[17-571] Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com

Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 8, 2019. Decided on Mar 4, 2019. Petitioner: Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation. Respondent: Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.. Advocates: Aaron M. Panner (for the petitioner) Peter K. Stris (for the respondents) Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall-Street cancelled its account, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding “registration” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “register the claim,” and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question Is “registration of [a] copyright claim” complete under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) when the copyright holder delivers the required application, fees, and materials to the copyright office, or only once the copyright office has acted on that application? Conclusion Registration of a copyright claim “has been made” not when an application for registration is filed, but only after the copyright office has processed the application and registered the copyright. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Fourth Estate’s application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights was not yet complete for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) because the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The Court looked to the language of the first two sentences of § 411(a) and found that under Fourth Estate’s proposed interpretation of the statute—that application alone would constitute registration—the second sentence would be made superfluous. Canons of statutory construction caution against such interpretations. The Court found that the more plausible interpretation—that registration occurs only when the copyright office finishes processing the application—is consistent with other provisions of the Copyright Act, as well.