[18-776] Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2019. Decided on Mar 23, 2020. Petitioner: Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla. Respondent: William P. Barr. Advocates: Paul W. Hughes (for the petitioners) Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero’s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch , 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, under Penalva v. Sessions , 884 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2018) the question whether a litigant acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual question, not a question of law, and thus is not reviewable. Question Does the phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and Nationality Act include the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts? Conclusion The phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s Limited Review Provision, 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(D), includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petitioners’ “factual” due diligence claims for equitable tolling purposes. The Court first looked to the statute’s language, finding that nothing there precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. Courts repeatedly refer to mixed questions of law and fact as “questions of law.” The Court then considered the principle of statutory construction favoring judicial review of administrative action, finding that principle supported interpreting the court of appeals as having appellate jurisdiction in cases such as this one. Next the Court looked at the language immediately surrounding the phrase at issue, finding a “zipper clause,” which consolidates judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.” The Court then turned to the statutory history and relevant precedent, finding that they too supported an interpretation of “questions of law” as including the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined all but one subpart. Justice Thomas argued that despite being presented with a narrow question, the Court’s decision answers a much broader question and “effectively nullifies a jurisdiction-stripping statute” by disregarding the text and structure of the statute.