About this episode
Rav assumes that the Mishna ruled that the story of the rape in the Mishna took place on the day of the shuk in Tzippori when there were not only a majority of Jews in the city but also a majority of Jews passing through to sell their wares and the ruling followed Rabbi Yehoshua who ruled that in a case where there are two majorities, we can assume the rapist was Jewish and the woman can marry a kohen. The majority of those who pass through the city should be enough to permit the woman to marry a kohen as they are a passing majority, as opposed to the majority of the city which is set in its place and therefore, regular laws of majority do not apply. However, the rabbis made a decree not to permit passed on a majority of passersby so that we don't come to accidentally permit based on the majority of the city's inhabitants. This is different from law of nine kosher stores and one non-kosher store and there is a piece of meat that we are unsure from which store it came. If a piece of meat is on the street, we follow the majority of stores and permit it, even though we only have one majority. The reason for the stringency in our case if because the rabbis were strict when it came to who kohanim can marry. Rabbi Zeira held that when an item is in its place (like a piece of meat was purchased from one of the stores and we don't know from which one), we cannot follow rules of majority - instead, we say it is either kosher or not kosher - 50/50 chance, both to be strict and to be lenient, depending on the case. The Gemara finds a case where we rule leniently. They bring a verse from the Torah Devarim 19:11 as the source for this rule. Rav Chiya bar Ashi says that Rav ruled like Rabbi Yosi that the girl who was raped was permitted to marry a kohen. Rav Chanan bar Rava says in the name of Rav that it was a unique case and one cannot learn halacha from there to permit based on a majority. Rabbi Yirmia assumes at this point that Rav Chiya bar Ashi held that Rav ruled like Rabbi Yosi even in the case of only one majority and raises a difficulty against this from a statement Rav himself made regarding the Mishna in Machshirin 2:7 indicating that for marriage with a kohen, one needs two majorities. However, the Gemara reminds him that Rav himself understood that the case where Rabbi Yosi ruled was one with two majorities. If so, then Rav Chanan in the name of Rav must be ruling more leniently - in which case, he holds that Rabbi Yosi permitted only based on two majorities in this particular case, but in general, one majority is enough. This understanding does not fit in with the statement Rav made regarding the Mishna in Machshirin. The Gemara explains that Rav Chanan must have not held by Rav's explanation of the Mishna that it was in the day of the market, but held that there was only one majority and that's why the ruling here was unique - as otherwise, one would need two majorities. The Gemara delves into Shmuel understanding of the Mishna in Machshirin as well. If after death or divorce, the woman does not have her ketuba in hand and she and the husband make different claims regarding whether she was a virgin when she married and whether her ketuba was 200 zuz or 100, how do we resolve this?