About this episode
When a woman sells her late husband's property for food payments, how much land can she sell at a time, and in what type of installments does she receive the money? Two opinions are brought and support from braitot are brought for each position. If she sold the land for food payments and then when she wanted to receive her ketuba payment, there was no land left in the estate, could she collect the ketuba payment from the buyer, as there was a lien on the property for her ketuba? Rav Sheshet answers that she cannot as can be derived from a braita. If one sells property as one needs the money for something else, but in the end, does not need the money, can they renege on the deal, even if the reason they were selling it was not made explicitly clear during the transaction? Two sources are brought to answer the question. The first one is rejected. It is unclear whether the second one is rejected or upheld (there are different interpretations of the Gemara). The Gemara rules that one can renege on the deal. If a woman sells her husband's land, does it have to be sold in court? Does it depend on whether she sells it for food or her ketuba payment? There is a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis. Why do the rabbis not require it for her ketuba? Ulla says it is because of hina , to enable marriage. Rabbi Yochanan says it is because a husband wouldn't want to humiliate his wife to make her go in front of a court. Two questions are raised against Ulla, but are resolved. If a woman sells her late husband's land to receive part of her ketuba payment or uses it as collateral for the value of her ketuba or less than the full value, does that prevent her from being able to collect food payments (as is the case when she collects her entire ketuba payment)? If she then proceeds to sell more land of her late husband's does it have to be done in a court or not? Also regarding these issues, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon. Even though the Mishna didn't mention Rabbi Shimon by name, the Gemara concludes that the unnamed opinion is Rabbi Shimon. The rabbis hold that if part of the marriage contract is not collected, it is as if the whole contract is not collected. Rabbi Shimon holds the opposite. If so, their opinions here appear to be the opposite of their opinions regarding the definition of a virgin for marrying a kohen gadol.