Architects of Peace: Episode 2 - Behind the Breakthrough

Tune into the second episode of AJC's newest limited podcast series, Architects of Peace. Go behind the scenes of the decades-long diplomacy and quiet negotiations that made the Abraham Accords possible, bringing Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and later Morocco, together in historic peace agreements. Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, U.S. Army General Miguel Correa, and AJC Chief Policy and Political Affairs Officer Jason Isaacson unpack the first Trump administration's Middle East strategy, share behind-the-scenes efforts to engage key regional players, and reveal what unfolded inside the White House in the crucial weeks before the Abraham Accords signing. Full transcript: https://www.ajc.org/news/podcast/behind-the-breakthrough-architects-of-peace-episode-2 Resources: AJC.org/ArchitectsofPeace - Tune in weekly for new episodes. AJC.org/AbrahamAccords - The Abraham Accords, Explained AJC.org/CNME - Find more on AJC's Center for a New Middle East Listen – AJC Podcasts: AJC.org/ForgottenExodus AJC.org/PeopleofthePod Follow Architects of Peace on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/ArchitectsofPeace You can reach us at: podcasts@ajc.org If you've appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Transcript: Donald Trump : I think we're going to make a deal. It might be a bigger and better deal than people in this room even understand. Manya Brachear Pashman: In September 2020, the world saw what had been years – decades – in the making: landmark peace agreements dubbed the Abraham Accords -- normalizing relations between Israel and two Arabian Gulf states, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. Later, in December, they were joined by the Kingdom of Morocco. Five years later, AJC is pulling back the curtain to meet key individuals who built the trust that led to these breakthroughs. Introducing: the Architects of Peace. Shortly after he was elected in 2016 and before he took office, President Donald Trump nominated his company's former bankruptcy attorney David Friedman to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Israel. He gave Friedman two simple tasks. Task No. 1? Build peace across the Middle East by normalizing relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Task No. 2? Solve the Israeli Palestinian conflict that a half dozen previous White House residents had failed to fix. After all, according to conventional wisdom, the first task could not happen before the second. The future of cooperation between Israel and 20-plus other Arab countries hinged on peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. Here's former Secretary of State John Kerry. John Kerry : There will be no advance and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. Manya Brachear Pashman: Ambassador Friedman disagreed with this conventional wisdom. David Friedman: We were told initially by most countries that the road to peace began with the Palestinians. This was a hypothesis that I rejected internally, but I thought: 'OK, well, let's just play this out and see where this can go. And so, we spent a couple of years really working on what could be a plan that would work for Israel and the Palestinians. The Palestinians, you know, rejected discussions early on, but we had a lot of discussions with the Israelis. Manya Brachear Pashman: The son of a rabbi who grew up in Long Island, Ambassador Friedman had been active in pro-Israel organizations for decades, He had advised Trump on the importance of the U.S.-Israel bond during the 2016 presidential election and recommended nothing less than a radical overhaul of White House policy in the region. Not long after his Senate confirmation as ambassador, that overhaul commenced. In February 2017, President Trump invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the White House – his first invitation to a foreign leader — and a symbolic one. After their meeting, they held a joint press conference. Donald Trump : With this visit, the United States again reaffirms our unbreakable bond with our cherished ally Israel. The partnership between our two countries, built on our shared values. I think we're going to make a deal. It might be a bigger and better deal than people in this room even understand. That's a possibility. So, let's see what we do. He doesn't sound too optimistic. But he's a good negotiator. Benjamin Netanyahu: That's the art of the deal. Manya Brachear Pashman: Nine months later, President Trump made another symbolic gesture -- recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital city and moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Though such a move had been approved by Congress in 1995, no president had ever acted upon it. When Trump's son-in-law, businessman, and senior White House advisor Jared Kushner opened conversations about that 'bigger and better deal,' Palestinians refused to participate, using the pretext of the Jerusalem decision to boycott the Trump administration. But that didn't stop Ambassador Friedman and others from engaging, not only with Israel, but with Arab countries about a new path forward. AJC's Chief Policy and Political Affairs Officer Jason Isaacson, who has been building bridges in the region since the early '90s, recalls this strategy at the time. Jason Isaacson: It was very clear for many months, 2019 on into early 2020, that there was a team working under Jared Kushner in the White House that was going from country to country in the Gulf and North Africa, looking to make a deal, looking to make deals that would lead to normalization with Israel, would involve various benefits that the United States would be able to provide. But of course, the big benefit would be regional integration and a closer relationship with the United States. Manya Brachear Pashman: The pitch for a new path forward resonated in the United Arab Emirates, a Gulf country of 10 million residents, some 11% of whom are Emiratis — the rest expats and migrants from around the world. The UAE had designated 2019 the Year of Tolerance, an initiative aimed at promoting the country as a global capital for tolerance and respect between diverse cultures and nationalities. That year, the Emirates hosted a historic visit from Pope Francis, and 27 Israeli athletes competed in the 2019 Special Olympics World Games held in the capital city of Abu Dhabi. The pitch also resonated in Bahrain. In June of that year, during a two-day workshop in Bahrain's capital city of Manama, the Trump administration began rolling out the results of its Middle East tour – the economic portion of its peace plan, titled "Peace to Prosperity." Jason Isaacson: The White House plan for Peace to Prosperity was a kind of an early set of ideas for Israeli Palestinian resolution that would result in a small, but functional Palestinian state, created in a way that would not require the displacement of Israelis in the West Bank, and that would involve large scale investment, mostly provided by other countries, mostly in the Gulf, but not only, also Europe, to advance the Palestinian economy, to integrate the Palestinian and Israelis' economies in a way that had never happened. And there was discussion that was taking place that all led up to the idea of a very fresh approach, a very new approach to the regional conflict. Manya Brachear Pashman: The 38-page prospectus set ambitious goals — turning the West Bank and Gaza into tourism destinations, doubling the amount of drinkable water there, tripling exports, earmarking $900 million to build hospitals and clinics. The Palestinians, angered by Trump's recognition of Jerusalem and viewing the Manama workshop as an attempt to normalize Arab-Israel ties while sidelining their national rights, boycotted the meeting and rejected the plan before ever seeing its details. But the workshop's host Bahrain, as well as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates participated, to varying degrees. Trump's team rolled out the rest of the plan in January 2020, including a map of land carved out for Palestinians and for Israel. The plan enabled Palestinians and Arab countries to expand economic opportunities. It enabled Israel to demonstrate that it was open to cooperation. It enabled the Trump administration to illustrate the opportunities missed if countries in the region continued to let Palestinian leadership call the shots. David Friedman: The expectation was not that the Palestinians would jump all over it. We were realistic about the possibility, but we did think it was important to show that Israel itself, under some circumstances, was willing to engage with the Palestinians with regard to a formula for peace that, you know, had an economic component, a geographic component, a governance component. Manya Brachear Pashman: The Palestine Liberation Organization accused the United States of trying to sell a "mirage of economic prosperity." Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh criticized the Arab leaders attending the al-Manama conference, saying "The (Palestinian) people, who have been fighting for 100 years, did not commission anyone to concede or to bargain." But that's the thing. Arab leaders weren't there solely on behalf of the Palestinians. They wanted to learn how their own countries' citizens could enjoy peace and prosperity too. David Friedman: The real point of all this that got the Abraham Accords jump started was not the fact that the Palestinians embraced this, but more so that they rejected it in such a way that enabled these other countries to say: 'Look, guys, you know what? We can't be more pro-Palestinian than you.' Here you have, you know, the U.S. government putting on a table a proposal that gets you more than halfway there in terms of your stated goals and aspirations. Maybe you don't like all of it, that's fine, but you're never going to get everything you wanted anyway. And here's the first government in history that's willing to give you something tangible to talk about, and if you're not going to engage in something that they spent years working on, talking to everybody, trying to thread the needle as best they could. If you're not willing to talk to them about it, then don't ask us to fight your fight. There's only so far we can go. But we thought that putting this plan out on a table publicly would kind of smoke out a lot of positions that had historically been below the surface. And so, beginning right after the 28th of January of 2020 when we had that ceremony with the President's vision for peace, we began to really get serious engagement. Not from the Palestinians, who rejected it immediately, but from the countries in the region. And so that's how the Abraham Accords discussions really began in earnest. Manya Brachear Pashman: AJC had been saying for years that if Arab leaders truly wanted to foster stability in the region and help the Palestinians, engaging with Israel and opening channels of communication would give them the leverage to do so. Isolating Israel was not the answer. Nothing underscored that more than the COVID-19 pandemic, the worst global health crisis in a century. As everyone around the world donned N95 masks and went into self-imposed isolation, some governments in the Middle East concluded that isolating innovative countries like Israel was perhaps not the wisest or safest choice. In May 2020, UAE Ambassador to the United Nations Lana Nusseibeh said as much during a virtual webinar hosted by AJC. Lana Nusseibeh : Of course, we've had Israeli medics participate in previous events in the UAE, that wouldn't be unusual. And I'm sure there's a lot of scope for collaboration. I don't think we would be opposed to it. Because I really think this public health space should be an unpoliticized space where we all try and pool our collective knowledge of this virus. Manya Brachear Pashman: A month later, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Anwar Gargash echoed that sentiment, during AJC Global Forum. Anwar Gargash : I think we can come to a point where we come to a given Israeli government and we say we disagree with you on this, we don't think it's a good idea. But at the same time there are areas, such as COVID, technology, and other things that we can actually work on together. Manya Brachear Pashman: Not surprisingly, the UAE was the first Arab country to begin negotiating with the White House to normalize relations with Israel. However, talks that summer hit a stalemate. Israel was moving forward with a plan to annex a significant portion of the West Bank, including Israeli settlements and the Jordan Valley. Even though President Trump himself had cautioned Prime Minister Netanyahu to hold off, Ambassador Friedman was not about to stop them. David Friedman: I thought that the idea of Israel walking away from its biblical heartland. Anything that required Israel to make that commitment was something I couldn't support. I was so dead set against it. Israel cannot, as a price for normalization, as great as it is, as important as it is, Israel cannot agree to cede its biblical heartland. Manya Brachear Pashman: Not only was this personal for Ambassador Friedman, it was also a major incentive for Israel, included in the Peace to Prosperity plan. The ambassador didn't want to go back on his word and lose Israel's trust. But annexation was a dealbreaker for the Emirates. In June, UAE's Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef Al Otaiba wrote a column speaking directly to the Israeli public. He explained that the UAE wanted diplomatic relations with Israel – it really did – but unilateral annexation of land that it considered still in dispute would be viewed as a breach of trust and undermine any and all progress toward normalization. David Friedman: It was a kind of a tumultuous period, both internally within our own team and with others, about what exactly was going to happen as a result of that Peace to Prosperity Plan. And even if there was an agreement by the United States to support Israeli annexation, was this something that was better, at least in the short term? Manya Brachear Pashman: Otaiba's message got through, and the team ultimately agreed to suspend the annexation plan — not halt, but suspend — an intentionally temporary verb. In addition to writing the column, Otaiba also recommended that a friend join the negotiations to help repair the trust deficit: General Miguel Correa, a U.S. Army General who had spent part of his childhood in the Middle East, served in the Persian Gulf War and as a peacekeeper maintaining the treaty between Israel and Egypt. General Correa had joined the National Security Council in March 2020 after serving as a defense attaché in Abu Dhabi. He had earned the respect of Emiratis, not as a dealmaker so much as a lifesaver, once orchestrating a secret rescue mission of wounded Emirati troops from inside Yemen. Among those troops, the nephew and son-in-law of Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed, the then-de facto ruler and now the current president of the UAE. Kushner and Friedman had never met Correa. Miguel Correa: I didn't know them, and they didn't know me. No one else had any military experience on the team. I had a unique perspective of the Arab side of the equation. And had relationships. So, it was a match made in heaven. Jared, David Friedman, these guys obviously understood Israeli politics and understood the Israeli side, and somewhat Jewish American side. I could provide a different dynamic or a different view from the Arab side, as someone who's kind of grown up with this. It really got serious when the team came together and, and we could start working on real, concrete things. Manya Brachear Pashman: Months of negotiations had already unfolded. It was already late July, first of August, when General Correa became the last person to join the tiny circle of a half dozen negotiators – kept intentionally small to keep a lid on the conversations. It's hard to keep a secret in Washington. David Friedman: The secrecy here was very, very important, because to be honest with you, I think anything bigger than that group of six or seven, we would have put it in jeopardy. Manya Brachear Pashman: In this situation, leaks not only threatened the deal, they could threaten lives. Though word trickled out that a deal was in the works, no one guessed just how transformational the result might be. In General Correa's opinion, the UAE had the most to lose. Miguel Correa: That was the concern that, frankly, guys like me had, that, I hurt a nation of good people that is incredibly tolerant, that builds synagogues and churches and Sikh temples, or Hindu temples, and tolerance 101, that everybody can pray to who they would like to pray to. And I was worried that all these extremists were going to come out of the woodwork and hurt that trajectory in the UAE, that was going to be a great nation with or without the normalization. But this ruler said: 'No, no, it's the right thing to do. Peace is the right thing to do.' Manya Brachear Pashman: General Correa actually had quite a few concerns. He didn't want the negotiations to be hijacked for political gain. He wanted leaders to have a security and public relations response in place before anything was announced. And the agreement? It lacked a name. Miguel Correa: A lot of it has to do with my military side. We love to name cool task forces, and things like that. And then I felt like: 'Hey, it has to be something that rolls off the tongue, that makes sense and that will help it, you know, with staying power. Let's do something that ties the people together. There was going to be a shock, a tectonic shock that was going to occur. From 1948, we're going to do a complete 180, and wow. So what do we do to take the wind away from the extremists? As a guy who's fought extremism, militant extremism, for most of his military career, I figured, hey, we've got to do what we can to frame this in a super positive manner. Manya Brachear Pashman: To the general's dismay, no one else shared his concern about what to call their project. A lot was happening in those last few weeks. Landing on a name – not a priority. On the morning of August 13, once all the details were hammered out, the team sat in the Oval Office waiting to brief the President before it was announced to the world. David Friedman: It came about 10 minutes before the end, we were all sitting around the Oval Office, waiting for this announcement about the UAE. And somebody, not me, said: 'Well, we need a name for this,' and I said, why? And they said, 'Well, you know, you have the Oslo Accords, you have the Camp David Accords. You need a name.' And I said, you know, Who's got an idea? And General Miguel Correa, he said: 'How about the Abraham Accords?' And I said: 'That's a great name.' And then we had a rush to call the Israelis and the Emiratis to make sure they were OK with it. Five minutes later we're broadcasting to a few hundred million people this groundbreaking announcement. And the President looks at me and says, 'David, explain why you chose the Abraham Accords?' So that was when we explained what the name was, which I hadn't really thought of until that point. We just thought it was a good name. So at that point I said, 'Well, you know, Abraham was the father of three great religions. He's referred to as Abraham in English, and Ibrahim in Arabic, and Avraham in Hebrew. And no single individual better exemplifies the opportunity and the benefits of unity among all peoples than Abraham.' And that was sort of on the fly how we got to the Abraham Accords. Manya Brachear Pashman: General Correa said he chose a name that would remind people of all faiths that what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. It was also important that the name be plural. Not the Abraham Accord. The Abraham Accords. Even if only one country – the UAE – was signing on at that moment, there would be more to come. Indeed, Bahrain came on board within a month. Morocco joined in December. Miguel Correa: I felt in my heart that this has to be more than one. As a guy that's been affected by this extremism and it allowed this, this craziness and that people decide who can get to know who and and I felt like, No, we can't allow this to be a one-shot deal. We have to prove that this is an avalanche. This could be sustained, and this is the way it should be. Everyone has to come into this one way or another. And it's not, by the way, saying that, hey, we're all going to walk lockstep with Israel. That's not the point. The point is that you have a conversation, the leaders can pick up the phone and have that conversation. So it has to be, has to be plural. By the way, this is the way that it was. This isn't new. This isn't like a crazy new concept. This is the way it was. It's not an introduction of Jews in this region, in society. This is a reintroduction. This is the way it's supposed to be. This is what's happened for thousands of years. So why are we allowing people to take us back, you know, thousands of years? Let's go back to the way things should be, and develop these relationships. It makes us all better. Manya Brachear Pashman: Next episode, we step out from behind the scenes and on to the South Lawn of the White House where leaders from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Israel and the U.S. signed the Abraham Accords, while the world watched in awe. Atara Lakritz is our producer. T.K. Broderick is our sound engineer. Special thanks to Jason Isaacson, Sean Savage, and the entire AJC team for making this series possible. You can subscribe to Architects of Peace on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen to podcasts, and you can learn more at AJC.org/ArchitectsofPeace. The views and opinions of our guests don't necessarily reflect the positions of AJC. You can reach us at podcasts@ajc.org. If you've enjoyed this episode, please be sure to spread the word, and hop onto Apple Podcasts or Spotify to rate us and write a review to help more listeners find us. 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