Brussels Sprouts

In the last episode of Brussels Sprouts, we looked at the dizzying series of U.S. announcements about America’s military posture in Europe. Since then, new reporting has emerged. The Wall Street Journal reports that the Pentagon is preparing allies for a much larger reduction in the U.S. forces earmarked to reinforce Europe in a crisis—including reductions in bombers, naval assets, and refueling tinkers. In other words, this is not just about troop numbers on the continent today. It’s about whether the United States will still provide the critical enablers that have long underpinned NATO’s ability to deter and, if necessary, fight a major war in Europe. Moscow is watching all of this closely, and the timing matters. As Washington signals that it intends to do less, Russia is increasing pressure on NATO’s eastern flank.   In recent weeks, Moscow has threatened Latvia over false claims that it is allowing Ukraine to use its territory or airspace to launch drone attacks against Russia. Baltic officials have rejected those claims, but the pattern is familiar: Manufacture a grievance, amplify it, and use it to build the foundation to justify future aggression. At the same time, Russia is facing growing domestic strain, which we’ve talked about here on Brussels Sprouts as well, raising questions about whether Putin needs a permanent state of confrontation with the West to sustain his hold on power. So, with all of this, today we are asking a central question: Does Russia see opportunity in this moment, one in which the United States may be pulling back faster than Europe can fill the gap?  To help us understand the view from Moscow, we’re very pleased to welcome back to Brussels Sprouts a series of former intelligence officials: Nate Reynolds, Pete Schroeder, and Jeff Edmonds.  Peter Schroeder is an expert on Russian foreign and security policy with nearly two decades of experience working on Russia and Eurasia in various roles in the intelligence community. He is an adjunct fellow with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).  Nate Reynolds is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and also a longtime intelligence official. Jeff Edmonds is the president of True North Policy, an adjunct fellow with CNAS, and also a very longtime intelligence veteran.

Over the last several weeks, U.S. allies have been trying to make sense of a dizzying series of announcements about America’s military posture and broader role in Europe. First came reports that the Trump administration planned to withdraw roughly 5,000 troops from Germany following a public dispute with Chancellor Friedrich Merz over the war with Iran. Shortly thereafter, the Pentagon paused the deployment of thousands of U.S. troops to Poland—a move that blindsided officials in Warsaw, particularly because Poland has consistently positioned itself as a model ally. Then, in another abrupt reversal, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would instead send an additional 5,000 troops to Poland, though it remains unclear whether these are new forces, previously paused deployments, or units being shifted from elsewhere in Europe. These announcements hung heavy over last week’s NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Sweden, where Secretary of State Marco Rubio signaled that Washington would step back from playing the leading role in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine after months of stalled diplomacy. Rubio also emphasized that European allies would need to shoulder more of the burden for their own defense, reinforcing the sense that the United States is narrowing the scope of its role in European security. At a moment when Russia continues to pressure NATO’s eastern flank, the debate is no longer whether the United States will reduce its role in Europe but how fast, how coherently, and with what consequences for deterrence and alliance cohesion. To help us unpack all of this, Douglas Lute and Justyna Gotkowska join Brussels Sprouts this week to discuss. Justyna Gotkowska is deputy director and head of the Security and Defence Department at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw. Ambassador Douglas Lute is chair of BGR Group’s International and Trade Practice and its Defense and Critical Technologies Practice. He is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and formerly served as the U.S. permanent representative to NATO.

As conversations about the status of the liberal world order swirl in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic, many are realizing that old ways of thinking about the rules-based order, power, and international cooperation may no longer hold. Mark Leonard’s new book, Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail, argues that we need a fundamentally different way of thinking about the future. The current moment may not be a world between orders, but a new state of durable “unorder,” defined by four big structural forces—climate, chips, capital, and civilizations—along with the biggest source of the chaos behind them: China. Chaos has become the system, Leonard argues, and rather than looking for order, Europeans should figure out how to have agency. Surviving Chaos is especially relevant given the U.S. war with Iran, demonstrating how today’s crises overlap and reinforce one another. Energy shortfalls, food insecurity, nuclear proliferation, and global economic shocks all occur simultaneously. Do today’s crises signal a deeper shift toward unorder? Are shared rules and assumptions still relevant? And what does this mean for Europe and how can it adapt? To discuss these questions and much more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Mark Leonard to this week’s edition of the podcast. Mark Leonard is cofounder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Over the last several weeks, strain within Russia's domestic political system has become increasingly apparent. The Kremlin has intensified digital controls, intermittently disrupting mobile internet access and placing growing pressure on foreign platforms, including the widely used Telegram messaging service. Authorities have also expanded efforts to restrict VPN use. While the government frames these measures as necessary to guard against Ukrainian drone attacks, public frustration appears to be mounting. Russians have attempted to hold protests and are voicing complaints on social media, with one video expressing grievances by an influencer and former reality TV star going viral. Discontent is also surfacing among segments of the elite. Politicians in the “systemic opposition,” along with some members of United Russia, have publicly questioned aspects of the tightening restrictions. Business leaders and economic officials concerned about mounting costs and disruptions have signaled unease. At the same time, structural pressures in the economy are becoming more pronounced. Despite benefiting from elevated energy revenues, Russia faces persistent inflation, fiscal strain, and an acute labor shortage. Putin’s central banker was just out declaring an unprecedented labor shortage driven by an exodus of 1.5 million people and about 1.3 million casualties in the war. Individually, neither tightening information controls nor economic strain is likely to drive political change. But taken together, do these pressures point to something more consequential? And what do they mean for Russia's future? To answer these questions and more, Brussels Sprouts welcomes Alexander Gabuev and Joshua Yaffa to the show. Alexander Gabuev is the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. Joshua Yaffa is a contributing writer at The New Yorker and the author of Between Two Fires: Truth, Ambition, and Compromise in Putin’s Russia, which won the Orwell Prize in 2021.

Doubts about U.S. reliability and the future of NATO are top of mind for most in the transatlantic community. The concerns that spiked after President Donald Trump’s threats to seize Greenland have gained new urgency amid the standoff over Europe’s position on America’s war in Iran. The tensions in U.S. relations with Europe were on full display earlier this month during President Trump’s meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Washington and afterward when Trump berated NATO allies online, calling the alliance a paper tiger.   In the context of these criticisms and threats, European officials are reportedly working on fallback plans to ensure Europe can maintain deterrence against Russia, preserve command and control, and replace military assets if the United States departs the alliance. All of this raises fundamental questions about the future of the NATO alliance. How can Europe maintain credible deterrence with less U.S. involvement? And what is the latest thinking on how the alliance needs to adapt?  To tackle these questions and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome back Ivo Daalder and Camille Grand to this week’s edition of the podcast.  Ivo Daalder is a former U.S. ambassador to NATO and previously served as president and chief executive officer of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Camille Grand is secretary general of the Aerospace, Security, and Defence Industries Association of Europe and previously served as assistant secretary general for defense investment at NATO.

On April 12, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban conceded defeat in the country’s general elections, which ousted his party Fidesz and ended his rule of 16 years. The election was widely seen as a referendum on Orban’s self-described “illiberal democracy,” and his loss is a blow to the global nationalist movement promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump. Peter Magyar, a former ally of Orban and the founder of Tisza, the main opposition party, will take over as prime minister once the new parliament convenes. The defeat is striking not just because Orban held power for so long but because of just how rigged the Hungarian system was in his favor. Over 16 years, Orban’s party tilted the electoral system to its advantage, stacked the judicial system and independent agencies, and took control of most news media. Magyar and his party’s message focused on economic dissatisfaction and anticorruption, which resonated with voters and prompted record turnout. And Magyar’s Tisza party win has broader implications for Europe. In the short term, without Orban advocating for the Kremlin’s interests, blocking European assistance to Ukraine, and watering down sanctions against Russia, change in Hungary will likely yield positive results for Ukraine. To discuss all of this and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Rosa Balfour and Dan Kelemen to this week’s edition.  Rosa Balfour is the director of Carnegie Europe. R. Daniel Kelemen is the McCourt Chair at Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy.

On April 7, after more than five weeks of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 14-day ceasefire, provided Iran allows passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The following day, the leaders of seven European states—plus Canada, the European Commission, and the European Council—released a joint statement welcoming the ceasefire, encouraging a negotiated settlement, and announcing that their governments “will contribute to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.” The group included the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, and Spain, which has especially angered President Trump for its opposition to the war. Leaders from each of these countries and the European Union have also called for the ceasefire to include Lebanon, which the United States and Israel say was not part of the agreement. On a planned visit to the Gulf, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer emphasized the importance of opening the Strait of Hormuz, saying it is the “job” of leaders to do so. France’s top military commander said that the French government was considering “strictly defensive” military options to assist. That same day, Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Washington as part of a long-scheduled visit. Trump reportedly used the meeting to vent his frustration with NATO allies over their refusal to back the U.S. war with Iran, signaling that he was considering reprisal. Trump, who has repeatedly threatened to pull the United States out of the alliance, berated NATO allies online following the meeting and alluded to his previous threats to annex Greenland—which precipitated the last major crisis in the transatlantic relationship before the war with Iran.  To make sense of these developments, Brussels Sprouts is happy to welcome back Constanze Stelzenmüller and Sophia Besch to this week’s edition of the podcast.    Sophia Besch is a senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  Constanze Stelzenmüller is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution.  The episode was recorded on April 10, 2026.

While the world's attention has turned to the war with Iran, the war in Ukraine continues. Russia has seemingly kicked off its spring offensive, but a meaningful breakthrough remains unlikely. Moscow has increased the tempo of its operations, relying more heavily on mechanized and motorized assaults, an approach that is typical for this time of year. Yet last year's experience suggests limited prospects for success. Despite a similar surge last year, Russian forces achieved only marginal gains while incurring significant equipment losses, ultimately forcing Russian forces to relatively quickly return to smaller scale infiltration tactics. Meanwhile, the war in Iran will affect dynamics in Ukraine. The most pressing concern for Ukraine is its air and missile defense. Russia is expanding production of ballistic missiles and improving their effectiveness. Kyiv remains heavily dependent on U.S.-provided systems to intercept these threats, with no real viable alternative currently available. The United States is rapidly expending these resources in the Middle East. And the longer that conflict continues, the more it is likely to exacerbate Ukraine's vulnerability. Financially, Russia is also benefiting from the war with Iran. Higher oil prices and the easing of US sanctions are pumping higher revenue into Russia's coffers. Although Ukraine is taking bold steps to disrupt Russia's energy exports, a prolonged period of higher energy prices will, at a minimum, alleviate the economic strain that Moscow was feeling earlier this year. To discuss these dynamics and much more, Brussels Sprouts is very happy to welcome Elina Ribakova and Ambassador Bill Taylor to the show this week. Ambassador Bill Taylor is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. Elina Ribakova is vice president for foreign policy at the Kyiv School of Economics and a non-resident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

On March 14, in the wake of a global energy shock triggered by the United States military campaign against Iran, President Donald Trump called on allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian attacks on commercial shipping have disrupted oil flows. European leaders responded cautiously, and in many cases negatively, as they tried to balance concerns about the conflict with the need to preserve relations with Washington. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius was blunt, saying, “This is not our war.” United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer struck a more measured tone, pledging to work with allies to restore freedom of navigation, but emphasizing that the UK would “not be drawn into the wider war.” The following day, Trump raised the stakes, warning that NATO faces a “very bad” future if allies fail to act. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte expressed confidence that members would ultimately come together to secure the strait. But the incident has already exposed deep unease in Europe, both about the trajectory of the conflict and on the future of the transatlantic alliance. To discuss all of this and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook and Jeremy Shapiro to this week’s show.  Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook is executive vice president at the Bertelsmann Foundation Jeremy Shapiro is the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S. foreign policy and transatlantic relations

On March 2, 2026, in a speech at France’s Île Longue base, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled major changes to France’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. First, Macron announced an increase, the first since 1992, in France’s nuclear stockpile. France currently maintains 290 warheads and will increase that number to a now-undisclosed count. He also announced a new doctrine, what he called “forward deterrence.” This is a partnership with seven European countries—Germany, Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden—on strategic issues. That cooperation will include partner participation in nuclear exercises and the potential for France to temporarily deploy nuclear armed fighter jets to other European countries. While France will maintain the independence of its nuclear command and control and remain outside of NATO’s nuclear mission, this extension of the French nuclear umbrella represents a significant shift in French policy in response to the new realities of the European security environment, which includes a less reliable commitment from the United States.  To help us understand these changes and to talk through broader implications of a declining U.S. presence in Europe for European strategic deterrence, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Claudia Major and Bruno Tertrais to this week’s show.  Claudia Major is the senior vice president of Transatlantic Security at the German Marshall Fund.  Bruno Tertrais is the deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research and a non-resident fellow at the Institut Montaigne.

On February 28, the United States launched Operation Epic Fury, a major military campaign against Iran carried out alongside Israeli strikes. The opening wave targeted Iranian command and control nodes, missile forces, and military infrastructure across multiple cities and included a decapitation strike that killed the supreme leader. The conflict quickly spread beyond Iran itself. Tehran has retaliated with missile and drone strikes across the Gulf, hitting U.S. and allied targets in countries including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and even striking the British military base in Cyprus. From Europe, the response has been sharply divided. Spain’s government has rejected what it called the “unilateral military action” by the United States and Israel and denied U.S. forces the use of Spanish bases for the operations. Sitting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in the White House, President Donald Trump slammed Spain’s position and threatened to cut off trade with Madrid. And Spain hasn’t been Trump's only target—Trump has been highly critical of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. After Starmer said the UK did not support regime change from the sky and initially blocked the use of UK bases for strikes, Trump said of his counterpart, “this is not Winston Churchill we are dealing with,” and that the special relationship between the United States and the UK is “not what it was.” Across European capitals, officials are also bracing for the consequences: fears of a new refugee crisis, evacuations of citizens from countries across the Gulf, higher energy prices, cyber and terrorism threats, and concerns that a widening Middle East conflict could further strain already tight munitions supplies needed to support Ukraine.  To discuss all this and much more, Brussels Sprouts welcomes Steven Erlanger and Julian Barnes-Dacey.  Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times and is based in Berlin.  Julien Barnes-Dacey is the director of the Middle East & North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

This week marks the four-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Brussels Sprouts wanted to mark this somber milestone with a look at the conflict and the ongoing efforts to secure a durable end to the war. Even as the war in Ukraine shows no signs of an imminent end, the international community, and the allies in Europe in particular, have been working on the foundations of a credible security guarantee for Ukraine once the fighting ends. Part of this line of effort has been the proposed creation of a multinational force, which could be deployed to Ukraine once the hostilities cease to serve as a visible reassurance force. Perhaps more critically, the multinational force could help Ukraine regenerate its military forces and strengthen its own ability to deter further Russian aggression. Led by the United Kingdom and France, the multinational force has the potential to be a key pillar of Ukraine's future security, yet there are lingering questions about what the force aims to do and how it will function. The UK Minister for the Armed Forces Al Carns joins Brussels Sprouts to share insights on the multinational force, the state of the war at this four-year mark, and UK views on the changing dynamics in the European security landscape. Alistair Carns has served as the UK minister for the armed forces since September 2025 and as a member of Parliament since 2024. Before holding elected office, he served as an active-duty Royal Marine officer for 25 years.

This week’s episode of Brussels Sprouts picks up in the aftermath of the Munich Security Conference. The U.S. tone at Munich was notably more conciliatory than last year, as U.S. officials sought to calm anxieties. Secretary of State Marco Rubio received a standing ovation as he called European allies America’s oldest friends and cited the history of mutual defense from Korea to Afghanistan. But for many Europeans, the rhetoric did little to dispel deeper doubts about the trajectory of the transatlantic relationship.  Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was also at Munich, stepping onto the main stage against the backdrop of transatlantic strain. Wang used his presence to position China as a responsible global actor and a stabilizing force in a fragmented world. Notably, the sharp European rhetoric toward Beijing that defined previous conferences was more muted. As tensions with Washington have mounted, several European leaders, including Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer, have also traveled to Beijing. Geopolitical currents in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific are rapidly changing, and there is no one better to talk about these developments than a former ambassador to both China and NATO: Ambassador Nick Burns.  Nick Burns is a professor of diplomacy and international relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Previously, he was a career foreign service officer and served as U.S. ambassador to China from 2021–2025 and as ambassador to NATO from 2001–2005.

Today’s Brussels Sprouts discussion follows on from our conversation last week on whether middle powers have the ability to chart a course more independent of the United States. Today, we delve into this question as it pertains to whether Europe can defend itself with significantly less U.S. presence in Europe—or none at all. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently addressed that question, saying that if anyone believes Europe or the European Union can defend itself without the United States, they are "dreaming.” In December, German newspaper Die Welt conducted a wargame simulating a Russian invasion of NATO, in partnership with military researchers at Helmut Schmidt University. During the exercise, Russian troops moved unchallenged through NATO territory for three days, capturing a Lithuanian city in the Suwałki Gap. The resulting analysis has cast serious doubt on whether European NATO states can defend their Baltic allies.   We are joined today by one of the wargame participants, Franz-Stefan Gady, as well as Russian military analyst Mike Kofman, to help us delve into these critical questions on how “Europe with less U.S." would fare in a fight against Russia, and how long it might take Europe to get to a place where it can take on greater responsibility for its own defense.  Mike Kofman is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  Franz-Stefan Gady is a defense analyst, the founder of Gady Consulting, and an adjunct senior fellow with the Center for a New American Security.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made headlines at this year's World Economic Forum in Davos with his speech in which he declared that the international system is in the midst of a rupture—not a transition—and that middle powers must reduce their dependence on great powers such as the United States. Carney called for middle powers to diversify their partnerships and cooperate among themselves to hedge against rising uncertainty, and great powers' weaponization of interdependence. Carney asserted that the middle powers must act together because “if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.”   Carney's speech was praised far and wide, with many crediting him for calling out what many have been feeling, especially in the last year under the Trump administration. What remains to be seen, however, is whether middle powers like Canada and its transatlantic partners will truly be able to form the new partnerships needed to reduce their dependence on the United States and navigate changing geopolitical realities.     To help us find the answers to these questions and more, we're excited to welcome Barry Posen and Ivo Daalder to Brussels Sprouts.  Barry Posen is professor of international relations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the former director of the MIT Security Studies Program.  Ivo Daalder is a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center. He was previously the president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the U.S. ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013.

It has been a tumultuous month in the transatlantic alliance. This week, President Donald Trump’s demands to take control of Greenland reached a fever pitch. On Sunday, President Trump threatened major tariffs on Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and a host of other American allies in Europe to coerce them to accept his demands for U.S. control over Greenland. For many European allies, Trump crossed a line, and allies raised the prospect of using their anticoercion instrument against the United States. Though Trump posted on Wednesday afternoon that he had negotiated a “framework deal” to avert the crisis with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, much damage was already done. Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave a speech at the World Economic Forum annual meeting at Davos declaring the end of the era of decisive U.S. global leadership, Trump launched the Board of Peace for Gaza—to which he invited Russian President Vladimir Putin—and Putin ordered more missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s capital and critical infrastructure, in what has been one of the harshest winters in Ukraine in recent memory. Less than a month into the new year, it’s hard to avoid the feeling that we are in the worst period the Transatlantic Alliance has seen since World War II.  To help us make sense of recent events and to put this crisis into historical context, we're very happy to welcome Jim Goldgeier and Charles Kupchan to Brussels Sprouts.  Jim Goldgeier is a research affiliate at Stanford University and a professor of international relations at American University, and he worked on the National Security Council under the Clinton administration.  Charles Kupchan is a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He also served on the National Security Council under Presidents Clinton and Obama.

Since the invasion of Ukraine, European states have taken major steps to rebuild their defense industrial bases, both to supply Ukraine and to rebuild their own militaries. Europe has been spending heavily on defense since 2022, but the Trump administration’s demand for European NATO members to take responsibility for the conventional defense of the continent has spurred further investments. Add in the Trump administration’s bellicose rhetoric around Greenland and public doubts about the reliability of America in NATO, plus the dual challenges of a resurgent Russia and a wavering United States, and the push for European officials to integrate their defenses further only grows. As European states continue to rearm in 2026, they face the prospect of rebuilding their militaries, supporting Ukraine, and deterring Russia with less U.S. support.     The new year has already shown a propensity for the unexpected. To help take stock of the way ahead for European security in 2026, we are excited to welcome Sophia Besch and Christian Mölling to this episode of Brussels Sprouts.   Sophia Besch is a senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  Christian Mölling is the director of European Defense in a New Age, a Berlin-based think tank, and is a senior advisor at the European Policy Centre.

On January 3, the United States apprehended the sitting president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, and brought him to the United States to face trial for drug trafficking. In the aftermath of the operation, President Trump and other senior officials in his administration have threatened similar aggression against Mexico and Cuba and revived rhetoric about the United States “needing” Greenland. The operation and Washington’s posture have sent shockwaves through the international system, as concerns rise about the resilience of international law and the risk that the world is moving toward a global order based on spheres of influence, where might makes right and authoritarian states like Russia and China sense a freer hand within their respective regions. The Trump administration’s comments about Greenland are putting additional stress on transatlantic relations, with the Danish prime minister making clear that any U.S. attack on Greenland would end the NATO alliance. To help make sense of the geopolitical implications of Maduro’s capture and more, Brussels Sprouts is pleased to welcome back to the podcast Lawrence Freedman and Shashank Joshi. Lawrence Freedman is an emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London. Shashank Joshi is the defense editor at The Economist.

This week Brussels Sprouts breaks down the latest negotiations on Ukraine. American officials told reporters that they had resolved or closed gaps around 90 percent of their differences with Ukraine on a draft agreement to end the war. Territory and security guarantees remain the key sticking points. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said it would be impossible for Ukraine to give up territory that Russia has not taken on the battlefield, while Russia has not dropped its demands to control the territories it illegally annexed. On the security guarantees front, the United States and Europe sound optimistic that progress is being made. The latest plan seems to envision an 800,000-strong peacetime Ukrainian military, U.S.-provided intelligence and monitoring to track any attempts to breach the peace agreement, and a European-led multinational force that would be stationed in Ukraine but away from the front lines to bolster confidence. However, it is highly unlikely that Russia will agree to this plan or any plan that leaves Ukraine with a strong and capable military. In the meantime, the European Union continues to wrangle over whether it will use the frozen assets to finance a €210 billion loan to keep Ukraine financially solvent.    To help us assess where negotiations stand and where they might go, Brussels Sprouts welcomes Jana Kobzova and Jennifer Kavanagh to the podcast.  Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities. Jana Kobzova is a senior fellow and codirector of the European Security Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

On December 4th, the Trump administration released its long-awaited national security strategy, sending another round of shock waves through the transatlantic community. The national security strategy acknowledges that Europe remains strategically vital to the United States and doubles down on the need for Europe to take more responsibility for its defense, but the strategy is unique in its condemnation of allies, focus on “civilizational erasure”, and promise to intervene to “help Europe correct its current trajectory.” While the 2017 National Security Strategy explicitly laid out several threats Russia poses to American interests, this one makes little mention of Russia except for calls to restore strategic stability. Many of America's European allies are feeling unsettled and concerned about the national security strategy and what it means for transatlantic relations. So, to help us understand the new national security strategy, it differs from Trump's first strategy and where the through lines are, we're excited to welcome Nadia Shadlow and Rebecca Heinrich to Brussels Sprouts. Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and a co-chair of the Hamilton Commission on Securing America’s National Security Innovation Base. Rebeccah Heinrichs is also a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and the director of its Keystone Defense Initiative.

It has been almost a year since Russia and Iran signed their comprehensive strategic partnership. That deal established a 20-year partnership between the two countries covering the full spectrum of their relationship from military to economic to cyber ties. Though the two countries have cooperated deeply, from mass production of military drones to smuggling millions of barrels of oil, Russia did not come to Iran's aid when Iran endured 12 days of punishing war at the hands of Israel and the United States. Despite this, cooperation between Russia and Iran has continued. In November, Financial Times reported that Iranian scientists and nuclear experts made a second covert visit to Russia last year in what the United States claims has been a push to obtain sensitive technologies with potential nuclear weapon applications. Cooperation between the two remains a significant challenge for the United States and its allies.   To take stock of where Russia-Iran relations are and where they may go, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Hanna Notte and Nicole Grajewski to this week’s episode of Brussels Sprouts. Hanna Notte is the director for Eurasia at the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Nicole Grajewski is a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an associate researcher at Harvard’s Belfer Center, and the author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine.

Over the last month, nuclear tensions have been heating up. In late October, Vladimir Putin claimed two achievements: the successful test of a nuclear-powered missile known as Burevestnik and the initial test of an unmanned nuclear-powered submarine known as Poseidon. Both systems theoretically have unlimited range, and both are capable of hosting nuclear warheads. Shortly thereafter, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would resume nuclear testing on an equal basis with Russia and China. This week on Brussels Sprouts, concerns around the world of a revived nuclear arms race are growing. Between Putin’s nuclear testing, inflamed rhetoric from President Trump, and the looming expiration of the New START Arms Control Treaty between Russia and the United States in February 2026, the mounting evidence paints a concerning picture. To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Corey Hinderstein and Jon Wolfsthal to Brussels Sprouts.  Corey Hinderstein is vice president of studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is responsible for the Technology, Sustainability, and Nuclear Policy Programs. Jon Wolfsthal is the director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists and a CNAS adjunct senior fellow.

America’s allies are cooperating in a growing variety of domains. In their recent Foreign Affairs piece, former NATO Ambassador Julie Smith and former National Security Council Senior Director Lindsey Ford argue that the United States should support and facilitate cooperation among America’s European and Indo-Pacific allies. In a world where U.S. adversaries are deepening their cooperation, it is no longer sufficient to ask allies to just focus on their own respective geographic corners of the world. Smith and Ford argue that cooperation between American allies stands to benefit American grand strategy.   This week on Brussels Sprouts, if the United States fails to capitalize on the already present trend of growing cooperation, Washington risks self-isolation and an inability to effectively manage challenges in a world where the lines between Asia and Europe are blurring and crises on one continent have spillover effects on the other.  To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Julie Smith and Lindsey Ford to Brussels Sprouts.    Julie Smith is president and cofounder of Clarion Strategies and former U.S. permanent representative to NATO from 2021 to 2024.    Lindsey Ford is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a former senior director for South Asia at the National Security Council from 2024 to 2025. She served as U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia from 2021 to 2024.

President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on October 30, 2025, ended with a temporary truce between the two leaders. While this may be good news for the U.S.-China relationship in the short term, no formal comprehensive trade agreement followed, and any number of issues could derail the delicate truce. Europe has long sought to balance its ideological opposition to China with the desire for pragmatic trade and diplomatic relations.  This week on Brussels Sprouts, while European nations have largely aligned with the United States in restricting trade with China, could the recent U.S.-China trade thaw lead Brussels to pursue a similar rapprochement?  To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Liz Economy and Mikko Huotari to Brussels Sprouts. Liz Economy is a principal with WestExec Advisors and a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution Mikko Huotari is the executive director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies

Are we in a new Cold War? That is the question Mike McFaul takes on in his new book, Autocrats versus Democrats: Russia, China, America, and the New Global Disorder. McFaul argues that modern analogies to a second Cold War hold some merit but are insufficient given the rise of authoritarian tendencies within the United States and European democracies. Combining analysis of the Russian and Chinese threats with a critique of the Trump administration's isolationist and authoritarian tendencies, McFaul articulates a set of policy prescriptions that sketch a new grand strategy for American engagement with the world. Dr. Michael McFaul is the Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Professor of International Studies at Stanford University

The Trump administration made a major move this week in its announcement of sanctions on major Russian oil companies Rosneft and Luke Oil, along with 31 subsidiaries. This follows President Donald Trump’s cancellation of a discussed meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest and a U.S. agreement to allow Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike targets deeper inside Russia. Some have suggested that European leaders are feeling some satisfaction that their repeated interventions with Trump on behalf of Ukraine have finally produced American pressure on Moscow. This week on Brussels Sprouts, how can Europe navigate escalating Russian attacks on Ukraine and hybrid threats from Moscow while keeping the United States on side? To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Daniela Schwarzer and Natalie Tocci to Brussels Sprouts. Daniela Schwarzer is a board member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung and one of Germany's leading experts on European and international politics and economics and the development of democracy and the rule of law. Nathalie Tocci is the Director of the Italian Institute of International Affairs and a Professor of Practice at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Four years into its war in Ukraine, Russia continues to escalate attacks on the Ukrainian population while also dialing up its hybrid campaign against Europe. In the last six weeks alone, Russia has sent military drones into Polish and Romanian airspace and fighter aircraft into Estonian airspace and has continued its influence operations in places like Moldova and Czechia. The Russian military threat appears to be growing: German intelligence has stated that Russia “will not shy away from a direct military confrontation with NATO,” and the European Commission proposed a roadmap to prepare Europe for war by 2030. Yet that is only one side of the story. Russia has not come close to an operational breakthrough in Ukraine, and its economy is increasingly strained. Ukraine has struck 21 of Russia’s 38 large oil refineries since the start of this year, disrupting as much as 40 percent of the country’s oil refining capacity. Gasoline prices in Russia have spiked nearly 10 percent. In many ways, this is a tale of two Russias: one that appears to be gathering itself to strike NATO and another slowly crumbling under the weight of the war and Western sanctions that show no sign of letting up. To help us evaluate these two paradigms and assess the Russian threat, Brussels Sprouts is pleased to welcome three former deputy national intelligence officers for Russia and Eurasia: Eric Ciaramella and Nate Reynolds, senior fellows with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pete Schroeder, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security’s Transatlantic Security Program.

On the surface, great power competition often seems driven by economic and military conflict, but diplomacy has always been central to great powers' engagement with the world. This is the argument made by Dr. Wess Mitchell in his forthcoming book, Great Power Diplomacy, The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Kissinger. Covering 15 centuries of history, the book makes a powerful case that diplomacy is an essential tool of great power politics and leaders ignore diplomatic skill at their own peril. With the press of current events and especially the rise of cooperation across the Axis of Upheaval, the book is more relevant than ever. We are very delighted to welcome the book's author, Wess Mitchell, to Brussels Sprouts. A. Wess Mitchell is a scholar of international relations, a principal at the Marathon Initiative, and he served as the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia from 2017 to 2019.

On September 28th, Moldovan voters went to the polls in parliamentary elections to choose between competing visions for their country's future. Despite intense efforts by the Kremlin to influence the information space, wage cyber attacks on election infrastructure, and even make bomb threats at diaspora polling places in Europe, the pro-EU party of action and solidarity clinched just over 50 % of the vote, defeating the pro-Russia patriotic electoral bloc's 24%. The pro-EU party will command a parliamentary majority without needing to form a coalition government. This, coupled with pro-EU President Maya Sandu's victory in last year's presidential election, maintains Moldova's path towards the EU. But persistent challenges remain. Economic growth remains sluggish, poverty remains high, and the pro-Russian enclave of Transnistria remains a challenge from Moldova's EU accession hopes. To help us understand and decode the election results and what they mean for Moldova and the future of Russian influence in its periphery, we are very happy to welcome Bill Hill and Laura Thornton to the podcast. William Hill is a retired Foreign Service Officer, was previously a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, and is the former two-time head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. Laura Thornton is the senior director for global democracy programs at the McCain Institute.

Over the last two weeks, Russia has repeatedly violated NATO airspace. Seventeen Russian military drones entered Polish airspace on September 10th, followed by another drone in Romania, three Russian jets flew into Estonian airspace for 12 minutes on September 19th, and drones of unknown origin shut down airports in Copenhagen and Oslo on September 22nd. In response to Russia's initial incursion, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry to increase and coordinate NATO efforts to counter Russia's drone threat. A new CNAS report released on September 10th details the tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to counter drones and finds current American drone capabilities lacking. NATO's counter-drone capabilities are not sufficient at present and urgent action is needed to prepare NATO militaries to counter Russian drone-based threats. Here to discuss the way forward with us is CNAS's own Dr. Stacy Pettyjohn, who's the co-author of the new CNAS report, and a Brussels Sprouts regular, Michael Kofman. Stacie Pettyjohn is a senior fellow and director of the defense program at CNAS Michael Kofman is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Despite the degradation of Moscow’s military in Ukraine, senior western officials estimate that it could reconstitute its forces within two to five years. A new CNAS report considers how a crisis in the Indo-Pacific could shape Russia’s willingness to test NATO. U.S. involvement in a major crisis in Asia would cause Washington to redeploy resources and would-be reinforcements for Europe to the Indo-Pacific, which would create meaningful gaps in NATO defenses. This, in turn, could lead Moscow to perceive a golden opportunity to accomplish its aims: divide the United States and Europe, expand its sphere of influence, and revise the security order in Europe. To discuss the latest Russian provocations and how NATO can fill the gaps in its defenses, we are very fortunate to be joined by General (Ret.) Philip Breedlove and Admiral (Ret.) James Foggo. General (Ret.) Philip Breedlove served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander, U.S. European Command from 2013-2016, capping a 39-year Air Force career. Admiral (Ret.) James Foggo served as Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa from 2017-2020, capping a 39-year Navy career.

In the early hours of September 10th, Polish authorities detected 19 Russian drones over Polish airspace. This incident represents a major escalation, with Poland triggering Article 4 of the NATO Treaty. At a minimum, this was an attempt by Russia to get European nations to back down from their support for Ukraine and to expose the Alliance as a paper tiger. The attack also provided the Kremlin with key insights into Poland and NATO's air defenses and its chain of response. So how do we understand what happened and what needs to happen? To answer those very hard questions, we're very fortunate to have Doug Lute and Kurt Volker with us. Ambassador (Ret.) Douglas Lute served as the United States Ambassador to NATO from 2013–2017. Ambassador (Ret.) Kurt Volker served as the United States Ambassador to NATO from 2008–2009 and as the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations from 2017–2019.

This week, we continue our assessment of the Trump-Putin and Trump-Zelensky meetings in August. European leaders can take solace in the fact that their presence at the Washington meeting means that their views are not being entirely ignored, but significant outstanding questions remain relating to how the discussions of western security guarantees for Ukraine could materialize. Now that any appearance of momentum from the meetings has petered out, we take stock of European leaders’ takeaways from the Washington meeting and where Europe goes from here in its efforts to support Ukraine. To share their views on the future of the European security order, we are very happy to welcome Shashank Joshi and Janis Kluge. Shashank Joshi is the Defense Editor at The Economist  Janis Kluge is Senior Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, Germany

The past week has seen a flurry of diplomacy from President Trump as he seeks to bring about a negotiated solution to Russia’s war on Ukraine. While activity has been undeniably high, what fruit has all this effort borne? Sam Charap and Angela Stent join Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Jim Townsend to help make sense of a whirlwind few days and the implications for the future of Ukraine and the transatlantic relationship writ large. Samuel Charap is Distinguished Chair in Russia and Eurasia Policy and a senior political scientist at RAND. Angela Stent is Professor Emerita of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

One of the most transformative geopolitical developments in recent years has been the increasing alignment among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.  Accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the deepening economic, military, and technological ties among these four countries have resulted in a new Axis of Upheaval—united by shared opposition to a U.S.-led global order. On July 30, CNAS hosted a virtual panel discussing the new report, The Axis of Upheaval: Gauging the Growing Military Cooperation Among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The panel featured: Richard Fontaine, chief executive officer at CNAS Andrea Kendall-Taylor, senior fellow and director of the transatlantic security program at CNAS Karim Sadjadpour, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace The event was moderated by David McKenzie, director of communications at CNAS Read the report! https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-axis-of-upheaval

Jim and Andrea sit down with Fiona Hill, one of the leading thinkers on Russia, U.S.-Russia relations, and transatlantic affairs. The conversation takes place against a dizzying backdrop of issues, including Russia's escalating attacks on Ukraine and its civilian centers, and political unrest in Ukraine over moves by the Zelensky government to strip anti-corruption agencies of their independence. There are also questions about whether President Trump's 50-day ultimatum to Putin to get to a ceasefire represents a genuine change and a new, harder stance on Russia. Trump was across the pond in the UK over the weekend, and met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to finalize a trade deal with the bloc. But despite reaching a deal, the U.S. forced posture review in Europe, of course, still looms over the future of transatlantic affairs. Fiona Hill is a senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe within the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is also the Chancellor of Durham University in the United Kingdom.

During the past several weeks, and since around March of this year, Russia has increased the intensity of its attacks on Ukraine. Moscow is launching brutal aerial assaults on cities and civilian centers, amounting to the largest drone and missile attacks to date in this war. Many eyes are now on Washington as the Trump administration sends inconsistent signals that give onlookers whiplash. Additionally, the bipartisan Senate bill to sanction countries that are still purchasing Russian energy has gained momentum in Congress. But with the August recess fast approaching, it will be a race to get to a vote this month.   To give us an update on the war in Ukraine, we're very pleased to welcome General Ben Hodges and Jana Kobzova.  Ben Hodges is a retired Lieutenant General in the United States Army and the former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe  Jana Kobzova is the Co-Director of the European Security Programme and the European Council on Foreign Relations  This episode was recorded on July 11, 2025

In the wake of a very short communiqué and an abbreviated Summit, many questions have been left unanswered by allies. How NATO would manage a reduction of military assets in Europe, support for Ukraine, nuclear strategy, and the rollout of the 5% spending benchmark are all uncertain at the moment, as is the transatlantic relationship.  To help us understand transatlantic dynamics following the Hague Summit, we’re very pleased to welcome Constanze Stelzemüller and Gabrielius Landsbergis   Constanze Stelzemüller is the Director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution  Gabrielius Landsbergis is the former Foreign Minister of Lithuania

This week’s episode of Brussels Sprouts is the second part in our series on the future of the New START treaty and the viability of arms control between Russia and the United States. If you haven’t already heard this week’s earlier episode with Frank Miller and Eric Edelman, be sure to give it a listen! In a Foreign Affairs piece from April, one of this week’s guests argues that the U.S. should pursue parallel nuclear arms control negotiations with Russia and China, given the deepening Moscow-Beijing partnership, the U.S. faces the realistic prospect of coordinated nuclear threats or a three-way arms race that could dwarf Cold War tensions. While New START's bilateral framework may be outdated, the piece suggests the window for meaningful arms control hasn't closed entirely—but it requires confronting the new reality of great power competition where America's nuclear rivals are increasingly aligned. This week, Rose Gottemoeller and Jon Wolfsthal join to discuss the future of arms control.   Rose Gottemoeller is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Jon Wolfsthal is the Director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists and an adjunct senior fellow at CNAS

On this week’s episode of Brussels Sprouts, we’re kicking off a special 2-part series on the future of the New START treaty and the viability of arms control between Russia and the United States. Tune in now to part 2 to hear the other side of this debate!  In a recent piece in Foreign Affairs, "No New START," this week’s guests argue that in the current geopolitical context, with Russia and China’s increased coordination, military capabilities, and aggression against the West, nuclear arms control only hurts the U.S.’s ability to deter them. With the possibility of conflict in more than one theater, the United States needs to reverse the material constraints put in place by New START in order to curb Russian and Chinese aggression.  So, this week, we’re very pleased to welcome Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller to discuss the U.S.’s future nuclear posture with Russia.  Eric Edelman is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and was the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2005-2009  Franklin Miller is a principal at the Scowcroft Group and served as a senior nuclear policy and arms control official in the Pentagon for 3 decades.

Next week, on June 24th and 25th, NATO will hold its annual summit in the Hague. In the run-up to the event, expectations are low among allies. The ultimate goal is to navigate the Summit without major incident and walk away with unity still intact. At the top of the agenda is the historic new pledge to spend 5% of GDP on defense. However, not everything is in agreement going into Tuesday, with varying perspectives on Russia, and Allies anxiously awaiting the outcome of the U.S. posture review to see how a downsized U.S. presence in Europe takes shape.  To discuss expectations and potential outcomes for the NATO Summit, we’re pleased to welcome Julianne Smith and Camille Grand to the podcast.  Julianne Smith is the president of Clarion Strategies and the former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO  Camille Grand is a Distinguished Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and the former Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment at NATO

China has remained a persistent—and increasingly complex—challenge. With looming discussions of tariffs and strategic decoupling from the U.S., European leaders are watching closely: How will Washington’s China policy evolve, and what does that mean for Europe’s strategic posture toward Beijing?  We’re very pleased to welcome Liz Economy and Noah Barkin to help unpack the evolving transatlantic dynamics on China.  Liz Economy is a Principal with WestExec Advisors and a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.  Noah Barkin is a Senior Advisor with Rhodium Group’s China Practice and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund

The relationship between the United States and Europe is facing unprecedented challenges. While the Russian threat to Europe continues to spark fears of a broader conflict, NATO is simultaneously grappling with the implications of a United States that is less committed to European security. To discuss how Europe is reacting to the Trump administration and more, Andrea Kendall-Taylor hosted leading diplomats for a special session at the CNAS 2025 National Security Conference Bogdan Klich, Head of Mission, Embassy of the Republic of Poland The Rt Hon Lord Peter Mandelson, UK Ambassador to the U.S. Jovita Neliupsiene, Ambassador, European Union to the United States Watch the session and more at conference.cnas.org

Please join the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS’s Annual Conference: America’s Edge, on June 3rd!  Analysis from the Economist in February this year shows that far-  right parties are now Europe’s most popular family of political parties by   vote share – overtaking conservative and social-democratic parties for the   first time in modern European history.   To help us understand the roots and repercussions of this movement, we’re pleased to welcome Sheri Berman and Richard Youngs.  Sheri Berman is a professor of political science at Barnard College.  Richard Youngs is a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Europe

Direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul this week – the first since March 2022 – have got off to a shaky start. Putin’s no-show meant President Zelenskyy remained in Ankara on Thursday, but he plans to send a delegation to Istanbul led by his Defense Minister. Russia’s unwillingness to send a more senior delegation suggests they are not taking the talks seriously, and there are few signs they have dropped their maximalist war demands and would be ready to make a settlement with Ukraine that ensures a sustainable peace. With their efforts so far having failed to yield significant results, President Trump has expressed his frustration with both Kyiv and Moscow and personally urged Presidents Putin and Zelenskyy to meet directly.   To discuss this round of talks and the prospects for a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, we’re very pleased to have Sam Charap and Sergey Radchenko with us on the podcast.     Sam Charap is distinguished chair in Russia and Eurasia Policy and a senior political scientist at RAND.   Sergey Radchenko is the Wilson E. Schmidt distinguished professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

In highly anticipated federal elections on April 28th, Canada’s Liberal Party emerged victorious after staging a major comeback in the polls over the past several months. This comeback victory took place against the backdrop of rising tensions between Canada and the United States, with the Trump administration’s combative stance toward its northern neighbor having played a role in boosting the popularity of the Liberals. Prime Minister Mark Carney, in his first week, has taken a firm stand against Trump, asserting earlier this week at the White House that Canada was “not for sale.”   To discuss Canada's new political era, Kim Richard Nossal and Elizabeth Anderson analyze the election results and implications for Canadian foreign policy.  Kim Richard Nossal is a professor emeritus in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, and the author of Canada Alone.  Elizabeth Anderson is a Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Associate Fellow in CNAS’s Transatlantic Security Program, as well as a former senior advisor in the office of Canada’s Foreign Minister.

There’s been a flurry of activity on the Ukraine front this week. Over the weekend, Donald Trump briefly met with Zelensky in Rome during ceremonies for Pope Francis’ funeral. A deal over mineral rights seems imminent, and President Trump rebuked Vladimir Putin, accusing him of leading him along as Russian strikes on Ukraine continue. However, uncertainty over the future of the U.S. and Ukraine continues, especially over whether the U.S. will push Ukraine to accept maximalist Russian demands. This week, Charles Kupchan and Eric Ciaramella join Brussels Sprouts to discuss the status of negotiations over Ukraine and the future of the U.S.–Russia relationship. Charles Kupchan is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University.  Eric Ciaramella is a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

On April 9th, Friedrich Merz, the leader of Germany’s center-right Christian Democratic Union, secured a coalition agreement with the Social Democrats following his party’s victory in the federal elections. In early May, the Bundestag is expected to convene and elect him as the next Chancellor. One of the most significant initiatives of this new government is likely to be a historic overhaul of Germany’s defense posture.   To discuss this and more, we’re pleased to welcome Claudia Major and Christian Mölling to discuss Germany's new government and defense strategy.  Claudia Major is the Senior Vice President of Transatlantic Security at the German Marshall Fund Christian Mölling is a Senior Advisor at the European Policy Centre

Under the Trump administration, U.S. support for Ukraine is no longer guaranteed. President Trump's pause on aid and intelligence to Ukraine in March may have been brief, but it sent a clear message to Europe and Ukraine that the U.S. may no longer be a reliable partner for Ukraine. A reduction or end to U.S. support for Ukraine could have a significant impact on the conflict dynamics in Ukraine and present a challenge for European allies as to whether they can step up and fill the gap.   Celeste Wallander joins the podcast to provide a firsthand account of the evolution of U.S. assistance to Ukraine and to discuss how a united Europe can help Kyiv keep up the fight.  Celeste Wallander was the assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs and is a adjunct senior fellow at CNAS.

On April 2nd, President Trump imposed sweeping tariffs across the globe – with only a handful of countries left untouched. The EU was hit with tariffs of 20% and the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has promised a ‘united response’ and stated a willingness to retaliate. As the U.S.’s biggest trading partner, any actions taken by the EU in response to the tariffs could have a significant impact on both sides of the Atlantic.   To help us understand where we go from here, we are pleased to welcome Dan Mullaney and Tobias Gehrke.  Dan Mullaney is the former assistant U.S. trade representative for Europe and the Middle East and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.  Tobias Gehrke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations whose research covers geoeconomics and European Economic Strategy.