her slave and it was stolen. The accused denies the claim and says that the slave was given as a gift/sold by the accuser. If the accused offers the accuser to take an oath that the slave is owned by him/her, then the accused can no longer reclaim the slave. The Gemara explains that the unique teaching of Rabbi Abba here is that the rabbis hold this even when money/property is being taken away from one side and given to the other (change of status quo). Others hold that this only in a case where the status quo is maintained. Creditors of a deceased can only collect from land that the father left the orphans. Rabbi Abba ruled that slaves are considered like land. Rav Nachman disagrees and does not equate slaves with land for this purpose. A person can testify for their father's first cousin as their connection is somewhat removed. It is called a third-generation testifying for a second-generation relative as they are both connected through brothers who are first-generation relatives. Rava holds that even a first-generation can testify for a third, i.e. a person and his great-uncle. Mar bar Rav Ashi even held that a person and his grandfather, but the ruling is not like his position as they are direct relatives. If one knew testimony about land borders and then became blind, one cannot testify. Shmuel rules that if the blind person can identify markers in the field, his testimony is accepted. Rav Sheshet and Rav Pappa extend this to other cases as well where one can identify items by size or weight (cloak and bar of silver). A braita is brought to raise a difficulty with Shmuel, Rav Sheshet and Rav Pappa. There are two interpretations of the fifth ruling of Rabbi Abba. One is he ruled like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka that one can choose to bequeath all of one's property to one of the heirs (a son among sons or daughter among daughters). The other is that if a father identifies one of the sons to be the oldest, when a different one was presumed to be the oldest, he is believed, as per the position of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Abba on this ruling and holds by the rabbis' position (either in their disagreement with Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka or with Rabbi Yehuda). If a man says that his wife will inherit among the sons, this is effective. However, this would only include items owned by the man at that point and does not include possession he acquires later. And if there were more sons born later, the wife would have to divide the property with them as well. If a creditor puts out a promissory note and the borrower says that half was already paid back and then witnesses come and testify that the entire loan was paid back, Rabbi Abba rules that the borrower takes an oath ( modeh b'miktzat ) and pays the other half but the creditor can only collect from property in the borrower's possession and not from liened property as the buyers can rely on the witnesses' testimony. Mar bar Rav Ashi disagrees and views the borrower as one returning a lost item who would be exempt from an oath.

Oct 30, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by the Greenstone cousins in honor of Lana Kerzner's birthday. "With love to our dear cousin Lana. Your commitment to learning is a profound tribute to the legacy of our parents, a testament to the values they instilled in us. May the merits of this learning bring you peace, joy, and health this year and every year, not only for yourself but as a blessing to all those around you." Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in loving memory of Lisa Altman z"l on her 20th yahrzeit. "We miss her love, warmth, kindness, wisdom and spirit. Her memory and legacy will remain with us always." There are various halakhot relevant to males that do not apply to a tumtum (one whose genitals are covered up and it is unclear if they are male or female) whose skin is then perforated and is found to be a male. He cannot inherit as a firstborn, he cannot become a ben sorer u'moreh , his brit milah does not override Shabbat, and his mother does not have laws of impurity of a woman who gave birth. A difficulty is raised against two of these laws from a Mishna in Nidda 28a. A braita is brought to support the position that a tumtum described above cannot inherit a double portion as a firstborn. The braita also derives that one cannot be a firstborn if it is doubtful whether or not he is the firstborn. The Gemara then explains why this was stated - to explain that if two brothers are born at around the same time (from two different mothers) but it was dark and it was impossible to determine who was born first, no one receives the double portion. Rava held otherwise - they could each write an authorization that "If I am the firstborn, I give you my share," and they can jointly receive the double portion. However, Rav Pappa raised a difficulty with Rava's position and Rava retracted. A father is believed to say a particular son is the firstborn but what if there is a chazaka that a different child is the firstborn? Shmuel ruled that the two brothers write an authorization as mentioned above. The Gemara explains Shmuel's position that he was unsure whether the ruling is like Rabbi Yehuda, who believes a father in that case, or the rabbis who do not accept the father's testimony when there is a chazaka . If the rabbis don't accept the father's testimony, for what purpose did the verse in the Torah use the language of " yakir "? If the father could have given the son a double portion as a gift, it would have been effective, so of course then we can believe the father that this is the firstborn?! The answer is that the father could have only given a double portion as a gift to the son for property in his possession at the time or possibly for items that would later be in his possession (according to Rabbi Meir), but it would not have covered property that would be brought into the father's possession as he was dying. For this situation, the verse taught " yakir ." Regarding believing a father about the status of his son, Rabbi Yochanan describes a situation in which a father says that a person is his son and then says that he is his Caananite slave. He is not believed to render the person a slave as he would never have called his slave his son in the first place. However, if he first called him his slave and then his son, we accept his last words as it's possible he meant originally that the son served him like a slave. The reverse is true for one who made a statement in front of the tax authorities. They raise a difficulty against Rabbi Yochanan from a braita, but resolve it.

Oct 29, 2024

Rav Asi ruled that a firstborn who protests, his protest is valid. There is a debate among the Rashbam and Rabbeinu Chananel, about what he is protesting. According to the Rashbam, he is protesting the brothers investing in the item before dividing the property, as he will not receive a double portion on the enhancements. Rabbeinu Chananel explains he is agreeing to receive an equal portion of this property/item but is not giving up on his rights to receive the double portion on other property/items. Rabba limits this statement to grapes that were picked but not if they were turned into wine. Why? If a firstborn gives up his rights to a double portion when dividing a particular property, Rav Pappa and Rav Pappi debate (based on a situation where Rava gave a psak about in a different case) whether Rava held that he gave up rights to the double portion of all the properties or only of that particular property? This debate is based on whether one holds that the firstborn receives rights to his double portion immediately upon the death of the father, even before the land is divided, or whether he receives rights to it only once the property is divided. The Mishna differentiates between a father who says he will not bequeath the double portion to his firstborn and a father who says he will equally divide his portion. The first is not allowed as it goes against the Torah and the second is allowed because it is viewed as a gift. One can use the language of a gift to divide property differently than stated by the Torah. What type of proof can be used to prove one is the firstborn to enable him to receive the double portion?

Oct 28, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Glenda Sacks Jaffe in honor of Sari Esserman's birthday and on her first grandchild, and to Rhona Fink on the birth of another grandchild. " Yom huledet sameach and mazal tov !" Does the firstborn receive a double portion of a loan due back to his father after his death? Raba and Rav Nachman each hold that the firstborn can receive a double portion but only if it is paid back in land, according to Raba or in cash according to Rav Nachman. Abaye raises two difficulties against each of their positions. Firstly, he sees no reason to distinguish - if the money "(or land) is not considered in the possession of the father, then the land (or money) should not be either. Secondly, he quotes a case for each of them where they held differently than they do here. Raba responds for himself and for Rav Nachman, claiming that they were both explaining the positions of the rabbis in Israel, but they do not actually agree with that position. The difficulty raised against Raba was from a case where a person on their deathbed gave all their property to their grandmother, to be then given to his heirs (which was his daughter) upon the grandmother's death. However, the daughter died before the grandmother. When the grandmother died, the daughter's husband claimed the property as the heir of the daughter. The rabbis in Israel ruled that the property was not in the daughter's possession at the time of her death and the husband could not inherit the property, as a husband inherits land/items of his wife that were in her possession at the time of her death. Rav Huna held that the husband could inherit it as when the father promised the property to the daughter after it first went to the grandmother, it was as if he said, "It will be yours from now, but the grandmother will enjoy the proceeds until her death." Raba sided with the rabbis in Israel as he claimed that it clearly belonged to the grandmother since if she were to sell it, the sale would be valid, thus proving that it was considered in her possession, not the daughter's, until her death. This shows that Raba holds that land/items are not considered possessed by someone ( muchzak ) if another person can sell them. Rav Pappa ruled: 1. a husband only inherits property that the wife possessed, not property due to her; 2. A firstborn only inherits the double portion of property that his father possessed, not property due to him; 3. A firstborn does not get a double portion of a loan due to his father, whether they collected land or money for the loan; 4. A loan that the firstborn borrowed from his father and did not repay until after the father's death is a case of doubt whether it is considered due to the father or in his possession and therefore the double portion is split between him and the brothers.

Oct 27, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of their friend and co-learner Debbie Weber Schreiber on the birth of a granddaughter. "May the new addition be a source of pride to the entire family and to Am Yisrael, and be a harbinger of simcha and shalom for us all. תזכו לגדלה לתורה ולחופה ולמעשים טובים" A braita ruled that the firstborn gets a double portion of the enhancement of their father's property that happened on its own, without the orphans' intervention. However, the Gemara points out that this is Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's opinion as the rabbis disagree and hold that the firstborn does not get a double portion of any enhancement. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi brings an example of this - a promissory note that was paid back after the father's death. If the father's estate owed a debt, the firstborn would need to pay a double portion, but if he agreed to pass up on receiving a double portion of the inheritance, he would not have to pay double for the loan. The Gemara brings the verse in the Torah where the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda haNasi derive their positions. Rav Papa limits the debate to a situation where the enhanced item is different from the original item, i.e. date flowers that became dates. There are four opinions about whether it is clear with whom the halakha accords or whether it is unclear and what we do with a case where a judge rules against the accepted opinion. Rav Nachman and Rami bar Hama each quote a Midrash Halakha (Sifrei) that accords with a different opinion on this issue. Rav Yehuda quoted Shmuel's ruling that a firstborn does not get a double portion on a loan. The Gemara tries to assess whether this ruling follows the opinion of the rabbis or Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, and concludes that it follows the rabbis' position. A ruling was sent from Israel to Babylonia that if a loan was paid back from a non-Jew, the firstborn would collect a double portion from the principal but not from the interest. This is understood to be the rabbis' opinion. Why would they distinguish between the principal and the interest? The principal is considered as if it is already collected, but the interest is not. The conclusion of this ruling seems to contradict Shmuel's ruling. Ameimar rules like the Israeli ruling and Rav Acha points out that he followed Rav Nachman's position as they were both from the same city, Nehardea. Raba and Rav Nachman each distinguish, in an opposite manner, between a loan that is paid back in land and one that is paid back in cash.

Oct 25, 2024

How is the double portion calculated - two times a portion that all the other brothers get or two-thirds of the whole property? The answer is derived from several verses and the Gemara explains why all are necessary. Many of the proofs are from Yosef's double portion. Why did Yaakov take the double portion from Reuven and give it to Yosef? First, it should have been given to Rachel's son, (as is derived from Breishit 37:2), but Leah was worthy that her son be the firstborn because she pleaded for mercy. However, on account of Rachel's tzniut, it was returned to her son. To explain the mercy of Leah and the tzniut of Rachel, the Gemara elaborates in great detail on the story of how Yaakov wanted to marry Rachel but ended up first marrying Leah. A braita describes various things of which the firstborn receives a double portion and the Gemara explains each case.

Oct 25, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 122 Was the land divided into twelve equal portions, one for each tribe, or by equal portions for each Israelite? Some type of compensation (either in land or financial) took place by those who received better quality portions. At first, the Gemara understood that as better quality land, but later concluded that it meant a better location, closer to Jerusalem. The land was divided by a lottery and the urim and tumim . A braita describes how the process worked. That braita also describes the distribution that is anticipated for the times of the Mashiach where everyone will get an equal portion of all different types of land, and it will be divided directly by God, as derived from a verse in Yechezkel 48:29, 31. Yehoshua and Caleb did not inherit by a lottery, but by the word of God. From what verses is this derived? The Mishna describes that the inheritance of sons and daughters is similar, other than a few differences. Four sages attempt to understand the Mishna - in what way are sons and daughters similar and how does that fit with the continuation of the Mishna where the differences described relate to differences between inheriting from a mother or a father, not the differences between a son and a daughter. Each answer is rejected, other than the last one.

Oct 22, 2024

On a day that mixes different emotions – being both a holiday and a day of remembrance, today's daf is dedicated to the memory of those who were tragically taken from us one year ago today. May our learning be an aliyah for their neshamot, a tribute to their lives, and a reflection of the strength and resilience of our people in the face of the unimaginable pain we have all experienced since that day. From where does Beit Shammai learn that hatarat nedarim can be done with three regular people, since he doesn't hold by the gzeira shava of " ze hadavar " from slaughtering outside the Temple? Why was Tu B'av considered a day of celebration? The sages bring six different answers explaining what incident happened on that date to merit a celebration for generations. Seven people together span all the generations, from Adam to Eliyahu Hanavi, who, based on tradition, never died. Who are they and how do we know each overlapped with the next?

Oct 22, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 120 Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia Klein in loving memory of her mother, Lila Klein, Leah bat Yosef v'Pasha. "She dedicated her life to her family, her students, Israel, and the Jewish people." If the daughters of Tzlofchad got married after the age of forty, how did they have children, as according to a braita , women who marry after the age of forty cannot give birth? Just as Yocheved, the mother of Moshe, gave birth to him at age 130 because her body miraculously "rejuvenated," the same occurred to the daughters of Tzlofchad. The chronology of Yocheved's narrative is extrapolated from the verses to establish that she was 130 years old at the time of Moshe's birth. The names of the daughters of Tzlofchad are mentioned twice in the Torah, each time in a different order—once in order of their intelligence (when they approached Moshe) and once in order of their age (when discussing who they could marry). In legal matters, respect is given to the wisest, while in social settings, it is accorded to the oldest. The daughters of Tzlofchad were permitted to marry anyone they chose, but it was recommended they marry within their tribe. However, other women in their generation who inherited land were prohibited from marrying outside their tribe. This prohibition applied only to that generation, as derived from the words " ze hadavar ." The Gemara raises a difficulty because there are other places (such as the prohibition to slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple and the laws of vows) where these words are used, and the commandments apply to all generations. How can this be explained?

Oct 22, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Blima Sztorchain in loving memory of her sister, Rivka Sara Rina bat Tina and Yitzhak Tzvi. The daughters of Tzlofchad inherited Tzlofchad's double portion from his father, even though one only inherits a double portion that was in the deceased's property at the time of death ( muchzak ). The reason is that the land of Israel was considered as if it had already been owned by those who left Egypt. Earlier, a braita had explained that the sons of the spies and those with Korach, whose fathers did not get land in Israel, received land through their grandparents. However, a different braita explains that they received land on their own merit. The Gemara brings two explanations for how to reconcile these seemingly contradictory braitot. Raba explains, as was explained above, that the land of Israel was considered already possessed by those leaving Egypt, which explains why Tzlofchad's daughters inherited his double portion. However, a braita is brought against Raba as it explains that Moshe knew that they should inherit but was unsure regarding the double portion. This issue is resolved by explaining that the law is still clear that the land was possessed by the generation that left Egypt and that is exactly what Moshe was unsure of, and was then clarified. In that braita, they compare the case of Tzlofchad's daughters and the one who was chopping trees on Shabbat, as in both cases Moshe does not know the law and turns to God. The law in each case could have been transmitted directly but was told through the lens of Tzlofchad's daughters/the wood chopper to teach that merits are brought by one who is meritorious and liability by one who is liable. Why does it say in the verse that Tzlofchad's daughters went before Moshe, Elazar the princes ( nesi'im ), and the entire congregation? Two opinions are brought and each reflects different approaches - do we give respect to a student before his rabbi or not? The halakha accords with both - how can this be explained? The virtues of the daughters of Tzlofchad are explained - their wisdom, their ability to interpret the verses in the Torah, and their righteousness. From where can we see these traits?

Oct 21, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina & Shalom Lamm in honor of their new grandson. "With hakarat hatov to Hashem for the blessing of a new grandson, Ayal Nachum, born on Yom Kippur and entered into the brit of Avraham Avinu on Shabbat Chol HaMoed Sukkot. Mazal tov to our children, the proud parents, Sara and Shmuel Lamm of Modiin." Today's daf is sponsored by Debbie and Yossi Gevir in honor of their two sons, Elazar and Eliav, and their son-in-law Boaz who are now serving in the army. "They are serving Am Yisrael from the Lebanon border and beyond. May Hashem continue to protect all of Am Yisrael and medinat yisrael . והעמידנו לשלום ופרוס עלינו סוכת שלומך, כן יהי רצון!" Rav Papa raises a second and third difficulty with the opinion that the land was divided among those entering the land. Firstly, why did the daughters of Tzlofchad complain - their father was not worthy of receiving any portion since he was no longer alive when they entered the land? Secondly, why in the book of Yehoshua 17:14, did the sons of Yosef complain that they did not have enough land for the people of their tribe as they were a large tribe? If the land was divided among those who entered, the tribe of Yosef should have received more land, according to the number of people! Abaye answers both of these questions. From both the stories of the daughters of Tzlofchad and the sons of Yosef, Abaye concludes that everyone else received a portion upon coming into the land, as if some did not, they would have complained. However, the Gemara concludes that it is possible others complained but since their complaints were ineffective, there was no need to record them. The sons of Yosef's complaint was also ineffective but was brought for a different reason - to teach that people should try to avoid the evil eye, ayin hara . They explain the exchange between the sons and Yosef and Yehoshua relating to that issue. Did the people who complained and those who joined Korach receive a portion of the land but it was given to Yehoshua and Caleb just like the spies' portion or did they not receive a portion at all? This is a source of debate and one of the opinions is derived from the verse Bamidbar 27:3, from the words of the Tzlofchad's daughters. Rav Papa raises a difficulty with the opinion that Yehoshua and Caleb inherited all their portions, as they would have inherited most of the Jews' property, since so many complained in the desert! Abaye responds that the complainers were those who complained with Korach. Rav Papa's fifth question is again against the opinion that the land was divided among those entering the land, based on a verse from Yehoshua 17:5 - that Menashe received ten portions, six for each family and four for the daughters of Tzlofchad. This makes the most sense with the opinion that the land was divided among those leaving Egypt. However, Abaye explains the four also to fit with the opinion that the land was divided among those entering the land.

Oct 20, 2024

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of Professor Paul Haberfield, father of Shulie Mishkin, who passed away on Thursday. Tanchumim from the whole Hadran family. How were the portions distributed when the Jews entered the land of Israel? There are three different answers to this question, each based on a different interpretation of the verses in Bamidbar 26:53, 55. One approach (Rabbi Yoshia) is that an equal portion was given to all those who left Egypt above the age of twenty. A second approach (Rabbi Yonatan) is that an equal portion was given to all those going into the land, but those portions were then redivided by families, according to how many had left Egypt. The third approach (Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar) is that a portion was given to each person who went into the land and also to each person who left Egypt. There were various people who didn't receive portions such as the spies and those who followed Korach. The spies' portion was given to Yehoshua and Caleb. The sons of the people from these groups inherited land through their grandparents, provided the grandparents had been at least twenty years old at the Exodus from Egypt. Rav Papa raises a difficulty against Rabbi Yonatan from the verse in Bamidbar 26:54, "To the more you shall give the more inheritance and to the fewer you should give the less inheritance." What is the need for this verse if it was divided equally between those coming into the land, since, of course, a large family will receive more portions?

Oct 16, 2024

Rabbi Yochanan quotes an opinion of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai saying if one dies without sons, it is a sign of God's wrath. Rabbi Yochanan himself and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about whether it is the lack of a son or lack of a student that is a sign that one is not truly God-fearing. Who held which position? On what basis can that be concluded? Three statements of Rabbi Pinchas ben Hama are quoted - the first relates to the importance of fathers leaving male children to follow in their ways. Rami bar Hama has some questions regarding cases of inheritance when there are no sons, daughters, or father. Does it go to the grandfather or the uncle? If the two heirs left are the grandfather and the brother of the deceased, who comes first? His questions derive from the last line in the Mishna, "the father comes before all those who come from him." Does it mean all his descendants or only before his own children, but not his grandchildren? Rava thought the answers to his questions were clear - the grandfather comes before any of his descendants.

Oct 16, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 115 Rabbi Yochanan quotes a statement of Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Shimon that a mother inherits her son. However, Rabbi Yochanan rejects this statement as it is contradicted by our Mishna which clearly states that a mother does not inherit her son. Rabbi Yehuda responded that he doesn't know who the author of the Mishna is and therefore is not concerned with the contradiction. The Gemara first explains why the Mishna cannot be explained according to Rabbi Zacharia ben haKatzav and then proceeds to explain that the Mishna has an inner contradiction regarding the drasha of the word 'matot'. However, they resolve the contradiction. The Mishna discusses the order of inheritance - at each stage, if the person who should inherit is not alive, it does to their descendants before moving on to the next in line. There was a big debate between the Saducees and the rabbis. In a case where there are two siblings, a son and daughter, and the son is no longer alive but has a daughter, the rabbis ruled that the son's daughter precedes his sister for their father's inheritance. The Saducees held that the sister and the granddaughter split it 50/50. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai debates them and wins and sets the law according to the rabbis' understanding.

Oct 16, 2024

If one performs a transaction with a kinyan chalipin , a symbolic act of acquiring, until what point can each side renege on the agreement? Raba and Rav Yosef differ on this point. Rav Yosef supports his opinion from the statement of Rav Yehuda regarding three who went to visit a dying person who can function as a court regarding dividing up the dying person's property. However, Raba rejects his proof. Why did the Mishna need to list the people who inherit but do not bequeath to each other, as it can be derived from the previous section of those who bequeath but do not inherit? The answer is that they wanted to teach something additional by connecting two of the three cases - a woman from her son and a woman from her husband - just as a husband does not inherit property the wife inherits after her death (property she would have inherited, were she still alive), a son does not inherit property from his mother if he is no longer alive to pass to his paternal brothers. Rabbi Yochanan quotes a statement of Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Shimon that a mother inherits her son.

Oct 16, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in loving memory of Laurence's mother, Eleanor Lasson Berkowitz, on her 22nd yartzeit. "A perfect mother, who as a social worker knew how to bring people together despite their differences. May her memory be blessed for the support of her many grandchildren serving in Tzahal." When a husband inherits his wife's property, he inherits land that she owned at the time of her death ( muchzak ) but not property that is passed on to her after her death ( ra'uy ), i.e. her father dies after her and she has no brothers. What is the source of this law? Some of the verses that were used in the earlier braita are now explained differently). The Mishna listed that the sons of the sister inherit from their uncle. The Gemara derives from these words that the ruling is for males, not females. Rav Sheshet explains this to mean that the nephews inherit before the nieces and such is true for all the stages of inheritance - first, it is given to the males and only if there are none, then it is passed to the females. What is the source of this law? One cannot divide inheritance at night. This statement is explained based on a braita and a statement of Rav Yehuda and Rav Hisda. Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in loving memory of Laurence's mother, Eleanor Lasson Berkowitz, on her 22nd yartzeit. "A perfect mother, who as a social worker knew how to bring people together despite their differences. May her memory be blessed for the support of her many grandchildren serving in Tzahal." When a husband inherits his wife's property, he inherits land that she owned at the time of her death ( muchzak ) but not property that is passed on to her after her death ( ra'uy ), i.e. her father dies after her and she has no brothers. What is the source of this law? Some of the verses that were used in the earlier braita are now explained differently). The Mishna listed that the sons of the sister inherit from their uncle. The Gemara derives from these words that the ruling is for males, not females. Rav Sheshet explains this to mean that the nephews inherit before the nieces and such is true for all the stages of inheritance - first, it is given to the males and only if there are none, then it is passed to the females. What is the source of this law? One cannot divide inheritance at night. This statement is explained based on a braita and a statement of Rav Yehuda and Rav Hisda.

Oct 15, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 112 Today's daf is sponsored by Joanna Rom in loving memory of her mother, Rose Rom, Sura Razel, on her sixteenth yahrzeit. "She is still with me every day, my inner teacher." Where in the Torah is a source for the law that a husband inherits from his wife? Two different opinions are suggested. Rabbi Yishmael proves it from five different verses and the Gemara explains why all five verses are needed. Abaye raises a difficulty with the verse Bamidbar 37:8 which is explained as referring to a daughter who inherits from two tribes (her father and mother). The verse explains that she must marry within her father's tribe to ensure that land will not be passed to another tribe. But if her mother is from another tribe and she inherits from her mother, how does it help her to marry someone from her father's tribe - in any case, land will move from her mother's tribe to her father's. Rav Yeimar and Abaye each resolve this question in a different manner. There are two braitot that each explain the two different verses that forbid a woman to marry from another tribe - one referring to the concern that her son will inherit from her and land will pass to another tribe and the other concerned that the same will happen but because her husband will inherit from her.

Oct 14, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Geelit and Eric Sommer in honor of Shai Seliger, his wife Hadar, to his parents, our dear friends and fellow daf learners Oren and Rachel Seliger upon Shai's safe return from a year of fighting in Gaza. " Am Yisrael is grateful to you and all the other men and women fighting to protect us and to their spouses and families for all their sacrifices." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Sacks "in honor of Rabbanit Michelle Farber who has made daf yomi accessible to me and a pleasure to learn." Our learning will also be in memory of those killed in Ba"ch Golani yesterday and for the refuah shleima of all the injured soldiers. Where in the Torah is a source for the law that a son or daughter inherits from their mother? The law is derived from a verse about a daughter and then learned for the son by a kal v'chomer argument from the inheritance from a father. The rabbis and Rabbi Zecharia ben haKatzav disagree about whether the laws of inheriting from the mother are the same as the father, and the son precedes the daughter, or whether they divide her property equally. The argument for the latter (Rabbi Zecharia ben haKatzav's opinion) employs the dayo principle, laws derived by kal v'chomer cannot be stronger than the original law. Since the law is stated by the daughter and learned by kal v'chomer to the brother, the brother can't have more strength than the daughter to inherit in place of her. The dayo principle is derived from God's punishment of Miriam when she spoke lashon hara about Moshe. How can the rabbis not employ dayo here if dayo is derived from the Torah? Some rabbis held like Rabbi Zecharia and even some who held that Rav held that way. But Rav Nachman was adamantly against this position as he believed that neither Rav nor Shmuel held that way. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia had an encounter with Rabbi Yanai where he asked the source for the law that a son precedes the daughter in their mother's inheritance. When Rabbi Yanai responded with a heikesh , comparison, between one who inherits from a mother and one who inherits from the father from the word ' matot ', Rabbi Yehuda questioned why doesn't a firstborn doesn't get a double portion from his mother's inheritance just as he does from his father? Rabbi Yanai was so offended by the question that he did not respond. Abaye, Rav Nachman and Rava each bring verses to explain why it was obvious to Rabbi Yanai that a firstborn would not get a double portion from his mother, but only Rava's is accepted. Where in the Torah is a source for the law that a husband inherits from his wife? Two different drashot are brought (in braitot) and Rava and Abaye each explain the first one in a different manner.

Oct 13, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored by Rhona Fink in loving memory of my mother, Malca bat Avraham v'Sarah, on her shloshim. "My mother was a woman of honor, modest and accomplished, a great listener, who was so proud that I was studying the Daf. And in honor of the Hadran daffers who have been so supportive during my difficult time." Rava recommends that in choosing a wife, one should check out her brothers as it will be an indication of how their future sons will behave, as sons are often similar in behavior to their maternal uncle. This is derived from the verse describing Aharon's marriage to Elisheva who is introduced as the daughter of Aminadav, sister of Nachshon. Yonatan, the Levi who helped Micah in the story of Micah's idol, was descended from Moshe, according to an interpretation of the verse. When the people questioned his behavior and why he worked with idols if he was a descendant of Moshe, he explained that he was taught that it is better to work with idols than to depend on others for sustenance. However, he misinterpreted that lesson as its true interpretation is that it is better to work in a strange job ( avoda zara ), meaning, even something demeaning, than to take charity. A verse in Chronicles is assumed to refer to Yonatan and indicates that he repented in the time of King David and was given the job of the head of the treasury. Where in the Torah is the source that a daughter only inherits if there are no sons? The Gemara analyzes four different possibilities—two are rejected. Where in the Torah is the source that only brothers who share the same father inherit and bequeath to/from each other?

Oct 11, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in loving memory of Meir ben Aryeh Leib HaLevi, Marvin Stokar. "Although his title of Zaidy was an honorary one, he and (lehavdil bein chayim lechayim) Bubby Fran were - and continue to be - an important part of our family. His love of all learning and of Eretz Yisrael were surpassed only by his love and care for our dear Bubby Fran. We are so grateful that we have now followed in their footsteps and made Aliya. May he continue to be a meilitz yosher for her and all of us!" The Gemara raises questions on the braita from which they derived the father inherits after the children, before the brothers, suggesting that the braita could have derived it differently. Why doesn't the drasha teach that the father inherits first, before the son or that the brothers inherit before the father? A different braita is brought which derives from a different source the same law that the father inherits if there are no children and before the brothers and paternal uncle. The Gemara questions the drasha as one can say otherwise - that the brother comes before the father and not the reverse? all of the above questions are answered. Each of the two braitot used to prove that the father inherits after the children of the deceased uses a verse not used by the other. What does the author or each braita learn from the other verse?

Oct 11, 2024

Study Guide and Pictures Bava Batra 108 What is the purpose of the small and large ditches around a field? Laws of inheritance begin with a list of which family relations inherit from each other and which bequeath to another. Some do both, some do neither and some do one or the other. Why does the Mishna begin with a son dying and passing on inheritance to his father and not the reverse case? The Torah delineates the order of who is first in the line of inheritance but the father is left off the list. The order in the Torah is son, daughter, brother, uncle (father's brother). Since the law that the father inherits the son is derived from a drasha, the author of the Mishna listed it first. According to the drasha, a father inherits if there are no children (before it goes to the brothers). Why not before the son? The son is considered the closest relative, as the son replaces his father for two laws, ye'ud and a consecrated ancestral field. But also a brother can replace his brother in yibum , so why isn't a brother considered closer?

Oct 10, 2024

Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family to Catriella in memory of her sister, Rebecca Miria Work z"l. "With a tefilla that through your learning and ours you will find comfort. With love, from Hadran Zoom family." If brothers split their inheritance and a creditor of the father comes and seizes the land of one of them, can that brother demand half the land of the other brother? Three opinions are brought - Rav says the land is redivided, as when brothers divide land, they are viewed as heirs, meaning they share responsibility for their father's debts. Shmuel holds that the brother whose property was seized loses out and cannot demand anything from the other brother, as brothers who divide property are considered as if they bought their portion from the other without a guarantee. Rav Asi rules that the other brother must give a quarter of his portion to the other (as per Sumchus's position that money that is in doubt is divided by the two parties), but he can decide if to give it in land or in cash, meaning, he has the upper hand, as Rav Asi is not sure if brothers are considered like heirs or purchasers. If three judges assess land at different amounts, by which judge do we hold? Tana Kamma holds that we follow the median position. Rabbi Eliezer b'Rabbi Tzadok follows the average between the lower two amounts. Others hold that one calculates the difference between the highest and lowest assessments, divides it by three and adds that amount to the lowest assessment. The Gemara explains the logic of each of these positions. Tana Kamma holds that we don't assume that all of the judges erred and therefore assume that the middle opinion is the correct one. The other two opinions hold that everyone erred but disagree about whether the highest assessment is taken into consideration when calculating the error. Both these positions give heavier weight to the lower two assessments. If one sold half one's land to another, the seller can give the buyer lean land and keep the better land but the seller must give the buyer land that is valued at half the entire property.

Oct 9, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Heather Stone in loving memory of her mother, Ellie Stone, Esther Bina bat Rachel Leah v'Avraham haLevy on her 13th yahrzeit. "She was always a strong and fierce advocate for the Jewish community." Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family for a refuah shleima to the grandson of our daf friend, Becki, Eitan Efraim ben Ayelet, who was wounded in Gaza on Monday and a tefilla for all soldiers. "מי שברך אבותינו...הוא יברך את חיילי צבא הגנה לישראל. שה' ישלח לו רפואה שלמה בגוף ובנפש בתוך שאר חולי ישראל" If one sells land and says it is a specific size but also says "according to its markers and borders" and shows the buyer the land, if the difference between the size stated and the actual size is off by less than 1/6, the sale is valid. But if it is off by more than 1/6, the buyer/seller can demand/take back the difference. At the exact measurement of 1/6, what is the halakha? Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda disagree and a source is brought to question Rav Huna's position. However, they resolve the difficulty. A case was brought in which Abaye ruled against Rav Papa (the buyer) even though the difference was more than 1/6. Abaye explains that since it was clear Rav Pappa knew the property and knew it wasn't the size the seller mentioned, the seller could have meant that it was such a good property that it's as if it were larger (marketing technique). Brothers who split inherited property acquire the property when the first brother picks his lot in a lottery. How can the lottery be a method of acquiring land without a kinyan ? There is a debate between Rav and Shmuel about a case where two brothers divided property and later a third brother shows up and claims a third of the inheritance. Do they cancel the division and redivide all the property or do they each give the third brother part of their portion?

Oct 8, 2024

If a seller says "I am selling you land the size of a beit kor measured out with a rope, more or less" - is the second part of the statement indicating a change of mind, or was it meant to keep open both possibilities? Ben Nanas says we hold by the last words. Rav points out that the rabbis disagree and hold that they split the difference since it is unclear what the seller intended. Why was it necessary for Rav to point this out when there is already a case in a Mishna regarding a rental agreement for "twelve months for twelve gold dinarim , one dinar per month" and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yosi ruled in a case of a leap year that the rent for the thirteenth month was to be split between the owner and the renter? The Gemara distinguishes between the two cases, explaining why it may not have been clear that the law would be the same in both cases. Shmuel held that those who disagree and think that the language is unclear hold that the seller has the upper hand as the land is in the seller's possession (in a case of doubt, the burden of proof lies on the one trying to take something from the possession of another). When Shmuel pointed out that some disagreed with Ben Nanas, did he mean to say that he held like the others or not? The Gemara brings other similar cases to assess whether Shmuel held like/against Ben Nanas and after differentiating between the cases, concludes that Shmuel held like the rabbis. Rav Huna explains that Rav rules like Ben Nanas in a different, but similar case. Why was it necessary for him to teach that ruling, if Rav's ruling was known from a different case?

Oct 7, 2024

Picture Today is October 7. It's hard to believe it has been a year since that tragic day. Sadly, we are still grappling with its aftermath. We continue to pray for the release of all the hostages, the safety of the soldiers on the front lines, the safe return of all those displaced from their homes, the full recovery of injured soldiers, and comfort for those mourning the loss of close family or friends. We also pray for the safety of those living under constant rocket attacks, and the list goes on… May this year bring peace and better days for Am Yisrael. If a seller sells a field and does not specify anything further, do we allow for a margin of error? First, the Gemara tries to answer this question from our Mishna, but it is inconclusive. Then they derive from a braita that there is a margin of error, just like one who adds the words "more or less." The Mishna explains that if the amount given to the buyer is greater than the margin of error (1/4 of a kav per se'ah , 1/24), the seller can insist that the buyer pay for all the land greater than the amount agreed upon. The buyer cannot insist on giving back the land to the seller as a small piece of land is useless to the seller. This gives power to the seller over the buyer. However, according to a braita, the buyer can insist that the seller sell the land if it is more than the margin of error, giving the buyer power over the seller. To resolve this contradiction, the case of the braita is understood to be one in which the price fluctuated from the time of the sale and the time they realized there was a mistake in the size of the land given to the buyer. While the buyer cannot insist on buying it (as per the Mishna), if the seller chooses to sell it to the buyer, the buyer is forced to pay but can insist on paying the lower price, either the one at the time of the sale or the current price (as per the braita). If the amount of land given to the buyer is nine kav more than agreed upon, the buyer can insist on returning the land to the seller, as nine kav of property is the minimum size of a field. Rav Huna and Rav Nachman disagree about whether this is an absolute amount (Rav Huna) and even if the field is larger than thirty se'ah , the buyer returns the amount to the seller (as there is no presumption of mechila for the amount of nine kav , even in a large field) or is it a relative amount (Rav Nachman) - nine kav for a field of 30 se'ah , as at that amount there is no presumption of mechila , but if it were in a larger field, there would be mechila by the seller on the error (as per 1/4 kav per se'ah ). Rava raises difficulties with Rav Nachman's position, but they are resolved. Rav Ashi asks: If a field was sold with a surplus of more than seven and a half, but less than nine kav , and when the surplus was measured, the field became potentially used as a garden, can the buyer return the surplus land to the seller? What about the reverse case? These questions remain unanswered. If the seller owns the adjacent field to the one being sold, the buyer can return the land, even if the surplus is less than nine kav . What if there is a pit, water channel, road, or row of palm trees separating the surplus land from the seller's field?

Oct 6, 2024

This month's learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Shim, Zoe and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v'Binyamin Benzion for her shloshim . "She was an elegant, smart, hardworking, "outspoken" person, who survived the shoah alone, and came to Montreal and built a family and a business. She learned from her parents to be observant, honest, and a giver of tzedaka anonymously. She loved going to shul on the Yamim Noraim, especially when there was a good chazan ! Ma, Savta, and Great- Savta - "Ateret Rosheinu" - we will try to emulate you and carry on your and Dad's legacy. With much love and admiration, we miss you." Today's daf is sponsored by Heather Stone in loving memory of her Grandma Rose, Rachel Leah bat Aharon v'Golda on her 39th yahrzeit. "She taught me to light Shabbat candles and I still use her grandmother's candlesticks." Today's daf is sponsored by Jane Leiser in honor of Nicki's birthday "Happy birthday!!! I am so proud of you for doing this incredible learning!!! Love you very much, Mom." If one sells a field of a particular size, if there are parts with cracks or rocks, they are included in the measurement of the field if they are less than ten handbreadths in depth/height. But if they are ten handbreadths in depth/height, they are not considered part of the field and more land must be given to the buyer to complete the measurement. A Mishna from Arakhin explains that if one consecrates a field from an ancestral field with cracks and rocks, they are included in the amount given to the Temple only if the cracks/rocks are less than ten handbreadths in depth/height. After asking why the cracks that are more than ten handbreadths deep aren't consecrated as an independent unit worthy of planting, the Gemara explains that the Mishna is referring only to cracks that are filled with water as they are not able to be used for planting. However, our Mishna can be referring to any kind of cracks, as cracks that are ten handbreadths deep are a hindrance for a buyer as they makes it difficult for the owner to plow. The Mishna discussed the height of the rocks but not the area of space they take up. Rabbi Yitzchak explains that if they take up a space in which four kav of seeds can be planted, they are not part of the measurement of the field even if they are less than ten handbreaths in height. However, there is a debate about whether these rocks (of four kav in size) are spread in a part of the field where five kav can be planted or even if they are not spread in the majority of the field. A series of questions are asked about what the law would be if they are spread not in the majority, but most of the four kav are in the majority or they are in a circle, or a row, or a zigzag, etc. These questions remain unanswered. If they are on the border, they are also not included, even if they are not ten in height. The Mishna delineates the margin of error in the measurement of a piece of land sold, which depends on the language used at the time of the sale. If the seller said " beit kor as measured by a rope, any extra amount given to the buyer needs to be returned to the seller. But if the seller said "give or take" the margin of error is a quarter kav per se'ah (1/24). The Gemara asks: What would be the law if the seller simply said, "a beit kor "?

Oct 2, 2024

A Mishna is brought from Ohalot and Nazir which seems to have measurements of burial caves that don't match either Tanna Kamma or Rabbi Shimon's opinions in our Mishna. The Gemara tries to figure out how to connect the opinion in the Mishna with one of the two opinions. If someone sells a field and specifies the size but some of the field is not worthy of planting, is that space included in the size of the field? On what does it depend?

Oct 2, 2024

If someone buys a burial cave or hires someone to build them a burial cave, what are the minimum measurements assumed and how many burial spots should there be? The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon each have different answers to these questions. Rabbi Shimon held that each cave holds thirteen spaces for bodies, of them one was to the right of the entranceway and one to the left. Where exactly were those two graves? Several explanations are suggested, and some of them are rejected. According to the last explanation, they overlapped with other graves but were placed deeper into the ground. A proof that bodies were buried below other graves is brought from Rabbi Shimon's opinion that there were four caves around each courtyard, as that would clearly lead to overlapping graves. However, Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua attempts to reject this proof by suggesting the graves were set up on an angle like branches of a palm tree and did not overlap. But the Gemara rejects Rav Huna's rejection as it could not work out mathematically. Rav Shisha brings an alternative explanation for the extra two graves by the entrance – they did not overlap at all with the others as they were made for stillborn babies and were therefore shorter.

Oct 2, 2024

One is not allowed to block public access from a path in one's property that has been used by the public. However, if the owner designated an alternate path, the owner cannot block the public from using that path either. Why is that the case? Are there different opinions regarding this issue? The Mishna delineated the minimum size for an individual's path, public path, etc. The Gemara quotes some alternate opinions, some other cases not mentioned in the Mishna, and explanations for some of the sizes. There is a custom to stand and sit at least seven times on the way back from a funeral. Details of this custom are discussed. If someone buys a burial cave or hires someone to build a burial cave, what are the minimum measurements assumed and how many burial spots should there be?

Oct 2, 2024

Rabbi Levi explains that the cherubs ( kruvim ) miraculously did not take up space in the kodesh h'kodashim . This statement is supported by Shmuel's resolution to the contraction in the verses. However, other rabbis provided alternate suggestions to explain how they fit in the room in a non-miraculous manner. Did the cherubs face one other or did they face the heichal ? When one has a pit in another's property and has an access route or an inner garden within an outer one, what are that person's right to that path - when can they use it, for what can they use it? If one had a public path going through one's property and took it back and provided a different public path on the side of the property, both paths remain public property. Why is the owner not allowed to block off access to the old road, isn't one allowed to take the law into one's own hand in a case of financial loss?! Three different rabbis each suggest a different interpretation.

Oct 1, 2024

The Mishna rules that if one sells wine and it turns to vinegar, the seller is not responsible. However, there are certain circumstances where the buyer can make the seller responsible. Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Chanina limits the ruling of the Mishna to a case where the buyer put the wine in his/her jugs, as then the buyer can be blamed. Rav Chiya bar Yosef disagrees as he deems the wine's owner responsible for the wine souring, as wine turning sour is understood to be a punishment for arrogance, as can be found in Chabakuk 2:5. If one sells a small house for a young couple or widowed daughter, what is the minimum size? What about other types of houses? A cowshed? A banquet hall? There is a debate regarding the minimum height for a house and whether or not it should be derived from the height of the heichal , sanctuary. There are contradictory verses regarding the size of the kodesh h'kodashim in the Temple.

Sep 30, 2024

If one makes wine with grapes that were already used for making wine, is it considered wine? What if it still tastes like wine? What are the rules for grapes that are truma, maaser sheni, or consecrated and are then reused to make wine a second and third time? Rabbi Yochanan said the rules that apply to those circumstances are the same for liquids that create susceptibility to impurity. To what was Rabbi Yochanan referring? One of the criteria for wine that can be used for making kiddush is that it be a wine that can be used on the altar. What type of wine is being excluded by that statement?

Sep 29, 2024

Rav Yosef brings a braita to clarify whether we hold that wine that is turning to vinegar one should say borei pri hagafen or shehakol . However, the braita had several interpretations and it was therefore unclear which opinion Rav Yosef was trying to prove from the braita. If one purchases wine and it goes bad soon after, is the seller responsible to give the buyer new wine? What is the halakha regarding wine that was made from the leftover grapes that had already been used for making wine - is it considered wine or not?

Sep 27, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 95 More tannaitic sources are quoted to prove Rav Huna's opinion that if the bad parts mixed in with the produce are more than the permitted percentage, one can demand compensation for the entire amount. However, each comparison is rejected and the Gemara explains why each case differs from the case that Rav Huna was referring to. The Mishna lists a case of one who sold wine from a cellar. What exactly is the case and what language was used regarding the commitment of the seller to provide the wine - was it "wine in a cellar," "wine in this cellar" or "this cellar?" From a braita that lists the law in each of these three options, it looks as if the Mishna can't be referring to any of the options. The Gemara suggests two different answers, the second based on a different version of the braita brought by Rav Zevid. These are discussed and reinterpreted to fit with the Mishna and with each other. What blessing is made on wine that is sold in the stores, i.e. starting to turn to vinegar – some say borei pri hagafen and others say shehakol .

Sep 27, 2024

When one sells produce, what percentage of bad produce can we assume will be mixed in, and therefore the buyer has no right to claim compensation from the seller for it. According to Rav Huna, once one goes beyond that percentage, one has to compensate for all the bad produce - even the percentage that would have been allowed had the seller not gone beyond. Various sources are brought to either support or contradict Rav Huna - however, they are all rejected as the case can be looked at in various ways.

Sep 26, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Jason, Erica, and Raquel in honor of their mother, Patty Belkin's birthday. "Wishing a wonderful birthday to our amazing mother!" Today's daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the 3rd yahrzeit of her mother, Yocheved bat Zvi and Sara. One source is brought to support Shmuel's position that if a buyer bought an item that has two main purposes and wasn't specific about with what intent he/she bought the item, if it is unusable for that use, the sale cannot be canceled. But this proof is rejected. Is this debate between Rav and Shmuel based on a tannaitic debate? Even though at first it seemed to be, this suggestion is rejected. Our Mishna is brought to prove Shmuel's position, but this suggestion is rejected as well, as our Mishna can be explained as Rav's position and a different braita has a tannaitic position that corresponds to Shmuel's opinion. If the seller needs to compensate the buyer for seeds that did not grow, does the seller need to reimburse the buyer for expenses incurred by the buyer for planting the seeds?

Sep 25, 2024

The Mishna rules that if one sold produce to another and the buyer planted it but nothing grew, the seller would have to compensate the buyer. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this is only the case if the sale was for inedible seeds and it was thereby clear that the purpose of the purchase was for planting and not for eating. If one buys an ox that can be sold for two different uses, either for plowing or for slaughtering, and the buyer doesn't specify for which purpose, and after the sale it becomes clear that the ox is a gorer and cannot be kept alive, can the buyer claim that it is not usable for the purposes for which it was purchased (plowing) or not? Does it depend on the majority, i.e. if the majority of people use it for the purpose that the buyer claims, can we believe the buyer and cancel the sale? Or do we say "the burden of proof is on the one trying to get the money from the other" in which case, the buyer is stuck with the item unless the buyer can prove with what intent the item was purchased? Rav rules that the sale can be cancelled and Shmuel rules that it cannot. A difficulty is raised against Rav from a Mishna but is resolved. A Tosefta is brought to support Rav, but it is rejected.

Sep 24, 2024

One cannot profit from selling basic food items in Israel. If so, how did Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria profit from wine and oil in Israel? A braita ruled that one cannot profit from eggs twice. The Gemara brings two explanations for what this ruling means. Under what circumstances of financial challenges is one permitted to leave Israel? Is it forbidden to leave Israel, even if prices are expensive for basic food items if one can afford the high prices? This is proven from the book of Ruth as Elimelech and his sons were punished for this. The Gemara tangents to various drashot on verses from the beginning of the book of Ruth as well as drashot on the connection between Boaz and Ivtzan - one of the judges mentioned in the book of Shoftim/Judges. After quoting a statement of Rav Chanan son of Rava regarding Elimelech, four other statements of his are quoted. An alternative explanation of the sins of Elimelech and his family is that they should have stayed to help pray for everyone. Four statements of Rabbi Yochanan that all start with the word ' nehirna ,' 'I remember when' are quoted. The sons of Elimelech, Machlon and Khilion were also mentioned in the Tanach by different names – Yoash and Saraph. Which was the real name and which was meant for extrapolation?

Sep 23, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Shapiro in loving memory of her mother, Deera Tychman, z"l, on her 11th yahrzeit. "She would have been very proud of her daughter, her four grandchildren, and her eight great-grandchildren." What size measuring cups are not permitted for one to use as they can be used to trick the buyer? Shmuel ruled that one cannot change a particular size by increasing it by more than a sixth. The Gemara grapples to understand the reason for this ruling and offers three different suggestions, all of which are rejected. Ultimately, Rav Chisda explains that Shmuel derived this law from a verse in Yechezkel 45:12. Rav Papa enlarged a measurement size by more than a sixth – how could he have done this in light of Shmuel's ruling? A braita rules that one cannot save up a lot of produce to sell later in the season, thus causing a shortage in the market and a rise in prices. But this applies to one who purchases it for resale. One who grows the crops is permitted to store them. Another braita distinguishes between storing produce that is an essential item that everyone buys and one that is not. If it is not essential, then one can store it and the aforementioned issue is no longer relevant as people who can't afford it can manage without it. A third braita rules that one cannot export oil, wine, and flour from Israel as these items are essential, and exporting them will cause a shortage in Israel and a rise in prices.

Sep 22, 2024

Eleven braitot are quoted that discuss the importance of honesty in business dealings (weights and measures) and keeping in line with the local customs. What are the measurements for building a balance beam? The measurements depend on what type of item one is measuring. A city needs to set up inspectors for checking that people have accurate weights but there is a debate about whether or not one needs inspectors for controlling prices. One needs to avoid actions with weights and measurements that could lead others to be suspicious of trickery.

Sep 20, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the 7th yahrzeit of her father, Hershel Tzvi Shlomo Chaim ben Pesach and Dina Sara. The Gemara brings two more possibilities of how to understand the Mishna and concludes that the last one is correct - the case is where the store owner used the father's flask for measuring for others and he became a borrower who borrows without asking permission from the owner. The debate in the Mishna is - do we view this kind of borrower as a borrower (who does not assume responsibility once the item is returned to the place it was borrowed from) or like a thief who is responsible until the item is returned to the original owner (or to a safe place). The Gemara explains more in detail Shmuel's ruling that one who picks up an item to purchase is responsible for accidental damages. How often does a seller need to clean out the measuring cups? It depends if the seller is the wholesaler, a homeowner, or a storekeeper. There is a law based on a verse from the Torah that when a seller weighs an item to sell, the seller needs to weigh it down a bit to favor the buyer. How much does one need to add? How much does it depend on the prevalent custom in that area? There is a discussion on the seriousness of the laws of weights and measurements and it is compared to illicit relations.

Sep 20, 2024

Another source is brought to raise a difficulty with Rav and Shmuel's ruling about acquiring items partway through the measuring if the wording of the sale was "separated it into parts. But this difficulty is resolved. The Mishna discusses three different halachot. At what point of measuring is neither side allowed to change their mind? If an agent sells someone else's produce to the buyer, is the agent responsible if the vessel breaks and the merchandise is lost? What is the status of drops left in the jug after the liquid is measured out and poured into the buyer's utensils? Details of these cases are discussed in the Gemara. The Mishna brings a scenario where a father sends a son to the store to buy oil and the utensil breaks, the oil is lost, as is the change that the son received for buying the oil. There is a debate about who is responsible. The Gemara brings several explanations to understand what exactly is the case in the Mishna and the source of the debate.

Sep 19, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Penina Lipskier in honor of her son's wedding, Daniel to Ella and in loving memory of his friends, Yakir Hexter and David Schwartz HY"D who were killed during the war. "May we only know smachot!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff Perlman in honor of the occasion of their daughter Yael Perlman and her new husband Matt Shapiro making aliyah to Jerusalem on Sunday! "We are so proud of their decision and look forward to sharing their experiences of their new life in our holy land!" Ravina suggests to Rav Ashi a fourth response to Rav Sheshet's question, can an item can be acquired by the buyer when it is placed in the buyer's vessels on the property of the seller? However, this too is rejected and the question is left unanswered. The Mishna in Kiddushin Chapter 1, Mishna 5 established that moveable items can be acquired by pulling. However, it is limited by either Rav Chisda, Rav Kahana, or Rava to a case where the item cannot be lifted. When Abaye taught this qualification of the Mishna, Rav Ada bar Matna raised a difficulty against it from a tannaitic source. Three other sources are also brought to question this limitation, but all the difficulties are resolved. Rav and Shmuel differentiate between a case where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor (30 se'ah ) of wheat for 30 sela " and one where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor for 30 sela , each se'ah for a zuz ." In the former, the sale is final only when the measuring is complete, in the latter, the sale is final for each se'ah as it goes into the measuring cup. A difficulty is raised against the first case from a braita quoted previously where the sale is final even before filling up the cup, provided the cup used was the buyer's. This difficulty is resolved by assuming the braita refers to a case more similar to the latter case of Rav and Shmuel.

Sep 18, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm. "With hakarat hatov to HKB"H for the zechut of celebrating the 100th birthday of my wonderful father, Mr. Mike Senders of Boca Raton, FL. May he go m'chayil el chayil and continue to enjoy nachat from his children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, ad me'ah v'esrim shana !" If an item is placed in the buyer's vessel, it is acquired by the buyer as a kinyan chatzer (courtyard). But does this depend on whether the vessel was in a private domain or is it effective also in a public domain? Rav and Shmuel hold that is not acquired in the public domain, while Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish hold that it is. However, Rav Pappa says that they do not disagree, as Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish refer to an alleyway and not an actual public domain. A proof is brought from the statement of Rabbi Yochanan. Then the Gemara brings a tannaitic source to suggest that perhaps they could mean a public domain, like the tana in the braita, but that source is explained also to be referring to an alleyway. Rav Sheshet asks Rav Huna if an item can be acquired by the buyer if it is placed in the buyer's vessels in the property of the seller? Rav Huna brings three sources to answer the question, but his suggestions are rejected.

Sep 17, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by the Billets and Cohns for the refuah shleima for Dr. David Harari, David Yonatan Ben Reizel. Rav Chisda explains that if there was a sale with ona'ah (over or undercharging) in which case the sale can be canceled, and then the price changed after the sale benefitting the one who over/undercharged, they cannot renege as the ability to cancel the agreement is only on the one who was cheated. Rav Chisda supported his statement from the Mishna. Why was his statement necessary if it could have been easily derived from the Mishna? The Mishna described a sale where one ordered darker/reddish wheat and received white wheat or the reverse. The term used for the reddish wheat is shechamtit , from the root chama , sun. This word leads Rav Pappa to explain that the sun is red, as can be seen at sunrise and sunset, and only appears white during the day because of our limited vision. A difficulty is raised against Rav Pappa's assertion but is rejected. There is a debate between Rebbi and the Rabbis in laws of teruma about whether wine and vinegar are considered two different types or the same type of item. If they are considered the same type, if one separates teruma from vinegar to wine, it is effective (even though it is prohibited) but not if they are considered two types. Our Mishna implies that wine and vinegar are two separate types of items for laws of sales - if one bought wine but received vinegar, either side can renege as they are two totally different items. Does this mean that our Mishna does not hold the opinion of the rabbis in teruma that they are the same type? How does one acquire fruits? The Mishna discusses which methods are/are not effective. Rabbi Asi and Rabbi Zeira disagree about Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding one who measured and put the items in a side area off the main thoroughfare. Does the buyer acquire it if it is placed there or is it effective only if it is placed in the vessels of the buyer? A braita and our Mishna are brought to try to resolve this issue (did Rabbi Zeira accept Rabbi Asi's interpretation of Rabbi Yochanan's position) but both sources are rejected as inconclusive regarding this issue.

Sep 16, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored by an anonymous donor for the safety of our chayalim, the recovery of those wounded and for the safe and speedy return of the hostages. If one purchases three trees, what is the minimum and maximum space needed between the trees to enable the purchaser to acquire the land in between as well? Rav Nachman holds 8-16 cubits and Rav Yosef holds 4-6 cubits. After Abaye questions Rav Yosef from a Mishna that clearly supports Rav Nachman, Rav Yosef supports his position based on a ruling of Rav Yehuda in a particular case. A Mishna is brought in support of Rav Yosef, as well, but Rav Nachman's position is stronger as the Mishna in support of his position had a situation where they ruled like his position. However, Rava explained that the halakha is from 4-16 cubits and a braita is brought in support of this position. Rabbi Yirmiya asks whether we measure from the lower wider part of the trunk or the higher narrower part. He also asks if three branches grew from one tree and were subsequently covered up and then sold, if there was the minimum distance required between the growths, would the buyer acquire the land as well? Rav Geviha answers both questions. Several questions were asked about situations where the three trees had two different owners or two in the field and one on the border (which was higher or lower than the field), or what if some large object was in the middle of the three trees like a water channel, public domain, etc.? All of these questions remain unanswered. However, if a cedar tree was between the three trees, it would not block the buyer from acquiring the land and the buyer even acquires the cedar tree. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether the three trees are in a straight line or a triangular formation. The Mishna explains that if one sells the head, legs, liver, or windpipe (with the lungs) of a large animal, the sale includes only the item mentioned. But in a small animal, the sale of the head would include the legs and the sale of the windpipe would include the liver, but not the reverse. The Mishna lists four types of sales and explains in each case whether or not the buyer or the seller or both can renege on the agreement.

Sep 15, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 24th yahrzeit. "She had a "נותן בעין יפה" approach to her interactions with everyone she encountered. She was generous of heart, of mind and of spirit, and we miss her. Yehi zichra baruch ." Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother, Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, Adina bat Aryeh Leib, on her 20th yahrzeit. "She was devoted to her husband, family, and the Beth El Synagogue community in New Rochelle, NY. Her two sons made Aliyah and her daughter has lived a professional life of service to the American Jewish community." Today's daf is sponsored by Ayala Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shulamit. How does one determine if the branches grew out of the trunk or the ground to determine whether the growths belong to the owner of the tree or the owner of the land? Rav Nachman rules that a palm tree does not have laws of geza , the trunk. Rav Zevid and Rav Papa each understand this statement differently. If one purchases three trees, one acquires land with the trees. How much land does one acquire? Rabbi Yochanan rules that they acquire the land beneath each tree, between each tree, and, in addition, the amount of space needed for a fig gatherer to walk around with a basket. Rabbi Elazar raises a question about the space for the fig gatherer - if one does not get an access route, as per the rabbis' position that a seller sells sparingly ( ayin ra'ah ), how does the buyer get space for collecting? The land underneath and in between the trees can be used by the tree's owner for planting, but who has the right to plant in the area around the trees for the fig gatherer and basket? How much space can/should there be between the trees to consider them a field so that the purchaser will acquire the land? Rav Yosef and Rava disagree. Abaye raises a difficulty from a Mishna against Rav Yosef's position.

Sep 13, 2024

If one purchases two trees, does the buyer acquire the land directly surrounding those trees? Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree. What are the ramifications of this debate? Does one bring the first fruits of a tree like this? According to the Mishna in Bikurim, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis also debate this point and according to the rabbis, one would bring the first fruits to the Temple but not say the recitation, as the obligation to bring b ikurim is dependent on owning the land. Shmuel derives from the Mishna in Bikurim that Rabbi Meir would also obligate one to bring bikurim from fruit bought in the market. He derives this from the fact that there was no reason to mention Rabbi Meir's disagreement in the Mishna in Bikurim as it could have been easily derived from his opinion on our Mishna and must therefore be coming to teach something additional. However, this suggestion is rejected. Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim asks why in the case above (one tree according to Rabbi Meir and two according to the rabbis), is obligated to bring the first fruits but not say the recitation - one should either be obligated and then should do both, or not obligated and do neither! Rabba answers that we do it because of a doubt - the rabbis are unclear whether or not one acquires the land. Four difficulties are brought against Rabba's answer and are all resolved, but each resolution leads to a modification of how the bikurim are brought to the Temple in this situation.

Sep 13, 2024

If one buys the produce of a dovecote, a beehive, a honeycomb, or a tree for its wood, the buyer is entitled to the produce but must leave a certain amount for the seller to ensure continued growth. The Mishna and Gemara discuss the amounts for each item. Rav Kahana explained that honey while still in the honeycomb is considered food and is susceptible to impurity, even if the bees are eating it. However, in a braita, the opposite ruling is brought. Abaye and Rava resolve the contradiction each differently and the Gemara raises two difficulties against Rava's ruling. A braita is brought in support of Rav Kahan's ruling. A braita expands on the law in the Mishna regarding trees sold for their wood and distinguishes between different trees and the amounts that need to be left to ensure regrowth. Some sources are brought that contradict some laws in the braita but are resolved.

Sep 12, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 79 Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran zoom family in loving memory of the beloved mother of their dear Hadran learner and friend, Rhona Fink - Millie Laxer, Malka bat Sarah v'Avraham z"l, who passed away yesterday. "May her family be comforted among aveilei Zion v'Yerushalayim . What is the punishment for those who separate themselves from the words of Torah? A Mishna in Meila is brought which discusses one who consecrates an item that generally holds something else like a pit with water, or a field with crops. If one consecrates the pit, is the water consecrated as well? Does it depend on whether it was full of water when it was consecrated or if it was empty? In which items do Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi disagree? After reconciling the disagreement between them with the words of Rebbi in a braita, the Gemara proceeds to bring a different braita also regarding this issue. In that braita, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon. First Raba explains the debate to be parallel to that of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi, but this is rejected in light of the latter case in the braita where Rabbi Elazar. In conclusion, they explain the debate differently. The debate in the first part of the braita is based on a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis about whether one can acquire items that are not yet in existence. A difficulty is raised, but it is resolved. The debate in the second part depends on whether we learn laws of consecrated items from laws of sales. A difficulty is raised with the explanations of each of these. A difficulty is raised on this explanation, as well, from our Mishna but it is resolved, as is proven from a braita, that the position in our Mishna is a minority opinion.

Sep 11, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 78 When one sells a donkey, does it include the equipment of the donkey, and if so, which equipment? The debate regarding this matter depends on whether the main purpose of buying a donkey was for riding or for carrying. According to Rabbi Yehuda, it depends on the language used during the sale. Are offspring included in the sale of one who specified they are buying a nursing cow or donkey? After extrapolating the use by the Mishna of the term "siyach" for a foal to teach that a foal obeys pleasant directives, while an older donkey does not, the Gemara quotes drashot on verses in Bamidbar 21:27-30 where a similar word is used. The content of the drashot relates to the rewards for the righteous and the destruction of the wicked.

Sep 10, 2024

Ameimar rules on how one can transfer a promissory note to another. There are two different versions of the text - each reaching the opposite conclusion. Although Amerimar explains that his ruling was learned by tradition, Rav Ashi explains the logic behind the ruling. The Gemara raises a difficulty with Rav Ashi's logical argument but then resolves the difficulty. The Mishna continues with other purchases related to wagons and animals and rules on what items are included/not included in the sale. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis disagree about whether the amount of money spent on the item can be a determining factor about what is included/not included in a purchase. The Gemara limits their debate to a more specific case.

Sep 9, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 76 This week's learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Shim, Zoe, and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred-Ephraim Hochstadter. "Dad & Saba - we miss you every day" Today's daf is sponsored by Rochelle Cheifetz in loving memory of Lenny Cheifetz, z"l, whose 32nd yahrzeit is today. "You were loved by all and taken much too soon." Is it possible to say that Rav and Shmuel's disagreement about how far one needs to pull a boat to acquire it is also a debate between tannaim—Rabbi Natan and tana kamma? This suggestion is made after several attempts to reread a braita regarding Rabbi Natan and the rabbi's debate regarding acquiring a boat and a promissory note. Ultimately, the suggestion is rejected as the Gemara assumes they agree regarding acquiring a boat and only disagree about the promissory note. The Gemara then suggests that the debate between Rabbi Natan and tana kamma regarding the promissory note is also the subject of debate between Rebbi and the rabbis. After resolving some difficulties regarding this suggestion, they conclude that, in fact, it is the same debate. What is the difference between acquiring objects in a private space/public space?

Sep 8, 2024

There are more stories about the awesomeness of the Leviathan and that it will ultimately be captured in the future (with the help of God) and will be used to serve the righteous people and the city of Jerusalem. The verses quoted throughout this section relate to verses in the Prophets and Iyov that are against haughtiness and remind the people that God is all-powerful. There are various statements describing the awesomeness of Jerusalem in the future. How does one acquire a boat? Rav and Shmuel disagree? Is their debate parallel to a tannaitic debate about how to acquire an animal? At first, the Gemara suggests that it is, but this suggestion is rejected.

Sep 6, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Jessica Jobanek and Harold Kingsberg in celebration of the second birthday of their beloved son Shmuel Meir (Sammy). "We love you and learn from you every day." Rabba bar bar Chana tells stories about when an Arab showed him the people who died in the desert ( dor hamidbar ), Mount Sinai, and the earth where Korach and his followers were killed. Each place seemed to have magical powers associated with it. More stories are told about unique creatures that were seen by people when traveling on boats. After mentioning the tanin in a story, the Gemara digresses to discuss what kind of creature was the tanin . Some identify it as the leviathan. They also discuss the unusual power and the limitations of these and other gigantic or unique creatures.

Sep 6, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Sue Talansky in loving memory of her mother, Ruth Stromer. "Holocaust survivor and woman of valor. You left us very young but imprinted in us great confidence and strength. Making you proud was one of my greatest joys." Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of Mitzi's brother, Dr. Dennis Lock, Yochanan ben Yaakov, on his 2nd yahrzeit tomorrow. "He was a loving husband, father, uncle and grandfather; a devoted physician; and had a love of learning Talmud. He is sorely missed." What parts are included/not included in the sale of the boat? Since boats were mentioned, Raba and Rabba bar bar Chana bring many stories about things they saw while traveling or stories that were told to them by those who came from the sea. The stories are very exaggerated and their meaning unclear. Many view these stories as allegorical.

Sep 5, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 72 Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family. "In these turbulent days, where we lean on our routine of the daily Daf learning for comfort, we are thrilled with the piercing double joy of two of fellow Dafferette's smachot . To Julie Mendelssohn and her family, mazal Tov and joy on the marriage of her son Rafi to his bride, Adi. And to Miriam Tannenbaum and her family, on the marriage of her son Avrumy to his bride, Rochel. With a tefilla that this sasson v'simcha will herald in many more wonderful times. With lots of love from the Hadran Zoom family." After reconciling Rav Huna's ruling (about one who sells a field but keeps two trees) with Rabbi Shimon's position by explaining that Rav Huna aligns with the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon with Rabbi Akiva, the Gemara raises a difficulty from braita. From the braita, which can only be explained according to Rabbi Shimon, it is clear that Rabbi Shimon does not hold that one sells generously, like Rabbi Akiva. Therefore the Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon's position in our Mishna differently - as a response to the rabbis according to their position and is not reflecting Rabbi Shimon's position. However, an additional issue is raised: the last line in the braita doesn't seem to match Rabbi Shimon's position, which undermines the conclusion of the previous section. This issue is resolved and the braita can be explained according to Rabbi Shimon.

Sep 4, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha and Rabbi Hayim Herring in loving memory of Terri's mother, Helene Krivosha, Hanna Mindel bat Yerachmiel haKohen and Feiga Raba on her first yahrzeit. "A true eshet hayil ." If one sells a field, the sale does not include a pit, winepress, or dovecote in the field. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis again disagree about whether the seller keeps an access route or needs to purchase one. However, if the field were given as a gift or to one of the brothers while dividing up an inheritance, or one who acquires an ownerless field (like from a deceased convert's property) the one who acquires the field would acquire everything in it, including the pit, winepress and dovecote. If one consecrated the field, the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether everything was consecrated or also the usual items are excluded, other than a grafted carob tree or sycamore. A case happened where a person on their deathbed promised a house of a particular size to gift to someone, but they owned a house larger than that size. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi each ruled differently how to fulfill the promise. Rav Ashi awarded the recipient the entire house based on the principle that one who gives a gift always gives generously, and the intent must have been for the entire house. Rav Huna made a statement that one who sold one's land but kept two trees intended to keep the land around the trees. At first, it is assumed that this statement can be understood even according to Rabbi Akiva that one who sells, sells generously, as the trees need the land for nutrients and if the seller did not retain rights to the land, it would lead to problems down the road with the buyer who insist the seller uproot the trees as it is weakening the buyer's land. However, they raise a difficulty on this from an explanation given for Rabbi Shimon's opinion in our Mishna regarding one who consecrated a field, the grafted carob tree and sycamore are consecrated as well since they get nutrients from the ground. This implies that the one who consecrated may have intended not to consecrate the trees but did not retain rights to the land around them. Therefore, one must assume that Rabbi Shimon and Rav Huna do not agree, as Rabbi Shimon holds like Rabbi Akiva that one who sells/consecrates does so generously, and Rav Huna's statement only accords with the rabbis' position.

Sep 3, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Laura Warshawsky in loving memory of her mother, Evelyn Margolis, Chaya Gittel bat Avram Yitzchak v'Rut, on her first yahrzeit. "My mother was a role model for me and I owe much of who I am and what I do to her example, including learning daf yomi." Rav Acha bar Rav Huna asked Rav Sheshet: If something generally not included in a sale of a field - like grafted carob trees or mature sycamore trees - is excluded by the seller, does that mean that all the other carob trees are included, or are none of the trees part of the sale? Rav Sheshet answered: Since, without saying anything, the tree would not have been sold, adding words does not weaken the seller's position. An alternative version of the question involves a seller stating, "I am selling you this field, except for half of one carob tree." Does the buyer acquire the other half of that tree? As before, they ruled that the seller retains full rights to the tree, even if the seller's language seems ambiguous. Rav Amram asked Rav Chisda: If one gives an item to a shomer (watchman) and there's a document proving the arrangement, can the shomer claim it was returned, even if the document remains with the owner, using a migo ? The shomer could claim it was lost or damaged and be exempt, so should we believe the claim that it was returned? Or, since the document is still in the owner's possession, should we assume it was not returned? Rav Chisda responded that a migo exists, and the shomer is believed if an oath is taken. Rav Amram disagreed. It is suggested that this debate is parallel to a tannaitic dispute regarding an investor seeking to reclaim funds from the heirs of a business partner. The debate concerns whether the investor could reclaim half or all of the funds upon swearing that the money wasn't returned. Since joint ventures are viewed as half-loan, half-deposit (to avoid interest issues), the dispute centers on whether the heirs can claim it was returned based on a migo , or if the investor is believed because they hold a document. This explanation is rejected, and an alternative is proposed: Whether the deceased would have informed his heirs if he had repaid the investment before dying, or if we are concerned he died before telling them. Rav Huna bar Avin ruled like Rav Chisda in the case of the shomer (the shomer is believed via migo ) and against the orphans in the case of the investment (the investor can reclaim all the funds). Although this appears contradictory, the Gemara resolves the issue by explaining that the ruling against the orphans assumes the father would have informed them if the money had been returned.

Sep 2, 2024

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of the six hostages Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Ori Danino, Eden Yerushalmi, Almog Sarusi, Alexander Lobanov, and Carmel Gat, who were murdered just a few days ago. Our thoughts and prayers are with their families and we continue to pray for the release of all the other hostages. When one sells a field, the stones are included. What are the stones used for in the field and in what circumstances are they included in the sale? There are different interpretations offered. There is an opinion of Rabbi Meir brought in a braita on Bava Batra 78b that all items used for a vineyard are included in the sale of that vineyard. The rabbis disagree. Many of the cases brought in the Mishna that are included/not included in the sale of a field are explained according to Rabbi Meir's understanding and the rabbis' position. Several questions are asked about items attached with pegs, such as a door frame or a window frame. Would they be included in the sale of a house? Would a stand for a leg of a bed be included in the sale of a bed (or maybe a house)? These questions are left unanswered. A carob tree or sycamore tree is only included in the sale of a field if the carob tree is grafted and if the sycamore is large enough to cut wood from it. This is derived from a verse in the context of Avraham's purchase of maarat hamachpela from Efron haChiti (Breishit 23:17). What trees are included in a sale can depend on the combination of the language used in the sale agreement and what actual trees are in the seller's possession. Several examples are brought to explain what would included in different scenarios.

Sep 1, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Rikki and Alan Zibitt in loving memory of Rikki's father, Mickey Carlin, Shevach ben Avraham z"l on his 20th yahrzeit. "We miss his energy, his vibrant smile, and his fierce love of his children and grandchildren. May his neshama have an aliya ." Today's daf is dedicated to all the teachers and students returning to school! Does the sale of an olive press include stores that sell other items and are also used for drying out sesame seeds before making sesame oil? On what does it depend? What is included in the sale of a privately owned city? Are Caananite slaves considered like land or movable property? Can we derive an answer to that question from the Mishna? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel included a santer in the sale of a city. There are two possible definitions for a santer - either a registrar who keeps track of the boundaries of the properties or fields outside the city. The Gemara attempts to resolve which definition is right from the case of beit hashlachin mentioned in the Mishna. However, this suggestion is rejected as there are two different ways to interpret the term beit hashlachin . Another source is brought to determine the correct definition for santer , but that attempt is also rejected. Which types of enclosures for animals are included in the sale of a city and which are not? What does the sale of a field include/not include?

Aug 30, 2024

An unmarried woman whose father died can claim her dowry from up to one-tenth of the father's estate. However, this amount can only be collected from 1/10 of the land of the father's estate. Rav Nechemia, the son of Rav Yosef accorded a woman one-tenth of her father's estate for her dowry and permitted the value of the estate to include moveable items that were attached to the ground as they are considered like land itself. Rav Ashi also included rental income from the father's properties in the calculation for a daughter's dowry. If one sold a courtyard, an olive press, or a bathhouse, what items are included in the sale, and what items are not included in the sale? Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the mainstream opinion.

Aug 30, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 66 Today's daf is sponsored by Sarah & Inna Pasternak, in honor of their first wedding anniversary. "We fell in love studying the daf and look forward to remaining havrutas as we build a home full of Torah together." Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of their friend and co-learner Miriam Eckstein-Koas on the engagement of her son, Daniel. "May Daniel and Talia build a bayit neeman b'Yisrael firmly grounded in Torah and chesed , and may all of Am Yisrael see smachot !" The Gemara continues to figure out which opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis doesn't seem to correspond to the Tosefta Mikvaot that distinguishes between a pipe that was constructed and then attached to the ground and one that was hollowed out from the ground or while it is attached to the ground. After rejecting the first two possibilities (the braita that related to our Mishna and a Mishna regarding a beehive), they find a Mishna Keilim 15:2 regarding a baker's board attached to a wall in which it seems that both Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree with the Tosefta Mikvaot. Since the Tosefta must fit with one of the two opinions, the Gemara then tries to assess which one. First, they attempt to reconcile it with Rabbi Eliezer, claiming that Rabbi Eliezer was more lenient in the baker's board case as it was only impure on a rabbinic level (a flat wood vessel). However, this is rejected on two accounts. One, mayim she'uvim disqualifies a mikveh by rabbinic law. Secondly, Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Chanina's explained that the Mishna in Keilim refers to a metal baker's block, which would make it impure by Torah law. In conclusion, the Gemara establishes that the rabbi's opinion corresponds to the Tosefta Mikvaot, as the issue of mayim she'uvim is only rabbinic. Therefore the rabbis are more lenient there than in the case of a baker's board. If rain falls on a movable item (vessel) that is detached from the ground and at the same time on food that is inside/on that item, if the owner wants the rain to fall on the item, the food also becomes susceptible to impurity. What if the moveable item was attached to the ground, would it be considered like the ground and the food inside it would not become susceptible to impurity, or would it be considered a vessel and the food inside it would become susceptible to impurity? The question is only asked according to the rabbis (and there is no answer), as according to Rabbi Eliezer, it would clearly be considered like the ground and the food would not become susceptible to impurity.

Aug 29, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Esther's birthday. "To my big sister, thank you for introducing me to this shiur. I'm so proud of you. Many happy and healthy returns!" Regarding the debate between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis about whether a seller sells generously (Rabbi Akiva) or sparingly (the rabbis), Rav ruled like the rabbis, and Shmuel like Rabbi Akiva. The difference of opinion between Rav and Shmuel on this issue is compared to a different debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding the distribution of inherited property. However, the comparison is rejected as the circumstances are unique and not applicable in a regular sale. Rav Huna held like Rav, and Rav Nachman held like Shmuel, but Rav Huna deferred to Rav Nachman as he was an expert in monetary law. If one sells an inner house and an outer house to two different people, both Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis will hold that the inner resident cannot pass through the outer resident's house as the seller has no reason to favor one over the other. However, if the inner one received the house as a gift, there is an assumption that a gift is given generously and therefore the buyer would be able to pass through the outer house without having to purchase an access route. If one sells a house without specifying what parts are included, does it include the door, key, lock, mortar, millstone, oven, etc? The Mishna explains that items that are attached to the ground are included, while those that are moveable are not. The Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir who held that one who sells a vineyard, any objects that serve the vineyard are included in the sale, even if they are not attached to the ground. A braita similar to the Mishna is quoted, however, there are some differences. In the braita, Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about an item attached to the ground after its construction. Tosefta Mikvaot 4:1 is brought regarding a pipe through which water is brought to the mikveh. If it is hollowed out (constructed) and then attached to the ground, it is considered a vessel and disqualifies the mivkeh as the water is considered ' mayim she'uvim,' water that is drawn with a vessel. The Gemara explains that this Tosefta doesn't correspond to Rabbi Eliezer's nor the rabbis' opinions. To which opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis is this statement referring? At first, the Gemara suggests it is referring to Rabbi Eliezer in the previous braita, but that suggestion is rejected. Then they suggest Rabbi Eliezer's opinion regarding a beehive as per the Mishna Shviit 10:4. This too, will be rejected.

Aug 28, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the birth of a grandson to our friend and co-learner, Tzippy Wolkenfeld. "May the entire family rejoice as they are zoche to raise the new "daf yomi addition" to Torah, chuppah , and maasim tovim . Mazal tov!" Another attempt is made from our Mishna to support Rav Dimi's position, that when one sells a house, it does not include the airspace above or below unless otherwise specified. However, this attempt is rejected. The Gemara then quotes an opinion of Rav Papa to show that he disagrees with Rav Dimi, but this also is rejected. Selling a house doesn't include a pit or cistern if it is not specified in the agreement. But can we assume that the seller kept an accessway to get there or does the seller need to buy an access route through the house from the buyer? Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis disagree about this. What is the difference between a pit and a cistern? A pit is dug in hard soil and is just dug up into the ground, while a cistern is dug in softer ground and therefore needs to be lined with stone to prevent it from collapsing. The Gemara understands the debate between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis in the Mishna to be the source of a well-known debate between them. Rabbi Akiva holds that a seller sells with a "good" eye (generously) and therefore does not keep an access route but completely sells the house. The rabbis hold that a seller sells with a "bad" eye (sparingly) and therefore keeps an access route to get to the pit. However, the Gemara suggests that perhaps their opinions in this Mishna are based on different reasoning. Eventually, the Gemara derives the well-known debate from the combination of our Mishna and a Mishna in Bava Batra 71.

Aug 27, 2024

If one says yachlok , divide my portion with..., the person gets half, but what is the law if one says "give a chelek , portion, to...? Ravina bar Kisi brings an answer from a braita which rules in a similar case that one gets a quarter as there is a doubt whether the intent was half or a bit and Sumchus rules that when there is money in question, the money is split it between the two parties. A braita explains that a Levite can sell one property and stipulate that the owner give the seller the Levite tithes. How can one do this if it means selling something that does not yet exist? To answer this question, the Gemara assumes that the seller retains rights to part of the land. Reish Lakish infers from this braita the law for a different case when the seller says he/she is selling the house but retaining the upper floor, as both are cases where there is no real meaning to the statement and it is therefore applied to mean something else. Regarding the Levite, there is no way to retain future produce, so the seller must have meant the land itself. With the house, since there is no need to retain the upper floor, so it must have been referring to something else. Rav Zevid and Rav Pappa each provide different interpretations in the case of the house as to what Reish Lakish understood to be retained by the original owner - either to hang a beam from the roof into the airspace of the courtyard (Rav Zevid) or building rights to build on the roof if the current roof is destroyed (Rav Papa). The Gemara raises a difficulty with Rav Papa's explanation as it is more intuitive to derive it from the next Mishna (Bava Batra 64a) than from the braita. Rav Dimi discusses the difference between a sale with no specification, one where it was stipulated that the buyer acquires the depths and the heights, and one where the buyer acquired from the depths of the earth to the height of the sky. What items are included in each case? The Gemara tries to prove his statement from the next Mishna, but then rejects the proof.

Aug 26, 2024

This week's learning is sponsored by Rozy Jaffe and family in loving memory of her father Mickey Muhlrad, משה יעקב בן ר׳ דוד ע״ה on his 11th yahrzeit. "My father was a humble man of incredible honesty and integrity. He never spoke Loshen Hara and though his cheder studies were cut short by WWII- he supported and encouraged Torah learning for his children and others throughout his lifetime!" Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in loving memory of Harlene Appleman, Chaya bat Osna Rachel v'Shmuel. "Harlene, our cherished friend and mentor, was the consummate professional and the ultimate friend. Her clear sechel and her passion for Jewish education and identity continue to "whisper in my ear" as an expression of שפתי ישנים דובבות. May our learning be a zechut for her!" If one designates the border of a field but one side extends farther than the other, what size field does the buyer get? Rav rules that a line is drawn from the shorter border, but Rav Kahana and Rav Asi say that a trapezoid shape is drawn from the shorter border to the longer one. In what case did Rav concede to the others? A question is asked about three similar cases – where the border delineated is just the corners of a field, or in the shape of an L, or there were two fields on each side and the border delineated skipped every other one. No answer is given to these questions. If three border strips were delineated but the fourth was not, does the seller get the field and the fourth border strip, the field without the fourth border strip, or just a strip of land alongside each of the three border strips? Rav, Shmuel, and Rav Asi each hold a different position. Rava rules and the Gemara brings two different versions of Rava's ruling. The Gemara then summarizes the two different versions of Rava's ruling. The Ramban and others comment that the summary is an addition of Rav Yehudai Gaon and not part of the original Gemara. Raba brings two rulings in which he differentiates between different wording used and their meaning. Abaye disagrees with both differentiations and holds that in each case, there is no difference in the law whether one language was used or another – the meaning is the same.

Aug 25, 2024

When one sells a house, it does not include certain parts of the house, unless the seller specifies that the sale includes everything in the house. The Mishna lists the properties not included in the sale – the yetzia , for which the Gemara brings two possible definitions, an inner room used for storage, and a room with a parapet of ten handsbreadths. Rav Yosef quotes a braita that says there are two other synonyms for the word yetzia – tzela and ta – and sources from the Torah and tannaitic sources are brought to show where these words are used. Mar Zutra qualifies the yetzia exclusion to one where the yetzia was four cubits. Ravina questions this but Mar Zutra resolves the difficulty. Why was it necessary for the Mishna to add the case of the room if one could have derived the ruling for the storage room from the yetzia ? It teaches that even if the seller designates a border, and the storage room is included in the border, if the seller says "house," the room is not included. This accords with two statements of Rav Nachman that the Gemara proceeds to analyze and establish the circumstances of the cases. Why did Rav Nachman need to teach about both cases – why couldn't we have derived one from the other? The Gemara mentions certain terms and explains what would be included in a sale if that particular term was used, such as ara , arata , zihara , and nichsei.

Aug 23, 2024

Aug 23, 2024

Why can a resident of a courtyard insist on a gutter pipe being moved, but not a gutter itself? If a resident has an item that juts out into a neighbor's airspace or a window that faces the neighbor's property, can the resident create a chazaka if the neighbor has not complained? Creating a chazaka depends on whether or not it is something we would expect the neighbor to complain about. If they will unlikely complain, their lack of complaint doesn't enable the other to create a chazaka . What types of things does a neighbor not even have the right to complain about?

Aug 22, 2024

Rabbi Bena'a measured burial caves to mark the locations of the graves for reasons of ritual purity. What happened when he reached Avraham's and Adam's graves? What was he allowed to see and what was he not allowed to see? A story is told of an amgosh (a Persian priest or magician) who entered the graves of others to take things or remove bodies from the caves. In a separate story about Rabbi Bena'a, he was imprisoned by non-Jewish authorities but later released due to his great intelligence and appointed as a judge. As a judge, he critiqued some signs hung at the entrance to their city, and they incorporated his edits into the signs. The Mishna discusses various items that may or may not create a chazaka (presumptive right) depending on various factors, including sizes - such as a gutter, the spout of a gutter, a ladder, and windows.

Aug 21, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim (Weiss) in loving memory of her father David Aschheim z"l, whose 44th yahrzeit is today. "You left us too soon at the age of 56. Although your Jewish education was interrupted because of WWII, you always ensured that I got a Jewish/Zionist education. You would be proud of the legacy you left: my aliyah, my continuous learning with Hadran and the achievements of Eitan and David in the International Little League championships, played in Kovno Poland. Eitan proudly carried the Israeli flag on the soil that our ancestors fled in 1900." In what type of a case can brothers both testify for someone regarding a three-year chazaka and in what type of case would their testimony not be accepted? The Mishna lists types of acts that can create a chazaka of possession in another's field and which actions can not. Different explanations are suggested to explain the difference between the actions that can/cannot create a chazaka . Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Bena'a make certian recommendations regarding appropriate behavior including: not looking at women when they launder their clothes, how men should dress, how to set the table in a way that will be neat and minimize mess, on which side of the table the ring should jut out so it doesn't harm others or cause children to play with it and what should one store under one's bed (only slippers so it shouldn't be cluttered).

Aug 20, 2024

If there is no border, how does one determine how much of the field was acquired by the buyer? The sea quill was used by Yehoshua to demarcate borders between the tribes when they conquered the land of Israel. In the book of Yehoshua, some cities were listed but not others – why? The boundaries given to Moshe are those used to determine which land is obligated in tithes. The ones excluded from this are the lands that belonged to other neighbors (not from the seven nations) - the Kini , Knizi and Kadmoni . There is a debate among three rabbis about where geographically these lands were. The Mishna and Gemara discuss issues regarding testimony for one who is trying to establish a three-year chazaka. Can three groups of witnesses testify each about a separate year? Is this considered a whole unit of testimony (which is acceptable) or a part of a testimony (which is not acceptable)? If two witnesses testified about all three years but disagreed about which type of produce the person benefitted from, would their testimony be accepted?

Aug 19, 2024

Rav Huna bought land from a gentile, but after he paid for the land and before a document was written, another Jew came and acquired the land through chazaka , by plowing a bit in the field. Rav Nachman ruled as per Shmuel's ruling that the land belongs to the other Jew. Rav Huna challenged Rav Nachman by suggesting that if Rav Nachman were to hold by Shmuel, then he should also hold by Shmuel's other ruling that if one plows in an ownerless field, one only acquires the area where one plowed. However, Rav Nachman responded that on that issue he holds like Rav Huna himself who held like Rav that the entire field belongs to the one who plowed, even if one plowed in a very small area. Rabba quoted three laws he heard from Ukvan bar Nechemia the exilarch in the name of Shmuel. The first is that dina d'mlachuta dina , that the law of the land is the law. The second and third are based on the first. In Persia, a chazaka can be created on land if one lives on a property for forty years. The commentaries disagree about the relevance of this halakha in Jewish law. If the king seizes the property of one who does not pay the land tax and sells it to another Jew, the sale is valid, as that is the law of the land. There is a debate about whether this applies only to land seized from those who did not pay the land tax or also to those who did not pay the head tax. If there is a border or a sea quill plant in the middle of a field, this is considered a separation for various laws. However, there is a debate whether the separation is only for the purposes of acquiring land that was ownerless, or also for pea'h and ritual impurity, and possibly also for laws of carrying on Shabbat. The Gemara explains the halakhic relevance of a separation between fields for pea'h , ritual impurity, and Shabbat.

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Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim (Weiss) in loving memory of her mother, Edith Aschheim Z"L, on her 41st yahrzeit today. "You left us too soon at the age of 56. You left Vienna on the kindertransport on 1 September 1939 and eventually began a new life in NYC, lamenting your lack of Jewish education due to interruptions caused by World War II. You would be proud of the legacy you left: my aliyah a year ago with Robert and my continuous learning with Hadran since this daf cycle began." Regarding those incapable of creating a chazaka , can their sons create a chazaka ? Why and in what case is there a difference between the son of a robber and the son of a craftsman or a sharecropper? For those who the Mishna mentions that they cannot create a chazaka , if they bring a proof, that would be effective. However, this does not hold true for a robber. Why? Rav Huna holds that if one forces another to sell an item, the sale is a good sale. The Gemara attempts to prove on what basis Rav Huna holds this way.

Aug 9, 2024

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Aug 5, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Marcia Baum in loving memory of her father, Sam Baum, on his 21st yahrzeit. "Dad was a larger-than-life individual whose acts of chesed and tzedaka are remembered to this day. He was a proud Jew, lover of Israel, and a proud American. He is sorely missed by all who knew him." For a chazaka of presumptive status to be effective, the possessor must bring a claim of how the land came into their possession. What would/would not be considered an effective claim? Why doesn't the court advise the possessor on a possible claim the possessor could make? In two stories, rabbis claimed they had a chazaka but were ruled against as the chazaka was not created properly. In a third story relating to chazaka , there is a debate among the rabbis about whether or not this was effective. If three different people owned the land for the three years of chazaka , each claimed to have purchased it from the previous owner, can the third one claim to have a chazaka on the land after the third year?

Aug 4, 2024

What other actions require the presence of two people and which require three? In the context of this discussion, the Gemara elaborates on the laws of moda'a , a preemptive declaration. Rav Yehuda ruled that a document gift that is "hidden" is not effective. Why? Can it be used as a preemptive declaration?

Aug 2, 2024

If the original owner protests if a possessor is profiting from the land, but tells the witnesses not to let the possessor know, is the protest effective? The Gemara brings several variations of this type of situation and the rulings of different rabbis in each one, depending on the language used. In front of how many people does one need to protest - two or three? Is it similar to the laws of lashon hara ? What is at the root of the debate? Is it sufficient to protest once in the first year or does one need to protest once every three years? What other actions need to be performed in the presence of two people and which require three?

Aug 2, 2024

Study Guide Bava Batra 38 There are three different regions for creating a chazaka on land, meaning that if the land is in one region and the owner is in a different region, one cannot prove ownership by benefitting from the produce for three years. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and explains the reason for three years is exactly for this type of scenario - to allow enough time for someone living far away to hear and return to protest. Does tana kamma hold that one does need/does not need to protest in the presence of the possessor? Rav explained that one does not need to protest in the presence of the possessor and explained the Mishna to be referring to a time of emergency when people were forbidden from traveling between regions. A question is raised from a different statement of Rav and is resolved. There are two different versions of the discussion regarding Rav's additional statement. What is the wording necessary for a protest to be considered a legitimate protest?

Aug 1, 2024

The Gemara continues to discuss whether plowing can create a chazaka on land. This issue was a subject of debate by many rabbis. If one benefits from only 10 out of 30 trees (that are growing in a field of three beit sea ) each year (and each year a different ten), one can still create a chazaka on the whole field, both according to the rabbis and Rabbi Yishmael. However, there are two limitations to this halakha. If one sold all one's property to two people - one the trees and the other, the land, does the one who purchased the trees also acquire the land under/around the trees? How does that differ from one who sold the rights to the trees in one's property? Or if one sold the land but kept the trees? How does that case relate to the argument of Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding one who sold a field but kept a pit or cistern for him/herself - did one leave oneself a path to get there or does one need to buy a path from the buyer to get there?

Jul 31, 2024

Today's daf is sponsored by Ariele Mortkowitz for the refuah shleima of Aliza Yehudit bat Malka Esther. "For the merit of healing and continued health and long life." Several assumptions about human behavior are used to determine ownership. One generally doesn't bring tools and harvest in a field that is not one's own. One wouldn't protest land that is unlikely to grow crops or unprotected land whose produce will likely be eaten by the animals, or produce that is forbidden to sell by law ( orla, shmita, kelaim ). According to the Mishna, there is presumptive ownership for slaves after three years. How can Reish Lakish's statement that possession of livestock cannot be used as proof of ownership as they are free to move on their own, be understood in light of the Mishna? Rava ruled that one can establish presumptive ownership on a small slave immediately - on what basis? There is a debate regarding whether or not plowing would be considered an act of chazaka if the owner did not protest. The Gemara first assume that this issue is the source of debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna, but then rejects that understanding.